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ABSTRACT 
This study tracks IPOs from the time of their entry into the public domain up to at least 
six years post-listing. In the first part of this study, the post-listing performance of these 
firms relative to that of a set of control firms in event and calendar time is evaluated, 
using a fresh sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999-2006 and 
stepwise matching algorithms that select the matching firms from the general 
population on the basis of key firm risk factors that includes three new factors – pre-
IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield – employing a refined matching 
technique and a battery of methods. Given that the majority of the studies in the 
literature find that IPOs are poor investments in the long-term, the findings in the first 
part suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond the immediate after-market may not 
be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-market performance is dependent on 
the proportions in which the stocks are stacked in the investor’s portfolio; secondly, 
value-weighted performance does not provide strong evidence against market 
efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted measure of abnormal performance 
[which tends to suggest that the former may provide a more useful benchmark in 
assessing the post-event risk-adjusted performance of IPO firms since it more 
accurately captures the investors’ wealth effects] and; thirdly, the under-performance of 
new issues of common stock remains an anomaly that really challenges the efficient 
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market hypothesis only when performance is equally-weighted. In the course of 
analysing the performance of the firms in the first part, this work finds that the under-
performance is more prevalent in some groups of IPOs than others. Hence, in the 
second part of the work, the economic importance and significance of key firm and 
industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO that may predict or explain this under-
performance is tested. The author’s findings reveal that industry risk factors of IPO 
surplus value, profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility in addition to firm risk 
factors of size, market-to-book, past performance, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ 
IPO market can help distinguish the best performing from the worst performing firms. 
More importantly, the industry effects here are economically large and are first 
documented in this study. In the third and final part of the work, the firms are tracked in 
event and calendar time, equally using only that information that is available prior to or 
at the IPO. The author’s findings reveal that industry risk factors of IPO surplus value 
and profitability in addition to firm risk factors of size, past performance, initial market 
return volatility [IPO risk], underwriter prestige and the ‘hot’ IPO market can foreshadow 
an IPO’s survival. More importantly, the industry effects here are also first documented 
in this study. More particularly, the evidence here on past performance and underwriter 
prestige is strong and overwhelming with the results suggesting that firms desirous of 
going public should first build a track record of profitable performance, while the latter 
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lays credence to the fact that firms underwritten by prestigious underwriters are less 
likely to fail. The results also suggest that potential IPO investors, IPO firms and their 
investment bankers should consider industry risk factors prevailing at the time of the 
IPO to provide them with additional information on whether or not to invest in the IPO 
[in the case of the investor] or go ahead with the IPO, or alternatively, withdraw and re-
launch at a more auspicious date [in the case of the issuing firm and its investment 
banker].    
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 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
[1.1] Introduction 
Initial Public Offerings [IPOs]1 have historically been found to be poor investments 
following their debut on worldwide stock exchanges, unless one can get in at the 
primary market stage and exit in the immediate secondary after-market. While average 
first-day and immediate after-market returns are large, buying and holding these IPOs 
after this initial period have generally been found to be unprofitable, much against the 
tenets of the market efficiency hypothesis. The decision to invest in an IPO is usually 
made on the basis of the offer document and any other supplementary information that 
may be available to the investor at the time of the IPO. These investors usually take a 
gamble that the financial projections in the prospectus would materialise in the long-run 
as they look forward to good returns on their investments. However, the value of these 
investments can either rise or fall and investors may not get back their initial capital 
outlay.  
In general, it is known from the IPO literature that firstly, they are profitable investments 
in the short-term; secondly, they are poor investments in the long-term either in relation 
to a market benchmark or a set of comparable firms with fairly similar risk profiles 
matched on the basis of size, market-to-book and industry using event time 
                                                          
1
 An IPO is a stock market launch where the shares of a firm are sold to the public on a stock exchange for 
the first time. 
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methodologies and/or calendar time techniques that rebalance the IPO stocks in 
monthly portfolios and; thirdly, the decision to float [by firms and their investment 
bankers] or invest [by investors] in an IPO are usually made on the basis of firm 
specific and market conditions prevailing at the time of the IPO. However, it is not 
known firstly, if the documented under-performance of IPOs is a manifestation of the 
statistical inadequacies of previous matching methods or inadequate matching criteria; 
secondly, if it is really an anomaly that challenges the efficient market hypothesis; 
thirdly, if the scale and magnitude of the observed under-performance is sensitive to 
the matching process [i.e. whether changing the way the control firms are selected 
from the general population into the composite benchmark portfolio by either varying 
the statistical technique or the number of matching criteria has any effect on the 
observed under-performance] and; fourthly, beyond the firm and market risk factors 
prevailing at the time of the IPO that are usually outlined in the offer document, the 
potential impact of salient industry conditioning risk factors on the performance and 
survival of these new issues.  
Following from the above, the three key issues that will be investigated in this study are 
as follows: firstly, the sensitivity of the under-performance finding, with respect to the 
choice of empirical method and matching criteria, using an improved technique that 
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seeks to remove the ambiguity surrounding previous conventional approaches; 
secondly, the impact of a raft of industry conditioning risk factors ranging from an 
adjusted IPO valuation [i.e. IPO surplus value], profitability and leverage to market-to-
book, concentration and equity volatility on the long-run performance of IPOs and; 
thirdly, the impact of this same battery of factors on the survival likelihood of these 
firms. Hence, the life cycle of IPOs is examined in three strands right from their 
transition from private to public life, as their performance and ultimate survival is 
tracked within a minimum 6-year cycle2.  
There appears to be harmony in prior research on the long-term performance of new 
issues of common stock that because it lacks a proper methodological framework, the 
scrutiny has been essentially unsophisticated. Lyon, et al [1999] further buttress the 
fact of the inappropriateness of the current approaches by positing that the use of the 
size and market-to-book factors alone as firm risk factors can lead to misspecified test 
statistics and spurious inferences in certain sampling situations. Therefore, before IPO 
performance is accepted as an example of market inefficiency, it will seem reasonable 
to further re-examine the robustness of these international findings, using a fresh 
sample of IPOs employing a unique multi-dimensional procedure that seeks to reduce 
                                                          
2 Based on the average life cycle of new listings, this is the estimated time period it should take an IPO firm 
to establish a foothold in the market by remaining a going concern or fail and be delisted.  
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the perceived imperfection in previous procedures and approaches used in the 
literature. Against this backdrop, the goal of the first empirical study is to unearth these 
additional key risk factors using a unique multi-dimensional procedure and in the 
process establish the various dimensions upon which the analysis of the performance 
of new issues of common stock should be based. 
Investment decisions and expectations on new stock issues are usually based on the 
prospectus [‘offer document’], which contains information on the firm and offering 
characteristics as well as financial projections about the future performance of the firm. 
Hence, any industry and other supplementary information not contained in the 
prospectus that could be germane to the performance of new issues would prove 
invaluable to these investors in their search for value, as it enables them to either avoid 
new issues that could potentially under-perform and/or fail in the post-IPO years or 
demand better discounts on their pricing at the IPO stage. This information could also 
be of immense value to the IPO firms and their investment bankers as they seek to 
time their offerings to coincide with favourable industry conditions. In addition, an 
understanding of the association between key firm and industry characteristics at the 
IPO date and the performance and survival of new issues of common stock in the post-
IPO period should firstly, provide an indication of the performance and survival 
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likelihood of these firms and secondly, allow issuing firms and their investment bankers 
to make better decisions about proceeding with or delaying the offering. Hence, the 
goal of the second and third empirical studies is to firstly, determine the class and 
profile of IPO firms that under-perform and/or fail and secondly, ascertain if a set of 
observable firm and industry characteristics prior to or at the IPO can foreshadow the 
performance and survival likelihood of the issuing firms in the long-term. 
[1.2] Main Findings 
In the first empirical study, the post-listing performance of the IPO firms is tracked 
relative to that of a set of control firms in event and calendar time. The findings reveal 
that, indeed, in line with the majority of extant research, IPOs are poor investments 
either in event time methodologies or calendar time techniques that rebalance the IPO 
stocks in monthly portfolios, using the equally-weighted technique. However, the 
evidence is mixed when a value-weighted performance measure is adopted. Under this 
scenario in event-time methodologies, the under-performance is also largely evident; 
however, when the risk-adjusted performance of the IPO stocks is tracked in calendar 
time, this work finds under-performance to be non-existent in some cases, and at best, 
weak in some others. This pattern of results is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of 
the late 1990s technology bubble. Overall, given that the majority of the studies in the 
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literature find that IPOs are poor investments in the long-term, the findings from the first 
empirical study suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond the immediate after-
market may not be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-market performance is 
dependent on the proportions in which the stocks are stacked in the investor’s portfolio; 
secondly, value-weighted performance does not provide strong evidence against 
market efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted measure of abnormal 
performance and; thirdly, under-performance of new issues of common stock remains 
an anomaly that really challenges the efficient market hypothesis only when 
performance is equally-weighted. 
In the course of analysing the performance of these new issues in the first part, the 
observed under-performance is found to be more prevalent in some groups of IPOs 
than others. A wide variation in the performance of these firms by industry is also 
obnserved, which tends to suggest that the characteristics of these industries may be 
germane to the short and long-term performance of these firms. Against this backdrop, 
this work test for the economic importance and significance of key firm and industry risk 
factors prior to or at the IPO that may predict or explain this cross-sectional variation in 
the second empirical study. When doing this, the work controls for and confirms the 
results of previous studies on the impact of firm-specific risk factors. More specifically, 
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size, market-to-book, past performance, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO 
market are found to be important predictors of IPO performance in a cross-section. The 
work also finds that industry level risk factors relating to IPO surplus value, profitability, 
market-to-book and equity volatility can help distinguish the best performing from the 
worst performing firms. These results are robust to including controls for variables 
known to predict IPO long-term performance. However, apart from industry profitability 
and industry market-to-book to a limited extent, the other industry risk factors are not 
robust to the exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble, which suggests that those 
years are driving some of the results.  
In the third and final empirical study, the IPO firms are tracked for an extended period 
in event and calendar time. An analysis of the distribution of the post-IPO states of 
these firms by industry reveals a wide variation in the survival and failure rates which 
also tends to suggest that there may be some industry structure variables that impinge 
on the entry and ultimate survival of these firms in the market place. This work confirms 
that firm risk factors of size, past performance, initial market return volatility [IPO risk], 
underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market are important predictors of the 
probability of IPO survival in cross-sectional regressions, using only that information 
that is available prior to or at the IPO. The author’s findings also reveal that industry 
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risk factors of IPO surplus value and profitability can be valuable determinants of an 
IPO’s survival prospects. Following from the first empirical study, the findings in the 
second and third empirical studies suggest that investing in IPOs beyond the 
immediate after-market may not be a bad trading strategy and that investors can 
improve their long-run returns by strategically investing in carefully and well-selected 
IPOs, after due consideration of key and relevant firm, industry and other 
supplementary information at the IPO date. 
[1.3] Contribution to the Literature 
In the words of Lyon, et al [1999, pp. 198], ‘the analysis of long-run abnormal returns is 
treacherous; as such, we recommend that the study of long-run abnormal returns be 
subjected to stringent ‘out-of-sample’ testing’. Fama [1998, pp. 283] also posits that 
‘apparent anomalies can be due to methodology [and] most long-term return anomalies 
tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique’.   
Lyon, et al [1999, pp. 198] also aver that ‘researchers should conduct a detailed 
descriptive analysis to reveal other firm specific risk factors that could be used in 
selecting the control firms from the population to be used as benchmarks for the IPO 
firms’. In the light of the above, the first empirical study contributes to the literature in 
two ways; firstly, it adds further evidence on the sensitivity of the under-performance 
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finding, with respect to the choice of empirical method, using a distance metric 
matching technique [the first of its kind in the UK market] that seeks to remove the 
ambiguity surrounding previous conventional approaches; secondly, it goes beyond the 
size, market-to-book and industry risk factors commonly used by most researchers in 
selecting the control firm from the general population used as a reference for 
measuring abnormal returns by introducing pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and 
earnings yield as additional key risk factors [the first of its kind in the literature, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge] that could be employed in selecting the control firm.  
The second empirical study contributes to the literature in three ways; firstly, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, the unique relationships between industry risk factors of IPO 
surplus value, market-to-book, profitability, equity volatility and IPO long-run 
performance are first documented in this study; secondly, it is the first to study the 
impact of industry-specific risk factors on the long-run performance of IPOs in the UK 
market and; thirdly, it helps provide potential IPO investors with additional useful 
information that they could use to build their investment opportunity sets at the offering 
stages of these firms.  
The third empirical study contributes to the literature in four ways; firstly, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, the unique relationships between industry risk factors of IPO 
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surplus value, profitability and IPO survival likelihood are first documented in this study; 
secondly, it is the first to study the impact of industry-specific risk factors on the survival 
of IPOs in the UK market; thirdly, it provides an initial estimate of the survival likelihood 
of new issues which helps managers of IPO firms, their investment bankers and 
potential IPO investors with additional useful information that they could use in their 
decision-making process at the IPO date and; fourthly, it helps us better understand the 
milieu of factors that prevent the capital market from growing in terms of the number of 
listed firms.  
Finally, to my knowledge, this is the first work in the UK market that extensively 
analyses the long-term performance and survival of IPOs in one empirical study. It first 
studies the relative performance of these firms, employing an appropriately-matched 
firm technique, in a fixed time period using different windows [1 - 5 years] and 
thereafter tracks the survival of this same cohort, on a ‘stand-alone’ basis, in event time 
and duration models. Conclusively, despite using a multi-faceted and comprehensive 
approach that utilises salient firm and industry information prior to or at the IPO date to 
re-assess the performance and survival likelihood of IPO firms, future research is 
encouraged into identifying other salient firm and industry risk factors that could be 
used in selecting the control firms from the general population in re-assessing IPO 
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long-run performance and also help in distinguishing between firms that are likely to 
perform and/or survive from those that are likely to under-perform and/or fail.         
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background to the 
study by analysing the new issues market and the allure of the IPO procedure to firms 
in the market place amongst other competing alternatives. Chapter 3 re-evaluates the 
long-run performance of IPOs using a raft of methods and techniques, while Chapter 4 
investigates the impact of salient firm and industry conditioning risk factors on the long-
run performance of these firms. The impact of this range of factors on the survival 
likelihood of these firms using a battery of techniques is explored in Chapter 5, while 
Chapter 6 summarises and concludes the work.         
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CHAPTER 2 – THE NEW ISSUES MARKET 
[2.1] Introduction 
This chapter sets the background to the study as it examines the market for new issues. 
Section 2.2 presents the various methods of raising capital that are available to both 
public and private firms in the market place, while Section 2.3 discusses the appeal of 
the IPO procedure to private firms desirous of going public amid other competing 
alternatives. Section 2.4 examines the global and UK IPO trends both in terms of the 
number of deals and the amount of capital raised commencing in the ‘dotcom’ period 
[i.e. 1999-2001] through the period of the global financial crisis [i.e. 2008-2009] till the 
middle of this year [i.e. June 2013].  
[2.2] Methods of Flotation 
To comprehend the motivations for equity offerings, it is vital to differentiate those 
offerings that raise new capital and those that do not. Firms can float new shares 
[‘primary shares’] via a variety of methods [‘public offering’, ‘rights issue’ or ‘private 
placement’] which effectively increases the number of outstanding shares and the 
market capitalisation of the firms in the market place, in the case of listed firms. In 
some other cases, they can also offer shares held by existing shareholders [‘secondary 
shares’] through an ‘offer for sale’, usually in conjunction with a primary share offer. It is 
important to emphasize that only primary share issuances raise new capital which can 
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then be used to finance investments. In contrast, the proceeds from an ‘offer for sale’ 
do not go to the firm, but to the existing shareholders who sell them. There are 
basically four main ways of floating securities in the new issues market. At the 
extremes, a firm can either list its shares on the stock exchange by 'introduction’ – 
where no new money is raised – or decide to undertake an ‘initial public offering’ [IPO] 
or a ‘rights issue’, where institutions and private individuals [in the case of an IPO] and 
existing shareholders [in the case of a rights issue] are invited to invest in the offering. 
A mid-way procedure is a ‘private placement’ in which the shares of the firm are offered 
for sale on a limited basis, primarily to a select group of institutional investors. 
A firm, with at least 25 per cent of its shares already in public hands [the ‘free float’], 
can list by ‘introduction’ on the stock exchange without any need to raise new capital. 
An advantage of this process is that it is the least expensive route to the market since it 
involves no underwriting, advertising or marketing fees. The additional upside is that 
the firm has the opportunity of listing on the stock exchange ‘quietly’ and in the process 
avoids the adverse selection costs that are usually associated with an IPO. This ‘quiet’ 
listing paves the way for an efficient price discovery for its stock which can reduce the 
potential level of under-pricing and the ‘amount of money left on the table’, if and when 
it decides to conduct an IPO. However, the downside is that opportunities for boosting 
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the firm’s profile and visibility are very limited. A ‘private placement’ typically involves 
the offering of the shares of an unlisted firm to a limited and choice group of 
institutional investors. This method allows the firm firstly, to raise capital with lower 
costs and secondly, more discretion to choose its shareholders. However, the 
drawback of this process is that it results in a lower liquidity in the shares of the firm 
resulting from a narrower shareholder base.  
In an ‘IPO’, a fixed number of securities of a previously unlisted firm are offered to both 
private and institutional investors at a specified price or price range through a 
prospectus. This procedure, usually underwritten by investment banks and the most 
expensive route to the market, is often used by larger firms or those looking to raise 
substantial amounts of capital. When an already listed firm does not want to dilute the 
controlling interest of the current shareholders, a ‘rights issue’ is undertaken where it 
raises new capital by issuing its shares to existing and qualifying shareholders whose 
names appear in the register of members at a designated date [‘the pre-qualification 
date’]. Despite being a relatively costly procedure, the IPO process remains the choice 
method of floating new securities for most firms in the market place given that it offers 
greater opportunities for raising cheaper capital and boosting the firm’s visibility in the 
market place. 
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[2.3] The IPO Process 
Following its debut on the stock exchange, the firm’s life as a private firm comes to an 
end as it transits to public life, where its shares are owned, exchanged and traded 
publicly. IPOs are made by different firms for a number of reasons. Small firms may 
seek to list their shares on the stock exchange to provide them with a platform to raise 
cheaper capital required for further expansion. Some other firms that may already be of 
substantial size may wish to use the IPO to other ends. For example, they may see the 
advantages of an enlarged and diversified equity base and the increased levels of 
public consciousness that are part and parcel of undergoing an IPO. 
Firms in the market place desirous of raising capital to prosecute large scale 
investments can do so either by issuing debt or equity. When prevailing interest rates 
are low and capital markets are bearish, firms tend to issue debt since it is cheaper and 
more conducive. On the other hand, when interest rates in the economy are high 
coupled with a buoyant capital market characterised by positive investor sentiments, 
firms are more disposed to raising equity capital than debt. This process tends to be 
very straight forward for already listed firms in the stock exchange as a fair price for its 
shares can be readily determined. Under this scenario, these firms can effortlessly 
raise additional capital via a seasoned equity offering [SEO], usually at a price close to 
 
 
16 
 
the prevailing market value. Given that information on these firms are already available 
in the public domain and coupled with the fact that they have a visible track record of 
performance in the market place, investors are better placed to make informed 
decisions on whether to invest in the offering or not.    
For a private firm, the going public process is a critical turning point in its life cycle and 
the most significant event in its history given that this process leads to significant 
changes in its life. The IPO market provides a real platform for a growing private firm to 
access relatively cheap capital. The decision by private firms to go public is more often 
than not motivated by the need to raise capital for organic growth and acquisitions, 
create liquidity for the shares of the firm, take advantage of high valuations and 
favourable market conditions, rebalance the capital structure by reducing or repaying 
lingering debt and create an exit route for private equity or venture capital in the firm. 
However, this debut equity capital raising exercise, which also brings the firms under 
increased disclosure and regulatory requirements, is a bit complicated given that the 
firms are not yet listed which makes it difficult to determine their fair values. Under this 
scenario, some of these firms could either decide to remain unlisted and conduct a 
‘private placement’ or initially list the shares by ‘introduction’. The latter option has the 
advantage of dousing the uncertainty and adverse selection costs that may surround 
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the firm’s stock on the eventual IPO day. On the flip side, buoyant economic conditions 
characterised by an improving economy, ‘hot’ markets, a huge demand for capital, low 
equity volatilities and positive investor sentiments may be too strong for some other 
private firms to resist and consequently, they are tempted to raise equity by issuing 
shares through an IPO. 
[2.4] Global and UK IPO trends 
Table 2.1 reports IPOs by the number of deals and amount of capital realised for the 
global and UK markets. From the table, this section finds that in the period around the 
technology bubble years [i.e. 1999-2000], the IPO market was tense as many firms 
rushed to the market to raise capital on the back of massive investor over-optimism in 
the market at the time. However, the ‘bubble bust’ in 2001, occassioned largely by the 
failure of information technology [IT] stocks which were at the forefront of the boom, 
reverberated through the market as investors’ enthusiasm ebbed with its attendant 
negative impact on equity markets as many firms halted their plans to go public. As of a 
consequence, the number of IPOs globally fell from 1,883 in 2000 to 876 in 2001. This 
lull in the IPO market continued till 2004 when the markets appear to have picked up 
again. In that year, 1,520 firms made initial offerings globally, raising $131b in the 
process. This pattern is also observable in the UK IPO market as the number of IPOs 
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TABLE 2.1: IPOS BY VOLUME AND VALUE  
The table reports IPOs by volume [number of IPOs] and value [total capital raised] for the period 
1999 to 2012. Panels A [Source: Dealogic, Thomson Financial, Ernst & Young] and B [Source: 
www.londonstockexchange.com] report the figures for the global and UK markets respectively. 
The average deal value per year is the deal value divided by the number of deals in that year.    
Panel A: Global Markets 
Year    No of Deals                     Deal Value [$’b]            Av. Deal Value [$’b]        
1999                    1,372                     177                  0.129 
2000                        1,883         210            0.112 
2001                           876           99            0.113 
2002                           847           70            0.083 
2003           812                       58                  0.071 
2004                        1,520         131            0.086 
2005                        1,552         180            0.116 
2006                        1,796         267            0.149 
2007            2,014         295            0.146 
2008     769           96            0.125 
2009   577         113            0.196 
2010            1,393         285            0.205 
2011            1,225         170            0.139 
2012   837         129            0.154 
TOTAL        17,473     2,280           0.130 
Panel B: UK Market 
Year    No of Deals                   Deal Value [£’b]            Av. Deal Value [£’b]         
1999                    145                     12                            0.083 
2000                            326         18             0.055 
2001                            175         11             0.063  
2002                              99           5             0.051 
2003                      86                       5                            0.058 
2004                            295           7             0.024 
2005                            423         16             0.038  
2006                            367         29             0.079 
2007                269         27             0.100 
2008      73           7             0.096 
2009      22           2             0.091 
2010                  95           9             0.095 
2011                  76         13             0.171 
2012      67           8             0.119 
TOTAL            2,518         169            0.067 
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FIGURE 2.1: GLOBAL IPOS BY VOLUME AND VALUE
 
FIGURE 2.2: UK IPOS BY VOLUME AND VALUE 
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fell progressively from 326 in 2000 to 86 in 2003 [deal value also dropped from £18b to 
£5b] before rising to 295 in 2004. This intense activity in the market was maintained 
through to 2007 with the global deal volume and value rising further to 2,014 and 
$295b respectively [UK: 269 and £27b] in that year before dropping to 769 and $96b 
respectively in 2008 [UK: 73 and £7b]. This remarkable decline coincided with the 
global economic turmoil that commenced in the same year [i.e. 2008], rocking financial 
markets across the world with negative consequences for financial and equity markets. 
This period was also characterised by high equity volatilities and negative investor 
sentiments which made it difficult for firms to launch their offerings. It is also observed 
from the same table and the corresponding diagrams in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 that the 
IPO market appears to have picked up again from 2010 onwards on the back of 
improved economic conditions and stock market indices, reduced stock market 
volatilities and renewed investor enthusiasm. This market rebound has continued into 
the current year [2013] as 344 IPOs around the world [UK: 23] raised $68.4b [UK: 
£2.4b] in the first half of the year as firms took advantage of strong equity market rallies 
and soaring investor appetite.  
Undoubtedly, patterns are observed in the IPO market that are somewhat tied to the 
state of the economy and investors’ sentiments at any given point in time. This section 
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finds an upswing in the number of IPOs in the ‘technology bubble’ period [i.e. 1999-
2000] on the back of brimming investor optimism and a high demand for capital. The 
‘bubble bust’ in 2001 permeated through world equity markets and rocked investors’ 
confidence leading to a lull in the IPO market, over the period 2001 to 2003, as many 
firms either withdrew or cancelled their initial plans to go public. The market picked up 
again from 2004 as investors’ confidence was restored, but this was shortlived as the 
global financial turmoil that started in 2008 took its toll on the market. It is also 
observed that the equity market has, once again, picked up from the rubbles of the 
financial crisis given the upward swing in the number and value of IPO deals from 2010 
and upwards.  
It is pertinent to point out that despite the surge in the number of firms going public 
every year as can be clearly seen from the Table, the rate of IPO failure is still relatively 
high3. Given that IPO firms are fundamentally different from public firms that already 
have a visible track record of performance in the market place, there is a potentially 
greater uncertainty and risk associated with their valuation and by extension, their 
performance and survival in the long-term. On the part of potential investors, financial 
performance, information presented in the offer document and the ‘road show’, the 
strength of the management team, industry specific conditions and the need for 
                                                          
3 See Section 5.5.2.2, pp. 353-354.  
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another asset class in their investment basket are some of the factors they consider 
before deciding to invest in an IPO. A firm conducting an IPO may not have a long 
track record of visible performance in the market place and consequently, could be 
difficult to value. It is the uncertainty surrounding the valuation of IPOs occasioned by 
this lack of visible performance data that make investors somewhat cagey of new stock 
issues. If many of these issues under-perform [which is still a subject of debate in the 
finance literature today] and subsequently fail in the post-IPO years, then it would be 
worthwhile to examine key predisposing firm and industry risk factors prior to or at the 
IPO that could signal this to potential IPO investors.     
Against this backdrop, the first part of this study attempts a re-evaluation of the long-
run performance of IPOs relative to a set of fairly similar firms using a raft of methods 
and techniques, while the second part investigates the impact of salient firm and 
industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the IPO on the after-market performance 
of these firms. The impact of this same battery of factors on the survivorship of these 
firms, using a range of techniques, is explored in the third and final part of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 - LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE 
[3.1] Introduction 
The persistent long-run under-performance of IPOs has been a vexed issue in the 
literature which has equally represented a challenge to market efficiency. Even after 
the considerable amount of attention that has been paid to this phenomenon [Barber 
and Lyon, 1997a; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon, et al, 1999; Loughran and Ritter, 
2000; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Brav, et al, 2000; Fama, 1998; Jegadeesh and Karceski, 
2004; Eckbo, et al, 2007; Petersen, 2005; Ahmad-Zaluki, et al, 2007; Boissin and 
Sentis, 2010; Thomadakis, et al, 2012], the debate is far from settled. The majority of 
extant literature reveals, in general, the existence of long-run under-performance of 
new issues of common stock, for periods upwards of three years from the event day. 
However, it is still an unsettled issue amongst financial economists on what the cause 
of this under-performance may be as it has been found to be very sensitive to the 
expected return model and methodology employed. As a result, the methodological 
research in this area becomes of great importance because it shows how very easy it 
is to assume under-performance when there may really be none.  
An onslaught of attacks has been launched on these results by other researchers who 
argue that the choice of a performance measurement methodology directly determines 
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both the magnitude of the measured abnormal performance and the size and power of 
the statistical tests. In that context, Lyon, et al [1999, pp. 198] affirm that the ‘analysis 
of long-term abnormal returns is treacherous’. This work also argues that IPO under-
performance may just be manifestations of the statistical inadequacies of traditional 
matching methods or inadequate matching criteria rather than an anomaly that 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis. The original IPO under-performance results 
are dramatic and generally imply that IPOs are poor investments. But recent findings 
[Freitas, et al, 2008; Xia and Wang, 2003; Kiymaz, 2000; Kutsuna, et al, 2009; 
Thomadakis, et al, 2012; Alli, et al, 2010] and the critical review of the anomalies 
literature by Fama [1998] suggest that this under-performance phenomenon merits 
further inquest.  
There has been so much controversy in the literature on how IPO firms should be 
evaluated. From the event-time to the calendar-time methodologies and the various 
asset pricing models, the issue of the performance of IPOs in the long-run has not 
been fully laid to rest. Put differently, the jury is still out on this issue. In the context of 
the event-time methodologies, it may well be that the documented under-performance 
is due to imperfect matching procedures, while in calendar-time procedures, it may be 
the result of the approach not being able to fully explain the variation in the cross-
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section of stock returns. A common technique in prior research is the matching method 
which matches issuing firms to a set of comparable non-issuing firms on a dimension-
by-dimension basis using some pre-defined callipers and a set of ex-ante firm 
characteristics. The purpose of this approach is to establish the existence of an 
abnormal price performance by comparing the ex-post stock returns of IPO firms with 
those of non-IPO firms having similar risk profiles. This work argues that the traditional 
matching methods may potentially not yield good matches because of a multi-
dimensional matching problem which makes it difficult to match simultaneously on 
multiple dimensions. Hence, the key issue here is about the dimensions on which the 
analysis of the performance and indeed survival of new issues of common stock should 
be based. The goal is to develop a robust and well-rounded performance measurement 
approach that will help provide answers to this knotty question. More specifically, this 
work seeks to identify and introduce key risk factors that could be pivotal in determining 
and shaping the return profile of the average firm into the model for assessing the post-
event risk-adjusted performance of new issues of common stock.  
In characteristics-based approaches4, this work seeks to match event firms with similar 
non-event firms on certain key return-determining risk factors using a systematic 
                                                          
4 Under this approach, we have the buy-and-hold abnormal returns [BHAR] and cumulative abnormal 
returns [CAR] as barometers for measuring long horizon stock price performance.  
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approach to enable us determine if the documented under-performance finding is 
genuine. To accomplish this task, the work follows Jegadeesh [2000] by introducing a 
multi-dimensional procedure that constructs a deviation metric measure that assesses 
event firms to non-event firms on carefully selected return-determining characteristics 
and then chooses for each event firm a matching non-event firm that is closest to the 
event firm on this constructed measure. By so doing, the work would firstly, ensure that 
event and non-event firms have similar risk profiles in all possible respects and 
secondly, reduce, to some extent, the potential problem of ‘bad modelling’ that may 
have plagued previous studies on the long-horizon performance analysis of new 
listings5. The price performance of the sample and benchmark firms subsequent to the 
IPO event is then tracked in characteristics and factor based approaches6.  
In this multi-dimensional process, the work goes beyond the traditional factors of size, 
market-to-book and industry by introducing new firm risk factors [turnover growth, pre-
IPO performance and earnings yield] not previously used in the literature, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, to select the control firms from the general population using 
stepwise matching algorithms that seek to ensure that the sample firms and benchmark 
                                                          
5 Fama [1970] posits that event studies are joint tests of market efficiency and a model of expected returns. 
Fama [1998] corroborates this point by asserting that all models of expected returns are incomplete 
descriptions of the systematic patterns in average stock returns.    
6 This is also known as the Jensen alpha or the calendar time portfolio approach. 
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firms have fairly similar risk profiles. Now, what informs the choice of variables to be 
employed in the matching models? It is generally agreed that firms that are in the same 
industry and with similar sizes, turnover and growth performances are assumed to 
have analogous economic and competitive factors and in most cases tend to have 
comparable operating, investing and financing opportunity sets [Perry and Williams, 
1994]. Also, prior literature7 that has studied the interface between firms in competitive 
industries shows that these firms consider the joint actions of their peers when making 
crucial financial decisions. Although, a myriad of factors may impinge on a firm’s 
decision to diversify its ownership base by issuing some of its shares to the public, it is 
an accepted view that this decision has implications on its financial structure and 
overall market value. 
To achieve the author’s matching objectives and also guarantee a fair assessment of 
the relative ex-post performance of the issuing firms subsequent to the IPO date, the 
work ensures that the ex-ante characteristics of the sample and control firms at the IPO 
date are fairly similar in all possible respects. Against this backdrop, the work uses 
information available prior to or at the IPO date to select the matching firms from the 
general population. In this regard, industry and pre-IPO performance [to control for 
                                                          
7 See Brander and Lewis [1986], Maksimovic [1988], Maksimovic and Zechner [1991], Williams [1995], 
Fries, et al [1997] and Mackay and Philips [2005]. 
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possible differences in firm specific performance before the IPO date], market 
capitalization [to control for size effects and possible differences in investing 
opportunity sets], turnover growth [to control for possible differences in operating 
opportunity sets], market-to-book ratio [to control for possible misalignments in growth 
potentials] and earnings yield [to control for possible differences in firm specific 
performance and potential returns to investors] are used as probable dimensions for 
choosing the matching non-event firms from the population. This informs the motivation 
behind the first part of the study as it seeks to re-examine the validity, reliability and 
robustness of the documented under-performance using a fresh sample of 746 IPOs in 
the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 and stepwise matching algorithms that 
select the matching firms from the general population on the basis of key firm risk 
factors that includes three new risk factors – pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and 
earnings yield – employing a refined matching technique and a battery of methods.  
The findings reveal that, indeed, in line with the majority of extant research, IPOs are 
poor investments either in event time methodologies or calendar time techniques that 
rebalance the IPO stocks in monthly portfolios, using the equally-weighted technique. 
However, the evidence is mixed when a value-weighted performance measure is 
adopted. Under this scenario in event-time methodologies, the under-performance is 
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also largely evident; however, when the risk-adjusted performance of the IPO stocks is 
tracked in calendar time, the under-performance is found to be non-existent in some 
cases, and at best, weak in others. This pattern of results is robust to the inclusion or 
exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. The results also show that the scale of 
the under-performance, which varies substantially and in some cases disappears 
altogether across the matching board, is sensitive to firstly, the choice of empirical 
method; secondly, the choice of matching firms in the benchmark portfolio; thirdly, the 
method of cumulating abnormal returns; fourthly, the weighting scheme employed; 
fifthly, the horizon over which it is measured and; sixthly, the inclusion or exclusion of 
the late 1990s technology bubble. This work also documents a novel finding. It is found 
that in almost all the cases, the observed under-performance is least, and in some 
cases evaporates, when the matching algorithm includes industry as an additional risk 
factor, which tends to suggest that a matching criteria that includes the industry of the 
firms is vital in the matching process as it ensures that issuing and non-issuing firms 
are fairly similar, thus making for better comparisons.    
Overall, given that the majority of the studies in the literature find that IPOs are poor 
investments in the long-term, the findings suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond 
the immediate after-market may not be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-
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market performance is dependent on the proportions in which the stocks are stacked in 
the investor’s portfolio; secondly, value-weighted performance does not provide strong 
evidence against market efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted measure of 
abnormal performance [which tends to suggest that the former may provide a more 
useful benchmark in assessing the post-event risk-adjusted performance of IPO firms 
since it more accurately captures the investors’ wealth effects] and; thirdly, under-
performance of new issues of common stock remains an anomaly that really 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis only when performance is equally-weighted.  
The first empirical study contributes to the literature in two ways; firstly, it adds further 
evidence on the sensitivity of the under-performance finding, with respect to the choice 
of empirical method, using a distance metric matching technique [the first of its kind in 
the UK market] that seeks to remove the ambiguity surrounding previous conventional 
approaches; secondly, it goes beyond the size, market-to-book and industry risk factors 
used by most researchers in selecting the control firm from the general population used 
as a reference for measuring abnormal returns by introducing pre-IPO performance, 
turnover growth and earnings yield as additional key risk factors [the first of its kind in 
the literature, to the best of the author’s knowledge] that could be employed in selecting 
the control firm. Despite the additional risk factors used in this first empirical study to 
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select the control firm, future research is encouraged into identifying other salient risk 
factors that could be used in selecting the control firms from the general population. 
Some of these factors could potentially include liquidity [Paster and Stambaugh, 2001; 
Amihud, 2002; Dey, 2005; Eckbo and Norli, 2005], leverage [Bhandari, 1988; Eckbo 
and Norli, 2005], access to credit markets [Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000] and 
skewness [Singleton and Wingender, 1986; Tang and Shum, 2003], albeit, it has been 
argued that sensitivity to some of these risk factors are already captured by the size 
and value [i.e. book-to-market] factors and hence, already priced in, which then 
suggests that they may not be distinct sources of additional risk.    
[3.2] Literature Review 
[3.2.1] Approaches to abnormal performance measurement 
There are two main approaches to assessing the post-event risk-adjusted performance 
of a sample of firms – the characteristics-based approaches in event time and the 
factor based approaches in calendar time. Under the event time approach, there are 
two main methods - the BHAR and CAR techniques. Mitchell and Stafford [2006, pp. 
296] describe BHAR returns “as the average multi-year return from a strategy of 
investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified 
period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-event firms”. 
Essentially, this approach, which typically does not involve rebalancing, uses a 
 
 
32 
 
matched firm technique to risk adjustment and is not immune from the joint test 
problem of market efficiency and a model of expected return since it is hinged on the 
validity of the assumption that event firms differ from the ‘otherwise similar non-event 
firms’ only in that they experience the event. A positive [negative] BHAR is generally 
interpreted as the specific IPO portfolio out-performing [under-performing] the 
designated benchmark. A related measure is the wealth relative which explores how 
the sample of IPOs performs relative to the matching benchmark. A wealth ratio greater 
than 1 is generally interpreted as the specific IPO portfolio out-performing the 
benchmark, whereas a wealth ratio of less than 1 indicates under-performance.  
The CAR returns can be described as the summation of the average of the monthly 
portfolio returns over a pre-specified period from a strategy of investing in all firms that 
complete an event contrasted with a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-
event firms. This approach frequently involves rebalancing which may give rise to 
security microstructure issues. A positive [negative] CAR is generally interpreted as the 
specific IPO portfolio out-performing [under-performing] the designated benchmark. 
The allure of the BHAR approach over the CAR lies in the fact that it more accurately 
captures investors’ real life investment experience. The factor based approach is an 
alternative to the event time approaches. This approach calculates calendar time 
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portfolio returns for firms experiencing an event and determines if these returns are 
abnormal in a multi-factor asset pricing regression framework. The estimated intercept 
from the regression of the time series of portfolio excess returns relative to the return 
on a risk-free instrument [usually mimicked by treasury bills] against factor returns is 
the post-event abnormal performance of the sample of event firms [Kothari and Warner, 
2007]. The asset pricing model could either be specified as the capital asset pricing 
model [CAPM] or the Fama and French 3-factor [FF3F] model or the FF3F model with 
Cahart’s [1997] momentum factor [FF-Cahart-4F model]. 
Barber and Lyon [1997a] evaluate two general approaches for developing a benchmark 
for calculating abnormal returns - the market portfolio and the matched control firm 
techniques. The use of a market-index based model of expected return, which is 
usually mimicked by the market portfolio and involves frequent rebalancing, is less 
favoured due to the fact that firms that constitute the market index typically include new 
firms that begin trading after the event month, which in most cases under-perform. A 
more favoured approach is the control firm technique which matches issuing firms to a 
set of comparable non-issuing firms on a dimension-by-dimension basis using pre-
defined callipers and a set of ex-ante firm characteristics. The purpose of this approach 
is to establish the existence of an abnormal price performance by comparing the ex-
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post stock returns of IPO firms with those of non-IPO firms having fairly similar risk 
profiles.  
The choice of a weighting scheme is also a relevant issue in measuring abnormal 
performance. Fama [1998] argues that apparent anomalies in long-term post-event 
returns shrink and often disappear when event firms are value-weighted rather than 
equally-weighted because the former more accurately captures the total wealth effects 
of investors. Hence, value-weighted performance provides a more useful benchmark 
and may not provide strong evidence against market efficiency when compared to an 
equally-weighted measure of abnormal performance. It is worthy to note that if the 
intention is to study the impact of a stock market mispricing, an equally-weighted 
technique would be more appropriate. However, if the objective is to accurately 
measure the real life investment experience of investors and the ensuing wealth effects, 
the proper approach would be a value-weighted performance measure.  
[3.2.2] Under-pricing and Short-run performance 
An overwhelming body of research has developed to suggest evidence of significant 
under-pricing of new issues of ordinary equity in the days and weeks following the 
initial listing [Mcdonald and Fisher, 1972; Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984 and 1991; 
Barlow and Sparks, 1986; Smith, 1986; Tinic, 1988]. Following the works of Ibbotson  
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TABLE 3.1: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON SHORT-RUN PERFORMANCE SHOWING THE RETURNS AVAILABLE TO IPO SUBSCRIBERS IN THE 
IMMEDIATE AFTER-MARKET SUBSEQUENT TO THE IPO  
 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size       Initial ret. [%] 
MALAYSIA  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83     21    166.60 
CHINA   XIA & WANG [2003]    1997-98               147                116.13 
MALAYSIA  ISA [1993]     1980-91   132      80.30 
BRAZIL   AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1979-90     62      78.50 
KOREA   DHATT, ET AL [1993]    1980-90   347      78.10 
THAILAND  ALLEN, ET AL [1999]    1985-92    150      63.49 
THAILAND  WETHYAVIVORN & KOO-SMITH [1991] 1988-89     32      58.10 
JAPAN   JENKINSON [1990]    1986-88     48      54.70 
POLAND  LYN & ZYCHOWICZ [2003]   1991-98     103                  54.45 
PORTUGAL  ALPHAO [1992]    1986-87     62      54.40 
JAPAN   DAWSON & HIRAKI [1985]   1979-84    106      51.90 
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TABLE 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size    Initial ret. [%] 
GREECE  KAZANTZIS & THOMAS [1996]   1987-94    129                            51.70 
GREECE  KAZANTZIS & LEVIS [1994]   1987-91      79                48.50 
UNITED STATES RITTER [1987]     1977-82    364    47.80 
TAIWAN  CHEN [1992]     1971-90    168    45.00 
HUNGARY  JELIC & BRISTON [1999]   1990-98      25                44.00 
NIGERIA  ADJASI, ET AL [2011]    1990-2006             80                43.10 
TAIWAN  HUANG [1999]     1971-95       311    42.60 
UK   MENYAH, ET AL [1995]    1981-91      75    41.36 
SINGAPORE  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83      39    39.40 
SWEDEN  RUDQVIST [1993]    1970-91    213    39.00 
SWITZERLAND KUNZ & AGGARWAL [1994]   1983-89      42    35.80 
SRI LANKA  SAMARAKOON [2010]    1987-2008     105    33.50 
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Table 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size    Initial ret. [%] 
POLAND  AUSENEGG [2000a]    1991-98    159    33.10 
MEXICO  AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1987-90      37    33.00 
ITALY   CHERUBINI & RATTI [1992]   1985-91      75    29.70 
AUSTRALIA  FINN & HIGHAM [1988]    1966-78      93    29.20 
NEW ZELAND  VOS & CHEUNG [1993]   1979-91    149    28.80 
GERMANY  LJUNGQVIST [1999]    1978-99    407    27.70 
SINGAPORE  KOH & WALTER [1989]    1973-87      66    27.00 
TUNISIA  NACEUR [2000]    1992-97            12                24.50   
ITALY   AROSIO, GUIDICI & PALEARI [2000]  1985-2000    164    23.94 
SPAIN   FREIXAS & INURRIETA [1991]   1986-90                  58    22.40 
CANADA  KOOLI & SURET [2004]   1991-98          445                20.57 
UNITED STATES RITTER & WELCH [2002]   1980-2001              6,169    18.80 
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Table 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size    Initial ret. [%] 
HONG KONG  MCGUINNESS [1993]    1980-90      80    17.60 
HONG KONG  CHEUNG & LIU [2007]    1996-2000     209       16.58 
CHILE   AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1982-90      19    16.30 
BELGIUM  ROGIERS, ET AL [1993]   1984-99      69    15.70 
THAILAND  CHORRUK & WORTHINGTON [2010]  1997-2008         142    15.42 
UNITED STATES IBBOTSON, ET AL [1994]   1960-92            10,626    15.30 
HUNGARY  LYN & ZYCHOWICZ [2003]   1991-98         33                  15.12 
UNITED STATES RITTER [1987]     1977-82     664    14.80 
FINLAND  KELOHARJU [1993a]    1984-92       91    14.40 
UK   LEVIS [1993]     1980-88     712    14.30 
UK   LEVIS [1995]     1980-89        713    14.20 
UK   LOUGHRAN, ET AL [1994]   1959-99              2,802    13.90 
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Table 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size    Initial ret. [%] 
HONG KONG  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83            21    13.80 
BELGIUM  MANIGART & ROGIERS [1992]   1984-90           28    13.70 
FRANCE  DERRIEN & WOMACK [2003]   1992-98       264    13.20 
TURKEY  KIYMAZ [2000]     1990-96       163    13.10 
SPAIN   OTERO & FERNANDEZ [2000]   1985-97           58    12.80 
GERMANY  LJUNGQVIST [1993]    1974-92       119    12.40 
JAPAN   KANEBO & PETTWAY [1994]   1989-93           37    12.00 
AUSTRALIA  LEE, ET AL [1996]    1976-89       266    11.90 
CANADA  JOG & RIDING [1987]    1971-83       100    11.00 
UNITED STATES REILLY [1977]     1972-75       486    10.90 
SPAIN   RAHNEMA, ET AL [1993]   1985-90           85    10.80 
UK   JENKINSON & MAYER [1988]   1983-86       143    10.70 
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Table 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size     Initial ret. [%] 
UNITED STATES AGGARWAL & RIVOLI [1990]   1977-87                       1,598    10.67 
PORTUGAL  ALMEIDA & DUGUE [2000]   1992-98        21    10.50 
GERMANY  LJUNGQVIST [1997]    1970-93     180        9.20 
CANADA  JOG & SRIVASTAVA [1996]   1971-92     254        7.40 
NETHERLANDS BUIJS & EIJGENHUIJSEN [1993]  1982-91         72      7.40 
SOUTH AFRICA ALLI, ET AL [2010]    1995-2004          141      7.35   
HONG KONG  VONG & TRIGUEIROS [2010]   1994-2005      480      6.90 
AUSTRIA  AUSENEGG [2000b]    1964-96         67      6.50 
NEW ZEALAND CHI, ET AL [2010]    1991-2005          114      5.91 
NETHERLANDS WESSELS [1989]    1982-87         46      5.10 
FRANCE  JACQUILLAT [1986]    1972-86         87      4.80 
UK   JENKINSON & MAYER [1988]   1983-86         68      4.70 
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Table 3.1 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period   Sample size     Initial ret. [%] 
FRANCE  HUSSON & JACQUILLAT [1990]  1983-86      131      4.00 
DENMARK  JAKOBSEN & SORENSEN [2001]  1984-92         76      3.90 
UK   MENYAH, ET AL [1995]    1981-92          75       3.50 
BRAZIL   FREITAS, ET AL [2008]    2004-06            30                  3.10 
UK   JENKINSON & MAYER [1988]   1983-86         26     -2.20 
Initial returns, measured from the first trading day or some day after trading opens, can either be unadjusted or market-adjusted. 
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[1975] and Ritter [1984], numerous researchers have revealed that in different 
countries and at different periods in time, the phenomenon of the under-pricing of IPOs 
is a generalized phenomenon. Table 3.1 compiles some of the works that have 
analysed the initial returns of going public and their results. The table, ranked by the 
level of initial returns, shows the early returns that are available to IPO subscribers in 
the immediate after-market. It is also a reflection of the significant level of under-pricing 
and the consequent ‘amount of money left on the table’ by the issuing firms at the close 
of the offering. The initial return ranges from -2.2% to 166.6%, with most showing 
returns of 10% or more. In fact, all but one of the returns, are positive.   
The most recent of these findings can be found in the works of Freitas, et al [2008] in 
their study of 30 Brazilian new offerings; Adjasi, et al [2011] in their study of 80 
Nigerian IPOs; Alli, et al [2010] in their study of 141 South African new equity 
issuances; Chorruk and Worthington [2010] in their price performance analysis of 142 
new listings in the Thai capital market and Chi, et al [2010] in their study of 114 New 
Zealand new issues of common stock. Several theories have been proposed to explain 
the extensive international evidence of initial under-pricing and its variability across the 
different capital markets around the world and there is little consensus regarding those 
factors that could explain this puzzle. These include the ‘winner’s-curse-hypothesis’ of 
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Rock [1986], the ‘legal-liability-argument’ proposed by Tinic [1988], the ‘merchant-
banker-and-issuer-inexperience’ explanation of Kunz and Aggarwal [1994], the 
‘underwriter-issuer-information asymmetry’ theory of Baron [1982], the ‘cost-of-
information-acquisition’ model of Benveniste and Spindt [1989], the ‘market-feedback-
hypothesis’ of Chemmanur [1993], Jegadeesh, et al [1993] and Spiess and Pettway 
[1997], the ‘bandwagon theory’ of Welch [1992] and the ‘underwriter-price-support’ 
model of Ruud [1993]8. However, the dominant theoretical perspective applied to 
examinations of IPO under-pricing seems to be the signalling theory [Bhattachaya, 
1979; Certo, et al, 2001; Ross, 1977]. The model suggests ‘certain variables or 
indicators send signals to potential investors about the capabilities and future values of 
firms’ [Deeds, et al, 1997; pp.33] and is consistent with the perspective that IPO issuers 
are more informed than investors [Anderson, et al, 1995; Keasey and Short, 1997; 
Lawless, et al, 1998; Marshall, 1998]. Under this model, firms deliberately under-price 
new issues to signal their quality to potential investors in the hope that the ‘huge 
amount of money left on the table’ would be recouped from subsequent seasoned 
                                                          
8 Other explanations that have been advanced in the literature can be found in the works of Habib and 
Ljungqvist [2001], Loughran and Ritter [2002], Carter and Manaster [1990], Allen and Faulhaber [1989], 
Beatty and Ritter [1986], Booth and Chua [1996], Brennan and Franks [1997], Aggarwal and Rivoli [1990], 
Chen, et al [1999], Rajan and Servaes [1997], Bossaerts and Hillion [1999], Fulghieri and Spiegel [1991], 
Baron and Holmstrom [1980], Su and Fleisher [1999] and Mauer and Senbet [1992]. 
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offerings that would be valued at a price closer to the ‘true values’ of the firms which 
would have been revealed to investors via their operating and market performances.   
Inspection of Table 3.1 shows that the evidence of initial under-pricing is overwhelming, 
though more severe in the emerging Latin and Asian markets. This, however, may not 
be unconnected with the institutional and market bottlenecks in these countries 
characterized by thin markets and thin trading, high information asymmetry, heavy 
oversubscription and large initial price run-ups [Dawson, 1987]. 
[3.2.3] Long-run Performance 
Unlike the overwhelming international evidence that has established the under-pricing 
of new issues of common stock, the performance of these stocks in the long-run 
remains controversial. No theory has been proposed that satisfactorily explains the 
long-run under-performance of IPO stocks that is observed for up to three years after 
their listing. Only very few theories provide useful frameworks for analysing this 
phenomenon. The closest have been the ‘behavioural’ theories. In his ‘divergence of 
opinion hypothesis’, Miller [1977] argues that this phenomenon may be due to 
heterogeneous expectations of optimistic and pessimistic investors, whose divergence 
of opinion narrows as more information becomes available which causes prices to drop. 
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Shiller’s [1990] ‘impresario hypothesis’ suggests that the market is subject to fads9, 
implying that firms could ‘time’ IPOs strategically in the sense that they may predict 
when over-optimism in the market is likely to occur and favourable offer prices can be 
obtained. As more information becomes available, investors adjust their initial over-
valuation, which causes long-run returns to fall. Ibbotson and Jaffe [1975] and Ritter 
[1984] provide evidence of the existence of ‘hot issue markets’. Ritter [1991] and Shiller 
[1990] have argued that during these hot periods, many poor quality IPOs are floated in 
the market, taking advantage of market over-optimism. All of the above mentioned 
theories are consistent with the ‘over-reaction hypothesis’ of De Bondt and Thaler 
[1985 and 1987]. Loughran and Ritter [1995] also go as far as to describe the short and 
long-term share price behaviour of the IPO firm as being a ‘puzzle’.  
Table 3.2 lists some of the works that have analysed the long-run returns of going 
public and their results. The findings so far are mixed with varying results for different 
regions in the world, albeit a preponderance of under-performance is evident. The table, 
ranked by the magnitude of long-run returns, shows the level of risk-adjusted returns, 
excluding the initial returns, available to IPO investors in the after-market up to a period 
of six years from the listing date. There is a wide variation in the level of the returns, 
                                                          
9 Investors behave irrationally in the sense that they value newly listed firms beyond fair values, such that 
prices drop over time as information on the true values become available in the market. This position is 
corroborated by Aggarwal and Rivoli [1990]. 
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TABLE 3.2: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE SHOWING THE RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS AVAILABLE TO IPO INVESTORS 
OVER DIFFERENT INVESTMENT HORIZONS   
 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size        Window Long-run ret. [%] 
KOREA   KIM, ET AL [1995]    1985-89  169   3.00                   91.59 
AUSTRIA  AUSSENEGG [1997]    1984-96    51   5.00                   74.00 
TURKEY  KIYMAZ [1999]     1990-95  138   3.00                   44.10 
US   CUSATIS, ET AL [1993]   1965-88  146   3.00                   33.60 
CHINA   XIA & WANG [2003]    1997-98  147   3.00                   25.19   
MALAYSIA  JELIC, ET AL [2001]    1980-95  182   3.00                   21.98 
POLAND  AUSSENEGG [1997]    1991-96    57   3.00                   20.10 
MALAYSIA  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83    21   1.00                   18.20 
BRAZIL   FREITAS, ET AL [2008]    2004-06    30   1.00                   12.80   
TUNISIA  NACEUR [2000]    1992-97    12   1.00                   11.04 
THAILAND  ALLEN, ET AL [1999]    1985-92  150   3.00                   10.02 
US   SIMON [1989]     1934-40    20   5.00                     6.20 
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Table 3.2 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size        Window Long-run ret. [%] 
SWEDEN  LOUGHRAN, ET AL [1994]   1980-90  162   3.00                     1.20 
SOUTH AFRICA ALLI, ET AL [2010]    1995-2004  141   3.00                     1.08   
JAPAN   KUTSUNA, ET AL [2009]   1997-2003  487   1.00                    -0.05 
HONG KONG  CHEUNG & LIU [2007]    1996-2000  209   1.00                     -0.17 
NIGERIA  ADJASI, ET AL [2011]    1990-2006    80   3.00                      -0.6 
ITALY   GIUDICI & PALEARI [1999]   1985-99    84   3.00                     -2.60 
SINGAPORE  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83    39   1.00                     -2.70 
TAIWAN  HUANG [1999]     1971-95  311   4.00                     -3.90 
GERMANY  WITTLEDER [1989]    1961-87    67   1.00                     -4.00 
HUNGARY  LYN & ZYCHOWICZ [2003]   1991-98    33               3.00                       -4.92 
GERMANY  EHRHARDT [1997]    1960-90  160   3.00                     -5.20 
SWITZERLAND KUNZ & AGGARWAL [1994]   1983-89    34   3.00                     -6.10 
FRANCE  DERRIEN & WORMACK [2003]   1992-98  264   2.00                     -6.30 
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Table 3.2 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size        Window Long-run ret. [%] 
AUSTRALIA  FINN & HIGHAM [1988]    1966-78     93   1.00                     -6.52 
SWITZERLAND DROBETZ, ET AL [2005]   1983-2000   120   1.17                     -6.80 
GERMANY  SCHLAG & WODRICH [2000]   1884-1914   163   5.00                     -7.80 
MALAYSIA  AHMAD-ZALUKI, ET AL [2007]   1990-2000   454   3.00                     -8.16 
SINGAPORE  HIN & MAHMOOD [1993]   1976-84     45   3.00                     -9.20 
HONG KONG  DAWSON [1987]    1978-83     21   1.00                     -9.30 
FRANCE  BOISSIN & SENTIS [2010]   1991-2005   270   5.00                   -10.00 
GERMANY  SCHMIDT, ET AL [1988]   1984-85     32   1.00                   -10.20 
US   REILLY [1977]     1972-75   486   1.00                   -11.60 
GERMANY  UHLIR [1989]     1977-86    70   1.25                   -11.90 
GERMANY  LJUNGVIST [1997]    1970-90   145   3.00                   -12.10 
GERMANY  BESSLER & THIES [2007]   1977-95   218   3.00                   -12.70 
US   AGGARWAL & RIVOLI [1990]   1977-87            1,598   0.68                   -13.73 
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Table 3.2 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size        Window Long-run ret. [%] 
PORTUGAL  ALMEIDA & DUQUE [2000]   1992-98    21   1.00                   -13.80 
CANADA  KOOLI & SURET [2004]   1991-98  445   5.00                   -16.86 
HONG KONG  MCGUINNESS [1993]    1980-90    72   2.00                   -18.30 
MEXICO  AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1987-90    44   1.00                   -19.60 
US   RITTER & WELCH [2002]   1980-2001           6,169   3.00                   -23.40 
CHILE   AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1982-90    36   3.00                   -23.70 
POLAND  LYN & ZYCHOWICZ [2003]   1991-98  103               3.00                   -24.44 
US   STIGLER [1964]    1949-55    46   5.00                   -25.10 
THAILAND  CHORRUK & WORTHINGTON [2010]  1997-2008  142   3.00                   -25.39 
FINLAND  KELOHARJU [1993b]    1984-89    79   3.00                   -26.40 
JAPAN   CAI & WEI [1997]    1971-92  180   3.00                   -27.00 
SPAIN   ALVAREZ & GONZALEZ [2005]   1987-97    37   3.00                   -27.80 
US   BRAV, ET AL [2000]    1975-92           4,622   5.00                   -28.40 
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Table 3.2 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size         Window Long-run ret. [%] 
US   RITTER [1991]     1975-84             1,526   3.00                   -29.13 
US   LOUGHRAN & RITTER [1995]   1970-90             4,753   5.00                   -30.00 
DENMARK  JAKOBSEN & SORENSEN [2001]  1984-92      83   5.00                   -30.00 
FRANCE  LELEUX & MUZYKA [1997]   1985-89      56   3.00                   -30.30 
GREECE  THOMADAKIS, ET AL [2012]   1994-2002    254   3.00                   -31.43 
CANADA  SHAW [1971]     1956-63    105   5.00                   -32.30 
GERMANY  JASKIEWICZ, ET AL [2005]   1990-2000    153   3.00                   -32.80 
US   LOUGHRAN [1993]    1965-87             3,656   6.00                   -33.30 
US   GOMPERS & LERNER [2003]   1937-72             3,661   5.00                   -34.80 
SPAIN   JASKIEWICZ, ET AL [2005]   1990-2000     43   3.00                   -36.70 
US   STIGLER [1964]    1923-28     70   5.00                   -37.70 
US   SIMON [1989]     1926-33     35   5.00                   -39.00 
NEW ZEALAND CHI, ET AL [2010]    1991-2005   114   3.00                   -42.40 
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Table 3.2 - CONT’D 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size         Window Long-run ret. [%] 
BRAZIL   AGGARWAL, ET AL [1993]   1980-90     62   3.00                   -47.00 
INDIA   MARISETTY & SUBRAHMANTAM [2010] 1990-2004            2,713               3.00                     -50.10 
AUSTRALIA  LEE, ET AL [1996]    1976-89   266   3.00                   -51.26 
SOUTH AFRICA PAGE & REYNEKE [1997]   1980-91   118   4.00                   -63.45 
[i] Window is the number of years over which the long-run returns are measured.  
[ii] Long-run returns are calculated over the investment horizon and thus are annualized. They also exclude the initial returns and are generally risk-adjusted. Some studies employ a 
battery of benchmarks and methodologies; in these cases, a representative result is depicted. 
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ranging from a high of 91.59% to a low of -63.45%, with most showing negative returns 
of -5% or more. In fact, about 80% of the studies report negative returns or IPO under-
performance. The findings also generally reveal that the under-performance finding is 
sensitive to the benchmark model and/or methodology employed. 
The results for the developed markets appear conclusive with most of the studies 
documenting long-run stock price under-performance. The earliest were undertaken in 
the United States [US] and several document the existence of under-performance. 
Stern and Bornstein [1985] show that 1,922 new issues floated during the 1975-85 
period under-perform the market by 22%. In contrast, Ibbotson [1975], using an 
aggregated return across time and securities [RATS] 10  model conditioned on an 
equally-weighted average of the returns on the New York Stock Exchange, finds that 
the after-market performance of US stocks floated during the 1960s is positive in the 
first year and negative in the next three years before returning to positive in the fifth 
year. Ritter [1991] investigates 1,526 US IPOs floated during 1975-84 and finds a 
significant under-performance to the tune of 29.13% over a 3-year period, employing a 
set of firms matched on industry and size as the return benchmark. He also finds 
varying degrees of under-performances using the value-weighted averages of the 
                                                          
10 This is a variation of the Jensen alpha or calendar time approach that allows for the variation of the 
systematic risk of an issuing firm, subsequent to the IPO event.  
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NASDAQ and NYSE stock exchanges as benchmarks. Other researchers in the US 
market have also documented this under-performance 11 . However, there are 
exceptions. Simon [1989], using the time-series of portfolio returns conditioned on the 
return on the NYSE in a CAPM model, documents an out-performance of 6.2% in his 
study of US IPOs over the period 1934-40. Cusatis, et al [1993] equally find a similar 
result in their investigation of the price and return performance of spin-offs12 and their 
parent firms in the US over the period 1965-88. Measuring stock returns of spin-offs, 
their parent firms and parent-spin-off combinations for periods up to three years 
following the spin-offs using the BHAR metric and the return on a size and industry-
matched firm as the benchmark, they find positive abnormal returns of 33.6%. 
More recent studies in the US market are those of Brav, et al [2000], Ritter and Welch 
[2002] and Gompers and Lerner [2003]. In a comprehensive study of 4,622 IPOs and 
4,526 seasoned equity offerings [SEOs]13 over the period 1975-1992 with the sole 
purpose of examining the robustness of IPO and SEO under-performances with 
respect to various model specifications, using a 5-year post-event window and the 
market return as the benchmark, Brav, et al [2000] document long-term abnormal 
                                                          
11 See Table 3.2. 
12 Spin-offs are similar to IPOs in that they represent newly-traded shares in the market place. 
13 These are firms that come to the market to raise more capital by issuing more equity subsequent to their 
IPOs. 
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returns ranging from -7.8% to -30.1% for SEOs and -8.8% to -44.2% for IPOs, implying 
that both IPOs and SEOs under-perform during the period. However, there is a striking 
revelation in their findings. Using an alternative model that matches IPO firm returns to 
size and book-to-market portfolios, which are themselves free of the issuing firms, the 
observed under-performance disappears. In fact, 5-year average excess returns of the 
IPO firms are actually positive ranging from 1.4% to 9.7%.  
Ritter and Welch [2002] document under-performances ranging from -5.1% to -23.4% 
depending on the benchmark used for measuring abnormal return in their study of 
6,169 IPOs over the period 1980-2001 employing a 3-year post-event window. They 
reach the same conclusions in calendar time analysis using multi-factor regression 
models. Gompers and Lerner [2003] find the same evidence when they undertook a 
large scale study of 3,661 IPOs over the period 1935 to 1972, using 3 and 5-year post-
event windows and the value-weighted return on the market index and the return on a 
portfolio of firms with the same size and book-to-market ratio as benchmarks. They 
document abnormal performances ranging from -8.4% to -34.8% under a buy-and-hold 
trading strategy using a value-weighted performance measure. However, this under-
performance disappears when they vary the trading strategy and/or the weighting of 
the stocks in the portfolio. Under a CAR strategy employing an equally-weighted 
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performance measure, the abnormal performance turns from negative to positive 
ranging from 2% to 8.7%. Using the calendar time models, they find no significant 
abnormal performance as the CAPM and FF3F intercepts are not significantly different 
from zero. The first comprehensive study on the Canadian market was undertaken by 
Kooli and Suret [2004] who investigate the after-market performance of 445 IPOs over 
the period 1991-1998 for up to five years after listing. Using the control firm approach, 
they document varying levels of under-performances for the IPO sample depending on 
the return metric and weighting scheme employed. More specifically, they report higher 
under-performances of between 15.16% and 26.50% when using the BHAR technique 
as against between 11.02% and 20.65% when adopting the CAR metric.  
Many other researchers have also reported long-run under-performances in several 
European markets. In a study of 37 Spanish IPOs over the period 1987 to 1997, 
Alvarez and Gonzalez [2005] analyse the long-run performance across 1, 3 and 5-year 
windows employing different return benchmarks spanning the index return on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange as well as size and book-to-market matched firms and 
portfolios. Their results, in general, reveal the existence of positive abnormal returns in 
the first year. However, in the other two horizons considered [i.e. 3 and 5 years], the 
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abnormal return turns negative ranging between -18.59% and -32.16% for the 3-year 
window and between -1.98% and -37.05% for the 5-year window. 
In a study of a sample of 218 German IPOs that came to the market over the period 
1977 to 1995 using a 3-year post-event window, the BHAR metric and a variety of 
market benchmarks, Bessler and Thies [2007] find that abnormal returns are positive 
for the first 15 months, but then turn negative after 36 months rising to a significant       
-12.70%. Thomadakis, et al [2012] analyse the long-run performance of 254 Greek 
IPOs that were listed during the period 1994 to 2002, computing BHARs and CARs 
over a 3-year window, using the standard CAPM and multi-index models as 
benchmarks. Their results reveal a persistence of IPO out-performance that ranges 
between 8.09% and 13.49% up until the 24th month subsequent to the listing date. 
However, when the window period is extended by another 12 months, the measured 
abnormal performance enters negative territory in the range of -16.17% and -31.43%.  
A study of Finnish IPOs by Keloharju [1993b] reports a -26.4% long-run market 
adjusted return for 79 issues going public between 1984 and 1989. Jakobsen and 
Sorensen [2001], in a study of 83 Danish IPOs over the period 1984-92, document 5-
year BHAR under-performances of 30% and 13% using the market and control firm 
techniques as the benchmarks respectively. Lyn and Zychowicz [2003] study the price 
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and return behaviour of a sample of 103 Polish and 33 Hungarian equity offerings over 
the period 1991-1998 and find significant under-performances in both markets. They 
document negative CARs of -24.44% and -4.92% for Poland and Hungary respectively 
using a 3-year post-event horizon and the market index return as the benchmark. 
Similar results have also been found in the Australian markets. Lee, et al [1996] 
examine 266 Australian IPOs over the period 1976-89 and find long-term performance 
to be inconsistent with an efficient market expectation. Using a 3-year post-listing 
window and the market index as the return benchmark, they document negative 
abnormal returns of -51.26% for the IPO sample over the period. Chi, et al [2010] study 
the performance of a sample of 114 New Zealand IPOs and calculate 3-year CARs and 
BHARs using the New Zealand stock market index as the return benchmark. They 
document 3-year CARs ranging between -42.4% and -47.8% as well as 3-year BHARs 
in the region of -27.8% and -36%. In the same market, Mustow [1992] and Allen and 
Patrick [1994] document significant long-run under-performance and 36-month post-
listing returns of -112.8% and -25.38% are reported respectively. 
Long-run under-performance has also been found in the Latin American stock markets. 
Aggarwal, et al [1993] report respective -47% and -23.7% 3-year returns for 62 
Brazilian IPO offerings in the period 1980-90 and 36 Chilean IPOs for 1982-90 as well 
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as a 1-year return of -19.6% for 44 Mexican IPOs during 1987-90. However, Freitas, et 
al [2008] document positive 1-year abnormal returns of 12.8% for a sample of 30 
Brazilian IPOs that were listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange between the period 
2004 and 2006, using the Sao Paulo stock market index as the benchmark.  
These under-performances have also been replicated in the African markets, albeit the 
studies have been few and far between14. Page and Reyneke [1997] document an 
under-performance of 63.45% over a 4-year period for 118 South African IPOs that 
came to the market over the period 1980-1991, using a set of comparable firms 
[matched on size] and the Johannesburg Stock market index as benchmarks. Adjasi, et 
al [2011], in a study of 80 Nigerian IPO offerings over the period 1990-2006 using the 
index return on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as the benchmark, find an insignificant 
under-performance of 0.6% using a post-event window of three years. Naceur [2000] 
finds a positive abnormal performance of 11.04% when investigating the 1-year 
performance of 12 Tunisian IPOs that were listed in the Tunisian Stock Exchange over 
the period 1992-1997, using the market return as the benchmark. Alli, et al [2010] 
document 1, 2 and 3-year out-performances of 4.25%, 3.29% and 1.08% respectively 
                                                          
14 Despite the increasing attention to the study of IPOs in emerging markets, there is relatively limited 
research on IPOs or SEOs of firms in the African continent. One major reason for the lack of studies on the 
African capital markets is the relatively small size and low liquidity of the equity markets in most African 
countries and the reliability of data on African capital market transactions [Alli, et al; 2010]. 
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for a sample of 141 IPOs in the South African market over the period 1995-2004, 
employing the Johannesburg Stock Exchange market index as the benchmark for 
calculating abnormal returns. 
However, it is worth noting that the evidence in Asia is not quite conclusive. Kim, et al 
[1995] find positive 3-year BHARs that ranges from 80.63% to 91.59% for 169 Korean 
IPOs over the period 1985 to 1989 using the market return and a set of comparable 
firms [matched on industry and size] as benchmarks, with most of the returns coming in 
the early weeks. Dawson [1987] reports negative long-run performances for IPOs in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, but positive for Malaysia [18.2%], employing the market 
index as the benchmark return for all the countries. Wu [1993] examines both the short 
and long-run performance of 70 Malaysian IPOs in the period between 1974 and 1989. 
Adjusted 1, 2 and 3-year period BHARs are positive. Sufar [1993] investigates the 
performance of a sample of 43 Malaysian new issues made over the 1980-86 period. 
The results show under-pricing in the first day of trading [140.5%] and a positive after-
market performance 12 months following official listing [10.9%]. Mohamad, et al [1994] 
study the initial and long-term performance of 65 IPOs from the Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange during 1975-90. Their findings show an initial under-pricing of 135% and 
significant positive CARs after 2 and 3 years. Cheung and Liu [2007] find an 
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insignificant 1-year under-performance of 0.17% in a study of a sample of 209 Hong 
Kong IPOs over the period 1996-2000, using the return on the Hong Kong stock index 
as the benchmark. 
Chorruk and Worthington [2010] examine the stock price performance of 142 IPOs on 
the Thailand Stock Exchange from 1997-2008 using various return metrics. They 
document positive average CARs from the first month up until the 23rd month. However, 
these returns turn negative from month 24 right up to the 36th month peaking at             
-468.81%. A similar pattern emerges for the other measures. The average BHAR is 
positive up until month 18 after which it drifts into negative territory, culminating in a 
BHAR of -25.39% after 3 years. The wealth relative measure stays above one up until 
month 18 after which it dips and even enters negative territory from month 31 till month 
36. In general, their findings show that Thai IPOs initially out-perform market 
benchmarks in the early years and under-perform thereafter. In a study of the long-run 
performance of IPOs in China using a sample of 147 firms who made their offerings 
between July 1997 and December 1998, employing the market benchmark across a 
host of return metrics, Xia and Wang [2003] show that IPOs in China out-perform the 
market in the long-run with the out-performance a positive function of the length of the 
observed horizon. More specifically, they find CARs of 12.19%, 13.39% and 25.19%; 
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BHARs of 13.78%, 23.93% and 27.80% and wealth relatives of 1.13, 1.17 and 1.22 for 
the 1, 2 and 3-year windows respectively. The results indicate, contrary to the majority 
of existing literature, that IPOs out-perform the market in the long-run.  
In an investigation of the 3-year share price behaviour of a sample of 454 Malaysian 
IPOs over the period 1990-2000 using a plethora of benchmarks, weighting schemes 
and return metrics, Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007] find significant out-performance using 
the market benchmark in conjunction with an equally-weighted performance measure. 
However, this out-performance disappears in procedures where matching firms are 
used as the benchmark and/or a value-weighted scheme is employed to calculate 
returns. They also find no out-performance in asset-pricing regressions, using the FF3F 
model. Their results are consistent with the view of Gompers and Lerner [2003] that the 
reported relative performance of an IPO sample depends on the method used to 
measure performance. Kutsuna, et al [2009] also find an insignificant 1-year abnormal 
stock performance of -0.05% in their analysis of a sample of 487 Japanese IPOs over 
the period 1997-2003. Marisetty and Subrahmanyam [2010] study the price 
performance of 2,713 IPOs in India over the period 1990-2004 and calculate 3-year 
CARs and BHARs using the market index as the return benchmark. They document   
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TABLE 3.3: EVIDENCE OF LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE IN THE UK MARKET 
 
Country   Study      Period  Sample size        Window          Long-run ret. [%] 
UK   MENYAH, ET AL [1995]    1981-91    75   1.10           6.45 
UK   LEVIS [1993]     1980-88  712   3.00         -8.10 
UK   GREGORY, ET AL [2010]   1975-2004            2,499   3.00      -12.60 
UK   LEVIS [1995]     1980-88  713   4.00      -14.50 
UK   LELEUX & MUZYKA [1997]   1987-91  220   3.00      -19.20 
UK   GOERGEN, ET AL [2007]   1991-95  240   3.00      -19.49 
UK   BROWN [1999]     1990-95  232   3.00      -20.10 
UK   ESPENLAUB, ET AL [2000]   1985-92  588   5.00      -21.30 
[i] Window is the number of years over which long-run returns are recorded.  
[ii] Long-run returns are calculated over the investment horizon and thus are annualized, exclude the initial returns and are generally risk-adjusted. Some authors use a range of 
benchmarks; in these cases, a representative result is shown. Computation methodologies vary. 
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average CARs of -10.5%, -25%, -37.3% and BHARs of -36.6%, -44.8%, -50.1% for 1, 2 
and 3-year windows respectively and conclude that the under-performance of new 
equity issuances relative to the market return in the India stock exchange seems to 
grow with the length of the post-event window, at least up to three years after listing. 
The studies in the UK have been few and far between with the majority of the evidence 
supporting the general trend in the literature as shown in Table 3.3. Levis [1993] 
documents a 3-year stock under-performance for 712 IPOs over the period 1980-88, 
ranging from -8.13% to -22.96%, using the CAR metric and between -6.77% and          
-42.11%, using the BHAR. He also documents wealth relatives ranging from 0.787 to 
0.958, signifying that the IPOs under-perform all the market benchmarks used in the 
study 15 . There are obvious doubts on these results as Levis made no explicit 
adjustments for risk, assuming that the risk profile of the IPO sample and that of the 
market are one and the same. Also, the several biases associated with using event-
time methods of CAR and BHAR alongside the market index as the benchmark 
reference portfolio are well documented [Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Lyon, et al, 1999]. 
Levis also did not control for event-clustering and cross-correlation in IPO returns. 
                                                          
15 The benchmarks used are the FTSE All-Share Index [FTA], the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index 
[HGSC] and a weighted All-Share Index [ALLSH]. The FTA is a value-weighted index comprising 
approximately 90% of UK stocks by value. The HGSC is also a value-weighted index comprising the 
lowest 80% of UK stocks by value, while the ALLSH is a specially constructed equally-weighted index of all 
UK stocks. 
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Levis undertook a follow-up study in 1995 where he studied 713 IPOs with subsequent 
offerings of stock and finds similar results, using the HGSC index as the return 
benchmark. Menyah, et al [1995] undertook a long-run performance study of 75 UK 
privatization IPOs [PIPOs]16 alongside another sample of private IPOs over the period 
1981-91, using the BHAR metric and the FTSE All-Share as the market benchmark. 
Interestingly, they document 13-month out-performances of 32.89% and 6.45% for the 
PIPO and IPO samples respectively.  
Espenlaub, et al [2000], study the long-run performance of 588 IPOs that were 
launched in the UK market over the period 1985-92. They tried to improve on the work 
of Levis by making adjustments for systematic risk and cross-sectional varying 
exposure to size effects. They also control for event-clustering and cross-correlation in 
IPO stock returns by using the calendar-time approach that was originally developed by 
Jaffe [1974] and Mandelkar [1974] and subsequently used by Loughran and Ritter 
[1995] and Brav and Gompers [1997]. They document a 5-year CAR ranging from        
-4.30% to -42.77% and a calendar time return ranging from -4.20% to -40.20%, using a 
variety of benchmarks spanning the CAPM, HGSC index and the FF3F models. 
Goergen, et al [2007] followed with their study of a sample of 240 IPOs that were listed 
on the London Stock Exchange [LSE] from 1991 to 1995. Given the issues surrounding 
                                                          
16 These are state-owned firms where government sells a portion of its holdings to the public via an IPO.  
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the measurement of abnormal returns, they calculate long-run returns for a period of 
three years following the listing date using different methodologies and index returns on 
the FTSE All-Share [FTA], the HGSC indexes and size decile portfolios17 as the return 
benchmarks. Overall, they document abnormal returns ranging from -13.17% to            
-21.98%. 
The biggest sample to date on the UK market is that of Gregory, et al [2010] in their 
study of 2,499 IPOs that were launched into the market over the period 1975-2004. 
They document a general level of under-performance in event and calendar time using 
equally and value-weighted techniques, employing decile reference portfolios and a 
matched firm technique constructed on market capitalization only as the return 
benchmarks. More specifically, they report 3 and 5-year under-performances of 12.60% 
and 31.60% respectively in event time. In calendar time regressions using the equally-
weighted technique, they also document under-performances of 0.7% and 0.6% per 
month over 36 and 60-month horizons respectively which evaporate in a value-
weighted approach where each firm is weighted according to its market capitalization. 
Despite an attempt to improve on the previous works in the UK market, the study may 
                                                          
17 These are specially constructed portfolios of non-issuing firms on the LSE to which sample IPO firms are 
allocated based on their market capitalization at the start of each sample year.   
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not have used appropriate benchmarks in calculating the risk-adjusted returns of the 
IPO firms as matching was only based on size.  
It is important to note that virtually all of the prior studies that have studied the long-run 
performance of new issues of common stock using the control firm technique to select 
matching non-issuing firms used as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of the 
issuing sample firms have used the traditional matching method18, with the majority of 
the evidence revealing IPO under-performance. Cheng [2003] and Li and Zhao [2006] 
employ propensity score methods19 to re-evaluate the long-run performance of SEOs in 
the US. Using data on SEOs offered between 1970 and 1997, the former finds 
significant BHARs of between -6% and -14% over 3-5 years when matches are 
constructed on size, book-to-market and industry adopting the traditional method. 
However, using a propensity score approach, they find little evidence of significant 
abnormal returns. The latter study, using data on SEOs offered between 1986 and 
1997, finds an average 3-year BHAR of -16% using conventional matching which drops 
to an insignificant -4% with propensity score matching.  
                                                          
18 This is the technique that matches non-event firms to event firms on a dimension-by-dimension basis 
using pre-defined callipers.  
19 This is the technique that reduces the problems of choosing a matching non-event firm to a single 
problem of matching on an estimated score - the propensity score. The event effect is then estimated as 
the difference in outcome between the event firm and the non-event firm with the same propensity score. 
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In summary, it can be seen immediately that unlike the undisputed overwhelming 
evidence of IPO under-pricing and short-term returns which cuts across the globe, the 
evidence on long-run performance is far from conclusive and is at best, mixed and 
controversial. It is very obvious from the preceding analysis that the issue of the under-
performance or otherwise of IPO stocks is a function of a whole gamut of factors 
ranging from the market being examined, the sample period, the sample size, the 
length of the window over which the IPOs are being examined, the reference 
benchmark employed, the method of cumulating abnormal returns, the method of 
selecting the control firms and finally, the weighting schemes employed. This is clearly 
illustrated by the varied findings in the works of Cheng [2003] and Li and Zhao [2006] 
for the US market. 
[3.2.4] Econometric and Methodological Issues  
In the light of the mixed results from the previous studies, the evidence on long-run IPO 
under-performance, which if firmly established will be unassailable evidence against 
market efficiency, merits further investigation. In fact, Lyon, et al [1999], Ritter and 
Welch [2002], Loughran and Ritter [2000], Barber and Lyon [1997a], Brav, et al [2000] 
and Fama [1998] have all raised doubts on the documented long-run under-
performance of IPOs.  
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The key issue here is about the dimensions on which the analysis of the performance 
of new issues of common stock should be based. In his study of major corporate 
events in the finance literature in general, Fama [1998] posits that most of the long-
term return anomalies associated with these events become marginal or even 
disappear when exposed to different models of expected returns or when different 
statistical approaches are used to measure them. Furthermore, he attributes most of 
the anomalies to chance events with an overall expected abnormal return of zero 
implying that markets are still, by and large, efficient. More specifically, in the case of 
IPOs, he finds that previous studies may not have captured all possible risk factors in 
the determination of abnormal performance. Put differently, he questions the results of 
previous studies on IPO long-run under-performance by asserting that all possible risk 
factors associated with the average firm stock return may not have been accounted for 
in the models used in determining abnormal returns. He further asserts that neither the 
use of the firm characteristics [size and book-to-market factors only] based approach 
nor the FF3F model is free from bad model problems in the estimation of long-horizon 
abnormal stock returns and as such, the results of studies based on these approaches 
should be treated with caution. He concludes that all models of expected returns are 
incomplete descriptions of the systematic variation of expected returns across firms 
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and as the measured horizon is extended, the inadequacies of the models are 
accentuated due to a compounding of pricing errors. 
The several biases associated with using event-time methods and the market index as 
a reference portfolio for measuring abnormal returns are well documented by Barber 
and Lyon [1997a]. These biases include the new listing bias20, the rebalancing bias21 
and the skewness bias22. They further claim that CARs are most affected by the new 
listing bias and a measurement bias23, therefore long-run cumulative returns and the 
associated test statistics are generally positively biased. In contrast, BHARs are most 
affected by rebalancing and skewness biases and as a result, holding period returns 
and the associated test statistics are generally negatively biased. Barber and Lyon 
                                                          
20 This arises because sample firms generally have a long post-event history of returns, while firms that 
constitute the market index typically include new firms that begin trading after the event month [Barber and 
Lyon, 1997a]. The use of a market-index based model of expected return may bias upwards the BHARs 
and CARs of a random sample of stocks since the market index includes these new firms which tend to 
under-perform [Ritter, 1991]. 
21 This arises because the compound returns on a market portfolio are typically calculated assuming 
rebalancing, while the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing [Barber and Lyon, 
1997a]. This frequent rebalancing amplifies any possible biases in the periodic returns arising, for example 
from bid-ask errors, non-synchronous trading or price discreteness which generates ‘substantial spurious 
returns’. Hence, BHARs and CARs constructed with the aid of market indices will be biased downwards 
[Conrad and Kaul, 1993]. 
22 This arises because long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed leading to negative skewness in 
the sampling distribution of the standard t-statistics which may cause an over-rejection of the null of zero 
abnormal return in favour of an alternative of negative abnormal performance. 
23 CARs tend to be poor predictors of an investor’s wealth experience as measured by the BHAR method 
because BHAR involves compounding of returns, while CAR does not [Barber and Lyon, 1997a]. 
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[1997a]24  and Fama [1998] favour BHAR over CAR because the former is more 
symbolic of an investor’s long-run returns and typically does not involve rebalancing25.  
Barber and Lyon [1997a] further claim that the size and power of the test statistics 
associated with a measure of long-run abnormal returns could be severely undermined 
by the choice of the return metric and benchmark employed in evaluating abnormal 
returns. They posit that the use of CAR in conjunction with a market reference portfolio 
as the benchmark for calculating abnormal return yields misspecified test statistics in 
virtually all sampling situations. Hence, they advocate the use of BHAR [as the return 
metric] and the return of a well matched control firm [as the benchmark] in calculating 
abnormal returns. Fama [1998] and Mitchell and Stafford [2000] point out that BHAR 
may overstate long-run performance and suffers more skewness problems than CAR in 
statistical inferences. Mitchell and Stafford [2000] further aver that most event time 
studies assume independence in event firm stock returns leading to inadequate and 
spurious outcomes. They further argue that cross-sectional dependence and calendar 
clustering of stock returns can lead to spurious abnormal returns and misspecified test 
                                                          
24 They evaluate three general approaches for developing a benchmark for calculating abnormal returns - 
the market portfolio, an appropriately matched control firm and the FF3F model – and posit that the market 
portfolio and the FF3F are most plagued with bad model problems.   
25 The BHAR approach also avoids biases that may arise from security microstructure issues when the 
portfolio is frequently rebalanced [Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; Roll, 1983; Ball, et al, 1995]. 
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statistics in an event time analysis26. In order to redress this problem, they advocate 
the use of a calendar time portfolio approach that accounts for the dependence of 
event firm abnormal returns27.  
Mitchell and Stafford [2000] further argue that an alternative approach to using the 
calendar time approach28 is to track the performance of an event portfolio relative to an 
explicit asset pricing model. However, Loughran and Ritter [2000] argue against using 
this approach because it might be biased towards finding results that supports market 
efficiency. Early studies of long-term abnormal returns used the Sharpe [1964] and 
Lintner [1965] CAPM model. Recently, some studies have used the FF3F and FF-
Cahart-4F models. Even though these models are massive improvements on the 
CAPM, they are still not able to provide a full explanation for the variation in the cross-
section of stock returns [Fama, 1998].   
Lyon, et al [1999] add their voice to the debate by stating that the test statistics 
associated with long-run returns are only well-specified under two approaches – firstly, 
                                                          
26 They re-examine the reliability of long-term stock price performance estimates, using three large 
samples of major corporate events – mergers, SEOs and share repurchases. Using a calendar time 
portfolio approach, they find little or no evidence of long-term abnormal performance. 
27 Fama [1998], Lyon, et al [1999] and Brav, et al [2000] all show that the calendar time series returns 
yields well-specified test-statistics in almost all sampling situations. 
28 The main feature of the calendar time approach is to calculate calendar time portfolio returns for firms 
experiencing an event and determine whether they are abnormal in a multifactor regression framework. 
The estimated intercept from the regression is the post-event abnormal performance of the sample of 
event firms [Kothari and Warner, 2007]. 
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the BHAR approach under event time using well-constructed reference portfolios as 
return benchmarks and secondly, the mean monthly abnormal return [MMAR] 
approach using calendar time portfolios. These methods alleviate the skewness, 
rebalancing and new listing biases also identified by Barber and Lyon [1997a]. 
However, they assert that these well specified test statistics only hold in random 
samples as there remains the seemingly intractable potential problem of ‘bad asset 
modelling’. They further posit that all tests of long-run abnormal returns are implicitly a 
joint test of firstly, market efficiency and secondly, the validity of the asset pricing model 
used to estimate the abnormal returns. Following from this, they sound a note of 
caution that matching sample firms to control firms from the general population on the 
basis of size and book-to-market factors alone and/or controlling for same factors only 
in an explicit asset pricing model may not be sufficient to yield well-specified test 
statistics when samples are drawn from non-random samples, thus leading to incorrect 
inferences. To correct this, they recommend a detailed descriptive analysis of the 
population to reveal other firm specific risk factors or characteristics that could be used 
in selecting the matching firms to be used as benchmark for determining the long 
horizon abnormal returns of the sample firms. 
Kothari and Warner [1997] affirm that long horizon results are potentially very sensitive 
to the assumed model for generating abnormal returns and that failure to use the 
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correct model could lead to systematic biases and misspecifications. Their findings, in 
tandem with those of Fama and French [1993], also reveal that biases that arise from 
the method of cumulating abnormal returns, model specifications, survivorship and 
return variance which all tend to grow with the length of the observed window, more 
often than not lead to biased estimates of the test statistics resulting in incorrect 
inferences of abnormal performance. They also aver that non-random samples can 
have firm characteristics that are correlated with the determinants of firms’ expected 
rates of return which can result in biased abnormal returns if the correct benchmark is 
not used. They conclude that only the application of non-parametric tests and bootstrap 
procedures are likely to reduce the misspecifications associated with tests for long-run 
abnormal returns. 
In their study of the anomalies literature, Brav, et al [2000] explore the effect of various 
long-run horizon stock tests and their effect on the measured performance of IPO 
stocks. They find that IPO firm returns are similar to that of non-issuing firms matched 
on size and book-to-market factors. Their results also show that SEOs under-perform 
various characteristics-based benchmarks in event time methodologies, but not in time 
series factor based models. They also document a model misspecification problem in 
their study by showing that small changes to the factor specifications in the FF3F 
model improve the predictive power of the model. More specifically, they show in their 
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results how a variation of models, trading rules and benchmarks influences the 
magnitude of the measured abnormal performances. In fact, using a benchmark that 
matches IPO firm returns on a portfolio composed of non-issuing firms that have been 
matched on size and book-to-market factors only, the measured abnormal performance 
swings from negative to positive over the measured horizon.  
In their study of US IPOs over the period 1935-1972, Gompers and Lerner [2003] show 
that the magnitude of the measured performance of the sample firms depends upon 
the method of return measurement used in the analysis. They posit that the results of 
their study serve to underscore the questions about IPO performance with the 
weakness of the evidence for under-performance and by extension, against market 
efficiency raising doubts about whether a unique ‘IPO effect’ indeed exists. Ritter and 
Welch [2002] document different patterns of long horizon stock price performance of 
new issues of common stock in event time and assert that the measured performance 
is very sensitive to the choice of econometric methodology employed. In their study of 
US IPOs over the period 1980-2001, they find that the observed under-performance 
reduces when a matching-firm technique of calculating abnormal returns is used. They 
also document differing patterns in the measured performances in multifactor 
regressions in calendar time when the number of factors in the models are varied.   
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The choice of a weighting scheme is also a relevant issue in measuring abnormal 
performance [Brav and Gompers, 1997; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Brav, et al, 2000]. 
Fama [1998] argues that apparent anomalies in long-term post-event returns shrink 
and often evaporate when event firms are value-weighted rather than equally-weighted, 
because the former more accurately captures the total wealth effects of investors. This 
becomes more illuminating when considered from the view-point of a large institutional 
investor who will not ordinarily hold an equally-weighted portfolio. Hence, value-
weighted performance may provide a more useful benchmark and does not provide 
strong evidence against market efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted 
measure of abnormal performance. 
Cheng [2003] and Li and Zhao [2006] employ propensity score methods to re-evaluate 
the long-run performance of firms conducting SEOs in the US. Using data on SEOs 
offered between 1970 and 1997, they both find significant BHARs when matches are 
constructed on size, book-to-market and industry using the dimension-by-dimension 
matching method. However, using a propensity score approach, they find little or no 
evidence of significant abnormal returns. 
Following from the above, it does appear that an accurate model of expected return is 
at the heart of the current methodological debate in the literature and this has arisen 
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because a model of expected return must be specified before abnormal returns can be 
delineated. Kothari and Warner [2007] aver that the bias as well as the precision of the 
measure of expected returns can vary across different methods, thus affecting the 
magnitude, direction and properties of the excess returns. They also contend that some 
of the critical issues that surround the analysis of long horizon stock price performance 
are risk adjustment, abnormal return modelling, the aggregation/measurement of 
abnormal returns and the statistical/economic significance of the abnormal return 
measure.  
In long horizon tests, it is vital to make apt adjustments for risk to deduce an abnormal 
price performance for at least two reasons. Firstly, a very small error in adjusting for 
risk can make economic differences of great proportions when calculating abnormal 
returns over long periods. Secondly, it is still unclear, to date, which expected return 
model is appropriate, given that estimates of long horizon abnormal returns are very 
sensitive to the chosen return model. As pointed out by Fama [1998] and Brav, et al 
[2000], all the current approaches used for the estimation of abnormal returns are 
subject to problems as no method is able to minimize, let alone eliminate these 
problems. In fact, Lyon, et al [1999] recommend that the study of long-run abnormal 
returns be subjected to stringent ‘out-of-sample’ testing.  
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There seems to be a general consensus in the literature that the choice of a 
performance measurement methodology determines both the magnitude and direction 
of the measured abnormal performance as well as the size and power of the statistical 
tests. The current studies in the literature make a strong contribution to the literature on 
the analysis of long-term stock returns based on sound theoretical reasoning and 
empirical analysis. The studies do not find that one approach is always preferred to the 
other as they provide in each case the relative merits and demerits of each approach; 
however, there seems to be general unanimity on the existence of model 
misspecification problems, most especially with the time-series factor-based models. 
All the studies, most especially the methodology papers, generally agree that existing 
approaches in the literature are associated with well documented biases that make it 
difficult to reach definitive conclusions on the issue of the long horizon performance of 
new issues of common stock.  
The methodology papers also agree on the two main approaches to long horizon 
security performance evaluation – the characteristics-based approaches in event time 
and the factor based approaches in calendar time. The former approach assumes that 
equity risk is captured by an observable set of firm-specific characteristics, while the 
latter assumes that the systematic patterns in average stock returns can be aptly 
captured by certain risk factors in an expected return model. The authors, however, 
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caution that if these discernible characteristics are only inadequate proxies for risk, 
then the characteristics-based approach might misclassify firms’ riskiness. They also 
point out that both approaches are likely to suffer from model misspecification problems. 
Against this backdrop, the debate on the long horizon stock price performance of new 
issues of common stock is far from conclusive; however, there seems to be a general 
agreement amongst the studies that several potential firm characteristics and/or risk 
factors that shape the return profile of firms may be missing. In the context of the 
characteristics-based approaches in event-time, long horizon IPO stock price under-
performance may be due to imperfect matching procedures, while in factor based 
approaches in calendar time, the phenomenon may likely be the result of these 
approaches not being able to fully explain the variation in the cross-section of stock 
returns. Also, there appears to be harmony in prior research on IPO long-term 
performance that because it lacks a proper methodological framework, the analysis has 
been less rigorous and essentially naive.  
The inconclusive IPO under-performance evidence may just be a manifestation of the 
statistical inadequacies of traditional matching methods or inadequate matching criteria 
rather than an anomaly that challenges the efficient market hypothesis; hence, the 
finding may not be robust to changes in the matching procedure or criteria used in 
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selecting the benchmark firms. Specifically, it could well be that by increasing the 
quality of the matching process using a multi-dimensional procedure that seeks to 
minimize the differences in ex-ante firm characteristics between the event and non-
event firms at the IPO date, a solution could be found to the IPO under-performance 
puzzle.  
It is also pertinent to note that though the singular objective of the matching algorithm 
of alternatively comparing new issues of common stock with a set of aptly matched 
firms29 is to ensure that issuing and matching firms have fairly similar risk profiles, the 
results may indicate that the critical performance indices of new issues and matching 
firms may conform much better than for the size and market-to-book only matched 
firms. Therefore, this may mean that selecting the matching firms according to their 
size, market-to-book and other key firm risk factors related to stock returns may 
facilitate a better match between IPO and the control firms. 
Lyon, et al [1999] further buttress the fact of the inappropriateness of the current 
approaches to the analysis of long-horizon stock analysis by positing that the use of the 
size and market-to-book factors alone as firm risk factors can lead to misspecified test 
statistics and spurious inferences in certain sampling situations. In fact, they are quoted 
                                                          
29 An appropriate matching process would be one that goes beyond the traditional dimensions of size and 
market-to-book to considering other key return-determining factors that could be influential to experimental 
outcomes and in the process explain further the cross-sectional variation in firms’ stock returns. 
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more clearly: “Though firm size and market-to-book ratio has received considerable 
attention from the recent research in financial economics, some would argue that other 
variables explain the cross-section of stock returns. To address this issue, we 
recommend that researchers compare sample firms to the general population on the 
basis of other characteristics. A thoughtful descriptive analysis should provide insights 
regarding the important dimensions on which researchers should develop a 
performance benchmark”. [pp. 198]. Barber and Lyon [1997b] also argue that “as future 
research in financial economics discovers additional variables that explain the cross-
sectional variation in common stock returns, it will also be important to consider these 
additional variables when matching sample firms to control firms”. [pp. 370-371].   
Against this backdrop, the principal motive of this study is to firstly, unearth these 
additional variables that could potentially explain further the cross-sectional variation in 
IPO stock returns; secondly, use them as additional risk factors to select the non-
issuing control firms from the general population and finally, determine if the 
performance of the issuing sample firms are significantly different from those of the 
non-issuing control firms using a battery of methods and techniques that also checks 
for robustness.  
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[3.2.5] Matching Models 
It is important to note that when examining long-run returns, the researcher must first of 
all, construct a control sample against which to measure abnormal returns. It is the 
vagueness surrounding the selection of this control sample [in the case of the 
characteristics-based approaches] and appropriate composite firm risk factors [in the 
case of the factor-based models] that generally provides the greatest source of 
criticism. The choice of a fitting expected return model is crucial to estimating the 
valuation effects of new equity issuances in the long-term as any study investigating 
the relative performance of securities must have a notion of what ‘normal’ or ‘expected’ 
returns are. To underscore this point more succinctly, let us express the t-period 
expected return on stock   as: 
 {     |   }     {     } ……. [3.1] 
where   is the element of the return attributable to the IPO [i.e. the ‘IPO effect'], 
 {     } is the unconditional          expected returns on stock   and  {     |   } 
is the observed          returns on stock   conditioned on the IPO event. 
Generally, event studies estimate the size of   to determine the impact of the IPO 
event. Over a short horizon,  {     } is infinitesimal and the estimate of the return 
attributable to the IPO event,       is usually not sensitive to the choice of the asset 
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pricing model. However, over long periods,  {     } is generally greater than   and as 
a result, makes it extremely intricate splitting perfectly the average ex-post returns into 
the two components in order to establish if a unique ‘IPO effect’ exists. Indeed, it has 
been shown that traditional asset pricing models such as the CAPM and the FF3F do 
not explain fully the cross-section of stock returns [Fama and French, 1993]. 
A valid scientific research enquiry into the analysis of firm returns would typically 
suggest that if expected returns are a function of a set of pivotal firm characteristics, 
then the researcher must match the sample returns to those on benchmarks 
comprising firms whose return-determining ex-ante characteristics are similar to that of 
the sample group. By so doing, the outcomes of any analysis of long horizon stock 
price analysis would be free of any form of bias, thus making it easier to reach 
definitive conclusions. This task is accomplished with a range of techniques available in 
the corporate finance literature spanning dimension-by-dimension, propensity score 
and distance score matching procedures.  
Dimension-by-Dimension matching: This technique, also known as the traditional 
method of matching and the most used in empirical corporate finance, generally 
assesses the difference between two sets of firms – one experiencing the event     
and the other not experiencing the event      – based on a set of observable ex-ante 
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attributes,  . Hence, the event effect for any firm   in the event group is the difference 
between its outcome and the outcome of a fairly similar firm   in the non-event group 
that matches it on all germane dimensions. If the post-selection outcomes for the event 
and non-event firms are denoted as    and     respectively, then the event effect 
equals,            , where      is such that              for all   relevant dimensions 
[Kothari and Warner, 2007]. 
Matching on all possible dimensions and estimating the matched pair discrepancies in 
results using the traditional method poses great challenges. Firstly, characteristics are 
not always precisely matched as more often than not, the size and market-to-book 
factors are matched with callipers in the neighbourhood of 20-30%. When matches are 
imprecise, sizeable biases could amplify as one negotiates different characteristics or 
dimensions being matched. Secondly, when the number of dimensions to be matched 
increases and the matching callipers become thinner and finer [i.e. size and market-to-
book factors matched within 5-10% rather than 20-30%], finding suitable matches 
become complex or even impossible [Li and Prabhala, 2007].  
This probably explains why matching has been done on a limited range of variables to 
date, despite the assertions of Fama [1998] and Lyon, et al [1999] that researchers 
should conduct a comprehensive descriptive analysis to reveal other firm risk factors, 
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other than the size and market-to-book, that can be used in explaining the cross-
section of average stock returns30. This work avers that the previous studies may not 
have achieved sufficient breadth31 and depth32 in the matching process. Basically, 
better matching procedures should aim at achieving these twin objectives in the 
matching process.   
Propensity Scores: To some extent, the propensity score technique33 overcomes the 
challenges of dimension-to-dimension matching by reducing the problems to a single 
problem of matching on one criterion – the propensity score [Kothari and Warner, 2007]. 
The propensity score is the probability of the event,     |  , usually estimated from the 
following probit model equation: 
    |              ……. [3.2] 
where the event firms belong to group  , non-event firms belong to group   ,   
denotes a set of explanatory variables,   is a vector of parameters and       |   is 
                                                          
30 Further, Fama [1998] argues that a matching technique based on size only can produce different 
abnormal returns from one that is based on size and market-to-book due to the fact that these factors do 
not capture all cross-firm variations in abnormal returns. Deductively, a matching technique based on size, 
market-to-book and other key return-determining firm risk factors should produce different abnormal 
returns when compared with a technique that is based on size and market-to-book only. 
31 This basically entails matching event firms to non-event firms across a host of possible risk factors and 
key return-determining characteristics. 
32 This involves choosing from a qualifying fixed set of non-event firms a matching non-event firm that is 
closest to the event firm as much as possible based on a criterion that seeks to minimise the differences of 
the characteristics of the event firm from the chosen non-event firm. 
33 This technique has been used by Cheng [2003] and Li and Zhao [2006] in their study of the long-run 
performance of SEOs in the US market. 
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the probability of not undergoing the event. The post-selection outcomes for the event 
and non-event firms are given in the following equations below: 
           ……. [3.3] 
               ……. [3.4] 
where,    denotes error terms,    denotes explanatory variables,    denotes parameter 
vectors and     {    }. For the group of event firms, the effectiveness of the event is 
then judged by testing whether the difference in outcomes between the event and non-
event groups is significantly different from zero using the following equation: 
 {        |    }    ……. [3.5] 
Hence, the event effect is the difference in outcome between the event and non-event 
groups with equal probability or identical propensity scores. The ease of the propensity 
score estimator and its uncomplicated rationalization makes it generally attractive; 
however, there are a few challenges in its implementation. Firstly, since the propensity 
scores are not known ex-ante, they must be estimated in the first instance, using 
parametric approaches, which may lead to imprecise estimates. Secondly, because the 
propensity score estimates are not exact, the corresponding event effects are also 
estimated with some error. Put differently, due to the fact that the event effects must be 
estimated, precise matching based on the exact event probability is virtually impossible. 
Thirdly, is the knotty issue of which variables are to be included in estimating the 
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probability of undergoing the event [i.e. the propensity scores] and the event effects 
[Kothari and Warner, 2007]34.  
Distance Scores: Similar in concept to the propensity score, distance scores equally 
surmounts the challenges of dimension-by-dimension matching by reducing the 
problems to a single problem of matching on a single criterion – the distance score. For 
each firm   in the event group, this approach calculates a distance score for each firm   
in the non-event group based on a set of germane observable ex-ante characteristics 
or dimensions. The distance score for firm  , denoted as    , in the non-event group is 
the sum of the absolute or squared differences between the characteristics of firm   in 
the event group and the characteristics of firm   standardized by the respective cross-
sectional standard deviation of each of the characteristics   in the period when the 
characteristic is measured. More formally, the matching technique is set out as follows: 
     ∑
{              }
 
  
 
    …….. [3.6] 
 
where   is the number of dimensions that are matched,       ) is the dimension value 
  of firm   in the non-event group,        is the dimension value   of firm   in the event 
group and    is the cross-sectional standard deviation of dimension   in the period 
when it is measured. Standardizing the absolute or squared deviations of a particular 
                                                          
34 Heckman and Navarro-Lozano [2004] argue that using ‘quality of fit’ as a model selection in estimating 
propensity scores leads to great difficulties.   
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dimension with its cross-sectional standard deviation across all firms in the population 
ensures that dimensions with small cross-sectional variation are given more weight for 
the same magnitude of deviation when compared to those dimensions that are more 
diffused in the population [Jegadeesh, 2000]. For each given firm   in the event group, 
that firm in the pool of potential matches [i.e. non-event group] that minimises the sum 
of the standardized absolute or squared differences across all the possible dimensions 
is chosen as the benchmark [Butler and Wan, 2010]. More formally, the author’s 
problem of choosing an appropriate matching firm from the non-event group for each 
firm in the event group reduces to optimizing the following expression: 
         {     |  }  ∑
{              }
 
  
 
    …….. [3.7] 
Due to the highlighted challenges with using the dimension-by-dimension and 
propensity score approaches, this study will adopt the distance score technique to 
select appropriate matching firms for the sample of IPO firms from the general 
population. The lure of this technique lies in the fact that it achieves significant depth 
and breadth in the matching process, just like in the propensity score approach, while 
avoiding the problems that tend to be associated with the latter. The simplicity of the 
distance score technique and its unfussy explanation also makes it generally attractive. 
The matching procedure closely follows that of Jegadeesh [2000] in his study of SEOs 
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in the US. Spiess and Affleck-Graves [1995 and 1999], Butler and Wan [2010] and Gao, 
et al [2006] also adopt versions of this approach. 
[3.2.6] Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The methodological question is the most crucial of all the fundamental philosophical 
questions that underlie all enquiries into the performance of IPOs and the crux of the 
current debate in the IPO literature. How can the enquirer go about finding out 
whatever can be known about the performance of IPOs? The answer to this question is 
usually constrained by the answers to the ontological35 and epistemological36 questions; 
that is, not just any methodology is appropriate. A real objective and systematic 
approach that seeks to study the long-run performance of IPOs must be one that 
mandates control of all possible intervening factors or variables that can influence the 
performance of the average firm in the real world 37 . Hence, the methodological 
question cannot be reduced to a question of methods as the researcher must, prior to a 
                                                          
35 What is the form and nature of the long-run performance of IPOs and therefore, what is there that can 
be known about it? Put differently, how ‘really are things’ in the world of IPO firms’ performance? Only 
those questions that relate to the matter of the long-run performance of IPOs within a legitimate, unbiased, 
logical and ‘water-tight’ scientific enquiry can be admissible; all other questions, such as those bordering 
on values, moral significance, argumentation or interpretivism which fall outside of the realm of a valid 
logical enquiry, are ruled out. 
36 What is the nature of the relationship between the enquirer and what can be known about the long-run 
performance of IPOs? It is pertinent to note that the answer here is constrained by the answer to the 
ontological question in footnote 35. Here, the posture of the enquirer must be one of objectivity or value 
freedom in order to be able to study the long-run performance of IPOs. 
37 The aim in a valid enquiry into the long-run performance of IPOs is to determine if a ‘unique’ IPO effect 
indeed exists in the market place that makes issuing firms that are similar in all respects to a set of 
comparable non-issuing firms based on a set of ex-ante characteristics and differ only in that they 
experience the IPO event, perform significantly worse in the long-run than their non-issuing counterparts. 
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commencement of any study, have an impeccable pre-determined methodology to 
which methods must be fitted in order to arrive at unbiased outcomes. Do IPOs really 
underperform in the long-run? It seems achieving a better match between the IPOs and 
the control firms may eventually answer this question.  
Following from the above, it may just be that the documented under-performance of 
new issues may be due to fundamental differences in firm characteristics between 
these new issues and mature non-issuing firms. It is also worthy to note that IPO firms 
may differ from their non-issuing counterparts with respect to a number of differing 
fundamental firm characteristics at the date of listing and provided that some of these 
characteristics are a function of stock returns, they might provide more illumination on 
the long-run price performance of the stock of IPO firms and why they also behave 
differently from those of seasoned non-issuing firms. In fact, there is a huge body of 
empirical literature that has established strong cross-sectional links between some of 
these firm characteristics and stock returns38. The results from the orthodox analysis of 
abnormal stock returns39 should be interpreted with caution as this phenomenon may 
just be due to an imperfect match between the IPOs and the control firms. In the 
context of the traditional approaches in event time using the BHAR approach, IPO 
                                                          
38 See Ritter [1991], Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004], Teoh, et al [1998 (a and b)], Levis [1993], 
Loughran and Ritter [2001], Spiess and Affleck-Graves [1995], Jain and Kini [2000] and Bhabra and 
Pettway [2003]. 
39 These are CAR, BHAR and FF3F. 
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under-performance may be the consequence of imperfect matching procedures, while 
in factor based approaches, the phenomenon may be the result of these approaches 
not being able to fully explain the variation in the cross-section of stock returns. 
Do stocks of firms going public really under-perform those of more mature firms and, if 
so, over what horizon is the under-performance statistically significant? The definition 
of a “long horizon” in event studies is subjective and generally applies to event 
windows of over a year [Kothari and Warner, 2007]. Therefore, instead of merely 
relying on the typical length of three or five years that have been used in prior research 
[Brav and Gompers, 1997; Brav, et al; 2000; Kooli and Suret, 2004; Gompers and 
Lerner; 2003; Boisson and Sentis, 2010] this study will attempt an investigation of the 
long-horizon stock price performance over differing time horizons spanning 1-5 years.  
A scientific approach of cautiously selecting the non-issuing control firms from the 
general population in the first stage and then controlling for all possible risk factors that 
could be associated with the average firm stock price performance in the second stage 
could help solve the protracted puzzle of the documented long-run under-performance 
of new issues of common stock. Against this backdrop, the first empirical study will 
undertake to provide an answer to the following knotty research question: 
 Do IPOs really under-perform? 
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If the answer is in the affirmative, then the questions below would follow logically: 
 Is the under-performance due to fundamental differences in firm characteristics 
between IPOs and the more seasoned non-issuing firms? 
 Is the under-performance the result of an imperfect match between IPOs and 
the control firms? 
 Is the under-performance a manifestation of statistical inadequacies of 
traditional matching methods or inadequate matching criteria? 
 Is the scale of the observed under-performance sensitive to the matching 
process? 
 Over what horizon is the under-performance statistically significant? 
 Is the under-performance really an anomaly that challenges the efficient market 
hypothesis?  
Following from the research questions above, the central hypothesis under 
investigation in the first empirical study is as follows: 
Hypothesis – [H0]: The documented under-performance of IPO firms is not genuine. 
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[3.3] DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
[3.3.1] Data and Sample Selection 
The following criteria are used in selecting the final sample [i] Only issues of common 
stock are retained with unit and exchange traded offerings excluded40 [ii] All financial, 
real estate and utilities are excluded41 [iii] All issues with offer price [offer proceeds] 
less than £0.1 [£0.5m] are excluded42. The LSE database provide all the offering 
characteristics for the final sample [date of issue, issuer, industry, offering price, 
number of shares on offer, gross proceeds, number of issued shares and market 
capitalization]. Finally, all firm characteristics are obtained from a unique database of 
all UK firms held at the University of Leeds43. The final sample of 746 IPOs is from a 
population of 1,724 IPOs [a fair representation of 43%] drawn from the LSE database  
 
 
                                                          
40 These offerings are not equity offerings of specific firms trading and operating in the market place; rather, 
they represent unit offerings of an investment basket across different asset classes by asset managers to 
potential investors. These offerings have also been excluded due to the difficulty in separating the value of 
the offerings [usually common stock with warrants].  
41 By excluding financial and real estate institutions, the study controls for ‘extreme out-performance bias’ 
since these IPOs usually come to the market at the maturity stage of these firms; this also applies to 
utilities which tend to be ‘monopolists’ in the market and are generally government privatised IPOs [Ritter, 
1991; Menyah, et al, 1995; Espenlaub, et al, 2000]. 
42 By excluding these relatively small IPOs, the study avoids firstly, any ‘extreme under-performance bias’ 
that may be associated with these class of offerings and secondly, the low-price stock effect [Loughran 
and Ritter, 1996].   
43 The author would like to thank Prof Nick Wilson, in conjunction with the Leeds University Business 
School, for providing this database which proved invaluable. 
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TABLE 3.4: SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE OF IPO FIRMS 
The table shows how the filters were applied to arrive at the final sample of IPO firms 
listed on the LSE, going from January 1999 to December 2006. 
Population          1,724         
Exclude: 
Unit Offerings           82 
Financial Institutions      588 
Real Estate           68 
Utilities           15   
Issues with offer price [proceeds] < £0.1 [£0.5m]  155 
Issues with no price data on Datastream       70 
Total Exclusions             978    
Final Sample              746    
 
of IPOs and covers the period January 1999 to December 200644. Table 3.4 illustrates 
how the filters were applied to arrive at the final sample of IPOs. 
 
[3.3.2] Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.5 presents a distribution of the key offering characteristics for the IPO sample. 
Panel A presents the distribution of the sample by year, both in terms of the number of 
offers and the gross proceeds, while in Panels B and C, firms are categorized by gross 
                                                          
44 The choice of period for the IPO sample is conditioned on the length of the event and evaluation 
windows. Firstly, given that the evaluation window for performance and survival for this fixed cohort of 
firms is five and six years with window end-points of 2011 and 2012 respectively for the last set of 
observed IPO firms [i.e. 2006 IPOs], the end-point for the event window must of necessity be 2006. 
Secondly, in order to permit as recent a dataset as possible that has previously not been investigated in 
the UK IPO market, the study has also decided to use 1999 as the start-off point for the event window.  
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proceeds and market capitalization respectively. In Panel D, firms are categorized by 
industry, while firms are categorized by industry and year in Panel E, where industry is 
determined by the standard industry classification [SIC] codes. The firms are 
categorized by underwriter market share in Panel F, where market share has been 
computed as the proportion of gross offer proceeds attributable to each underwriter in 
the period, while Panel G provides a summary of the key statistics. 
Inspection of Panel A reveals that the sample shows clear evidence of clustering. For 
example, 545 of the 746 sample offers [73.06%] occurred in 2000 and the period going 
from 2004 to 2006. These years account for 61.53% [£16,619.16m of the £27,011.58m 
total] of the aggregate gross proceeds which seems to be consistent with the notion of 
‘hot’ markets [Ritter, 1984]45. A closer look at the IPO distribution shows that the 
number of IPOs moved sharply in 2000 to 150 [20.11% of total sample] from 48 IPOs 
[6.43% of total sample] in 1999. It subsequently fell in the three years following sliding 
progressively to 63 IPOs [8.44% of total sample], 50 IPOs [6.70% of total sample] and 
40 IPOs [5.36% of total sample] in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. There was an 
upswing in 2004 as the number of IPOs moved sharply to 138 [18.50% of total sample],
                                                          
45 Hot market periods are normally characterised by a large number of offerings, a high volume of gross 
offer proceeds and a high level of IPO under-pricing and immediate after-market returns. More often than 
not, start-ups, fledgling and poor quality firms also tend to take advantage of this booming market period to 
float their offers.  
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TABLE 3.5: DISTRIBUTION OF IPO FIRMS’ OFFERING CHARACTERISTICS 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. In Panel A, firms are categorized by year with gross proceeds 
calculations based upon the amount sold at the offer and computed as the total number of shares offered multiplied by the offer prices. The average 
age/proceeds in each year is calculated as the total age/gross proceeds divided by the number of firms that went public in that year. In Panels B and C, firms 
are categorized by gross proceeds and market capitalization respectively. Market capitalization, which is based on the number of shares issued by each firm 
comprising the amount offered and the amount retained by the old shareholders, is calculated as the total shares on issue multiplied by the market prices on 
the first listing day for all the IPO firms in each category, while the average market capitalization is computed as the gross market capitalization in each 
category divided by the number of firms in that category. In Panel D, firms are categorized by industry with the gross proceeds in each industry representing 
the total shares offered by the firms in that industry multiplied by their respective offer prices. The average proceeds in each industry is computed as the total 
gross proceeds divided by the number of firms in that industry. In Panel E, firms are categorized by industry and year, where industry is determined by the 
standard industry classification [SIC] codes. Finally, in Panel F, firms are categorized by underwriter market share, where market share has been computed 
as the proportion of gross offer proceeds attributable to each underwriter in the period. Panel G provides a summary of the key statistics. 
Panel A: By year 
Year               No of IPOs      Average Age [Yrs.]   Gross proceeds [£’m]      Average proceeds [£’m] 
1999            48         2.44    2,838.06    59.13 
2000          150         2.58    6,685.24    44.57 
2001            63         3.38    1,487.08    23.60 
2002            50         4.99    3,932.43                            78.65 
2003            40         3.84    2,134.85    53.37 
2004          138         3.11    2,679.68    19.42 
2005          152         2.44    3,355.98    22.08 
2006          105         2.74    3,898.26    37.13 
 
TOTAL          746         2.96              27,011.58                36.21 
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Panel B: By gross proceeds 
Bound [£’m]       No of IPOs       Gross proceeds [£’m]                  Average proceeds [£’m] 
 ≤ 10          463       1,621.85         3.50 
< 10 BUT ≤ 20         107       1,407.36       13.15 
< 20 BUT ≤ 50           89                    2,744.02       30.83 
< 50 BUT ≤ 100           37                    2,516.79                               68.02 
> 100            50                  18,721.56                              374.43 
 
TOTAL          746                 27,011.58                                           36.21 
 
Panel C: By market capitalization 
Bound [£’m]        No of IPOs      Gross market cap [£’m]             Average market cap [£’m] 
≤ 10                           197           1,088.71       5.53 
< 10 BUT ≤ 20                  171                       2,471.94                             14.46 
< 20 BUT ≤ 50                  184                       5,688.16                             30.91 
< 50 BUT ≤ 100                    80                       5,530.56                             69.13 
> 100                   114                     74,880.95                          656.85 
 
TOTAL                   746        89,660.32                                       120.19 
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Panel D: By industry 
Industry                       No of IPOs      Gross proceeds [£’m]           Average proceeds [£’m]                            
Aerospace & Automobiles    6           185.00       30.83 
IT & Computer Services              154                    4,786.14                   31.08 
Health & Pharmaceuticals               79                    1,313.67                               16.63 
Food Producers & Processors               14                         63.12                  4.51 
Personal Care & Household Goods              18                       193.19                    10.73 
Leisure, Hotel & Restaurants               64                    2,778.95                               43.42 
Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas             130                    3,401.06                               26.16 
Construction & Engineering               58                    1,248.68                   21.53 
Wholesalers & Retailers                27                    2,932.99                             108.63 
Media & Entertainment                79                    3,830.85                               48.49 
Telecommunications                23                    2,353.80                            102.34 
Transport                 10                       259.90                                25.99 
Support Services                84                    3,664.23                                43.62 
 
TOTAL                746                  27,011.58                                           36.21 
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Panel E: By industry & year 
Industry    1999               2000             2001            2002          2003               2004                2005               2006 
Aerospace & Automobiles   1            0      0             1       0                        1                        1                       2 
IT & Computer Services   15                          61                      9                   5                  4                       26                     25                       9 
Health & Pharmaceuticals   0                           14                      8                   8                  4                       17                     17                     11 
Food Producers & Processors   0                            0                       2                   1                  3                         5                       1                       2 
Personal Care & Household Goods  2                            0                       3                   1                  0                         8                       1                       3 
Leisure, Hotel & Restaurants  11                          13                      8                   6                  4                         4                      10                      8 
Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas   1                            6                       5                  11                12                       23                     46                    26 
Construction & Engineering   3                            3                       6                   5                  2                       11                     15                     13 
Wholesalers & Retailers    4                            7                       2                   3                  1                         3                       3                       4 
Media & Entertainment    3                           24                      6                   2                  5                        17                    15                       7 
Telecommunications    2                            4                       2                   0                  0                         3                      6                        6 
Transport     0                            4                       1                   1                  3                         0                      0                        1 
Support Services    6                           14                     11                  6                  2                       20                     12                     13 
 
TOTAL     48                       150                     63                  50                40                    138                    152                  105 
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Panel F: By underwriter 
Underwriter                        No of IPOs      Market Share [£’m]    % of Market Share     Rank                                                          
Merrill Lynch Europe Plc   13             4,840.63                 17.92                     1 
JP Morgan Cazenove Ltd   18            3,164.73     11.72                        2 
UBS Investment Bank Ltd   13            2,138.70       7.92                        3 
Goldman Sachs Equity     8            1,915.33       7.09                        4 
Lazard & Co. Ltd       3            1,884.90       6.98                        5 
Credit Suisse Securities     9            1,661.02       6.15                        6 
Linklaters      1            1,087.50       4.03                        7 
Citibank NA       2               974.47       3.61                        8 
Colins Stewart Europe Ltd   41               769.95       2.85                        9 
Deutsche Bank AG      4               753.08       2.79                      10 
Schroder Salomon Smith Barney   1               734.71       2.72                      11 
Others                633            7,086.56     26.22                12-109  
 
TOTAL                746                                          27,011.58                                        100.00 
Using the technique of Megginson and Weiss [1991] and Beatty and Ritter [1986], the underwriter reputation variable for each underwriter has been derived based on the percentage 
of the market share, reflecting the total market gross offer proceeds for the sample over the study period. The total number of underwriters is 109 with rank 1 denoting the underwriter 
with the highest percentage of market share [tagged as the most prestigious underwriter] and rank 109 denoting the underwriter with the least percentage of market share [tagged the 
least prestigious underwriter]. 
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Panel G: SUMMARY OF KEY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF IPO FIRMS THAT WENT PUBLIC OVER THE PERIOD 1999 AND 2006 
Total IPOs                           746   
Total Gross Proceeds [£’m]                                          27,011.58 
Average Gross Proceeds [£’m]                               36.21 
Total Market Capitalization [£’m]                                          89,660.32 
Average Market Capitalization [£’m]                  120.19 
No of Internet & IT Software IPOs                               126   
No of Internet & IT Software IPOs as % of Total IPOs                16.89 
No of Internet & IT Software IPOs as % of 1999 & 2000 IPOs               32.32 
2000 Internet & IT Software IPO Gross Proceeds as % of 2000 Gross Proceeds         35.24 
Average Age [Yrs.] – All Internet & IT Software IPOs                    2.75 
Average Age [Yrs.] – 1999 & 2000 Internet & IT Software IPOs                   1.77 
Average Age [Yrs.] – All IPOs [Ex. Internet & IT Software IPOs]                    3.01 
Average Age [Yrs.] – All IPOs                         2.96 
No of Underwriters                                 109 
Mkt. Share [%] of Most Prestigious Underwriters [11 of 109 total]                73.78 
Mkt. Share [%] of Least Prestigious Underwriters [98 of 109 total]               26.22 
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rising further to 152 [20.38% of total sample] in 2005 before closing out at 105 IPOs 
[14.08% of total sample] in the final year [2006]. The period 1999-2001 is generally 
known as the ‘technology bubble’ or ‘dotcom’ years that actually started in 1997, a 
period that saw a great number of fledgling firms take advantage of the transitory 
opportunity created by the market heat at the time to float their IPOs. Hence, for this 
study, the period 1999 – 2001 will be treated as the ‘dotcom’ period. 
The distribution of the sample by size, in terms of gross proceeds and market 
capitalization is presented in Panels B and C respectively. Both Panels show that tiny 
IPOs and small firms [gross proceeds and market capitalization < £10m] represent 463 
and 197 of 746 total IPOs [62.06% and 26.41%] respectively, while large IPOs and big 
firms [gross proceeds and market capitalization > £100m] represent 50 and 114 of 746 
total IPOs [6.70% and 15.28%] respectively. IPOs with gross proceeds and market 
capitalization between £10 and £100 million represent 31.24% and 58.31% of the 
sample respectively. The dispersion in the size of the IPOs and the sample firms and 
their subsequent performance will have a definite impact on the size and direction of 
the results via the weighting schemes employed. The distribution of the sample by 
industry both in terms of the number of offers and the gross proceeds is presented in 
Panel D. It reveals that the sample covers different industries. Information Technology 
[IT] and Computer Services; Leisure, Hotels and Restaurants; Chemicals, Mining, Oil 
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and Gas; Media and Entertainment and Support Services represent 511 out of 746 
total IPOs [68.50%]. About 68.35% [£18,461.23m of the £27,011.58m total] of the 
aggregate gross proceeds in the sample were raised by these industries.   
In Panel E, which presents the distribution of the IPOs by industry and year, the 
number of Internet and Information technology [IT] Software IPOs [included in the IT 
and Computer Services industry] in 1999 and 2000 combined is 64 out of 198 sub-total 
IPOs [32.32%] with gross proceeds in 2000 alone of £2,356.09m out of £6,685.24m 
total in 2000 [35.24%]. Glowing growth projections and readily accessible capital led 
many fledgling Internet and IT software firms to the IPO market in this period. This 
boom in the IPO market was a global phenomenon at the time and was more 
pronounced in the United States. During these years, a record number of firms went 
from start-ups to IPOs in less than two years. The vibrant IPO market coupled with the 
desire of many private equity investors in some of the start-up firms to realize their 
investments and make swift returns led to a situation where many of these firms went 
public with unproven business plans [Westenberg and Gallagher, 2001].     
Against this backdrop, it means that the performance of the 1999 - 2001 sub-group of 
IPO firms would have a considerable impact on the long horizon stock price 
performance of the IPO sample because firstly, at 34.99% [261 out of total 746], they 
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represent a sizeable proportion of the overall sample. In addition, because an ebullient 
and ‘hot’ IPO market such as we had in 1999 - 2001, generally raises the prices at 
which a fixed cohort of firms can sell their securities, an opportunity is created for weak 
and marginal firms to float their own offers. Following from this, this study would not be 
surprised to find under-performance of these new issues over the study period even 
before any empirical analysis gets underway. Panel F presents the distribution of the 
sample by underwriter both in terms of the number of offers and an attributed share of 
market gross proceeds for the study period. It reveals that only 11 underwriters out of a 
total of 109 in the period [about 10%] accounted for about 74% of total market gross 
proceeds [£19,925.02m out of £27,011.58m total].  
A summary of the key statistics for the IPO sample is presented in Panel G. Of 
particular note from this panel is the statistics relating to the internet and IT software 
IPOs, which was at the forefront of the market bubble in the ‘dotcom’ period. The 
number of these IPOs as a percentage of total IPOs stands at 16.89% [126 out of the 
746 total] with the average age standing at 2.75 years. In fact, at the height of the 
boom [1999 and 2000], the average age of the internet and IT software IPOs launched 
in the market in those years is a mere 1.77 years. It is also observed that if this group 
of IPOs are excluded, the average age of the overall sample increases from 2.96 years 
to 3.01 years. 
 104 
 
A brief descriptive analysis of the data of the sample firms regarding the offering 
characteristics is presented in Table 3.6. An inspection of that table shows that the 
mean values for the age at IPO date, market equity, gross offer proceeds, offer price, 
shares on issue and shares on offer are respectively 2.96 years, £120.19m, £36.21m, 
£0.96, 91.40m and 0.28m. A closer look at the table also shows that the distribution of 
all the offering variables is positively skewed and this is confirmed by the kurtosis 
values which are all greater than the threshold level of three. There also seems to be a 
wide dispersion in the offering characteristics, given by the range values. Of particular 
interest from the table is the distribution of the age and offer price at the IPO date. The 
oldest firm from the sample is Mouchel Ltd in the Support Services sector at nearly 95 
years, while the youngest is IFTE Ltd also in the Support Service industry at less than a 
month old. The highest offer price is made by Autonomy Corp [IT and Computer 
Services industry] at £32.76, while the lowest offer price of £0.1 is posted by Designer 
Vision in the Aerospace and Automobile Industry. 
Table 3.7 presents a descriptive analysis of the key characteristics of the IPO firms. An 
inspection of that table shows that the mean/[median] values for total assets, market 
equity, market value, turnover, profit before tax, profit margin, earnings per share, 
market leverage, market-to-book and turnover growth are £76.29m/[£8.20m],        
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TABLE 3.6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE OFFERING CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. Offer price, total shares on offer, gross proceeds, shares on issue, market 
value of equity and age are all calculated at the IPO date. Total shares offered represent the amount of shares on issue sold at the IPO, while gross proceeds is 
based upon the amount sold at the offer multiplied by the offer prices. Market value of equity is based on the number of shares on issue for each firm comprising the 
amount offered and the amount retained by the old shareholders and is calculated as the total shares on issue multiplied by the market prices on the first listing day 
for all the IPO firms. The Age for each IPO firm is calculated as the difference between the year of incorporation [instead of the founding year] and the year of going 
public. 
Statistic Age [yrs.]         Mkt. Equity [£’m]  Gross proceeds [£’m]        Offer Price [£]     Shares on Issue [‘m] Shares on Offer [‘m]                                                                                                                     
Mean           2.96        120.19        36.21   0.96         91.40                0.28 
Median           0.86          19.94          5.50   0.72             43.36                0.13 
St. Dev           5.84              491.28      120.86   1.48       157.06                0.50 
Skewness          6.90          10.16          7.27             13.12                5.63             5.11 
Kurtosis        82.79        124.65        63.31           265.44         45.96                          33.27 
Range         94.72     7,724.00               1,544.50             32.66             2,037              4.86 
Minimum          0.03                   1.00          0.50                 0.1           3.00                0.01 
Maximum        94.75     7,725.00               1,545.00             32.76         2,040                4.87 
It was difficult obtaining the founding dates for all the sample firms as the obtained amount was way below a critical mass level. Hence, this work uses the dates of incorporation, which 
was readily available for all the sample firms, as a proxy. 
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TABLE 3.7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. Market equity [ME] is calculated as the total shares on issue multiplied by the 
market prices on the first listing day for all the IPO firms. Market value [MV] is computed as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt [sum of 
short-term and long-term debt] in the year of the IPO. Market Leverage [ML] is defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of each of the firms. 
The pre-IPO performance is measured by the operating profit margin [PM]/{earnings per share [EPS]}, where operating profit margin/{earnings per share [EPS]} is 
defined as the profit before tax [PBT] divided by turnover/[total shares on issue] in the preceding year to each IPO date for all the sample firms. Turnover growth 
[TOG] is defined as the change in turnover between the year of going public and the preceding year for all the sample firms. All figures represent characteristics in 
the preceding year to the date of each IPO, except for total assets [TA], market leverage [ML], market equity [ME], market value [MV] and market-to-book [MTB] 
which are in the year of the IPO. Figures on total assets, market value, turnover [TO] and profit before tax [PBT] are all in £’m, while profit margin, market leverage, 
market-to-book and turnover growth are in ratios. EPS is in pence [p].     
Statistic  TA [£’m]    ME [£’m]          MV [£’m]  TO [£’m]          PBT [£’m]        PM             EPS [p]           ML           MTB          TOG 
Mean         76.29        120.19          166.03         53.77              1.23       (9.33)        (1.44)            0.08            9.77            4.36 
Median           8.20          19.94                   20.92           1.10            (0.18)       (0.07)        (0.30)            0.01            3.31            0.48 
St. Dev       382.96        491.28                 554.09       238.28            31.23       45.76        11.12             0.14           47.21         24.88 
Skewness        10.51          10.16                     8.58         14.15            17.07       (6.77)        (2.63)            2.27             6.23          13.42 
Kurtosis      127.84        124.65                   89.42       257.11          331.96       59.38        28.36            5.37           63.86         213.20 
Range    5,799.57     7,724.76              7,829.76         5,028          765.70     756.79        191.96            0.82         882.23         454.43 
Minimum     0.0004            0.24                    0.24         0.002         (117.70)        (537)    (108.20)            0.00        (321.37)        (1.00) 
Maximum   5,799.57          7,725                  7,830         5,028               648     219.79       83.76              0.82         560.86        455.43 
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TABLE 3.8: DISTRIBUTION OF KEY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE IPO 
SAMPLE 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. In Panels 
A - D, firms are categorized by total assets, market value, turnover and pre-IPO pre-tax profits 
respectively. The averages are computed as the gross values divided by the number of firms in 
each category. All figures are in the year of the IPO except the pre-tax profits which is in the 
preceding year.   
Panel A: By Total Assets 
Bound [£’m]    No of Firms   Total Assets [£’m]           Av. Tot. Assets [£’m]         
 ≤ 10         396                       1,544.93                                       3.90   
< 10 BUT ≤ 20        127                       1,782.99                                        14.04          
< 20 BUT ≤ 50         111                       3,571.19                                        32.17                  
< 50 BUT ≤ 100           43                       2,941.71                                     68.41                  
> 100            69                     47,071.77                                   682.20                  
TOTAL        746          56,912.59                 76.29 
Panel B: By Market Value 
Bound [£’m]           No of Firms        Total Mkt. Val. [£’m]    Av. Mkt. Val. [£’m]         
 ≤ 10         197                             948.91                                      4.82   
< 10 BUT ≤ 20        134                          1,911.76                                    14.27          
< 20 BUT ≤ 50        187                          5,842.65                                    31.24                  
< 50 BUT ≤ 100         90                          6,408.15                                    71.20                  
> 100          138                      108,749.97                                  788.04                  
TOTAL        746          123,861.44            166.03   
Panel C: By Turnover 
Bound [£’m]           No of Firms       Total Turnover [£’m]     Av. Turnover [£’m]         
 ≤ 10         498                             999.42                                       2.01   
< 10 BUT ≤ 20          84                          1,190.44                              14.17          
< 20 BUT ≤ 30           33                             834.55                                     25.29                  
< 30 BUT ≤ 50           37                          1,364.96                                     36.89                  
> 50            94                        35,720.17                                   380.00                  
TOTAL        746            40,109.54               53.77 
Panel D: By Pre-IPO Pre-tax Profits [PBT] 
Bound [£’m]          No of Firms    Total PBT [£’m]           Av. PBT [£’m]         
 < 0        445                         -1,425.59                           -3.20   
 > 0          301                          2,343.45                                        7.79                  
TOTAL        746                 917.86                  1.23 
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£120.19m/[£19.94m], £166.03m/[£20.92m], £53.77m/[£1.10m], £1.23m/[-£0.18m],        
-933%/[-7%], -1.44p/[-0.30p], 0.08/[0.01], 9.77/[3.31] and 436%/[48%] respectively.      
A closer look at the table also shows that the distribution of all the firm characteristics is 
positively skewed [except for the profit margin and earnings per share] and this is 
confirmed by the kurtosis values which are all greater than the threshold of three. 
There also seems to be a wide dispersion in the firm characteristics, given by the range 
values.  
Table 3.8 presents a distribution of some of the key firm characteristics of the IPO firms. 
An interesting feature from the table is the pre-tax operating performance [PBT] of the 
IPO firms prior to their IPO dates shown in Panel D. The mean value for the PBT 
[£1.23m] belies the fact of the preponderance of loss-making firms amongst the sample 
firms as revealed by the median [-£0.18m]. In fact, a cross-sectional analysis shows 
that 445 firms out of the 746 total [59.65%] were already making losses prior to their 
respective IPO dates as reflected in the PBT, profit margin and EPS. The largest 
operating loss of £117.70m was posted by Debenhams Plc. in the Wholesalers and 
Retailers sector, while South African Breweries Plc., in the Leisure, Hotels and 
Restaurant Industry, posted the highest profit of £648m. The disparity in the size of the 
firms as reflected in their total assets and market values is also apparent from the 
distribution of these characteristics in Panels A and B respectively. Small firms [with 
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total assets and market value less than £50m] represent 634 and 518 of 746 total IPOs 
[84.99% and 69.44%] respectively. This seems to concur with the size distribution of 
the firms according to their market capitalization from Panel C in Table 3.5, where 
small firms [firms with market capitalization less than £50m] constitute 73.99% of the 
sample [552 firms out of a total of 746]. These disparities are also noticeable across 
the turnover board shown in Panel C with small firms [turnover less than £30m] 
representing 82.44% of the sample [615 out of a total of 746].  
Following from the above, if the weak pre-IPO operating performance noticeable in 
most of the sample firms continues unabated into the post-IPO period, the efficient 
market expectation is that investors’ valuation of these firms may fall resulting in the 
market prices of the shares of these firms plunging as well to reflect this performance in 
equilibrium. If this is the case, it may lead us to suspect, for the second time, possible 
under-performance of this cohort of firms in the post-event window.  
[3.3.3] Applied Empirical Design 
The start-off point begins with the transformation of the stock prices into returns [    , 
using the natural logarithms of the monthly prices at t      and t-1        thus: 
                        …….. [3.8] 
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Following from previous research, the initial returns have been excluded from the 
calculation of the long-term performance. Hence, instead of the issue price, the second 
month-end closing price following the listing day is used as the set off point for 
calculating long-term performance46. Also in line with the majority of previous research, 
the performance of the sample firms is studied over a 5-year period47.  
The BHAR return metric is used as the baseline barometer for measuring abnormal 
performance in event time in this study since this has been shown in the literature to be 
more representative of the long-run returns an investor can earn and typically does not 
involve rebalancing [Barber and Lyon, 1997a; Fama, 1998; Conrad and Kaul, 1993]48. 
However, there is a need to benchmark the returns of the IPO firms to enable the 
author to calculate adjusted returns. In this regard, the benchmark is the return on 
control firms that have been carefully selected from the general population based on a 
host of matching criteria. Hence, the         adjusted returns for each IPO stock is 
calculated as the difference between the holding-period return of a buy-and-hold 
                                                          
46 Page and Reyneke [1997] stress the importance of examining IPOs from the standpoint of investors who 
are forced to purchase shares in the after-market since they are not able to obtain a full allotment of 
shares at the issue price due to over-subscription. Excluding this period after the IPO listing also ensures 
that the impact of any initial under-pricing and underwriter price support is reduced to the barest minimum. 
47 It gives a period long enough to study issues relevant to asset pricing theory, more so in the light of 
Graham’s [1959, pp.37] contention that ‘the interval required for a substantial under-/[over]-evaluation to 
correct itself averages 1.5 to 2.5 years’. 
48 However, Fama [1998] and Mitchell and Stafford [2000] point out that BHAR may overstate long-run 
returns and suffers more skewness problems than CAR in statistical inferences. 
 111 
 
investment in the sample firms49 and that of the chosen benchmark control firm with an 
appropriate expected return. The mean BHAR is then computed as the average of the 
abnormal returns for all IPOs in the sample using equally and value-weighted 
techniques50. But, first there is a need to formalize the BHAR approach. 
The         BHAR for the      firm          going public in month            is 
defined as: 
 
           
        
       ∏ [        
   
]           ∏ [        
     ]          …….. [3.9] 
  
where     
   ∏ [        
 ]          refers to the H-month BHAR of the      IPO firm 
        and its matching firm           and [     
 ]  denotes the firms’ month   
return. The BHAR for each firm going public in month   is derived from: 
        {
  
  ∑               
  
   
                                   
 
The average BHAR for all    ∑   
 
    IPO firms in the sample is then obtained as: 
      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ∑            
         ……………. [3.10] 
                                                          
49 If any of the IPO firms delists within any of the post-event windows, the author simply rebalances the 
portfolio by spreading the investible amount on the remaining securities in the portfolio. If the study 
continues to track firms that delist within any of the evaluation windows to the end of the designated 
window, it will only strengthen the point that IPOs under-perform in the long-run. 
50 The weight      is calculated using two methods:    
 
 ⁄  for equally-weighted and    
   
∑   
⁄  for 
value-weighted;   is the number of IPOs in the sample and     is the market value of equity of the sample 
firms. 
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where the frequency weights are loaded in vector              and the BHARs for 
each of the sample firms are stored in vector                      . 
The abnormal returns are then tested for being different from zero by performing the 
conventional t-test: 
 ́   
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 ́     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
          …….. [3.11] 
 ́     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    √
 
 
 
   
∑ ∑             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
  
   
 
    ………….. [3.12] 
In order to add some depth to the results, the CAR metric is also used to calculate 
abnormal returns. Using CAR, the benchmark-adjusted returns of each IPO at time, t is 
calculated as: 
         
        
        ………….. [3.13] 
where        is the abnormal return of each IPO,    
   
 the raw return of each IPO and 
   
      the return on the benchmark all at month  . 
The relative performance of the IPOs or the benchmark-adjusted returns for   months 
is the average cumulative abnormal return     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from month 1 to month  , which is the 
summation of the average of the benchmark-adjusted returns, using equally and value-
weighted techniques51: 
                                                          
51 See footnote 50. 
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   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ∑        
 
     ………….. [3.14] 
Barber and Lyon [1997a] document that the long-horizon BHAR [CAR] returns are 
positively [negatively] skewed leading to negatively [positively] biased t-statistics. In line 
with their recommendation, skewness-adjusted t-statistics, originally developed by 
Johnson [1978], are adopted in place of the conventional t-tests for both the CAR and 
BHAR:  
   √   [  
 
 
      
 
  
 ]…….. [3.15] 
 
  
  ̅̅ ̅̅
     
 ,   
∑        ̅̅ ̅̅  
  
   
        
 …….. [3.16] 
where,   is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness,   ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean CAR [BHAR] of 
the sample,       is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation, √     is an 
approximate measure of the conventional t-statistic and   is the sample size. 
Following Ritter [1991] and Loughran and Ritter [1995], long-run performance is also 
measured using wealth relatives        , which is similar in concept to the BHAR 
method: 
               
∏       
   
     
∏       
          
 ………….. [3.17] 
The wealth relative explores how the sample of IPOs performs relative to the matching 
benchmark. A wealth ratio greater than 1 is generally interpreted as the specific IPO 
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portfolio out-performing the benchmark, whereas a wealth ratio of less than 1 indicates 
under-performance.  
Brav and Gompers [1997] and Lyon, et al [1999] argue that cross-sectional 
dependence and calendar clustering of stock returns can lead to spurious abnormal 
returns and misspecified test statistics in an event time analysis. In order to address 
this problem, the MMAR approach is used to also test for long-run performance. For 
each calendar month, the abnormal return is calculated for each sample firm using the 
control firms from the various matching algorithms as the benchmark according to 
equation [3.13]. Afterwards, a mean abnormal return      ] across firms    ] in the 
portfolio is calculated using equally and value-weighted techniques52: 
      ∑        
  
    ………….. [3.18] 
A grand MMAR is then calculated as: 
       
 
 
∑     
 
    ………….. [3.19] 
where    is the total number of calendar months. To test the null hypothesis of zero 
MMAR, a t-statistic is calculated, using the time-series standard deviation of the MAR 
  (      ) 53: 
                                                          
52 See footnote 50. In the MMAR approach, the weights       change from month to month depending on 
the number of firms in the portfolio and their market value of equity. 
53 Fama [1998], Lyon, et al [1999] and Brav, et al [2000] all show that calendar time-series returns yield 
well-specified test statistics in almost all sampling situations; hence, conventional t-statistics apply. 
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 (      )
 √  ………….. [3.20] 
Mitchell and Stafford [2000] argue that an alternative approach to using the calendar 
time methodology is to track the performance of an event portfolio relative to an explicit 
         asset pricing regression model with     as the dependent variable as follows: 
                                 ….. [3.21] 
where      = mean monthly excess return of all firms in portfolio   
     = estimate of the relative performance of portfolio   
In most applications, equation [3.21] is specified as the CAPM or the FF3F model or 
the FF-Cahart-4F model as shown in equation [3.22] below.  
          (        )                           ….. [3.22] 
Typically, these asset pricing models are used to analyse the investment performance 
of a portfolio of firms in calendar time. These models calculate calendar time portfolio 
returns for firms experiencing an event and determine if these returns are abnormal in 
a multi-factor regression framework. The estimated intercept from the regression of the 
time series of portfolio excess returns relative to the return on a risk-free instrument 
[usually mimicked by treasury bills] against factor returns is the post-event abnormal 
performance of the portfolio of firms and provides a test of the null hypothesis that the 
MMAR on the calendar time portfolio is zero. The parameters,   ,   ,    and   stand 
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for the loadings of the portfolio on the market, size, book-to-market and momentum 
factors respectively. However, the use of the calendar time portfolio approach is by no 
means limited to an analysis of the performance of a single portfolio of firms [Hoechle, 
et al, 2011]. It can be extended to a comparison of the investment performance of two 
separate portfolios of firms           ], where the dependent variable is given by 
            . In this case, equation [3.21] can be re-written as follows:  
                                ….. [3.23] 
If portfolio 1 out-performs [under-performs] portfolio 2, then the coefficient estimate for 
    should be positive [negative] and significantly different from zero. Basically, this 
approach, which addresses risk measurement issues, is a zero investment portfolio 
that consists of long positions in sample stocks and short positions in their matched 
firm counterparts that have been selected based on a battery of unique firm and 
industry characteristics. These portfolios are then further adjusted for risk using 
calendar time factor models. Any remaining residual return is then deemed to be 
abnormal in that particular asset-pricing framework.  
It is pertinent to note that the previous finding of IPO under-performance in calendar 
time could be due to omitted unique firm and industry risk factors associated with stock 
price performance that are embedded in the ‘error’ term in the factor models which 
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consequently shows up in the alphas [intercepts]. The non-issuing control firms have 
been painstakingly matched to the IPO sample on the basis of a raft of firm and 
industry-specific risk factors, spanning size, market-to-book, profitability [i.e. pre-IPO 
performance], turnover growth, earnings yield and industry. Hence, to the extent that 
stocks with these unique characteristics are not fully captured by the factor based 
models, this variant of the calendar time portfolio approach, which appeals to the 
matched firm method of risk control that has been used by Jegadeesh [2000], 
Ikenberry and Ramnath [2002], Eberhart, et al [2002] and Loughran and Ritter [1995], 
should correct for any possible bias in the estimated intercept.  
The factor-based models usually assume that the systematic pattern in average stock 
returns can be captured by the classical market, size and book-to-market factors. 
However, these factors may only be inadequate proxies for risk which may lead to a 
misclassification of firms’ riskiness and then result in model misspecification and 
incorrect inferences. Beyond these classical factors, this author avers that there may 
be other unique firm/industry–specific or idiosyncratic risk factors that could be 
germane to the average firm stock price performance in the market place. The author 
posits that if the under-performance of IPO firms is merely a manifestation of lurking 
effects related to differences in beta, size, book-to-market, momentum and these other 
idiosyncratic factors, then the intercepts in the regressions from the factor models that 
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include these factors should be economically and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Hence, the goal in this factor-based approach here is to attempt an isolation of 
the price performance that may be associated with these systematic and any possible 
idiosyncratic factors from that associated with the IPO event itself, to enable the author 
to firstly, delineate any unique ‘IPO effect’ in the market place [if any], and secondly, 
reach definitive conclusions on the under-performance or otherwise of IPO stocks.  
The second part of the first empirical study seeks to examine the sensitivity of the 
alphas from the factor-based models to various benchmark portfolios constructed on 
various possible dimensions. A battery of firm and industry specific risk factors that 
could impinge on the average firm stock price performance are first controlled for by 
conducting firm-specific matching using the distance metric technique [also used in 
event-time] in conjunction with stepwise matching algorithms that seek to identify non-
issuing control firms that are closest to the IPO firms on various key return-determining 
risk factors. The CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F models are then adopted as baseline factor 
models that capture the classical stock market factors to further control for any other 
variation in average stock returns that may be related to these factors. Essentially, in 
this variant of the calendar time portfolio approach, risk control is a two-staged 
approach. In the first stage, the cross-sectional average of the monthly return 
difference between a portfolio of sample firms and its corresponding benchmark 
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portfolio matched on the stepwise algorithms is computed. In the second stage, the 
time-series of these return differences is then regressed on the risk factors in the 
CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F models to obtain fair estimates of the alphas.    
More specifically, the price performance for each sample and benchmark firm is 
estimated over 60 months following the IPO event. In each calendar month over the 
entire sample period, portfolios of all the sample IPO firms and their corresponding 
non-issuing control firms matched on the stepwise algorithms are constructed. Since 
the number of IPO firms is not homogeneously distributed over the sample period on 
account of the fact that some firms are added and some exit each month, the sample 
and benchmark portfolios are rebalanced each month and an equal or value-weighted 
abnormal return, representing the difference between the sample portfolio and 
corresponding benchmark portfolio returns is calculated. For each calendar month, the 
IPO portfolio return     
   
] less the matching portfolio benchmark return     
       
denoted by     
       
       is calculated using equally and value-weighted 
approaches54. The time-series of this monthly difference in return between the IPO and 
the benchmark portfolio is then regressed on the market factor, measured by the 
excess returns of a value-weighted FTSE All-Share Index       over the monthly 
returns on 3-month Treasury bills      , denoted by       , using the CAPM model. 
                                                          
54 See footnote 52. 
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The size       , book-to-market        and momentum        factors55  are then 
added to the CAPM model to form the FF-Cahart-4F model and a separate time-series 
regression is run. More formally, the performance of the IPO and benchmark portfolios 
relative to the CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F models is tracked using the following asset 
pricing regressions: 
    : 
                  (        )       ….. [3.24] 
                    (        )       ….. [3.25] 
              
                  (        )                          ……… [3.26] 
                    (        )                          …... [3.27] 
Subtracting equation [3.25] from [3.24] on the one hand and [3.27] from [3.26] on the 
other hand yields the following final equations which are estimated for the IPO and 
benchmark portfolios across all the matching algorithms: 
      
                       (        )        ….. [3.28] 
                                                          
55
 The size factor is a zero-investment size portfolio that measures the return difference between small and 
big firms; the book-to-market factor is a zero-investment value portfolio that measures the return difference 
between high book-to-market firms and low book-to-market firms, while the momentum factor is a zero-
investment momentum portfolio that measures the return difference between high and low prior 
momentum stocks [Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Kothari and Warner, 2007]. The author would like to thank 
Gregory, et al [2013] for providing these factors for the UK market. 
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                       (        )                               . [3.29] 
It is vital to note that for the CAPM model, estimating equation [3.28] is analogous to 
estimating equation [3.24] for the IPO portfolio and equation [3.25] for the different 
benchmark portfolios and then comparing the alphas from the IPO and different 
benchmark portfolios to see if the differences are significantly different from zero. The 
same also applies to equations [3.26], [3.27] and [3.29] for the FF-Cahart-4F model56.  
The estimate of the intercept term       from equations [3.28] and [3.29] provides a 
test of the null hypothesis that the difference in the MMAR between the IPO and 
benchmark calendar time portfolios is zero57. If the IPO portfolio out-performs [under-
performs] the matching benchmark, then the coefficient estimate for       from the 
CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F models should be positive [negative] and significantly 
different from zero. The parameters,    ,    ,     and    stand for the differences in 
loadings between the IPO and benchmark portfolios on the market, size, book-to-
market and momentum factors respectively. The use of several methodologies in 
evaluating long-run abnormal performance is to firstly, give the greatest possible level 
                                                          
56 This technique was employed by Jegadeesh [2000]. 
57  Since        is the average monthly difference in mean abnormal return between the IPO and 
benchmark portfolios, it can be used to calculate annualized post-event abnormal performance.   
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of depth and robustness to the results and secondly, reduce model bias which 
becomes more likely when one technique is favoured over the others. 
[3.3.4] Matching Design and Variable Selection 
A key part of the empirical design is the cautious construction of the control firms. 
However, before this, the group of potential qualifying matching firms or pool of 
potential matches must, first of all, be defined. This group must firstly, exclude firms 
whose IPOs occurred within the last seven years to each IPO date58. This process also 
guarantees the exclusion of the sample firms which are the subject of the test59. Table 
3.9 illustrates how the filters were applied to arrive at the final control groups for the 
sample of IPO firms on a yearly basis. Firstly, the feasible set of non-issuing firms is 
drawn from all the firms listed on the LSE in each of the IPO years by excluding all 
financial, real estate and utilities and all new issues, as in the IPO sample. Secondly, in 
each IPO year, a final set [‘the qualifying set’ or ‘pool of potential matches’] is drawn 
from the feasible set by excluding firms whose IPOs occurred within the last seven  
                                                          
58 Following earlier studies [e.g. Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Eckbo and Norli, 2005], the work 
compares the characteristics and returns of IPO firms with those of mature non-issuing control firms in 
order to be able to delineate the specificities of the effect of the ‘IPO event’ on the return profile of the 
sample firms. The definition of a mature firm is that firm whose IPO must have occurred at least seven 
years prior to each IPO date. Secondly, based on the average life cycle of new listings, it gives a period 
long enough for a newly-listed IPO firm to establish a foothold in the market-place either by remaining a 
going concern or fail and be delisted. As a result, the author expects firms that are still surviving after the 
7th year of their listing anniversary to be firms that have passed this litmus test.  
59 Loughran and Ritter [2000, pp.364] point out that ‘a test is biased towards high explanatory power and 
no abnormal returns if it uses a benchmark that is contaminated with many of the firms that are the subject 
of the test'.  
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TABLE 3.9: THE QUALIFYING SET OF NON-ISSUING CONTROL FIRMS 
The table shows how the filters were applied to arrive at firstly, the feasible set of non-issuing 
firms and secondly, the qualifying set for each sub-group of the sample firms on a yearly basis, 
going from January 1999 to December 2006. The feasible set of non-issuing firms is drawn from 
firms listed on the LSE in each of the IPO years by excluding all financial, real estate and 
utilities and all new issues. The qualifying set or pool of potential matches is drawn from the 
feasible set by excluding firms whose IPOs occurred within the last seven years to each sample 
firm IPO date. 
IPO Year   All Listed Firms   Feasible Set        Qualifying Set         
1999          2,895     1,419               638 
2000          2,778     1,302   691 
2001          2,927     1,451   782 
2002          2,880     1,404   921 
2003          2,814     1,338               1,114 
2004          2,681     1,260             1,046 
2005          2,844     1,393             1,212 
2006          3,088     1,575             1,433 
 
years to  each sample firm IPO date. For example, for the 1999 IPO firms, the feasible 
set of non-issuing firms would be firms listed on the LSE as at January 1999 excluding 
all financial, real estate and utilities. The qualifying set is then drawn from this feasible 
set by excluding firms whose IPOs occurred after December 1992 [i.e. firms with IPOs 
occurring from 1993 onwards].  
The stepwise matching algorithms relies on six firm/industry dimensions or 
characteristics that are deemed by this study to be pivotal risk factors in the return of 
the average firm: [i] Market capitalization [to control for size effects and attendant 
differences in investing opportunity sets] [ii] Market-to-book ratio [to control for possible 
misalignments in growth potentials] [iii] Pre-IPO performance measured by operating 
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profit before tax divided by the turnover in the year preceding the IPO date [to control 
for possible differences in firm specific performance before the IPOs] [iv] Turnover 
growth [to control for possible differences in operating opportunity sets] [v] Earnings 
yield [to control for possible differences in firm specific performance and potential 
returns to investors] [vi] Industry [to control for possible differences in financing, 
investing and operating opportunity sets facing the firms]. In the light of the assertion of 
Lyon, et al [1999], a rigorous descriptive analysis that provides the author with insights 
on some of the important dimensions on which the study could develop a performance 
benchmark is conducted. The rationale for the choice of risk factors for the stepwise 
matching algorithms is next provided: 
Size: This is the most commonly used risk factor in the literature for selecting the 
control firm from the population for very obvious reasons. The size of a firm goes a long 
way in determining its competitiveness, performance and ultimate survival in the 
market place. Larger firms are able to survive the rigours of the market place, while 
small firms are normally the first to buckle under high wages and increasing investing 
opportunity costs [Lucas, 1978]. Also, in most cases, variable costs usually represent a 
greater [smaller] fraction of the total cost of small [large] firms with its attendant 
adverse consequences on the ability of small firms to stay competitive when prices fall 
in the market [Mata and Portugal, 1994]. Moreover, Banz [1981] and Basu [1983] both 
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show that the stocks of firms with low market capitalizations tend to have higher 
average long-run returns than those of large market capitalization stocks. Following 
from the above, market capitalization is used to control for the size effects and possible 
differences in the investing opportunity set.  
Market-to-Book: This is another commonly used risk factor in the literature. The 
market-to-book factor is a reflection of investors’ expectations of the future value or 
growth potential of a firm based on the opportunities that abound in the firm’s industry. 
This is also a proxy for the riskiness of a firm and, more often than not, the peer 
market-to-book average is used to determine the relative attractiveness of the firm. 
High market-to-book stocks [also known as ‘growth stocks’] are usually firms whose 
prices trade higher than their current profits may warrant because, more often than not, 
they receive intense media and investor attention. Usually, investors buy such stocks 
[which tend to be riskier] based on their potential for future earnings. Savvy value 
investors hunt low market-to-book stocks [also known as ‘value stocks’] because of 
their conviction that the stocks [which tend to be less risky] are trading below their 
intrinsic values. They also believe that the market occasionally overreacts to both good 
and bad news which results in price swings that do not match up with the company’s 
long-term fundamentals [Bauman, et al; 1998]. Firms that issue equity tend to have 
higher-than-average market-to-book ratios because of the higher–than-average growth 
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opportunities available to them in the market place. Rosenberg, et al [1985], Fama and 
French [1992], Chan, et al [1991] and Lakonishok, et al [1994] all show that ‘value 
stocks’ out-perform ‘growth stocks’ in the long-run. Hence, market-to-book factor is 
used as a risk factor to control for possible misalignments in growth potentials by 
investors in the market place.  
Pre-IPO Performance: In efficient markets, it is expected that the positive [negative] 
operational performance of a firm will impound into its trading price in the market place 
as ‘good [bad] news’. This operational performance is a reflection of the activities of the 
firm in its investing and operating space, which in turn is a function of its business 
environment. This is a key return-determining firm risk factor and a technique that 
matches benchmark firms with the issuing firms on this characteristic in the year prior 
to the IPO goes a long way in ensuring that benchmark and issuing firms are on the 
same footing. Hence, the profit margin, defined as the operating pre-tax profit divided 
by the turnover in the year preceding the IPO date, is used as a measure of operational 
performance to control for possible differences in firm specific performance before the 
IPOs.  
Turnover Growth: Turnover growth is firstly, a measure of the extent to which a firm has 
exploited the business and growth opportunities reflected in its investing opportunity set 
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in its industry on a yearly basis and secondly, a measure of the attractiveness of the 
firm to value investors. As a result, investors are increasingly focussing not only on 
bottom-line profits that firms generate, but also on their top-line revenues [Jegadeesh, 
2002]. High year-on-year turnover or top-line growth, barring increasing operational 
costs, should trickle down to higher bottom-line profits and rising stock values in the 
market place. Hence, the turnover growth, defined as the change in turnover between 
the year of going public and the preceding year, is used to control for possible 
differences in the investing opportunity sets of the issuing and benchmark firms at the 
IPO date.  
Earnings Yield: This is similar in concept to the market-to-book factor and the inverse 
of the conventional price-earnings ratio. Stocks trading at higher than ‘peer average’ 
price earnings ratio or lower than ‘peer average’ earnings yield are generally seen to be 
riskier and investors buying into such stocks take a gamble that the expectation of 
future earnings built into the current market price would be realised. Conversely, stocks 
trading at lower than ‘peer average’ price earnings ratio or higher than ‘peer average’ 
earnings yield are generally seen to be less risky and investors buying into such stocks 
usually purchase with a large ‘margin of safety’. Firms that issue equity tend to have 
low earnings yield ratios in the same way that they have high market-to-book ratios. 
Basu [1977 and 1983] and Jaffe, et al [1989] all show that stocks with higher-than-
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average earnings yield ratios significantly out-perform stocks with lower-than-average 
earnings yield ratios. Similar to the intuition behind the use of the market-to-book factor, 
the earnings yield is used as an additional risk factor in selecting the matching firms 
from the population.   
Industry: This is another risk factor commonly used in the literature. Firms that are in 
the same industry and with similar sizes, turnover and growth performances are 
assumed to have comparable economic and competitive factors and in most cases 
tend to have analogous operating, investing and financing opportunity sets [Perry and 
Williams, 1994]. It is an accepted view that the conditions of a firm’s industry impacts 
on its financial structure and competitiveness amongst its peers. There is also empirical 
evidence that has demonstrated the connection between industry structure, financial 
structure and product markets [Chevalier, 1995; Philips, 1995; MacKay and Philips, 
2005]. Brander and Lewis [1986], Maksimovic [1988], Maksimovic and Zechner [1991], 
Williams [1995] and Fries, et al [1997] show that firms reckon with the joint actions of 
their peers when making crucial financial decisions. Although, a myriad of factors may 
impinge on a firm’s decision to diversify its ownership base by issuing some of its 
shares to the public, it is an accepted view that this decision has implications on its 
financial structure and overall market value. Hence, industry is used as an additional 
risk factor in selecting the matching firms from the population. 
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The problems associated with the traditional matching methods are well documented. 
On account of the fact that the first empirical study wants to achieve the greatest 
possible level of depth and breadth in the matching process in order to arrive at the 
best possible match for each of the IPO firms, a deviation metric approach that seeks 
to select a matching firm based on the least square deviations [LSD] between the 
characteristics of the IPO firms and those of the qualifying set of mature non-issuing 
firms is employed. The author’s goal is to arrive at the best point estimate of the 
matching firm for each IPO firm across all possible dimensions and matching 
algorithms. The author believes that a method that seeks to minimize the differences 
between the characteristics of the control group of non-issuing firms and that of the 
sample firms and then chooses a benchmark firm on this basis provides the best point 
estimate, with all callipers and probable matching errors reduced to almost nil.    
Firstly, for each sample IPO and matching algorithm, the discrepancies between the 
sample firm risk factors and the risk factors for each of the firms in the qualifying set is 
determined at each IPO date. These discrepancies are squared and then standardized 
with the cross-sectional standard deviation of that risk factor for all firms in the 
qualifying set for that year to arrive at a squared deviation metric [SDM]. Thereafter, for 
each IPO firm and matching algorithm, all firms are ranked in accordance with the SDM 
and that matching firm that has the lowest SDM is then chosen as the benchmark.  
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More formally, the matching technique is set out as follows: 
      ∑
{                }
 
  
 
    …….. [3.30] 
 
where   is the number of risk factors that are matched,      ) is the risk factor   of firm 
  in the qualifying matching set  ,         is the risk factor   of IPO firm   and    is the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of risk factor   in the period when the risk factor is 
measured. Standardizing the squared deviations of a particular risk factor with its 
cross-sectional standard deviation across all the qualifying non-issuing firms on each 
IPO date ensures that risk factors with small cross-sectional variation are given more 
weight for the same magnitude of deviation relative to those risk factors that are more 
diffused in the population. For each IPO firm, that non-issuing firm that is closest to the 
issuing firm on the SDM is chosen as the benchmark and then, a ranking list is kept60.  
More formally, the problem of choosing an appropriate matching firm for each IPO firm 
       reduces to optimizing the following function: 
         {    |    }  ∑
{                }
 
  
 
    …….. [3.31] 
 
Hence, for each of the sample firms, the firm in the pool of potential matches that 
minimizes the sum of the standardized squared differences in size [Match 1], size and 
                                                          
60 For each IPO, a ranking of matching firms according to the SDM is kept to provide a backstop to 
possible issues [i.e. incomplete price data history and/or delisting of original matching firms] that may arise 
in the tracking process.  
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market-to-book [Match 2], size, market-to-book and pre-IPO performance [Match 3], 
size, market-to-book, pre-IPO performance and turnover growth [Match 4], size, 
market-to-book, pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield [Match 5] 
and size, market-to-book, pre-IPO performance, turnover growth, earnings yield and 
industry [Match 6] is chosen as the best match. 
Expressing and expanding equation [3.31] in terms of the chosen risk factors yields the 
following distance metric objective equations for the six stepwise matching algorithms: 
         {    |    }  
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  …. [3.37] 
                         
where                     represent the risk factors for size, market-to-book, pre-IPO 
performance, turnover growth and earnings yield respectively. The industries of the 
IPO and benchmark firms are denoted by        and      respectively. Equations [3.32] 
to [3.37] represent the objective functions for matching algorithms 1 – 6 respectively.   
The matching firm must have complete price data history; otherwise, the next closest 
firm on the ranking will be adopted as the matching firm. The matching firm’s return is 
then adopted as the benchmark return for the IPO firm and this is maintained till the 
end of the 5-year test period61 or until it is delisted, whichever occurs first. If a matching 
firm delists before the end of the tracking period, a second [and, if necessary, a third or 
fourth] matching firm will be chosen and the data from this replacement firm will be 
appended from the date of delisting of the previous matching firm till the end of the 
tracking period. The replacement firms are identified on the original IPO date and are 
based on the same selection procedures as the original matching firms. For example, 
                                                          
61  This approach has been adopted as the alternative of rebalancing the control firm every year 
accentuates the new listing and rebalancing biases [normally present in a market-index based model of 
expected return] and creates another bias called the ‘momentum bias’ [Rau and Vermaelen, 1998]. 
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for the first matching algorithm [where   = 1, the size factor], the potential replacement 
firms are simply the firms second, third and fourth on the ranking list closest in market 
capitalization to the IPO firm. For all the algorithms, the fisrt part of this work will see 
how the adjusted BHAR for the IPO sample firms compares. The expectation is that the 
difference in the BHAR between the IPO and control firms along any horizon should 
diminish as the number of dimensions or marching criteria is increased. Now, if this 
indeed is the case, the expectation is that in the limits [i.e. as the number of dimensions 
is further increased], the difference in the BHAR between the IPO firms and the control 
firms should gravitate to zero.  
Mathematically: 
Denote the long-run returns of holding the stock of the IPO and benchmark firms as: 
∏           
 
          
∏       
 
        
Denote the number of matching criteria as k, where k goes from 1………n. 
As the number of matching criteria     :      |∏  1 r    t 
t
t 1   ∏  1 rbt
t
t 1  |     
The matching algorithms are conducted in stepwise fashion starting with the size factor 
[Match 1] and then adding the market-to-book [Match 2], pre-IPO performance [Match 
3], turnover growth [Match 4], earnings yield [Match 5] and industry factors [Match 6] in 
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that order. The author starts off with the size and market-to-book factors since these 
have been shown to be the common risk factors in average stock returns [Fama and 
French, 1993]. Moreover, the use of these factors is already well documented in the 
literature. The author then proceeds to add the profitability factor [i.e. pre-IPO 
performance] since this factor has been shown to be closely related to the common 
factors [Fama and French, 1993]. Turnover growth and earnings yield, also related to 
the profitability factor, are further added in that order as the study seeks to ascertain 
the plausible impact of these factors on stock performance. Finally, the industry factor 
is introduced as the study aims to achieve the finest possible level of matching by 
restricting the circumference of the potential matching firms to the industry of the IPO. 
Hence in this final process, matching firms from the industry of the IPO that are closest 
to the IPO firms on the basis of the previous five factors [i.e. size, market-to-book, pre-
IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield] are selected. However, no 
particular ordering is expected to have any significant impact on the results as changes 
in the results are expected to come from the fact that the number of matching criteria is 
progressively increasing as the matching corridors [i.e. M1 to M6] are traversed.  
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TABLE 3.10: STEPWISE MATCHING CORRIDOR DYNAMICS 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. Panel A 
shows the dynamics in the control firm composition along the various stepwise matching 
corridors with each of the matching algorithms [M1 – M6] serving as the base match in each 
case. The figures represent the number of firms that drop out along each corridor. Panel B 
shows the changing firm composition along the corridors with the figures representing the 
number of firms that are retained in each corridor. The stepwise matching algorithms are based 
on firm characteristics spanning size [Match 1], size and market-to-book ratio [Match 2], size, 
market-to-book ratio and pre-IPO performance [Match 3], size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO 
performance and turnover growth [Match 4], size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO performance, 
turnover growth and earnings yield [Match 5] and finally size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO 
performance, turnover growth, earnings yield and industry [Match 6]. 
Panel A – Firm Drop-outs 
Matching Corridor     No of Firms                      %         
M2 VS M1             670                   90 
M3 VS M2                         219               29 
M4 VS M3                         282               38 
M5 VS M4                         392               53 
M6 VS M5                          706               95 
      Panel  B – Firm Retentions 
Matching Corridor  M1         M2      M3           M4     M5         M6 
M1                 746         76         62           25      23            7 
M2       76           746     527           449       365            12 
M3       62              527     746           464    382             21 
M4       25              449     464          746    354           28 
M5       23              365     382          354    746           40 
M6      7          12       21            28      40           746 
How do the matching firms change as the matching corridors are navigated? Panel A in 
Table 3.10 shows the dynamics in the control firm composition along the various 
stepwise matching corridors with each of the matching algorithms [M1 – M6] serving as 
the base match in each case. It is observed, for example, that going from M1 to M2 [i.e. 
M2 VS M1], only about 10% of the matching firms [76 of the 746 total] are retained with 
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670 new firms [about 90% of the 746 total] entering the fray. Similarly, if going from 
from M5 to M6 [i.e. M6 VS M5], only about 5% of the firms [40 of the 746 total] are 
retained, while 706 firms [about 95% of the 746 total] drop out.  
A fuller and clearer picture of the dynamics in the firm composition is presented in 
Panel B, which shows the number of firms that are retained in each corridor [i.e. those 
that don’t drop-out]. For example, if the constituent firms in M3 are juxtaposed with 
those in M1 [i.e. M3 VS M1], only about 8% of the matching firms [62 of the 746 total] 
are retained, while 684 new firms [about 92% of the 746 total] enter the fray. In the 
same light, comparing the constituent firms in M6 relative to those in M1 [i.e. M6 VS 
M1], only about 1% of the firms [7 of the 746 total] are retained, while 739 firms [about 
99% of the 746 total] drop out. After the iterations, it is observed that the highest firm 
retentions occur in the M3 VS M2 corridor [527 of the 746 total], while the least firm 
retentions occur in the M6 VS M1 corridor [7 of the 746 total]. By extension, the least 
firm drop-outs [219 of the 746 total] as well as the highest firm drop-outs [739 of the 
746 total] also occur along these respective corridors. Clearly, massive changes occur 
in the constituent stocks of the benchmark portfolios as the matching corridors are 
traversed, suggesting that the long-run abnormal returns may also change. More 
formally, the long-run IPO abnormal return at time, t is calculated as:  
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         ………….. [3.38] 
where       is the long-run abnormal IPO return,   
   
 the raw return of the IPO portfolio 
and   
       the return on the benchmark portfolio selected according to matching 
algorithm  , where   goes from 1 to 6.  
It is also known that the benchmark portfolio return is given as: 
  
        ∑             
   
   
    ………….. [3.39] 
where,   
 
 and   
 
 are vectors comprising the individual weights and returns of the 
matching firms respectively in the benchmark portfolio.  
Now, these vectors must surely be dependent on the composition of the firms in the 
benchmark portfolio given as:  
  
   
              ………….. [3.40] 
Following from the above, it must surely be the case that:  
       
      
   
    ………….. [3.41] 
   where       
   
              
Clearly from equation [3.41], the magnitude and direction of the long-run abnormal IPO 
return       must be a function of the long-run returns of the matching firms which in 
turn, is dependent on the composition of the firms in the benchmark portfolio. 
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[3.4] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
[3.4.1] Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return [BHAR]  
Table 3.11 reports long-run abnormal returns for the sample of 746 IPOs that went 
public over the period January 1999 to December 2006. Equally and value-weighted 
BHARs are compared with the control firms selected according to the six matching 
algorithms as earlier defined. Panel A reports the equally-weighted returns, while Panel 
B reports value-weighted returns. The BHAR returns are generated by compounding 
monthly returns starting in the 2nd month after listing following equity issue till the 13th, 
25th, 37th, 49th and 61st months for 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year long-run 
returns. Abnormal return [AR] is the simple difference between the IPO raw average 
return [Raw] and the corresponding matching return [Bench].  
Clearly, from Panel A, IPOs under-perform across the horizon and matching board. 
Two other striking features are observed from the results; firstly, the dismal 
performance of the IPO and control firms across the board [the performance of the IPO 
firms are worse]62 and secondly, the direct association between the performance of the 
firms and the length of the evaluation window63. An investor who purchases the IPO  
                                                          
62 This may not be unconnected with the choice of period of study which straddles the ‘dotcom’ years 
[1999 -2001]. The bust of the ‘technology bubble’ at the time had wide-spread ripple effects in the UK and 
indeed global markets with attendant adverse consequences on stock price performance and investors’ 
sentiments.  
63 The dismal performance of the firms tends to grow as the investment horizon is increased. 
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TABLE 3.11: POST- IPO LONG-RUN EVENT-TIME BHAR RETURNS VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS OVER THE 
PERIOD JANUARY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2006 
The table reports long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the sample of 746 IPOs that went public over the period January 1999 and December 2006. Equally and value-
weighted BHARs are compared with control firms matched on various algorithms based on size only [Match 1], size and market-to-book ratio [Match 2], size, market-to-book 
ratio and pre-IPO performance [Match 3], size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO performance and turnover growth [Match 4], size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO performance, 
turnover growth and earnings yield [Match 5] and finally size, market-to-book ratio, pre-IPO performance, turnover growth, earnings yield and industry [Match 6]. Panel A 
reports equally-weighted returns, while Panel B reports value-weighted returns. BHAR returns are generated by compounding monthly returns starting in the 2nd month after 
listing following equity issue till the 13th, 25th, 37th, 49th and 61st months for 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year long-run returns. Abnormal return [AR] is the simple 
difference between the IPO raw average return [Raw] and the corresponding matching return [Bench]. The BHAR return figures are in %. The figures in parentheses are the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
PANEL A - EQUALLY-WEIGHTED RETURNS  
                           Within the first year                   Within the first 2 years              Within the first 3 years             Within the first 4 years           Within the first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
           ______________________          ______________________         ______________________         ______________________    ______________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR         Raw      Bench        AR    Raw       Bench      AR           Raw      Bench       AR      Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                                  
Match 1         -23.85    -0.20     -23.65            -42.23     -3.64      -38.59           -51.82     -22.88     -28.94         -53.40   -31.30     -22.10     -58.49    -39.63    -18.86 
                                    (-5.33***)         (-7.82***)                 (-6.16***)        (-4.55***)          (-3.12***) 
Match 2         -23.85    -5.58     -18.27             -42.23     -7.30     -34.93            -51.82     -19.10     -32.72         -53.40   -26.21    -27.19     -58.49    -26.27    -32.22 
                                    (-6.25***)         (-9.24***)     (-7.75***)        (-5.07***)           (-5.45***)     
Match 3         -23.85    -4.49     -19.36             -42.23     -7.56     -34.67            -51.82     -21.82     -30.00         -53.40   -29.59    -23.81    -58.49    -27.68    -30.81 
                                    (-6.43***)         (-9.30***)      (-7.24***)           (-4.51***)           (-5.07***) 
Match 4         -23.85    -5.43     -18.42             -42.23    -10.23     -32.00           -51.82     -21.84     -29.98         -53.40   -34.41    -18.99   -58.49    -36.92     -21.57 
                                    (-6.68***)         (-8.54***)      (-7.48***)      (-4.05***)           (-4.20***) 
Match 5         -23.85    -2.26     -21.59             -42.23     -3.91      -38.32           -51.82     -19.14     -32.68         -53.40   -25.91    -27.49    -58.49    -23.75    -34.74 
                                    (-7.19***)        (-10.06***)      (-8.44***)       (-5.63***)          (-7.06***) 
Match 6         -23.85    -8.02     -15.83             -42.23    -10.42     -31.81            -51.82     -22.40     -29.42        -53.40   -36.95    -16.45    -58.49    -41.22     -17.27 
                                    (-6.09***)         (-8.15***)      (-7.19***)     (-3.41***)           (-3.23***) 
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PANEL B - VALUE-WEIGHTED RETURNS  
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years            Within first 3 years           Within first 4 years         Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
           ______________________    ______________________    _____________________      __________________  ____________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw        Bench      AR     Raw       Bench      AR Raw    Bench     AR  Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                                  
Match 1        -12.04    -6.86       -5.18        -13.79    -13.90        0.11    -32.88    -14.37    -18.51   -37.40    -8.48   -28.92   -35.93   -16.87    -19.06 
          (-0.60)          (0.05)               (-1.44)   (-1.79*)           (-0.98) 
Match 2        -12.04    -3.27       -8.77        -13.79     14.03      -27.82   -32.88       8.42    -41.30   -37.40    -0.79   -36.61   -35.93    13.58    -49.51 
          (-1.26)          (-1.38)           (-2.51**)               (-1.76*)         (-2.37**) 
Match 3        -12.04    -3.22       -8.82        -13.79     13.08      -26.87   -32.88       6.99    -39.87   -37.40    -2.76   -34.64   -35.93    11.17    -47.10 
          (-1.27)          (-1.33)           (-2.43**)                (-1.66*)        (-2.25**) 
Match 4        -12.04    -3.37       -8.67        -13.79     13.68      -27.47   -32.88       8.70   -41.58    -37.40    -1.80   -35.60   -35.93    12.00    -47.93 
          (-1.27)          (-1.37)          (-2.54**)               (-1.72*)       (-2.31**) 
Match 5        -12.04    -4.37       -7.67        -13.79     11.05      -24.84   -32.88       5.39   -38.27    -37.40    -2.66   -34.74    -35.93     9.84     -45.77 
          (-1.11)            (1.24)         (-2.38**)               (-1.72*)       (-2.27**) 
Match 6        -12.04   -19.95       7.91        -13.79       0.11      -13.90   -32.88       4.76   -37.64    -37.40    -3.67   -33.73    -35.93     3.29     -39.22 
           (0.67)          (-0.57)           (-2.33**)              (-1.65*)       (-1.97**) 
 
 
 
 
 
 141 
 
stocks in the second month of trading64 on an equally-weighted basis and holds them 
for a period of 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months suffers raw losses of 23.85%, 42.23%, 
51.82%, 53.40% and 58.49% respectively. However, if this same investor had instead 
invested in a comparable set of firms, he would have suffered maximum losses of 8.02% 
[Match 6], 10.42% [Match 6], 22.88% [Match 1], 36.95% [Match 6] and 41.22% [Match 
6] along the various horizons [12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months] respectively.  
It is also observed from the table that the abnormal returns are all significant across the 
matching and horizon board which initially tends to indicate that the matching process 
may not matter. However, a closer look also shows that the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns appears to be sensitive to the matching algorithm employed. Put differently, 
albeit the observed under-performances are strong and overwhelming, the extent 
appears to be sensitive to the matching dynamics as a wide variation in the scale of the 
abnormal returns is evident across the matching and horizon board. For example, 
within the 12-months horizon, the abnormal returns range from -15.83% [t-stats: -6.09] 
to -23.65% [t-stats: -5.33] as the matching corridors are traversed [Match 1 to Match 6]. 
Similarly, over the 36 – month horizon, the abnormal returns range from -28.94% [t-
stats: -6.16] to -32.72% [t-stats: -7.75]. Over the four-year horizon, the under-
                                                          
64 Since the study excludes the initial returns from the long-run results, it is assumed that the investor 
enters the market in the second month of trading following listing. 
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performance in no particular order or pattern, ranges from 16.45% [t-stats: -3.41] to 
27.49% [t-stats: -5.63]. On a related note, it is also found that, in general, the abnormal 
returns are the least [most] over the tracking windows when the M6 [M5] matching 
algorithm is used to select the benchmark firms from the population65. However, a 
different picture emerges if this same investor decides to hold the stocks in proportion 
to their market values [value-weighting]66. It is observed from Panel B that an investor 
who purchases the IPO stocks in the second month of trading on a value-weighted 
basis and holds them for a period of 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months suffers raw losses of 
12.04%, 13.79%, 32.88%, 37.40% and 35.93% respectively. However, if this same 
investor had instead invested in a comparable set of firms, he would have suffered 
maximum losses of 19.95% [Match 6] and 8.48% [Match 1] over 12 and 48 months 
respectively.  However, on this same investment over the other horizons [24, 36 and 60 
months], he reaps maximum positive raw returns of 14.03% [Match 2], 8.70% [Match 4] 
and 13.58% [Match 2] respectively. Under this weighting technique, the abnormal 
returns are not as strong and pervading across the matching and horizon board, like in 
the equally-weighted approach. In fact, in some cases, the evidence is weak and in 
                                                          
65 However, there is an exception in the first two horizons as the M1 algorithm produces the most under-
performance finding. 
66 The under-performance using the technique of value-weighting reduces and in some cases, is non-
existent which is in line with the argument of Fama [1998] that long-term post-event returns shrink and 
often disappear when event firms are value-weighted rather than equally-weighted because the former 
more accurately captures the total wealth effects of investors.  
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some others, non-existent. Also, just like in the equally-weighted approach, the scale of 
the abnormal returns appears to be sensitive to the matching dynamics as a wide 
variation across the matching and horizon board is noticed. For example, over the 60-
month tracking window, the IPO portfolio under-performs a set of comparable firms by 
19.06% [t-stats: -0.98] – Match 1, 49.51% [t-stats: -2.37] – Match 2, 47.10% [t-stats: -
2.25] – Match 3, 47.93% [t-stats: -2.31] – Match 4, 45.77% [t-stats: -2.27] – Match 5 
and 39.22% [t-stats: -1.97] – Match 6.  
Comparing both set of results [i.e. equally and value-weighted], the under-performance 
is found to be more over the first two windows when returns are equally-weighted 
which reverses from the 36th month upwards when returns are value-weighted. Value-
weighting the returns and changing the composition of firms in the benchmark portfolio 
is also found to produce no significant under-performance finding over the one and 
two-year horizons. Put differently, the scale and significance of the under-performance 
finding under the value-weighted approach appears to be sensitive to the matching 
process as some of the abnormal returns are now no longer significant across the 
board. For example, over the one-year horizon, the abnormal returns are not significant, 
ranging from -8.82% [t-stats: -1.27] to 7.91% [t-stats: 0.67]. Also, no significant under-
performance is observed over the two-year window as the abnormal returns range from 
-27.82% [t-stats: -1.38] to 0.11% [t-stats: 0.05].  
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In general, the under-performance finding is found to be strong and overwhelming 
under the BHAR approach, using the equally-weighted approach with the results 
providing strong evidence against market efficiency. However, the results are mixed 
when a value-weighted performance measure is employed. Under this scenario, the 
under-performance finding is not as strong; in fact, in some cases, the evidence is 
weak and in some others, non-existent. The results generally show that the scale of the 
under-performance, which varies substantially and in some cases disappears 
altogether across the matching board, is sensitive to firstly, the choice of matching 
firms in the benchmark portfolio; secondly, the weighting scheme employed and; thirdly, 
the horizon over which it is measured.  
The general under-performance finding, which is consistent with those of Ritter [1991], 
Ritter and Welch [2002], Gompers and Lerner [2003], Kooli and Suret [2004], Alvarez 
and Gonzalez [2005], Jakobsen and Sorensen [2001], Bessler and Thies [2007], Page 
and Reyneke [1997] and Chorruk and Worthington [2010] and contrasts with those 
obtained by Cusatis, et al [1993], Brav, et al [2000], Kooli, et al [2003], Kim, et al [1995] 
and Wu [1993], also shows that, in some cases [especially value-weighted 
performance], the observed under-performance is weak and in some others, 
disappears altogether when the matching algorithm includes industry as an additional 
risk factor, which tends to suggest that a matching criteria that includes the industry of 
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the firms is vital in the matching process as it ensures that issuing and non-issuing 
firms are fairly similar, thus making for better comparisons. 
To ensure robustness and also enable us reach more definitive conclusions, the long-
run analysis is also performed using other methodologies in event and calendar time in 
the sections that follow.  
[3.4.2] Robustness Checks 
[3.4.2.1] Cumulative Abnormal Return [CAR] 
Panels A and B of Table 3.12 provide a summary of equally and value-weighted CARs 
over similar horizons and matching board as another measure of performance in event 
time. From Panel A, IPO under-performance is found to be more severe across the 
board in the post-IPO period compared to the equally-weighted BHAR returns. 
However, just like in the equally-weighted BHAR returns, all the abnormal returns 
remain negative and highly significant as the matching corridors are negotiated. The 
scale of the under-performance finding appears to be sensitive to the matching 
dynamics, just like in the equally-weighted BHAR approach. For example, the abnormal 
returns are observed to be the least [most] when the M6 [M1] matching algorithm is 
employed to benchmark the firms. When the returns are value-weighted as shown in 
Panel B, the under-performances continue to be largely strong, albeit, the evidence  
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TABLE 3.12: POST- IPO LONG-RUN EVENT-TIME CAR RETURNS VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS 
OVER THE PERIOD JANUARY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2006 
The table reports long-run cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of 746 IPOs that went public over the period January 1999 and December 2006. Equally and 
value-weighted CARs are compared with control firms matched on the six stepwise algorithms as defined in Table 3.11. Panel A reports equally-weighted returns, 
while Panel B reports value-weighted returns. CAR returns are generated by summing monthly returns starting in the 2nd month after listing following equity issue till 
the 13th, 25th, 37th, 49th and 61st months for 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year long-run returns. Abnormal return [AR] is the simple difference between the IPO 
raw average return [Raw] and the corresponding matching return [Bench].The CAR return figures are in %. The figures in parentheses are the skewness-adjusted t-
statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
PANEL A - EQUALLY-WEIGHTED RETURNS 
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years              Within first 3 years              Within first 4 years        Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
           ______________________    ______________________    ______________________  ______________________ ___________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw     Bench      AR    Raw       Bench      AR Raw       Bench     AR     Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                               
Match 1        -35.87     -1.06     -34.81        -85.24    -8.38    -76.86         -105.67   -11.64   -94.03          -106.05   -23.33   -82.72      -109.92   -26.86   -83.06  
         (-9.15***)             (-13.43***)                    (-13.73***)               (-10.33***)             (-8.99***) 
Match 2        -35.87     -7.67     -28.20        -85.24   -12.92    -72.32        -105.67   -21.75    -83.92         -106.05   -30.77   -75.28      -109.92   -25.21  -84.71 
        (-7.99***)              (-13.77***)       (-12.50***)               (-9.16***)         (-9.01***) 
Match 3        -35.87     -6.03     -29.84         -85.24   -11.47    -73.77        -105.67   -23.07   -82.60          -106.05   -34.18   -71.87      -109.92   -31.92  -78.00 
       (-8.20***)              (-14.06***)      (-12.30***)              (-8.81***)         (-8.45***) 
Match 4        -35.87     -6.96     -28.91       -85.24   -13.29    -71.95         -105.67   -21.66   -84.01          -106.05   -34.45   -71.60      -109.92   -34.41   -75.51   
                (-8.24***)                          (-14.13***)                   (-13.13***)                (-9.19***)       (-8.53***) 
Match 5        -35.87     -4.90     -30.97       -85.24   -11.14    -74.10          -105.67   -26.87   -78.80          -106.05   -31.17   -74.88      -109.92   -27.07    -82.85 
       (-8.64***)            (-14.10***)                  (-12.50***)                (-9.77***)     (-9.64***) 
Match 6        -35.87     -9.88     -25.99       -85.24   -19.18   -66.06          -105.67    -29.39   -76.28          -106.05   -39.66   -66.39      -109.92   -44.68    -65.24 
       (-8.01***)            (-13.52***)                 (-11.98***)               (-8.87***)                    (-7.80***) 
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PANEL B - VALUE-WEIGHTED CAR RETURNS 
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years             Within first 3 years              Within first 4 years       Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
           ______________________    ______________________     ______________________  ___________________    ____________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw     Bench      AR      Raw     Bench      AR  Raw     Bench    AR     Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                              
Match 1        -22.56     -5.60    -16.96       -63.66   -21.07    -42.59       -80.22   -15.63   -64.59      -80.32    -6.76   -73.56   -72.75   -14.75   -58.00 
         (-1.69*)               (-2.48**)          (-3.68***)                (-3.46***)         (-2.25**) 
Match 2        -22.56     -3.06    -19.50       -63.66     8.77     -72.43       -80.22      6.34   -86.56      -80.32     2.79   -83.11    -72.75    17.51   -90.26 
         (-2.09**)             (-3.59***)                      (-4.42***)            (-3.47***)       (-3.91***) 
Match 3        -22.56     -2.73    -19.83       -63.66     8.46     -72.12       -80.22      4.83   -85.05      -80.32     0.54   -80.86    -72.75    14.13   -86.88 
         (-2.14**)             (-3.58***)                     (-4.34***)                (-3.36***)     (-3.75***) 
Match 4        -22.56     -2.90    -19.66       -63.66     9.18    -72.84        -80.22      8.27   -88.49      -80.32     2.68   -83.00    -72.75    15.81   -88.56 
         (-2.13**)             (-3.63***)                     (-4.48***)              (-3.51***)      (-3.87***) 
Match 5        -22.56     -3.39    -19.17       -63.66     6.71    -70.37        -80.22      2.13   -82.35      -80.32     0.60   -80.92    -72.75    11.85   -84.60 
         (-2.08**)             (-3.49***)                     (-4.18***)               (-3.42***)      (-3.69***) 
Match 6        -22.56   -22.33      -0.23       -63.66   -26.96   -36.70        -80.22   -33.58   -46.64     -80.32   -36.97   -43.35   -72.75   -37.79   -34.96 
         (-0.03)                             (-1.82*)          (-1.98**)                 (-1.78*)          (-1.52) 
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using the M6 algorithm is not as strong and in one case, weak. Three other striking 
features are also obseved from the results, just like in the BHAR results; firstly, the 
dismal performance of the IPO and control firms across the board [the performance of 
the IPO firms are worse]; secondly, the linear relationship between the performance of 
the firms and the length of the tracking window and; thirdly, the under-performances 
obtained from the CAR analysis are larger than those obtained from the BHAR 
analysis67.  
In general, while the IPOs tend to under-perform across the horizon and matching 
board using this performance measure, the results, which are broadly in line with those 
obtained by Ritter [1991], Jakobsen and Sorensen [2001], Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007], 
Chorruk and Worthington [2010] and Espenlaub, et al [2000] and contrast with those 
obtained by Wu [1993], Kim, et al [1995], Gompers and Lerner [2003] and Kooli, et al 
[2003], show that the scale of the under-performance, which varies substantially across 
the matching board, is sensitive to firstly, the choice of matching firms in the 
benchmark portfolio; secondly, the weighting scheme employed and; thirdly, the 
horizon over which it is measured. It is also found, in some cases [especially in the 
                                                          
67 This is not unconnected with the fact that BHAR involves compounding of returns, while the CAR does 
not [Barber and Lyon, 1997a]. Hence, in a period of rising prices in the stock market, the CAR and BHAR 
results will be positive with the BHAR results larger absolutely, while in a period of declining share prices 
as we had for a large part of the study period, the CAR and BHAR results will be negative with the CAR 
results larger absolutely. 
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value-weighted approach] that the observed under-performance is weak, and in some 
other cases, non-existent when the matching algorithm includes industry as an 
additional risk factor. 
[3.4.2.2] Wealth Relatives [WR]  
Table 3.13 provides a summary of the wealth relative results under the various 
benchmarks over the various horizons, which is consistent with the BHAR result 
pattern. Wealth relatives measure investors’ wealth gain or loss from an investment in 
a basket of IPO stocks relative to a similar investment in a set of matching non-issuing 
firms. Clearly from the table, the same pattern of results is more or less observed if this 
same investor decides to hold the stocks either in equal weights or in proportion to their 
market values [value-weighting], albeit, by and large, the wealth losses appear to be 
lower under value-weighting, just like in the other approaches, especially at the 
windows up to three years. A wide variation in the scale of the under-performance 
finding is also evident across the matching and horizon board. However, the results, 
which are broadly in line with those obtained by Ritter [1991], Levis [1993] and Chorruk 
and Worthington [2010] for the US, UK and Thai markets respectively and at variance 
with the findings of Menyah, et al [1995], show that the extent of the under-
performance finding is again sensitive firstly, to the choice of matching firms in the 
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TABLE 3.13: POST- IPO LONG-RUN WEALTH RELATIVES RELATIVE TO CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS 
ALGORITHMS OVER THE PERIOD JANUARY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2006 
The table reports long-run wealth relatives for the sample of 746 IPOs that went public over the period January 1999 and December 2006. Equally-
and value-weighted wealth relatives are computed relative to the benchmark portfolios matched on the six stepwise algorithms as defined in Table 3.11. 
The periodic wealth relatives [WR1 – WR5] are calculated as the ratio of one plus the mean IPO holding period return [not in %] divided by one plus 
the mean benchmark holding period return [not in %] over the different horizons, while the corresponding wealth losses are calculated as [1 – wealth 
relative].  
             Equally-Weighted                                                                               Value-Weighted                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
           _____________________________________________________                   ___________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
              WR1            WR2             WR3       WR4  WR5   WR1          WR2           WR3  WR4       WR5                                                                                                                                                      
Match 1 0.7630           0.5995          0.6248          0.6783        0.6876            0.9444         1.0013         0.7838      0.6840        0.7707 
Match 2 0.8065           0.6232          0.5955          0.6316        0.5630            0.9093         0.7560         0.6191      0.6310        0.5640 
Match 3 0.7973           0.6249          0.6162          0.6618        0.5740            0.9088         0.7624         0.6273      0.6437        0.5763 
Match 4 0.8052           0.6435          0.6164          0.7105        0.6581            0.9103         0.7583         0.6175      0.6374        0.5720 
Match 5 0.7791           0.6012          0.5958          0.6290        0.5444            0.9198         0.7763         0.6369      0.6431        0.5833 
Match 6 0.8279           0.6448          0.6209          0.7391        0.7062            1.0988         0.8612         0.6407      0.6498        0.6203 
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benchmark portfolio; secondly, the weighting scheme employed and thirdly, the horizon 
over which it is measured. The results also show that the observed under-performance 
is least [especially under the equally-weighted approach] when the matching algorithm 
includes industry as an additional risk factor. 
[3.4.2.3] Mean Monthly Calendar Abnormal Returns [MMAR]   
Using this variant of the calendar time approach, a similar picture emerges. The first 
three columns in Table 3.14 reports equally-weighted returns, while the last three 
presents value-weighted performance. In general, firstly, the dismal performance of the 
IPO and control firms is noted across the board [the performance of the IPO firms are 
worse], just like in the event time approaches, and secondly, the MMAR results 
approximate the CAR results in magnitude68. The evidence on IPO under-performance 
when performance is calculated as the return of a portfolio composed in each month by 
the stocks of those firms that have carried out an initial offering appears mixed. It can 
be observed from the table that when the portfolio firms are formed equally-weighted, 
the MMAR ranges from -1.31% [t-stats: -3.35] to -1.66% [t-stats: -4.04] across the 
matching board, corresponding to an under-performance range of 78.6% [-1.31% x 60  
                                                          
68 This may not be unconnected with the fact that in a downturn as we had in the years following the bust 
of the technology bubble [1999-2001], it is not unlikely that common shocks may permeate and pervade 
the market. If these shocks are negative, then a drag on general market price performance is expected 
because the calendar approach captures important cross-correlations and dependencies in stock returns, 
missed out by the event time approach. When abnormal returns are measured in a downturn using the 
event time approach, the CAR metric returns a worse performance relative to the BHAR metric.   
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TABLE 3.14: 5-YEAR POST-IPO MEAN MONTHLY CALENDAR TIME ABNORMAL 
RETURNS [MMAR] VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON 
VARIOUS ALGORITHMS OVER THE PERIOD 1999 TO 2006 
The table reports MMARs for the sample of 746 IPOs that went public over the period January 
1999 and December 2006. Equally-and value-weighted MMARs are compared with alternative 
benchmarks using the technique of control firms. The control firms are matched on the six 
stepwise algorithms as defined in Table 3.11. Monthly portfolio returns are calculated starting in 
the 2nd month after listing following equity issue. The simple difference between the IPO return 
in a given month and the designated benchmark is the abnormal return. MMAR is the simple 
sum of the monthly abnormal returns across firms in the portfolio each month. The grand MMAR 
is the sum of the time-series MMARs divided by the number of calendar months. The abnormal 
return [AR] is the simple difference between the grand mean monthly IPO raw average return 
[Raw] and the corresponding benchmark return [Bench]. The first 3 columns reports equally-
weighted returns, while the last 3 report value-weighted returns. All the return figures are in %. 
The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively. 
                           Equally-Weighted              Value-Weighted                     
          Raw              Bench                AR                  Raw             Bench                 AR                                                                                                                                    
M1                -1.86               -0.40               -1.46                -1.03              -0.33               -0.70                       
                                                  (-3.17***)                                                          (-0.94) 
M2                -1.86               -0.29               -1.57                -1.03               0.16               -1.19             
                                                 (-3.70***)                                             (-1.67*) 
M3                -1.86               -0.24               -1.62                -1.03               0.08               -1.11             
                                                 (-3.73***)                                               (-1.27) 
M4                -1.86               -0.20               -1.66                -1.03               0.16               -1.19             
                                                 (-4.04***)                                              (-1.67*) 
M5                -1.86               -0.29               -1.57                -1.03               0.04               -1.07             
                                                (-3.92***)                                               (-1.24) 
M6                -1.86               -0.55               -1.31                -1.03              -1.19                0.16             
                                                (-3.35***)                                               (0.15) 
months] and 99.6% [-1.66% x 60 months] for five years after the issue.  Hence, when 
returns are equally-weighted, under-performance appears to be strong and persistent 
across the matching board. However, mixed findings are observed when a value-
weighted performance measure is employed. Under this scenario, the MMAR ranges 
from -1.19% [t-stats: -1.67] to 0.16% [t-stats: 0.15] across the matching board, 
corresponding to a range of 71.4% [-1.19% x 60 months] and 9.6% [0.16% x 60 
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months] for five years after the issue. More importantly, a significant level of under-
performance is ony found when the M2 and M4 matching algorithms are employed, 
and then only at the 10% level. The pattern observed in the event-time measures is 
clearly present in this approach as the scale and significance of the under-performance 
finding appears to be sensitive to the matching dynamics. It is observed that under the 
equally-weighted approach that, though, the abnormal returns are all significant across 
the matching board, they are least when the M6 algorithm is employed to benchmark 
the IPO firms. A similar pattern is observed when the returns are value-weighted with 
the M6 algorithm, once again, producing the least under-performance finding. In fact, 
no significant under-performance is found in four of the algorithms [i.e. M1, M3, M5 and 
M6] with the M6 algorithm even producing an insignificant out-performance finding. 
Thus, with this version of the calendar time approach, there is a persistence of IPO 
under-performance across the matching board, albeit the evidence when the returns 
are value-weighted appears to be much weaker; however, it is also observed that the 
scale of the under-performance, just like in the event time approaches, appears to be 
dependent on the matching algorithm used in benchmarking the returns. The findings 
also reveal, in line with the event-time methodologies, that IPOs are poor investments 
using the equally-weighted technique. However, the evidence is much weaker when a 
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value-weighted performance measure is adopted. Under this scenario, the under-
performance is non-existent in some cases, and at best, weak in others.   
[3.4.2.4] CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F Model   
When the difference in performance between the IPO and benchmark portfolios relative 
to the CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F models is tracked equally in calendar time, a similar 
pattern is observable. The first two columns in Table 3.15 present the intercepts from 
the CAPM regressions, while the last two columns present those from the FF-Cahart-
4F regressions. The evidence on IPO under-performance using these factor models 
appears mixed, just like in the MMAR and indeed the event-time approaches. Again, 
two salient features are noticeable from the results, just like in the event time and 
MMAR results; firstly, the dismal performance of the IPO firms across all benchmarks 
and secondly, the reduction in the level of the under-performance when returns are 
value-weighted. 
The intercepts, which measure the differences in the MMAR between the IPO and 
benchmark portfolios, from the CAPM regressions across all benchmarks for the five 
years following the IPOs, are all negative and significantly different from zero on an 
equally-weighted basis. However, when the returns are value-weighted, the under- 
performance finding completely disappears, which may be an indication of the lower 
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TABLE 3.15: 5-YEAR POST-IPO INTERCEPTS FROM THE CAPM & FAMA-FRENCH-
CAHART 4-FACTOR REGRESSIONS ON THE IPO & CONTROL FIRM PORTFOLIO 
MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS OVER THE PERIOD JANUARY 1999 TO 
DECEMBER 2006 
This table reports the intercepts and t-values [in parentheses] of equally-weighted and 
value-weighted ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions. In all regressions, the 
discrepancy between the IPO firms’ portfolio monthly return [IPO] and the monthly return of 
the designated control portfolio benchmark is the dependent variable, where the control 
firms have been selected based on the six stepwise matching algorithms as defined in 
Table 3.11. The sample comprises 746 firms going public between 1999 and 2006 and 
their matching mature control firms [firm age since IPO is at least 7 years]. The explanatory 
variables are the monthly excess return of the value-weighted FTSE All-Share index over 
3-month Treasury Bills rate [RMRF], the return of a zero-investment size portfolio [SMB], 
the return of a zero-investment book-to-market portfolio [HML] and the return of a zero-
investment momentum portfolio [MOM]. The first two columns present the results for the 
CAPM regressions, while the last two columns present FF-Cahart-4F regressions. The t-
stats have been calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL              FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 Eq. Weighted       Val. Weighted           Eq. Weighted            Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
M1                  -0.0146 [-3.01***]    -0.0106 [-1.37] -0.0161 [-4.01***]      -0.0117 [-1.86*] 
M2        -0.0150 [-3.39***]    -0.0119 [-1.33]       -0.0159 [-4.31***]      -0.0148 [-2.07**] 
M3  -0.0157 [-3.40***]    -0.0110 [-1.21] -0.0167 [-4.20***]      -0.0138 [-1.86*] 
M4  -0.0159 [-3.67***]    -0.0120 [-1.41] -0.0175 [-4.78***]      -0.0149 [-2.15**] 
M5  -0.0155 [-3.66***]    -0.0101 [-1.12] -0.0166 [-4.38***]       -0.0134 [-1.82*] 
M6  -0.0127 [-3.08***]     0.0011 [0.09]       -0.0150 [-3.83***]          -0.0055 [-0.47] 
 
[higher] long-run performance made by smaller [larger] IPO firms over the period. This 
is also in line with the assertions of Brav and Gompers [1997] who aver that if IPO 
under-performance is a small firm effect, value-weighting will reduce the measured 
under-performance. When the difference in performance between the IPO and 
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benchmark portfolios relative to the FF-Cahart-4F model is tracked, a slightly different 
picture emerges. The third column presents the FF-Cahart-4F time series regression 
results for the five years following the IPOs on an equally-weighted basis for the entire 
period. The intercepts across all benchmarks are all negative and highly significant at 
the 1% level. More importantly, IPO under-performance persists as the firms are mixed 
and matched in the composite benchmark portfolio, albeit they are lower when industry 
is included as an additional matching criterion. When the IPOs are value-weighted, the 
intercepts are still negative and largely significant across the matching board, unlike in 
the CAPM approach. However, it is also noted that the scale of the under-performance 
is not as strong, in some cases weak and in one case, non-existent69.  
It is also observed, just like in the MMAR and the event-time approaches, that the scale 
and significance of the under-performance finding under the CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F 
calendar approaches appears to be sensitive to the choice of matching firms in the 
benchmark portfolio. Under the equally-weighted technique, even though the abnormal 
returns are all significant across the matching board, the least under-performance 
finding is produced when the M6 algorithm is employed [CAPM: –1.27%, t-stats: -3.08; 
FF-Cahart-4F: –1.50%, t-stats: -3.83]. In the same vein, IPO under-performance is 
                                                          
69
 The intercept in Match 6, the matching corridor that includes the industry of the firms as an additional 
matching criterion, is not significantly different from zero. 
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most when the M4 algorithm is used to select the benchmark firms [CAPM: –1.59%,      
t-stats: -3.67; FF-Cahart-4F: –1.75%, t-stats: -4.78]. A similar pattern is evident when 
the returns are value-weighted as the M6 algorithm, once again, produces the least 
under-performance finding. In fact, the abnormal returns in this zone are insignificant 
[CAPM: 0.11%, t-stats: 0.09; FF-Cahart-4F: –0.55%, t-stats: -0.47], with the CAPM 
approach even producing an infinitesimal, albeit insignificant IPO out-performance 
finding. 
In general, this first empirical finds firstly, that the under-performance persists in 
calendar time with all the intercepts [save for the CAPM value-weighted] still significant 
and in negative territory; secondly, when compared with the CAPM results, the 
magnitude of the under-performance is higher under the FF-Cahart-4F model; thirdly, 
just like in the other approaches, the magnitude of the under-performance reduces and 
in some cases disappears when the event firms are value-weighted rather than 
equally-weighted and; fourthly, the scale and magnitude of the observed under-
performance appears to be sensitive to the matching process. The results, which are 
consistent with Ritter and Welch [2002], Loughran and Ritter [1995], Thomadakis, et al 
[2012], Espenlaub, et al [2000], Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007], also show that, in some 
cases [especially value-weighted performance], the observed under-performance is 
weak and in some others, disappears altogether when the matching algorithm includes 
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industry as an additional risk factor, which tends to suggest that a matching criteria that 
includes the industry of the firms is vital in the matching process as it ensures that 
issuing and non-issuing firms are fairly similar, thus making for better comparisons. 
[3.4.2.5] Exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble 
As a further robustness check, the ‘dotcom’ years [1999 – 2001] are excluded from the 
sample period the analysis with IPOs that went public over the period 2002 and 2006 is 
performed. The results are not too different from the previous results obtained for the 
full sample period. Tables 3.16 – 3.20 present the results for the period excluding the 
‘dotcom’ years for the BHAR, CAR, WR, MMAR and the factor models [i.e. CAPM and 
FF-Cahart-4F] approaches respectively. In general, it is observed that excluding the 
‘dotcom’ period produces a less marked under-performance finding across all the event 
time measures [i.e. BHAR, CAR and WR] using the equally and value-weighted 
approaches, which may not be unconnected with the dismal performance of the firms 
that had their IPOs over the technology bubble years [1999-2001]. In fact, under the 
value-weighted approach, the IPO firms out-perform their matching benchmarks over 
the 1-year investment horizon. However, the results are mixed in calendar time when 
the’dotcom’ period is excluded. Under an equally-weighted approach, the under-  
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TABLE 3.16: POST- IPO LONG-RUN EVENT-TIME BHAR RETURNS VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS 
ALGORITHMS FOR THE SUB-PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM YEARS’ [2002 – 2006] 
The table reports long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the sample of 485 IPOs for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble [‘dotcom’] years, 
going from January 2002 to December 2006. Equally and value-weighted BHARs are compared with control firms matched on the six stepwise algorithms as 
defined in Table 3.11. Panel A reports equally-weighted returns, while Panel B reports value-weighted returns. BHAR returns are generated by summing 
monthly returns starting in the 2nd month after listing till the 13th, 25th, 37th, 49th and 61st months for 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year long-run returns. 
Abnormal return [AR] is the simple difference between the IPO raw average return [Raw] and the corresponding matching return [Bench]. The CAR return 
figures are in %. The figures in parentheses are the skewness-adjusted t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
PANEL A - EQUALLY-WEIGHTED RETURNS 
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years             Within first 3 years             Within first 4 years          Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
           ______________________    ______________________     ______________________  ______________________ ___________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw       Bench      AR       Raw       Bench      AR  Raw     Bench      AR      Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                             
Match 1         -11.62      9.93      -21.55            -27.61     4.77        -32.38        -42.08       -25.50      -16.58      -47.54     -45.61      -1.93     -56.47     -57.45       0.98 
       (-3.54***)      (-4.79***)   (-0.89)       (-0.05)          (0.12) 
Match 2         -11.62      5.08     -16.70            -27.61     3.65         -31.26        -42.08      -14.54       -27.54      -47.54      -29.24    -18.30    -56.47    -30.15      -26.32   
                (-4.28***)                  (-6.10***)                          (-4.86***)                    (-2.57**)      (-3.44***) 
Match 3         -11.62      6.18     -17.80            -27.61     4.78        -32.39         -42.08      -17.48       -24.60      -47.54      -31.30    -16.24    -56.47    -30.47      -26.00 
      (-4.39***)               (-6.44***)                         (-4.44***)                   (-2.26**)     (-3.18***) 
Match 4         -11.62      3.49     -15.11            -27.61     1.38        -28.99        -42.08       -15.26       -26.82      -47.54      -35.39    -12.15    -56.47    -41.14      -15.33 
      (-4.13***)      (-5.80***)           (-4.75***)                  (-2.00**)       (-2.50**) 
Match 5         -11.62      8.18     -19.80            -27.61     9.72        -37.33        -42.08       -13.55       -28.53      -47.54      -29.06    -18.48    -56.47    -31.75      -24.72 
       (-5.05***)      (-9.01***)            (-5.33***)                  (-2.96***)        (-4.24***) 
Match 6         -11.62      5.32     -16.94            -27.61    13.31       -40.92        -42.08         -3.69       -38.38      -47.54      -29.44    -18.10    -56.47    -38.67      -17.80 
      (-5.38***)      (-8.02***)            (-7.35***)                  (-3.05***)                     (-2.77***) 
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PANEL B - VALUE-WEIGHTED RETURNS  
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years              Within first 3 years              Within first 4 years         Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
           ______________________    ______________________     ______________________  _____________________  ___________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw     Bench      AR       Raw     Bench      AR  Raw     Bench     AR       Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                                 
Match 1         10.65      3.53        7.12        21.77    -5.00      26.77       -7.97      -9.63       1.66      -13.20    -8.84     -4.36    -12.14   -29.38   17.24 
           (1.30)               (2.38**)               (0.11)                    (-0.25)           (0.82) 
Match 2         10.65      0.78        9.87        21.77    24.07     -2.30        -7.97     17.05     -25.02      -13.20    5.50    -18.70   -12.14    19.59   -31.73 
           (1.17)          (-0.12)              (-1.10)                     (-0.67)           (-1.66*) 
Match 3         10.65      0.84        9.81        21.77    23.30     -1.53        -7.97     16.01     -23.98      -13.20    4.21    -17.41   -12.14    18.49   -30.63 
           (1.17)          (-0.09)             (-1.06)                     (-0.63)          (-1.67*) 
Match 4         10.65      0.88        9.77        21.77    23.92     -2.15        -7.97     18.83     -26.80      -13.20    6.29    -19.49   -12.14    20.46   -32.60 
            (1.17)          (-0.11)             (-1.19)                     (-0.70)         (-1.68*) 
Match 5         10.65      1.12        9.53        21.77    23.63     -1.86        -7.97     18.17     -26.14      -13.20    7.72    -20.92   -12.14    21.26   -33.40 
            (1.14)          (-0.10)             (-1.17)                    (-0.76)         (-1.69*) 
Match 6         10.65    13.38       -2.73        21.77    57.18   -35.41        -7.97     69.17     -77.14      -13.20   55.41   -68.61   -12.14   78.46   -90.60 
         (-0.29)                 (-2.74***)             (-1.83*)                 (-3.44***)     (-3.92***) 
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TABLE 3.17: POST- IPO LONG-RUN EVENT-TIME CAR RETURNS VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS 
FOR THE SUB-PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM YEARS’ [2002 – 2006] 
The table reports long-run cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 485 IPOs for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble [‘dotcom’] years, going 
from January 2002 to December 2006. Equally and value-weighted CARs are compared with control firms matched on the six stepwise algorithms as defined 
in Table 3.11. Panel A reports equally-weighted returns, while Panel B reports value-weighted returns. CAR returns are generated by summing monthly 
returns starting in the 2nd month after listing following equity issue till the 13th, 25th, 37th, 49th and 61st months for 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year 
long-run returns. Abnormal return [AR] is the simple difference between the IPO raw average return [Raw] and the corresponding matching return [Bench]. 
The CAR return figures are in %. The figures in parentheses are the skewness-adjusted t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively.  
PANEL A - EQUALLY-WEIGHTED RETURNS 
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years              Within first 3 years           Within first 4 years          Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
           ______________________    ______________________     ______________________  ____________________   ____________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw     Bench      AR       Raw     Bench      AR Raw     Bench      AR      Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                                 
Match 1         -15.72      9.98       -25.70         -53.74     2.30        -56.04           -90.75     -10.67     -80.08        -103.67   -35.14    -68.53      -107.45    -38.76     -68.69 
         (-5.58***)               (-8.17***)                          (-9.75***)                  (-7.01***)                       (-6.00***) 
Match 2         -15.72      4.54      -20.26          -53.74     1.36       -55.10           -90.75     -15.97     -74.78        -103.67    -34.12   -69.55      -107.45    -30.69     -76.76 
        (-5.04***)               (-9.03***)                        (-9.22***)              (-6.86***)         (-6.63***) 
Match 3         -15.72      5.34      -21.06          -53.74     3.38       -57.12           -90.75     -18.96     -71.79        -103.67    -38.54   -65.13      -107.45    -38.96     -68.49 
        (-4.96***)               (-9.44***)                       (-8.89***)                  (-6.47***)         (-5.93***) 
Match 4         -15.72      3.71      -19.43          -53.74     1.06       -54.80           -90.75     -14.03     -76.72        -103.67    -35.63   -68.04      -107.45    -36.59     -70.86 
        (-4.85***)               (-9.30***)                       (-9.97***)                 (-7.01***)         (-6.36***) 
Match 5         -15.72      6.13      -21.85          -53.74     6.67       -60.41           -90.75     -20.35     -70.40        -103.67    -33.57   -70.10      -107.45    -30.18     -77.27 
        (-5.40***)              (-10.40***)         (-9.41***)                 (-7.36***)         (-7.21***) 
Match 6         -15.72      3.64      -19.36          -53.74     7.49       -61.23           -90.75      -5.72     -85.03         -103.67    -25.15   -78.52      -107.45    -30.79     -76.66 
        (-5.69***)              (-11.08***)        (-11.85***)                             (-8.97***)         (-7.70***) 
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PANEL B - VALUE-WEIGHTED RETURNS 
     Within the first year             Within first 2 years              Within first 3 years           Within first 4 years           Within first 5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
           ______________________    ______________________     _____________________  _____________________   ___________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
             Raw     Bench      AR           Raw     Bench      AR       Raw     Bench      AR   Raw     Bench      AR      Raw     Bench      AR                                                                                                                                             
Match 1           9.13      4.36        4.77         1.18    -13.14    14.32       -21.28   -12.66     -8.62        -28.49   -3.71    -24.78    -20.61   -21.89    1.28 
          (0.85)                      (1.36)             (-0.68)                      (-1.11)             (0.11) 
Match 2           9.13      1.82        7.31         1.18     20.23   -19.05       -21.28    15.58    -36.86       -28.49   11.24   -39.73    -20.61    24.21 -44.82 
          (0.94)                    (-0.77)             (-1.72*)                    (-1.70*)         (-1.77*) 
Match 3           9.13      1.92        7.21         1.18     19.65   -18.47       -21.28    13.70    -34.98       -28.49    8.42    -36.91    -20.61    21.49 -42.10 
          (0.93)                    (-0.75)             (-1.70*)                    (-1.69*)         (-1.67*) 
Match 4           9.13      2.15        6.98         1.18     20.71   -19.53       -21.28    19.21    -40.49       -28.49   13.03   -41.52    -20.61    25.01  -45.62 
          (0.91)                     (-0.80)             (-1.90*)                     (-1.71*)         (-1.85*) 
Match 5           9.13      2.55        6.58         1.18     20.74   -19.56       -21.28    16.21    -37.49       -28.49   13.25   -41.74    -20.61    24.78  -45.39 
          (0.85)                     (-0.79)             (-1.77*)                      (-1.71*)         (-1.80*) 
Match 6           9.13    12.90      -3.77         1.18     39.45   -38.27        -21.28   41.06     -62.34       -28.49   29.91   -58.40    -20.61    41.32 -61.93 
         (-0.40)                   (-1.79*)             (-2.03**)                     (-1.87*)        (-2.14**) 
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TABLE 3.18: POST- IPO LONG-RUN WEALTH RELATIVES VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS 
FOR THE SUB-PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
The table reports long-run wealth relatives for the sample of 485 IPOs for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble [‘dotcom’] years, going from 
January 2002 to December 2006. Equally-and value-weighted wealth relatives are computed relative to the benchmark portfolios matched on the six 
stepwise algorithms as defined in Table 3.11. The periodic wealth relatives [WR1 – WR5] are calculated as the ratio of one plus the mean IPO holding 
period return [not in %] divided by one plus the mean benchmark holding period return [not in %] over the different horizons. The corresponding 
wealth losses are calculated as [1 – wealth relative]. 
             Equally-Weighted                                                                                  Value-Weighted                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
           _____________________________________________________                    __________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
              WR1            WR2             WR3       WR4  WR5   WR1          WR2            WR3  WR4        WR5                                                                                                                                  
Match 1 0.8039           0.6909          0.7775          0.9646        1.0231            1.0688         1.2818         1.0184         0.9522     1.2441 
Match 2 0.8411           0.6983          0.6778          0.7414        0.6232            1.0980         0.9814         0.7863         0.8227     0.7347 
Match 3 0.8323           0.6908          0.7019          0.7636        0.6260            1.0973         0.9876         0.7933         0.8329     0.7415 
Match 4 0.8540           0.7140          0.6836          0.8120        0.7396            1.0968         0.9826         0.7745         0.8167     0.7294 
Match 5 0.8169           0.6597          0.6700          0.7396        0.6378            1.0942         0.9849         0.7788         0.8058     0.7245 
Match 6 0.8391           0.6388          0.6015          0.7435        0.7097            0.9759         0.7747         0.5440         0.5585     0.4923 
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TABLE 3.19: 5-YEAR POST-IPO MEAN MONTHLY CALENDAR TIME ABNORMAL 
RETURNS [MMAR] VERSUS CONTROL FIRM BENCHMARKS MATCHED ON 
VARIOUS ALGORITHMS OVER THE PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS 
[2002 – 2006] 
The table reports MMARs for a sample of 485 IPOs for the sub-period excluding the 
technology bubble [‘dotcom’] years. Equally and value-weighted MMARs are compared 
with alternative benchmarks using the technique of control firms. The control firms are 
matched on the six stepwise algorithms as defined in Table 3.11. Monthly portfolio 
returns are calculated starting in the 2nd month after listing following equity issue. The 
simple difference between the IPO return in a given month and the designated 
benchmark is the abnormal return. MMAR is the simple sum of the monthly abnormal 
returns across firms in the portfolio each month. The grand MMAR is the sum of the 
time-series mean monthly abnormal returns divided by the number of calendar months. 
The abnormal return [AR] is the simple difference between the grand mean monthly 
IPO raw average return [Raw] and the corresponding benchmark return [Bench]. The 
first 3 columns report equally-weighted returns, while the last 3 columns present value-
weighted returns. All the return figures are in %. The figures in parentheses are the t-
statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
                                    Equally-Weighted                Value-Weighted  
         Raw           Bench              AR                    Raw       Bench              AR                                                                                                                    
M1                -2.14               -0.23                 -1.91                  -0.42           -0.19             -0.23             
                       (-4.26***)                                (-0.40) 
M2               -2.14                -0.09                 -2.05                  -0.42            0.53             -0.95       
                                                    (-4.66***)                                  (-1.25) 
M3               -2.14                -0.15                 -1.99                  -0.42            0.50              -0.92       
                                                    (-4.47***)                                  (-1.22) 
M4               -2.14                -0.19                 -1.95                  -0.42            0.56              -0.98       
                                                    (-4.09***)                                 (-1.30) 
M5               -2.14                 -0.47                -1.67                  -0.42            0.45              -0.87       
                                                     (-4.89***)                                 (-1.23) 
M6               -2.14                 -0.53                 -1.61                 -0.42            0.81              -1.23       
                                                      (-5.26***)                                  (-1.60) 
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TABLE 3.20: 5-YEAR POST-IPO INTERCEPTS FROM THE CAPM & FAMA-FRENCH-
CAHART 4-FACTOR REGRESSIONS ON THE IPO & CONTROL FIRM PORTFOLIO 
MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS FOR THE PERIOD EXCLUDING THE DOTCOM 
YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
This table reports the intercepts and t-values [in parentheses] of equally-weighted and 
value-weighted ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions. In all regressions, the 
discrepancy between the IPO firms’ portfolio monthly return [IPO] and the monthly return of 
the designated control portfolio benchmark is the dependent variable, where the control 
firms have been selected based on the six stepwise matching algorithms as defined in 
Table 3.11. The sample comprises 485 firms going public over the sub-period 2002 to 2006 
[excluding the ‘dotcom’ period] and their matching mature control firms [firm age since IPO 
is at least 7 years]. The explanatory variables are the monthly excess return of the value-
weighted FTSE All-Share index over 3-month Treasury Bills rate [RMRF], the return of a 
zero-investment size portfolio [SMB], the return of a zero-investment book-to-market 
portfolio [HML] and the return of a zero-investment momentum portfolio [MOM]. The first 
two columns present the results for the CAPM regressions, while the last two columns 
present FF-Cahart-4F regressions. The t-stats have been calculated using Davidson & 
Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively. 
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL                     FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
  Eq. Weighted        Val. Weighted              Eq. Weighted        Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
M1  -0.0195 [-4.01***]    -0.0069 [-1.14]      -0.0214 [-4.29***]    -0.0059 [-0.94]  
M2  -0.0203 [-4.25***]    -0.0102 [-1.27]      -0.0208 [-4.23***]    -0.0100 [-1.23]                               
M3  -0.0199 [-4.08***]    -0.0100 [-1.25]      -0.0196 [-3.87***]    -0.0096 [-1.18]                                
M4  -0.0192 [-3.68***]    -0.0106 [-1.32]      -0.0194 [-3.60***]    -0.0105 [-1.30]                                
M5  -0.0165 [-4.58***]    -0.0087 [-1.18]      -0.0171 [-4.55***]    -0.0086 [-1.19]                                
M6  -0.0159 [-5.00***]    -0.0160 [-1.93*]     -0.0176 [-5.55***]   -0.0141 [-1.67*]                                
performance is generally more severe, while the reverse is the case when a value-
weighted performance measure is adopted.  
Clearly, from all the tables, the study finds that the under-performance results are 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ period as it continues to be strong, 
pervading, overwhelming and highly significant across all the methodologies under an 
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equally-weighted performance measure. However, the panels and columns of Tables 
3.16 – 3.20 that report the value-weighted performance results present interesting 
findings. An exacerbation of the ‘no under-performance finding’ is found across the 
methodologies. For example, from Panel B of Table 3.16, the under-performance is 
found to be largely non-existent, save for the last horizon and the sixth matching 
algorithm [M6]. The under-performance is also largely non-existent from the CAR 
results in Panel B of Table 3.17 and the evidence is at best, weak. Under the WR 
approach, the results presented in Panel B of Table 3.18 shows a relatively weak 
finding. Excluding the M6 algorithm under the factor model approaches that include 
industry as an additional matching risk factor, the evidence on the ‘no under-
performance finding’ presented in Tables 3.19 - 3.20 under the calendar time 
techniques [i.e. MMAR, CAPM and FF-Cahart-4F] is stronger as the MMAR and factor 
model alphas are shown not to be significantly different from zero. 
Table 3.21 summarises the results of the under-performance finding over the matching 
and horizon board from the various methodologies used to test the null hypothesis that 
the difference in the return between the IPO and benchmark portfolios is zero, under 
the equally and value-weighted approaches. Clearly for the full period, the under- 
performance finding is strong and overwhelming across the various methodologies, 
using the equally-weighted approach with the results providing strong evidence against  
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TABLE 3.21: SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNDER-PERFORMANCE 
FINDING FROM THE VARIOUS METHODOLOGIES USED TO TEST THE NULL 
HYPOTHESIS 
FULL PERIOD [1999 – 2006] 
 EQUALLY-WEIGHTED VALUE-WEIGHTED 
EVENT-TIME APPROACH:   
BHAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT IN THE 1ST 2 
HORIZONS, ALBEIT PRESENT IN 
THE LAST 3 AT 5 AND 10% LEVELS 
CAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
MILDLY STRONG ALL THROUGH 
THE MATCHING AND HORIZON 
BOARD, MAJORLY AT 1%, ALBEIT 
WEAK AT M6 
WR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
MILDLY STRONG ALL THROUGH 
THE MATCHING AND HORIZON 
BOARD 
CALENDAR-TIME APPROACH:   
MMAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT; AT BEST, WEAK IN 
A COUPLE OF CASES 
CAPM VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT IN ALL CASES. 
INSIGNIFICANT OUT-
PERFORMANCE EVEN OBSERVED 
UNDER M6 
FF-CAHART-4F VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
MILDLY STRONG [NOT MORE 
THAN 5%], ALBEIT NON-EXISTENT 
UNDER M6  
PERIOD EXCLUDING THE DOTCOM YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
EVENT-TIME APPROACH:   
BHAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
LARGELY NON-EXISTENT, EXCEPT 
IN THE LAST HORIZON AND M6  
CAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
LARGELY NON-EXISTENT; AT BEST 
WEAK 
WR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
LARGELY EXISTENT BUT WEAK 
CALENDAR-TIME APPROACH:   
MMAR VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT  
CAPM VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT; ALBEIT, WEAK 
EVIDENCE UNDER  M6  
FF-CAHART-4F VERY STRONG ACROSS THE 
BOARD [ALL AT 1% LEVEL] 
NON-EXISTENT; ALBEIT, WEAK 
EVIDENCE UNDER  M6  
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market efficiency. However, the results are mixed when a value-weighted performance 
measure is employed. Under this scenario, the under-performance finding under the 
event-time methodologies continues to be largely strong, albeit not as pervading as in 
the equally-weighted approach. Under the calendar techniques, the under-performance 
is persistent under the FF-Cahart-4F model, albeit not as strong as in the equally-
weighted approach; however, the evidence evaporates and is at best, weak under the 
MMAR and CAPM approaches. The same pattern is largely evident when the period 
that excludes the ‘dotcom’ years is considered. 
In general, the findings show firstly, that the scale and magnitude of the observed 
under-performance is sensitive to the matching process; secondly, that under-
performance is compelling, overwhelming and genuine only when returns are equally-
weighted and; thirdly, the evidence on the under-performance finding is not as strong 
when returns are value-weighted; in fact in some cases, the evidence is weak and in 
some others, non-existent. The disappearance of the under-performance finding under 
the value-weighted technique may be an indication of firstly, the preponderance of 
small firms in the sample and secondly, the lower [higher] long-run performance made 
by the smaller [larger] firms over the period70. This is in line firstly, with the assertions of 
                                                          
70
 Indeed, Panel C of Table 3.5 reveals that the number of small firms [market capitalization < £50m] and 
big firms [market capitalization > £50m] is 552 and 194 respectively. The sum of the weights of the small 
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Brav and Gompers [1997] who avers that if IPO under-performance is a small firm 
effect, value-weighting will reduce the measured under-performance and secondly, with 
the argument of Fama [1998] that long-term post-event returns shrink and often 
disappear when event firms are value-weighted rather than equally-weighted because 
the former more accurately captures the total wealth effects of investors.  
The intent of this study at the onset was to determine firstly, if a ‘unique’ IPO effect 
indeed exists that makes issuing firms that are similar in all respects to a set of 
comparable non-issuing firms based on a set of observable ex-ante characteristics and 
differ only in that they experience the ‘IPO event’, perform significantly worse in the 
long-run than their non-issuing counterparts; secondly, if the documented under-
performance of IPOs is a consequence of imperfect matching procedures or 
inadequate matching criteria; thirdly, if the under-performance is due to fundamental 
differences in firm characteristics between the issuing IPO firms and the non-issuing 
benchmark firms prior to or at the IPO date71; fourthly, if the scale and magnitude of the 
observed under-performance is sensitive to the matching process and; fifthly, if the 
under-performance is a real anomaly that challenges the efficient market hypothesis. In 
                                                                                                                                                                          
firms in the portfolio in terms of equal-weighting and value-weighting are 74% and 9% in that order, while 
the corresponding figures for the big firms are 26% and 91% respectively. 
71 This is more so in the light of the assertion of Lyon, et al [1999] that researchers should look at other key 
firm risk factors that explains the cross-section of stock returns that could be used in selecting the control 
firms from the general population. 
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order to arrive at an appropriate performance benchmark, pre-IPO operating 
performance, turnover growth and earnings yield were identified as additional key risk 
factors beyond the size, market-to-book and industry factors that could be used in 
selecting the control firms from the population in order to appropriately match its risk 
profile to that of the IPOs. 
Under the equally-weighted approach, the results show that after adjusting for market, 
size, book-to-market, pre-IPO performance, turnover growth, earnings yield and 
industry effects, the evidence for under-performance and by extension, against market 
efficiency is strong. The converse holds under a value-weighted performance approach 
as the under-performance finding and the evidence against market efficiency is not as 
strong, may not even exist, and in some cases, weak. The value-weighted results also 
reject any unique ‘IPO effect’ in the market place. Nevertheless, on the evidence of the 
equally-weighted results obtained, which is strong, consistent and overwhelming 
across the horizon and matching board, the author makes bold to say that IPO under-
performance is neither due to imperfect matching procedures or inadequate matching 
criteria nor differences in fundamental characteristics between the issuing IPO firms 
and their non-issuing counterparts prior to or at the IPO date. The equally-weighted 
results, rather, establish the existence of a unique ‘IPO effect’ in the market place that 
makes IPOs significantly under-perform their comparable non-issuing counterparts. 
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The author also avers that this ‘IPO effect’ is not a function of the process of selecting 
the control firms or the actual choice of the benchmark firms from the general 
population. Clearly, from the results of the various methodologies under an equally-
weighted performance, IPO under-performance persists despite using a more refined 
process to mix and match the control firms in the benchmark portfolios using key 
return-determining firm risk factors; however, the scale and magnitude of the observed 
under-performance also appears to be sensitive to the matching process. 
[3.5] SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
[3.5.1] Summary 
The study re-examines the validity, reliability and robustness of the documented long-
run under-performance of new issues of common stock using a fresh sample of 746 
IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 adopting a distance metric 
matching approach that firstly, selects matching firms across several relevant 
dimensions and secondly, avoids the problems of the traditional matching methods 
used in the majority of earlier studies.  
The IPO performance results across five different horizons are compared with the 
results of a set of matching firms selected according to the six stepwise matching 
algorithms as earlier defined. More importantly, the use of stepwise matching 
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algorithms that select the matching firms from the general population on the basis of 
key firm risk factors that includes three new risk factors – pre-IPO performance, 
turnover growth and earnings yield – employing a distance metric matching technique 
is first documented in this study. The findings reveal that, indeed, in line with the 
majority of extant research, IPOs are poor investments either in event time 
methodologies or calendar time techniques that rebalance the IPO stocks in monthly 
portfolios, using the equally-weighted technique. However, the evidence is mixed when 
a value-weighted performance measure is adopted. Under this scenario in event-time 
methodologies, the under-performance is also largely evident; however, when the risk-
adjusted performance of the IPO stocks is tracked in calendar time, the under-
performance is found to be non-existent in some cases, and at best, weak in some 
others. This pattern of results is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the late 1990s 
technology bubble.  
The results also show that the scale of the under-performance, which varies 
substantially and in some cases disappears altogether across the matching board, is 
sensitive to firstly, the choice of empirical method; secondly, the choice of matching 
firms in the benchmark portfolio; thirdly, the method of cumulating abnormal returns; 
fourthly, the weighting scheme employed; fifthly, the horizon over which it is measured 
and; sixthly, the inclusion or exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. This first 
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part of the work also documents a novel finding. It is found that in almost all the cases, 
the observed under-performance is least, and in some cases evaporates, when the 
matching algorithm includes industry as an additional risk factor, which tends to 
suggest that a matching criterion that includes the industry of the firms is vital in the 
matching process as it ensures that issuing and non-issuing firms are fairly similar, thus 
making for better comparisons. In general, the findings show firstly, that the scale and 
magnitude of the observed under-performance is sensitive to the matching process; 
secondly, that under-performance is compelling, overwhelming and genuine only when 
returns are equally-weighted and; thirdly, the evidence on the under-performance 
finding is not as strong when returns are value-weighted; in fact in some cases, the 
evidence is weak and in some others, disappears altogether.  
Overall, given that the majority of the studies in the literature find that IPOs are poor 
investments in the long-term, the findings suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond 
the immediate after-market may not be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-
market performance is dependent on the proportions in which the stocks are stacked in 
the investor’s portfolio; secondly, value-weighted performance does not provide strong 
evidence against market efficiency when compared to an equally-weighted measure of 
abnormal performance [which tends to suggest that the former may provide a more 
useful benchmark in assessing the post-event risk-adjusted performance of IPO firms 
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since it more accurately captures the investors’ wealth effects] and; thirdly, under-
performance of new issues of common stock remains an anomaly that really 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis only when performance is equally-weighted. 
[3.5.2] Conclusions 
The majority of the earlier studies document under-performance of new issues of 
common stock using the traditional method of matching to select the control firms from 
the general population, despite its drawbacks. This study’s use of a more refined 
technique in choosing the benchmark firms provides mixed findings. Under an equally-
weighted measure of performance, the results also generally suggest that investors 
who are crowded out of the initial offers in the primary market and hoping to find some 
succour in the immediate secondary market might be disappointed as a long-term 
investment in this set of IPOs from the second month of trading following the listing of 
these stocks relative to a similar investment in a set of comparable firms selected 
according to the six matching algorithms consistently produces an inferior performance 
across the horizon and matching board. The equally-weighted results also generally 
imply that for the study period, the market was not efficient given the prevalence of 
these negative abnormal returns in the long-run which also directly implies that 
investing in IPOs beyond the immediate after-market may not be a good trading 
strategy. However, under a value-weighted performance approach, which has been 
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touted as the appropriate technique for measuring the wealth effects of the typical 
investor in the market place, the IPO under-performance evidence is not as strong and 
consistent,  which suggests  that the markets were, by and large, efficient.  
Despite the fact that the greatest possible level of breadth, depth and robustness has 
been given to these results, the author warns that the results of this first empirical study 
only hold for the sample size and period used here as this may change if a different 
and/or larger sample were to be employed. Although this fisrt part of the work has used 
pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield as additional risk factors in 
selecting the control firms from the general population, it is still not able to explain fully 
the cross-section of stock returns. Hence, future researchers are recommended to 
compare the sample firms to the general population on the basis of other 
characteristics.  
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CHAPTER 4 – FIRM AND INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND 
IPO PERFORMANCE 
[4.1] Introduction  
The outcome of the first strand of this study naturally leads the author to a second 
strand that examines the cross-sectional dynamics in the firm and industry 
characteristics of this fixed cohort of newly-listed firms in a bid to identify the range of 
variables that shape the long-term performance of these firms. Following from the first 
empirical study where the market performance of the issuing firms relative to a set of 
fairly similar non-issuing firms was tracked, the work now ascertains, in this second 
empirical study, which set of firms within the general group of the IPO firms really 
under-perform. It could well be that the under-performance is concentrated within a 
particular group of the issuing firms which invariably becomes a drag on the general 
performance of the IPOs. In fact, the results from the first empirical study seem to 
suggest that size could be a key risk factor, amongst others, in the post-IPO long-run 
performance of issuing firms given that value-weighted performance did not produce a 
strong and consistent under-performance finding.   
The ‘window of opportunity’ hypothesis argues that when stock market indices and 
investor sentiments are high, firms tend to take advantage of these transitory 
opportunities occasioned by these favourable market conditions to float their offerings. 
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Extending this argument to include industry conditions, private firms desirous of going 
public are expected to also take advantage of favourable [adverse] industry conditions 
to float [delay] their offerings. For example, if firms in an industry believe the industry is 
over-valued which is reflected in high market-to-book multiples, they could time their 
offerings to obtain favourable offer prices and in the process, maximise the amount of 
capital they eventually raise. There could also be first-mover advantages from being 
the first firm to go public in an industry or competitive advantages from following a 
bandwagon of firms going public. Firms issuing IPOs in mature industries, dominated 
by established firms and where growth opportunities are limited, may find it difficult to 
perform in the market place. On the flip side, IPO firms that are domiciled in high 
growth industries may be able to use the additional capital raised from the IPO to take 
advantage of profitable niche opportunities in the market place.    
The impact of several firm and offering characteristics on the subsequent performance 
of new issues is well documented; however, only a few others have studied the impact 
of industry conditioning risk factors on IPO after-market performance. By and large, the 
amount of published research on this area is still limited. It is also pertinent to point out 
that none, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has investigated the impact of industry 
structure variables on the post-listing performance of IPO firms albeit, some 
researchers have studied the relationship between industry structure and the 
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performance of firms [Porter, 1980; Dess, et al, 1990]. This provides the springboard 
for the second empirical work as it seeks to ascertain the value and economic 
importance of salient industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the issue date on 
IPO long-run performance. Realistically, a firm’s long-run performance is not only a 
function of the firm, industry and market conditions around its IPO date but also on the 
industry and market conditions subsequent to the issue. However, the author’s goal in 
this second part of the study is to determine if one can predict the long-run 
performance of new issues by using only that information that would be available to the 
issuer, its investment banker or the IPO investor prior to or at the IPO date72. 
Hence, the aim of the second empirical study is to firstly, determine the class and 
profile of IPO firms that under-perform and secondly, ascertain if a set of observable 
firm and industry characteristics prior to or at the IPO can foreshadow the performance 
of the issuing firms in the long-term. This information could prove invaluable to potential 
IPO investors in their search for value as it enables them to avoid new issues that 
could potentially under-perform in the post-IPO years. It could also be of immense 
value to IPO firms and their investment bankers as they aim to time their offerings to 
coincide with favourable industry conditions. The dearth in the amount of studies 
analysing the impact of industry characteristics on the after-market performance of new 
                                                          
72 This excludes IPO risk, which is measured 30 days post-listing. 
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issues naturally leads the author to ask: which industry conditions are germane to IPO 
post-listing performance? In this regard, this second study evaluates the impact of six 
industry structure variables – an industry-adjusted IPO firm valuation [IPO surplus 
value], concentration, market-to-book value, profitability, leverage and equity volatility. 
The industry market-to-book value attempts to capture industry growth prospects, while 
industry profitability and concentration give an indication of the attractiveness of the 
industry. The industry leverage and equity volatility provide a proxy for the riskiness of 
the industry, while IPO surplus value tracks the valuation of the IPO firm relative to 
industry peers.  
During major IPO waves occasioned by profound investor sentiments and a massive 
demand for capital, there is a tendency for valuations and attendant growth and 
investor expectations to vary widely between industries. More often than not, these 
expectations feed through into the stock prices of the constituent firms in these 
industries resulting in excessively high stock prices and as of a consequence, 
unfounded market capitalizations for these firms relative to industry peers with the 
same accounting data in the IPO year. This section of the srudy controls for this 
anomaly by computing a surplus value measure that tracks the valuation of the IPO 
firms relative to industry peers in the IPO year to enable us determine those trading at 
a ‘premium’ or a ‘discount’.      
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The industry leverage and equity volatility risk factors provide a proxy for the riskiness 
of the industry. An assessment of the level of threat posed by the IPO firm to industry 
rivals can be captured by the existing industry leverage. If this leverage is presently 
high which invariably puts the industry at great risk, then the IPO firm can steal a march 
on its rivals and enhance its competitiveness by raising equity capital which helps to 
rebalance its own capital structure. An evaluation of the riskiness of the industry can 
also be provided by its equity volatility. This volatility should naturally impinge on the 
constituent firms in the industry as their risk profiles are expected to reflect this. 
However, an assessment of the impact of this risk on the long-run performance of new 
issues of common stock is best addressed empirically.       
The extant profitability of an IPO firm’s industry can provide a measure of the relative 
attractiveness of that industry. It is pertinent to note that an IPO firm without a track 
record of visible performance in the market place is very difficult to assess. Hence, 
some investors become cagey of the firm and as of a consequence, may decide to wait 
to assess the firm’s first set of publicly available accounting data before investing in the 
stock of the firm in the secondary market. However, other investors may decide to go 
ahead and invest in the offering based on the IPO firm’s industry profit conditions which 
may help to reduce the adverse selection costs that may surround the firm’s long-term 
prospects.  
 181 
 
Using the same sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 as 
in the first empirical study, this part of the study tests for the economic importance of 
selected firm and industry-specific risk factors prior to or at the issue date to IPO firms, 
their investment bankers and potential IPO investors. When doing this, the work 
controls for and confirms the results of previous studies on the impact of firm-specific 
risk factors. Size, market-to-book, past performance, underwriter reputation and the 
‘hot’ IPO market are found to be important predictors of IPO performance in a cross-
section. The study also documents that industry risk factors relating to an adjusted IPO 
valuation [i.e. IPO surplus value], profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration 
and equity volatility can potentially be valuable in predicting or explaining the cross-
sectional differences in IPO long-term performance. However, after controlling for other 
factors that are germane to IPO long-run performance in a cross-section, the findings 
reveal that only IPO surplus value, industry profitability, industry market-to-book value 
and industry equity volatility can be significant predictors of an IPO’s long-term 
performance.  
More specifically, significant negative relationships between industry conditioning risk 
factors of profitability, equity volatility and IPO long-run performance on the one hand 
and significant positive relationships between industry structure variables of IPO 
surplus value, market-to-book value and IPO long-term performance on the other hand 
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are observed. These results are robust to including controls for other variables known 
to predict IPO long-term performance. However, apart from firm size, past performance, 
underwriter reputation, industry profitability and industry market-to-book to a limited 
extent, they are not robust to the exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble, which 
suggests that those years are driving some of the results. In general, the results 
suggest that IPOs issued in low market-to-book and profitable industries with high 
equity volatilities and that also tend to trade at a discount relative to industry peers [i.e. 
trading below their industry-adjusted valuations] perform worse than other IPOs in the 
counterpart industries. Overall the findings suggest that not all IPOs are bad 
investments as potential IPO investors can substantially improve their long-run returns 
if these IPOs are painstakingly selected by considering prospectus and other salient 
industry information available prior to or at the IPO date. The results also suggest that 
IPO firms and their investment bankers should consider industry conditioning risk 
factors prevailing at the time of the IPO to provide them with additional information on 
whether to go ahead with the IPO, or alternatively, withdraw and re-launch at a more 
auspicious date.         
The second empirical study contributes to the literature in three ways; firstly, the unique 
relationships between industry risk factors of IPO surplus value, market-to-book, 
profitability, equity volatility and IPO long-run performance are first documented in this 
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study; secondly, it is the first to study the impact of industry-specific risk factors on the 
long-run performance of IPOs in the UK market and; thirdly, since the study 
investigates the long-run performance of newly-listed firms using a set of observable 
firm and industry characteristics prior to or at the IPO date, it helps provide the 
stakeholders [i.e. IPO firms, their investment bankers and potential IPO investors] with 
additional useful information that they could use in their decision making process. 
Despite assessing the relation between long-run performance and the firm and industry 
risk factors used in this study, future research is encouraged into identifying the impact 
of other salient firm and industry risk factors on the long-run performance of new issues 
of common stock. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the literature on 
firm and industry characteristics and IPO long-term performance, while Section 4.3 
describes the data and methodology used in assessing cross-sectional IPO 
performance. The empirical analysis and ensuing findings are reported in Section 4.4, 
while Section 4.5 summarises and concludes the study.   
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[4.2] Literature Review 
[4.2.1] Firm Characteristics and IPO Performance  
Most studies in the literature have analysed the relationship between certain firm 
characteristics and the long-run performance of new issues of common stock. In his 
path-breaking work, Ritter [1991] finds that under-performance is preponderant among 
relatively small, younger growth firms whose stocks are offered in periods of high stock 
activity [‘hot markets’]73. Loughran and Ritter [1995] report that IPOs that occur in years 
of low issuing activity [‘cold markets’] show no significant under-performance, while 
those that occur in high volume periods [‘hot markets’] severely under-perform, which is 
consistent with the findings of Helwege and Liang [2004] and Thomadakis, et al [2012]. 
In the same vein, Kooli and Suret’s [2003 and 2004] results for the Canadian market 
are in line with the ‘window of opportunity’ hypothesis74 suggested by Ritter [1991] and 
Loughran and Ritter [1995] as an explanation for the after-market performance of new 
issues of common stock. 
                                                          
73 Boisson and Sentis [2010] report a significant positive relationship between the ‘hot market’ variable and 
the 1-year performance of IPOs which becomes insignificant when the horizon is extended to 3 and 5 
years.  
74 The hypothesis suggests that firms take advantage of investors’ optimism during ‘hot’ market periods to 
float many poor quality IPOs. 
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Ritter [1991] also contends that IPOs that tend to have more initial returns75 experience 
more under-performance in the long-run which is consistent with the ‘fad’ hypothesis of 
Aggarwal and Rivoli [1990] and the ‘overreaction’ hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler 
[1985 and 1987]76 and in line with the findings of Levis [1993], Loughran and Ritter 
[2001], Spiess and Affleck-Graves [1995], Bhabra and Pettway [2003], Loughran, et al 
[1994], Jelic, et al [2001], Paudyal, et al [1998], Krigman, et al [1999], Goergen, et al 
[2007], Gao, et al [2006] and Chi, et al [2010]. However, these contrast with the 
findings of Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007] who document a positive relationship between 
initial returns and the after-market performance of new common stock issues for the 
Malaysian market. The difference in results could be a reflection of the differences in 
the sample composition, benchmark employed and time period, given that the studies 
of Paudyal, et al [1998] and Jelic, et al [2001] in the same market produce a negative 
relationship.   
In the same vein, Ritter [1991] shows that there is a tendency for IPOs which have the 
greatest under-pricing, generally attributed to information asymmetry and investors’ 
                                                          
75 Ritter finds that younger firms tend to have more initial returns and the worse long-run performance, 
which is in line with the findings of Clark [2002] who documents a positive relationship between the firm 
age at the IPO and the after-market performance.  
76 Both hypotheses suggest that investors behave irrationally by valuing newly listed firms beyond fair 
values due to information asymmetry and over-optimism in the market place. As information on the true 
values of the firms become available to the market, prices drop over time. Hence, the hypotheses predict 
that the more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent price adjustment. 
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misevaluations in the marketplace, to have the worst long-run performance which is in 
line with the findings of Shaw [1971], Kooli and Suret [2004], Ibbotson and Jaffe [1975], 
Loughran [1993], Chi, et al [2010], Rajan and Servaes [1997], Carter, et al [1998] and 
Loughran and Ritter [1995], but contrasts with Kooli and Suret [2003]77. He also avers 
that this phenomenon is stronger for young, small growth firms with high market-to-
book ratios. Using a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980 – 1995, Guo, et al 
[2006] examine the impact of another pervasive source of information asymmetry and 
valuation uncertainty – the pre-IPO intensity of the issuer’s Research and Development 
[R-and-D] activities – on the long-run performance of these firms. They document a 
positive relationship between the R-and-D intensity and IPO long-term performance, as 
they find that the high R-and-D group out-perform their low or no R-and-D counterparts 
in the long-run.      
The presence of expert informational intermediaries have also been shown to have a 
positive impact on the long-term performance of new issues due to the certification 
services they provide before, during and after the offering. These intermediaries 
include the underwriter and the venture capitalist. It has been shown that IPO firms 
underwritten by more prestigious underwriters show less severe under-performance in 
                                                          
77 Kooli and Suret [2003] find that under-pricing is positively related to the long-run performance of 
Canadian IPOs, corroborating the signalling model of Deeds, et al [1997]. 
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the long-run [Carter, et al, 1988; Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Logue, et al, 2002; Paudyal, 
et al, 1998; Ljungqvist and Wilhem, 2002; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Doukas and 
Gonenc, 2005; Gao, et al, 2006; Chan, et al, 2008; Johnson and Westberg, 2009; 
Chang, et al 2010]. Thomadakis, et al [2012] find a negative association between 
underwriter reputation and long-run performance, with the result implying that reputable 
underwriters tend to engender high post-listing market prices in the immediate after-
market which eventually leads to severe negative returns in the long-term. Corwin and 
Schultz [2005], however, argue that the presence of a large underwriting syndicate is 
likely to narrow the gap between the offer price and the true value of the firm and in the 
process, reduce the consequent levels of under-pricing and long-run under-
performance. The positive relationship between venture capital backing and IPO after-
market performance is also well documented [Brav and Gompers, 1997; Jain and Kini, 
2000; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Chan, et al, 2008; Barry, et al, 1990; Boisson and 
Sentis, 2010; Hamao, et al; 2000; Tykvova and Walz, 2004; Rindermann, 2003; 
Espenlaub, et al, 1999; Levis, 2011]. Brav and Gompers [1997] examine the long-run 
performance of venture and non-venture capital backed firms and find that the under-
performance is more severe for the latter. However, this contrasts with Boisson and 
Sentis [2010] who document a negative relationship between venture capital affiliation 
and the long-run performance of new stock issues. Specifically, they find that the 
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market responds inauspiciously to the presence of venture capital at the time of the 
IPO78. 
Houge, et al [2001] and Schultz [1993] aver that IPOs with greater levels of risk and 
uncertainty, which are generally small, young and unseasoned firms with little or no 
track record, perform worse in the long-run. More specifically, the former study 
examines the nexus between investor uncertainty, divergence of opinion and the 
performance of IPOs. They employ three opening day variables to proxy for the 
uncertainty and divergence of opinion about the IPO stock – the percentage opening 
bid-ask spread, the time of first trade and the flipping ratio79. They find that IPO firms 
with wide opening spreads, late opening trades and high flipping ratios perform worse 
than their counterparts when the share price performance is tracked over a 3-year 
period. On a related note, Pukthuanthong-Le and Varaiya [2007] examine the impact of 
block sales80 on the long-run performance of IPOs and find that IPOs with high block 
                                                          
78 Hamao, et al [2000] suggest that conflict of interests could explain the high initial performance and long-
run under-performance of venture capital backed IPOs. This is due to the tendency of the investment 
bankers, who are parent companies of the venture capitalists in most cases, to overstate the value of the 
IPO to investors at the offering stage. When investors recognise this, the share values are subsequently 
adjusted downwards, causing long-run returns to fall. 
79 The quoted ‘bid-ask’ spread reflects market makers’ and dealers’ order processing, adverse selection 
and inventory holding costs. The time of first trade is the time when the lead underwriter begins trading on 
the IPO stock after the market opens. The flipping ratio is the volume of sell-signed, large-block volume 
initial share allocations that are sold to retail investors, other institutional investors, market makers and 
underwriters on the opening day relative to the total trading volume [Houge, et al, 2001].    
80 Unlike Houge, et al [2001] who only use the immediate sale of initial IPO allocations by institutional 
traders on the opening day to determine the block sales and the corresponding flipping ratio, 
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sales perform better than those with low block sales from 20 days after the IPO to the 
lockup81 expiration date. However, the picture changes when the firms are tracked from 
the lockup expiration date till the 3rd year after issue, as the high block sales IPOs 
under-perform their counterparts, with the results robust to cross-sectional regressions 
that control for other factors that influence IPO long-term returns. They also find that 
over-valued IPOs [i.e. ‘hot market’ IPOs] exhibit higher block sales than under-valued 
IPOs [i.e. ‘cold market’ IPOs] after controlling for underwriter reputation, opening trade 
return and IPO size.  Using a sample of 4,057 US IPOs from 1980 to 2000, Gao, at al 
[2006] use the IPO firm’s early market return volatility82 to gauge the ‘divergence of 
opinion’ and uncertainty that may surround new issues of common stock. They find a 
significant and robust association between the early market return volatility and IPO 
long-term returns. They also use dispersion of analyst forecasts83 to proxy for the 
divergence of opinion and find that the coefficient estimate is negative, which suggests 
that a greater dispersion in analyst forecasts leads to poorer IPO long-term returns. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Pukthuanthong-Le and Varaiya [2007] calculate the block sales ratio as the volume of sell-signed trading 
volume executed in blocks of over 3,500 shares in the first two trading days, comprising institutional, 
market maker, interdealer and short-seller trades expressed as a percentage of the total trading volume. 
81 The lockup period, usually between 3 – 6 months, is an attempt to control the supply of shares of the 
IPO stock in the immediate after-market. During this period, insiders and existing shareholders are 
prohibited from selling shares without the written permission of the lead underwriter [Yong, 2007]. 
82 This is computed as the standard deviation of the IPO daily return for the first 25 days of trading after 
listing. 
83 This is computed as the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year-
end scaled by the stock price at the time the forecasts are made. 
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The above findings are consistent with Miller’s [1977] ‘divergence of opinion’ 
hypothesis which suggests that the long-run under-performance of IPOs may be due to 
heterogeneous expectations of optimistic and pessimistic investors, whose divergence 
of opinion narrows as more information becomes available which makes investors 
adjust their initial over-valuation, leading to a fall in long-run returns.  
Teoh, et al [1998a] suggest that the long-run performance is worse for IPOs that may 
want to ‘window-dress’ through ‘creative accounting’. They argue that this is largely due 
to the fact that the IPO firm wants to ‘look good’ when it conducts its IPO; afterwards, 
the market recognizes the firm’s true value and the value of the new share is 
downwardly adjusted84. More specifically, they examine the effects of discretionary 
accounting accruals to study the impact of ‘subtle earnings management’ by firms prior 
to going public85. They find that IPOs with the highest accruals in the IPO year 
experience poorer stock price performance in the following three years than those that 
had little or no accruals, which is consistent with the findings of Chan, et al [2008]. 
They also find that issuing firms with the most aggressive earnings management or 
                                                          
84 This position is equally supported by Loughran and Ritter [1995] who find that firms going public at the 
moment of relative over-valuation [i.e. high market-to-book values] show more under-performance in the 
long-run. 
85 The earnings management hypothesis suggests that issuing firms exhibit unusually high operating 
performance relative to the industry average in the pre-IPO year which is intended to lead investors to be 
overly optimistic on the firms’ prospects. Hence, the firms’ reported earnings are more than the actual 
operating cashflows with the difference representing accounting accruals.   
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‘creative accounting’ exhibit the worst 3-year after-market performance compared to 
those with little or no earnings management. In a similar study, Teoh, et al [1998b] 
report that issuing firms have high earnings and positive accruals in the IPO year that is 
followed by low earnings and negative accruals in the immediate post-IPO years. They 
also find that these abnormal accruals in the IPO year explain to a great extent the 
cross-sectional variation in the post-issue operating and market performance of these 
firms. DuCharme, et al [2004] also document unusually high abnormal accounting 
accruals around new equity issuances which are more pronounced for issuing firms 
whose offers attract lawsuits afterwards. They aver that these accruals tend to reverse 
almost immediately after the offers with a consequent decline in the after-market stock 
price performance. Jelic, et al [2001] study the association between the long-run 
performance of Malaysian IPOs and management earnings forecasts with the evidence 
indicating a negative relationship in the first 12 months following the listing date of the 
IPOs. 
Controlling for a raft of ex-ante variables that are known to investors at the time of the 
offering [industry, shares offered, underwriters, venture-capital backed, amongst others] 
or occurring within five years after the listing date [specifically, financial analysts’ 
recommendations], Boisson and Sentis [2010] study the link between this range of 
variables and post-IPO performance. They find that investors pay attention to analyst 
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coverage when the IPOs have a huge underwriting syndicate, are venture capital 
backed and lowly under-priced. Specifically, they find that IPO firms with high analyst 
coverage perform better than those with little or no coverage, which is in agreement 
with the findings of Bradley, et al [2008] and Kooli and Suret [2003]. Michaely and 
Womack [1999] study the impact of affiliated analyst recommendations on IPO 
performance using a sample of US IPOs. They report that IPOs with affiliated analyst 
recommendations perform worse than those with unaffiliated analysts, which is 
consistent with the findings of Houston, et al [2006]86. However, Rajan and Servaes 
[1997] document an inverse relationship between analyst over-optimism and long-term 
performance as they find that IPO firms with the highest projected growth perform 
substantially worse than those with the lowest growth projections. They adduce this to 
the decline in analysts’ growth projections several months after the IPO when they 
eventually realise that their initial projections are flawed, over-estimated and cannot be 
attained. Investors, who rely on these initial projections to make their investment 
decisions, purchase these shares at inflated prices, which is downwardly adjusted in 
the long-term.   
                                                          
86 This may not be unconnected with the fact that affiliated analysts tend to be positively biased in their 
recommendations of the subject IPO firms who may be trading poorly in the after-market. Rational 
investors would, expectedly, discount these recommendations relative to those of unaffiliated analysts.  
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Bessler and Thies [2010] analyse the abnormal return behaviour of a sample of 
German IPOs over the period 1977 to 1995 to better understand the cross-sectional 
pattern in the long-term returns. They find that differences in the initial returns, market 
value and security type do not really explain the pattern of returns in the sample. 
Intriguingly, they find that the single criterion that strongly explains the cross-sectional 
variation is whether each of the firms had an opportunity to raise additional funds in the 
capital market via an SEO after the IPO. Bhabra and Pettway [2003] also show that 
firms that have the opportunity of re-issuing equity subsequent to their IPOs exhibit a 
superior after-market stock price performance compared to those firms that continue to 
trade and did not re-issue equity.   
The positive relationship between the size of the firm and IPO market performance is 
also well documented [Chi, et al, 2010; Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Keloharju, 1993b]. 
Ritter [1991] also finds that US IPOs exhibit severe long-run under-performance with 
small firms having the worse after-market performance, which is consistent with the 
findings of Page and Reyneke [1997] and Goergen, et al [2007] in their studies of the 
long-run performance of South African and UK IPOs respectively. Also, Brav and 
Gompers [1997] and Brav, et al [2000] show that smaller firms have a worse post-
listing stock price performance relative to large firms in their studies of the abnormal 
return behaviour of a sample of US IPOs. However, Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007], in a 
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study of Malaysian IPOs, find that smaller firms [both in terms of gross proceeds and 
market value] perform better than large firms in the long-run, with the findings in 
tandem with those obtained by Jelic, et al [2001] in the same market, Durukan [2002] 
for the Turkish market and Xia and Wang [2003] for the Chinese market. The difference 
in results for the Malaysian and Turkish studies from the majority of the literature could 
be due to the small size of the samples and the peculiarities of the markets87. The 
variation in results for the Chinese study is attributed to the preference of investors in 
the Chinese market for capital gains rather than dividends, which leads to a situation 
where the stocks of small firms become attractive to market makers and investors alike 
since they require a relatively small amount of capital and also tend to be easier to 
manipulate.  
Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004] assert that IPOs that are priced higher than 
their market comparables [i.e. high market-to-book or price-earnings multiples] 
generally show higher first day returns, but the worse long-term performance, which is 
in line with the results obtained by Chang, et al [2010] who document lower post-IPO 
stock returns for firms with high price-earning [P/E] or low book-to-market [B/M] ratios. 
In the same vein, Corhay, et al [2002] and Xia and Wang [2003] find that the long-run 
                                                          
87 The sample sizes for the Ahmad-Zaluki, et al [2007], Jelic, et al [2001] and Durukan [2002] studies are 
454, 182 and 173 firms respectively. 
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under-performance of ‘value’ [i.e. low market-to-book or high book-to-market ratios] 
IPOs is less severe relative to ‘growth’ [i.e. low book-to-market or high market-to-book 
ratios] IPOs88. The results show that investors may be overly optimistic about the future 
of the IPO firms and in the process, over-project their future earnings. This leads them 
to pay excessively for the shares of these firms at the time of issuance; however, with 
the passage of time, their expectations are not met and as of a consequence, the share 
prices are subsequently adjusted downwards, causing long-run returns to fall. 
Mikkelson, et al [1997] document a positive relationship between the change in pre and 
post-flotation IPO operating performance and long-run share price performance, which 
suggests that when post-listing operating performance fails to uphold pre-listing 
profitability levels, investors revise their expectations of the firm and the share price is 
downwardly adjusted in the long-term. The result, which is in tandem with those 
obtained by Goergen, et al [2007], indicates that firms go public at the peak of their 
performance. In the same vein, Bhabra and Pettway [2003] find a negative relationship 
between profitability and long-run performance, which appears to be inconsistent with 
the expectation that firms with a track record of good performance should perform 
better in the long-term. They adduce this variation in result to the downward revision of 
                                                          
88 See Section 3.3.4, pp. 125-126. 
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expectations of future earnings for these firms due to their inability to sustain pre-listing 
performance levels.  
Leland and Pyle [1977] argue that in line with agency theory89, firms with a higher 
percentage of insiders selling their shares at the IPO should have a worse long-run 
performance. Jelic, et al [2001] find a weak association between both variables, while 
Paudyal, et al [1998] find no relationship. The findings of Goergen, et al [2007], Jain 
and Kini [1994], Durukan [2002] and Thomadakis, et al [2012] are in tandem with the 
predictions of the agency theory. In a study of the impact of managerial decisions and 
pre-IPO performance on the long-run performance of IPOs, Goergen, et al [2007] find a 
positive relationship between the multi-nationality [diversity in terms of products and 
subsidiaries] of a firm and its long-run performance. It has been argued that PIPOs 
exhibit better long-term performance compared to private firms, because they are more 
highly scrutinized at the time of listing [Perotti and Guney, 1993; Perotti, 1995; 
Megginson, et al, 2000]. There is a large body of evidence that has shown that firms 
under private ownership perform significantly worse than their state-owned 
counterparts [Durukan, 2002; Hingorani, et al, 1997; Megginson and Netter, 2001; 
Jones, et al, 1999; Keloharju, et al, 2008; Thomadakis, et al, 2012].  
                                                          
89  Jensen and Meckling [1976] argue that the incentives of an owner/manager change when their 
ownership is diluted by the issuance of shares to another party. In the same vein, Mikkelson and Partch 
[1985] show that a decrease in ownership concentration reduces the market value of listed firms. 
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Hsu [2010] investigates the relationship between board characteristics90 and financial 
performance for US IPOs and finds that board independence [board quality] is 
negatively [positively] related to financial performance. Chang, et al [2010] document a 
negative relationship between board size and post-IPO stock returns, with the results 
suggesting firstly, that there is an optimal board size and secondly, that a very large 
board tends to reduce the efficacy of corporate monitoring [Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, 
et al, 1998]. Baker and Gompers [2003] and Campbell and Frye [2006] also show that 
the presence of venture capital directors in the board is positively linked with financial 
performance. Kim and Kim [2007] find that demutualized firms91 perform better than 
other stock insurance firms with the evidence suggesting that the two major market 
imperfections advanced in the literature for the under-performance of new issues of 
common stock – high information asymmetry and high agency costs - may just be valid.  
 
                                                          
90 Board characteristics include independence [i.e. percentage of outsider directors in the board], quality 
[i.e. board expertise and educational background] and the proportion of venture capital directors. Financial 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q computed as the total market value of the firm [sum of market 
value of equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of debt] divided by the book value of the 
firm’s assets. 
91 Demutualization is a process whereby firms convert from a mutual company [where policyholders are 
the owners] to a stock company [where outside investors are the owners]. In a full demutualization, the 
policyholders give up their ownership rights in exchange for either shares in the new stock company, cash 
or policy credits. In a mutual holding demutualization, a stock holding company, under the aegis of a 
mutual holding company, is created to directly own a newly created stock insurance firm [Viswanathan and 
Cummins, 2003]. 
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[4.2.2] Industry Characteristics and IPO Performance  
It is important to point out that very little has been done to consider whether the 
characteristics of an issuing firm’s industry are also germane to the post-listing 
performance of new stock issues, which is startling given the extant literature’s 
widespread handling of other corporate finance issues. Simutin [2009] studies the 
relationship between the price choices of firms going public and the post-issue stock 
price performance and finds that the raw and risk-adjusted returns of IPOs is a rising 
function of the ratio of the issue price to the average industry price. More specifically, 
he finds that IPO firms with relatively high prices out-perform those with relatively low 
prices by 32% over a 3-year tracking period. In fact, they find that firms in the highest 
relative price group do not under-perform their matches in the same period.  
Dong and Michel [2011] examine whether the growth prospects of an IPO’s industry 
can help investors select good quality IPOs. Using analysts’ ex-ante long-term earnings 
growth forecasts for the IPO firm’s industry as a proxy for the IPO’s growth potential 
and a sample of 7,608 US IPOs entering the market over the period 1982-2007, they 
examine whether an industry’s growth prospects impacts on the issuing firm’s long-run 
stock performance92. Given the documented association between industry conditions, 
                                                          
92 Industry growth is measured by the value-weighted average of the mean analyst long-term earnings 
growth forecasts in the IPO firm’s industry in the month prior to the offer. 
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stock returns and information flow [Barberis, et al, 2005; Hou, 2007; Cen, et al, 2010] 
coupled with the fact that an IPO firm’s industry provides rational comparables for its 
characteristics [Edelen and Kadlec, 2005; Wang, et al, 2010], Dong and Michel [2011] 
show that the most prominent feature of an issuing firm prior to the offering is its 
industry. They document a strong positive relationship between the industry growth 
prospects and IPO long-term performance in the period before the ‘dotcom’ period [pre-
1999] which reverses in the ‘dotcom’ period [1999-2000] and the period thereafter. Put 
differently, IPOs in high growth industries out-perform their counterparts in the three 
years following the IPOs, up to the period before the ‘dotcom’ bubble. However, in the 
‘dotcom’ period and thereafter, these same IPOs under-perform their counterparts with 
the evidence suggesting that, excluding investors’ overreaction to growth prospects in 
the ‘dotcom’ period, IPO investors tend to under-react to industry growth prospects, 
leading to superior performance both in the short and long-term.  
Jain and Kini [2006], using a sample of 6,922 US IPOs listed over the period 1980-
1997, examine the industry conditions that influence the clustering of IPOs and the 
impact of the clustering on the post-listing performance of these firms93. They find that 
IPO clustering is more rampant in fragmented and high growth industries characterized 
                                                          
93 IPO cluster industries are identified as those industries where at least 20 IPO issues occurred and also 
where at least one-third of issuing firms went public during any 2-year adjacent period.  
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by favourable investor sentiments, high levels of investment in R-and-D and robust 
investment opportunities. They document significant positive relations between industry 
risk factors such as profit conditions, market-to-book and industry returns and IPO 
clustering. They also find an inverse relation between the post-listing operating 
performance and whether the IPO firm goes public in its industry cluster period94.    
Akhigbe, et al [2003] examine whether the entrance of IPO firms in the market place 
has any implications for rival industry firms using a sample of 2,493 US IPOs that were 
listed between 1989 and 2000. They aver that the average valuation effects for rival 
firms are insignificant, which may suggest that IPOs are purely firm-specific events with 
no industry ramifications. On the contrary, they document significant offsetting positive 
information and negative competitive effects, with the former coming from IPOs in 
regulated industries and industries with the first IPOs, while the latter results from 
relatively large IPOs in less concentrated, less risky and better performing industries95.  
                                                          
94 They argue that the relatively poor post-IPO long-run performance in the cluster periods is due to the 
over-investment in the industry that arises as a result of too many firms in that industry chasing the same 
investment opportunities.  
95 Kohers [1999] argues that the constraints imposed by regulation are expected to reduce the diversity 
amongst firms in an industry which should result in stronger information effects for rival firms from firm-
level events. Akhigbe, et al [1997] show how the first IPO relative to subsequent IPOs in an industry, after 
a period of prolonged dormancy, should result in greater valuation effects for rival firms. On the flip side, it 
is expected that rivals in more competitive industries will experience severe competitive effects following 
the additional capital raised by the IPO firm [Lang and Stulz, 1992]. It is also expected that large IPOs in 
less concentrated and less-risky industries will signal ‘bad news’ for industry rivals. Finally, rival firms in a 
high-performing industry could lose out because IPO firms could time their entry into the industry and 
reduce the excess rents.    
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In a related study using a sample of 2,483 US IPOs that were listed between 1990 and 
2000 and computing 3-year BHARs, Akhigbe, et al [2006] examine whether an IPO 
provides an indication as to the direction and magnitude of industry returns in the long-
term. They find that the industry experiences a worse after-market performance in the 
three years following the IPOs, which they adduce to competitive and/or timing effects96. 
They also show that the poor industry share price performance following the IPOs is 
accentuated when the industry is highly regulated, over-valued, has high operating and 
financial leverage, less concentrated [i.e. more competitive] and when there is a large 
industry run-up prior to the IPO filing97. In the same vein, Hsu, et al [2010] study the 
stock price, operating performance and the likelihood of survival of rival firms after a 
large IPO in their industry. Their results show that the successful completion of an IPO 
in an industry is ‘bad news’ for industry rivals as they experience negative stock price 
reactions after the IPO. They also find that the withdrawal of an IPO earlier announced 
                                                          
96 Akhigbe, et al [2003] aver that the IPO firm can serve as a threat to industry rivals by either pulling their 
market share or reducing their margins [‘competitive effects’]. Also, firms could strategically time their initial 
offerings to coincide with the peak performance of the industry [‘timing effects] [Kim and Ritter, 1999; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Pagano, et al, 1998; Jain and Kini, 1994]. 
97 Industry concentration indicates the extent of significant barriers to entry that may confront new firms 
and is measured by the Herfindahl Index [HHI], computed as the squared sum of the proportions of 
industry sales by the rival firms. Financial [Operating] leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt 
[fixed assets] to total assets, while the industry valuation is measured as the ratio of the prevailing price-
earnings multiple to its average multiple in the previous 3 years. A signal that industry valuations have 
peaked may be more damaging for those firms that have experienced significant price run-ups prior to the 
IPO, where run-up is measured as the median cumulative return in the industry portfolio for 100 days 
ending 20 days prior to the IPO. 
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has the opposite effect as the incumbent firms in the industry exhibit positive stock 
price reactions around the date of this announcement.       
Several other studies have also investigated the impact of industry conditions on the 
volume of IPOs [Pagano, et al, 1998; Lowry, 2003]. IPO intensity has been found to be 
associated with increases in aggregate demand for capital, diminution in the level of 
information asymmetry and a bullish market fuelled by fierce investor optimism. Extant 
research has also linked the IPO versus takeover decision98 to industry characteristics, 
market timing, demand for capital and firm-specific risk factors [Mitchell and Mulherin, 
1996; Pagano, et al, 1998; Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001; Rajan and Servaes, 2003]. 
On a related note, Benveniste, et al [2003] show that a firm’s decision to complete or 
withdraw an IPO as well as the terms of the offering is a function of the filing 
experiences of their industry peers [i.e. indirect feedback].  
Clearly, the majority of prior studies on the long-run performance of new issues of 
common stock have mainly focussed on the impact of firm and offering characteristics 
on this stage of the life of these firms. The most researched variables in the literature 
have been size, underwriter reputation, IPO risk, pre-IPO performance, IPO market 
condition, age, venture capital, corporate governance, initial returns/under-pricing, 
                                                          
98 Access to equity markets can also be accomplished through a takeover by a listed company [Brau, et al, 
2003]. 
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market-to-book ratio and earnings management. In general, these variables have been 
found to be significantly related to the after-market performance of new issues. 
However, apart from the works of Simutin [2009], Dong and Michel [2011] and Jain and 
Kini [2006], none has studied the relationship between industry structure variables and 
IPO long-run performance.  
Given that this aspect of the IPO literature has been greatly under-examined in the 
literature and having also tracked the performance of these new issues relative to a 
similar set of firms with fairly similar risk profiles in the first empirical study, the second 
part of this work now seeks to ascertain whether potential IPO investors can use ex-
ante industry information available prior to or at the offering date to foreshadow the 
performance of the firms in the long-run to enable them make more informed decisions 
on whether or not to invest in the offering. Since the focus of this second empirical 
study is on industry, a limited range of the variables that have been shown to be 
germane to the after-market performance of new listings is pre-selected as control 
variables in the empirical design. In this regard, size related variables of offer price, 
offer proceeds, market capitalization, total assets and market value as well as 
performance related variables of profit margin, return on assets and earnings yield are 
considered. The IPO market condition, firm leverage, firm age, market-to-book ratio, 
underwriter prestige, initial returns and IPO firm risk are also included. These are the 
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variables which the majority of the previous studies have shown to be the most 
important in the assessment of the long-run performance of IPOs. Venture capital 
backing is not included because the author believes that the underwriter prestige 
variable provides an adequate proxy and effectively captures the role and impact of 
expert informational intermediaries on the long-run performance of IPOs. Earnings 
management, analyst recommendations and corporate governance characteristics are 
also excluded, as they are outside the scope of this work. The discussion of all the 
choice variables, which also include the selected industry conditioning risk factors, will 
be conducted in Section 4.3.2. 
[4.2.3] Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The literature on the impact of industry conditions at the time of the IPO on the post-
issue performance of new issues of common stock is still shallow. Clearly from the 
previous section, the studies have been few and far between. Simutin [2009], Dong 
and Michel [2011] and Jain and Kini [2006] respectively study the ratio of the issue 
price to the average industry price, the growth prospects of the industry and industry 
clustering of IPOs on the long-run performance of new issues of common stock.  
Access to capital markets depends on the state of the economy as well as market and 
industry conditions at the time the firm is ready to conduct the initial offering. On the 
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one hand, if these conditions are not conducive around the time that the firm intends to 
go public, it may be very challenging to complete a successful offering. On the other 
hand, if the economic and industry conditions are right, the firm could effortlessly 
conduct a fruitful IPO that affords it the opportunity to raise sufficient funds to meet its 
growth and expansion needs that ultimately puts it a step ahead of its industry rivals. 
Against this backdrop, the success of an IPO and by extension, the subsequent after-
market performance and survival of the firm very much depends on market timing in 
terms of whether it launches the IPO in strong market and industry conditions. It is 
important to note that the aim of the issuing firm and its investment banker is to locate 
an auspicious market and industry window to launch the IPO before the window is shut. 
If the window closes before the IPO takes place which is quite possible given that the 
IPO process typically takes between six to nine months to complete, then the issuing 
firm and its underwriter would have no other option but to withdraw the offering and re-
launch at a more propitious date. The consequences of proceeding with the offering 
under these conditions could be damaging not only to the subsequent after-market 
performance and survival of the firm in the market place but also to the reputation of 
the investment banker given that they do not want to be associated with failed offerings. 
Hence, industry conditions prevailing at the time of the IPO could be germane to the 
post-listing performance and survival of new issues of common stock.   
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Against this backdrop, the goal of this second empirical study is to identify other salient 
industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the IPO that can explain and/or predict 
the long-run performance of IPOs, using the works of Simutin [2009], Dong and Michel 
[2011] and Jain and Kini [2006] as a springboard. In this regard, this second study 
firstly, asks whether an industry-adjusted valuation of an IPO can foreshadow its long-
run performance. Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004], Chang, et al [2010], Corhay, 
et al [2002] and Xia and Wang [2003] all show that IPO valuation at the listing date 
could presage its long-term performance. The valuation of new listings is intriguing on 
at least two grounds. Firstly, Zheng [2007] avers that valuing IPOs based on 
accounting data is spurious99 and secondly, Hawawini, et al [2003] posit that valuation 
levels and growth expectations may vary significantly between different industries, 
which are exacerbated during major IPO clusters. The author overcomes these 
challenges by using a similar technique used by Berger and Ofek [1995] to compute an 
industry-adjusted valuation of the IPO firms to enable us to determine those trading at 
a ‘premium’ or ‘discount’. 
Secondly, this second study investigates whether an IPO firm’s industry concentration 
has any sort of impact on the long-run performance of these new issues. It is generally 
                                                          
99 Zheng [2007] argues that investors’ expectations, in general, is that IPO firms will increase their key 
performance indices after the IPO event and since these expectations are impounded in the stock prices of 
these firms at the time of the offer, it invariably follows that their market capitalization should, on average, 
be higher than that of their industry rivals with the same accounting data in the pre-IPO year. 
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accepted that the extent of an industry’s concentration is likely to be influential in 
determining the demand for capital, investors’ optimism and the extent of industry IPO 
activity100. Furthermore, it is also germane to the choice between IPO versus takeover 
as a means of raising equity capital [Brau, et al, 2003; Audretsch, 1995; Sharma and 
Kesner, 1996]. In less concentrated industries, it is unlikely that a dominant player has 
emerged which provides a good avenue for new entrants into the industry to deploy 
their equity capital more productively. Conversely, in highly concentrated industries 
which tend to be less competitive, there are fewer opportunities to deploy equity capital 
to maximum effect. Concentrated industries also tend to be characterised by less price 
and market-share wars, which provides a good platform for IPO firms, which are 
typically smaller, high growth firms, to spot lucrative niches overlooked by the dominant 
players. Furthermore, firms in the industry are more capable of warding off new 
entrants due to the high barriers to entry [Akhigbe, et al, 2006]. Conversely, firms 
issuing their IPOs in fragmented and less concentrated industries are more likely to use 
a greater portion of the IPO proceeds in forceful price and promotional wars, rather 
than value-maximising activities. 
                                                          
100 The industrial economics literature has also emphasized the import of industry concentration as a 
measure of the extent of opportunity for complicity by firms in the industry [Hambrick and Lei, 1985]. 
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Thirdly, this second empirical study inquires whether the relative valuation of an 
industry [i.e. market-to-book ratio] can help investors construct their investment 
opportunity sets as to which IPOs to select. It is well documented that firms could time 
their IPOs either after aggressive accounting accruals that creates a divergence 
between the reported earnings in the IPO year and the cashflows [Teoh, et al, 1998(a 
and b)] or when its own earnings and indeed valuation has peaked [Ritter, 1991; Jain 
and Kini, 1994]. In the same vein, poor quality firms could also time their IPOs when 
the valuations of comparable firms within the industry are at their peak, which makes 
equity issuance very attractive [Kim and Ritter, 1999; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry 
and Schwert, 2004; Pagano, et al, 1998; Rajan and Servaes, 2003]. During periods of 
strong investor sentiments towards an industry in response to sporadic increases in 
investment opportunities and an ensuing enormous demand for capital, many private 
firms and their investment bankers are tempted to choose comparables with high 
market-to-book multiples in their initial valuation of the IPOs when they want to go 
public [Jain and Kini, 2006; Kim and Ritter, 1999]. There are two opposing explanations 
for the relation between industry market-to-book ratio and the likelihood of going public 
[Pagano, et al, 1998]. The first explanation is in tandem with the views of Kim and 
Ritter [1999], Loughran and Ritter [2002], Lowry and Schwert [2004] and Rajan and 
Servaes [2003] that suggests that firms are motivated to go public to take advantage of 
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their over-valuation in the market place by investors, which is consistent with the 
‘window of opportunity’ hypothesis101. In the long-term, investors recognise the firm’s 
true value and the share price and ensuing long-term returns plummet. Under the 
second explanation, a high industry market-to-book ratio may suggest that investors 
have high expectations of the future value of the firms based on the growth 
opportunities that abound in the industry which cause them to value the stocks highly. If 
these firms are to take advantage of these opportunities, they may then have to go 
public to raise the required amount of capital to finance the huge investment outlay. 
The expectation by investors is that these prices would be futher sustained to higher 
levels leading to positive stock returns in the long-term.  
Fourthly, this second study examines whether an IPO firm’s industry profit conditions 
can foreshadow its long-run performance. A firm can launch its IPO without any track 
record of sustained profitability, which consequently increases the adverse selection 
costs for investors as they have little or no information on the future prospects of these 
firms. Savvy investors can use an IPO firm’s industry profit conditions to value firms 
going public and in the process reduce the information asymmetry and uncertainty 
                                                          
101 A ‘window of opportunity’ is defined as a period when issuers can raise equity capital on relatively 
favourable terms. However, there is a debate in the equity pricing literature as to what could be the reason 
for this. Bayless and Chaplinsky [1996] and Choe, et al [1993] argue that the window is due to time-varying 
asymmetric information, while Loughran and Ritter [1995] adduce this to investor over-optimism in the 
market place which leads to misevaluations of stock prices.  
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surrounding the firm’s long-term prospects and by extension, the adverse selection 
costs they [i.e. the investors] may face at the IPO date. It is expected that investors’ 
perceptions of the future prospects of these firms will be positively/[negatively] 
influenced by robust/[weak] industry profit conditions. Hence, investors’ misevaluations 
and the level of under-pricing in the market-place should reduce as they pay higher for 
the offerings of these firms.  
Fifthly, this second part of the work next asks whether investors can use the leverage 
of an IPO firm’s industry to gauge the performance of the new issue in the long-term. 
Akhigbe, at al [2006] affirm that following the raising of additional capital which reduces 
the IPO firm’s leverage ratio and in some cases actual debt burden when the IPO 
proceeds are used for debt repayment, the new firm could pose an increasing threat to 
rivals, which is accentuated in industries that are already less concentrated and highly 
leveraged.  
Finally, the impact of the equity volatility of an IPO firm’s industry on the future 
performance of new stock issues is investigated. If the volatility of an IPO firm’s 
industry is a proxy for the riskiness of the industry, it is expected that this will increase 
the risk profile of each of the constituent firms in that industry. If this risk is priced 
sufficiently, then IPO firms from industries with high volatilities should earn higher 
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returns in the long-term. On the other hand, higher risk could also imply a higher 
likelihood of poor performance in the long-term.  
Following from the above, the second empirical study will provide answers to the 
following tricky questions: 
 What are the industry characteristics of IPOs that under-perform? 
 Can one foreshadow the performance of IPOs based on a battery of industry 
risk factors related to an adjusted firm valuation, market-to-book ratio, leverage, 
concentration, profitability and equity volatility at the IPO date? 
 
Following from the research questions above, the central hypothesis under 
investigation in this second empirical study is presented below: 
Hypothesis – [H0]: Industry structure risk factors related to an adjusted IPO valuation 
[i.e.IPO surplus value], market-to-book ratio, profitability, leverage, concentration and 
equity volatility cannot foreshadow the long-run performance of IPOs.  
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[4.3] Methodology 
[4.3.1] Applied Empirical Design 
Sample segmentations and analysis of mean returns are first undertaken to give an 
insight as to the possible association and impact of these variables on long-run 
performance, before proceeding to conducting more detailed cross-sectional tests. 
Hence, in the first stage of the empirical analysis here, the sample is split into terciles 
to check for any general patterns. In the second stage, a regression based 
generalization of Jegadeesh and Karceski’s [2004] robust version of the BHAR 
approach is introduced to establish the explanatory powers of these variables.  
The BHAR approach  is now generalised by forming an ordinary least squares [OLS] 
regression equation that regresses the BHAR        , calculated from the first 
empirical study, on a set of  explanatory variables        as follows: 
          ∑           
 
      ……… [4.1] 
In order to investigate the determinants of IPO long-run performance, several variants 
of equation [4.1] are estimated, using the IPO firm’s 5-year BHAR with respect to an 
appropriately matched non-issuing firm as the dependent variable. Hence, in all 
regressions, the value-weighted BHAR calculated according to the fifth matching 
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algorithm [M5] is used as the dependent variable102 . The firm level independent 
variables are IPO market heat [‘hot’ and ‘cold’ dummy variables to be used as proxies], 
firm leverage [market leverage ratio to be used as measure] and earnings yield. The 
other variables are offer price, offer proceeds, market capitalization, total assets, 
market value, age, pre-IPO profit margin, pre-IPO return on assets, market-to-book 
ratio, underwriter prestige, initial returns and IPO firm risk. The industry level 
independent variables to be employed are those related to an adjusted IPO firm 
valuation [i.e. IPO surplus value], leverage, concentration, equity volatility, profitability 
and market-to-book ratio. These risk factors are each considered in the first instance, in 
isolation to determine their individual explanatory powers and in the second instance, in 
conjunction with other variables in a multivariate framework. Section 4.3.2 that follows 
this section provides the definitions and measurements of all the variables under 
consideration in this part of the study.  
In the first of the univariate regressions, each firm’s BHAR is regressed on its 
underwriter reputation variable. For the age variable, each firm’s BHAR is regressed on 
its age variable in the second regression specification. In the third and fourth 
                                                          
102 Using the M5 matching algorithm, IPO long-run returns have been benchmarked with the returns of 
control firms matched on size, market-to-book, pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield. 
The study adopts the value-weighted 5-year M5-matched BHAR as the choice dependent variable as this 
is more representative of firstly, the risk-adjusted long-run performance of the IPO firm given that matching 
firms have been selected on the greatest possible range of factors and secondly, the long-run returns of 
the typical average investor in the market place. 
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regression specifications, the BHARs are regressed on the hot and cold dummy 
variables, with the variables taking the value of 1 for firms going public in hot and cold 
markets and 0 otherwise. In a fifth specification, the IPO firms’ market leverage ratio is 
introduced as the explanatory variable in the regression.  
In five following specifications, the size measures [offer price, offer proceeds, total 
assets, market capitalization and market value] are introduced as the explanatory 
variables in separate regressions as the study seeks to ascertain the impact of firm 
size on long-run performance. In three other specifications, the firms’ pre-IPO 
performance measures [earnings yield, return on assets and profit margin] are 
considered as the explanatory variables in separate regressions as the study seeks to 
determine the impact of pre-IPO operating performance on long-run market 
performance. In three final firm specifications, the IPO firm’s market-to-book ratio, initial 
return and risk [as measured by the volatility of the 30-day post-listing return] are 
presented as the explanatory variables. Finally, the study controls for all the firm level 
variables simultaneously in a multivariate framework by estimating a seventeenth 
regression specification. 
The industry level variables earlier described in separate regressions are next 
introduced in order to determine the impact of an IPO firm’s industry structure on its 
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long-run performance. As such, in an eighteenth regression specification, the BHARs 
are regressed on the firms’ industry-adjusted valuation measures [i.e IPO surplus 
value]. In a nineteenth specification, the firm’s industry leverage is considered as the 
independent variable. What is the impact of an IPO firm’s industry profitability on its 
long-run performance? This poser would be answered in a twentieth specification that 
introduces the industry profitability as the independent variable in the regression. In a 
twenty-first specification, the study seeks to determine the impact of an IPO firm’s 
industry market-to-book ratio on its long-run performance. To accomplish this, the 
BHARs are regressed on the respective IPO firms’ industry market-to-book ratios.  
An IPO firm’s industry concentration impact on its long-run performance will next be 
considered in a twenty-second specification that introduces the industry concentration 
proxy, the size-weighted Herfindahl index [HHI], as the independent variable in the 
regression. The relation between an IPO firm’s industry equity volatility and its long-run 
performance will be examined in a twenty-third regression specification. The study 
controls for all the industry level variables simultaneously in a multivariate framework 
by estimating another regression specification. Finally, all the firm and industry level 
variables are controlled for simultaneously in a twenty-fifth and final regression 
framework.  
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[4.3.2] Variable Selection, Measurement and Expectations  
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the definitions and measurements of all the variables 
that are under consideration in this second empirical study. The proxies for these 
variables, their measurements and envisaged relationship with IPO after-market 
performance [shown in brackets] are provided below: 
IPO Market Heat {Hot (-); Cold (+)}: The hot and cold variables serve as proxies for 
IPO market heat, where      and       are dummy variables set to 1 for firms going 
public in hot and cold markets respectively and 0 otherwise. The age at the IPO date, 
instead of the number of offerings and offer proceeds, serves as the study’s most direct 
measure of market heat. The respective signs of the coefficients of these dummies 
would enable us to infer if the issue period has an impact on IPO long-run performance. 
IPOs issued in hot [cold] periods are expected to perform relatively worse [better] in the 
long-run [Ritter, 1991; Gompers and Lerner, 2003; Ritter and Welch, 2002] due to the 
overtly positive [modest] market sentiments at these times which tend to over-value 
[under-value] these firms unrealistically. Hence, the expected sign for the hot [cold] IPO 
dummy should be negative [positive]. 
Age (+): The age variable is calculated as                , where age is calculated as 
the difference between the year of going public and the year of incorporation. Young 
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firms tend to have very little trading history and are also less likely to be strong enough 
to withstand the vicissitudes of the industry and indeed the market place. Also, they 
tend to be uncertain about their future prospects and are also less likely to have the 
requisite managerial expertise to withstand the vagaries of the market place. For older 
firms, the age at the IPO date could also potentially reduce the uncertainty and adverse 
selection costs that may face investors due to the availability of several years of 
operating performance data. Hence, the long-run returns of younger firms is expected 
to be worse than that of their older counterparts [Ritter, 1991] and the sign of the 
coefficient estimate for the age variable to be positive. 
Size (+): The offer price          , offer proceeds       , market capitalization       , 
market value        and total assets        serve as proxies for the size of the firm. The 
offer price is the price at which the IPO shares are sold to the public. For each firm, 
offer proceeds is computed as the total number of shares offered multiplied by the offer 
price. Market capitalization is based on the number of shares issued by each firm that 
comprises the amount offered and the amount retained by the old shareholders and is 
calculated as the total shares on issue multiplied by the market prices on the first listing 
day for all the IPO firms. Market value is computed as the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt [sum of short-term and long-term debt] in the year of 
the IPO. Large firms [with higher total assets, market capitalization and market value] 
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which tend to have relatively higher offer prices and gross offer proceeds and also tend 
to be less risky are expected to perform better than smaller firms in the long-run [Ritter, 
1991; Drobetz, et al, 2005]. If the coefficient estimates are positive and significant as 
expected, it would then indicate that large firms with relatively large IPOs perform 
better in the long-run. 
Leverage (+): The market leverage ratio serves as a proxy for the firm’s leverage 
where          refers to the firm’s market leverage by the end of year t. To compute debt, 
debt is identified as the sum of the book value of short-term debt and long-term debt. A 
firm’s equity is identified as its market capitalization in year t. The leverage ratio is then 
the firm’s debt divided by debt plus equity103. It has been argued that the presence of 
debt in the IPO firm’s balance sheet prior to going public could potentially reduce the 
level of information asymmetry and ex-ante uncertainty of the firm as well as potential 
moral hazard costs to investors due to the supervision provided by debt holders. 
However, it is also a known fact that these benefits could be offset by increased 
financial distress costs that may arise from having too much debt. Eckbo and Norli 
[2005] also argue that a relatively low leverage ratio might be a vital factor in the under-
performance of new stock issues as leverage has a ‘turbo charging’ effect on the factor 
                                                          
103 Welch [2004] explains why leverage based on the market value of equity, not book value of equity, is 
more relevant. 
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loadings in a multi-factor model. Against this backdrop, a positive relation between 
leverage and IPO long-run performance is predicted104. 
Pre-IPO Performance (+): Return on assets       , profit margin        and earnings 
yield        are used as proxies for the pre-IPO performance of the firms all as at year t-
1 [earnings yield is computed in the year of the IPO]. For a given firm, earnings yield is 
the profit before tax scaled by the number of outstanding shares divided by the market 
price of the share of the firm in year t. The return on assets is computed as the profit 
before tax divided by the total assets, while profit margin is defined as the operating 
profit before tax divided by the total sales, all in year t-1. Investors’ expectations of 
future superior earnings and cashflows are usually based on the operating 
performance and growth projections of these firms contained in the offer document 
prior to going public105. Highly profitable firms are generally seen to be less risky and 
should be less under-priced given that the ex-ante uncertainty level is reduced at the 
IPO date. Hence, IPOs with a stronger record of profitability at the time of the IPO are 
expected to exhibit superior performance in the long-term and as such, the coefficient 
estimates of the performance variables are expected to be positive. 
                                                          
104 It is important to note that the leverage of the IPO firm automatically reduces after the offering given 
that the firm now has a larger capital base. The leverage level can be further reduced if part of the IPO 
proceeds is used to rebalance the capital structure by repaying some or all of its debts.   
105 By and large, the value of any security in the market place is determined by investors’ expectations of 
future earnings based on current operating performance.  
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Market-to-book ratio (-): The firm’s market-to-book ratio,        is calculated as the 
market capitalization divided by the book value of equity as at year t. Specifically, this 
study examines if the expectations of future earnings performance built into the prices 
of these firms at the time of their going public, reflected in their market-to-book values, 
has any impact on the after-market performance of these firms. If the coefficient 
estimate is positive [negative] and significant, it would then imply that IPOs with high 
market-to-book ratios perform better [worse] in the long-run than those with lower or 
modest market-to-book ratios. In line with the majority of the findings of previous 
studies that document an inverse relationship between market-to-book ratio and IPO 
long-run performance, the coefficient estimate of the market-to-book variable is 
expected to be negative. 
Underwriter Reputation (+): The market share attributable to each underwriter in the 
sample period serves as the study’s direct measure of the reputation of each of the 109 
underwriters for this study. Using the technique of Megginson and Weiss [1991] and 
Beatty and Ritter [1986], an underwriter reputation variable        is constructed for 
each of the sample IPOs based on the market shares of the underwriters that took 
them public. Market shares are computed as the proportion of total market gross offer 
proceeds attributable to each underwriter in the period. Prestigious investment banks 
cautiously hand-pick clients that tend to be less risky since they are very much 
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concerned about losing their prized reputational capital garnered over the years 
[Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter, et al, 1998]. Hence, a 
positive relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO performance is expected, 
in line with the majority of previous studies. In the sample, rank 1 is assigned to the 
underwriter with the highest percentage of market share [tagged as the most 
prestigious underwriter], rank 2 to the next, and so on until rank 109, tagged as the 
least prestigious underwriter [see Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 98]. Hence, the higher the 
numerical rank, the lower the prestige of the underwriter. Following from this, the 
coefficient estimate of the underwriter reputation variable is expected to be negative, 
which indicates a positive relationship to long-run performance. 
Initial Returns (-): The firm’s initial returns,       is the level of returns available in the 
immediate after-market to investors who subscribe to the offer at the IPO date. Initial 
return is computed as the sum of the daily returns from the 1st day of listing to the 30th 
day for each of the IPOs. If the coefficient estimate is negative [positive] and significant, 
it would signify that IPOs with high initial returns in the immediate after-market, 30 days 
post-listing, perform worse [better] in the long-run than those with lower or modest 
initial returns. If investors’ valuations or expectations of the performance of IPO firms in 
the early after-market are not met in the long-run, then firms that have the most initial 
returns are expected to have the worst long-run performance. Hence, in line with De 
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Bondt and Thaler’s [1985] overreaction hypothesis106, a negative relationship between 
initial returns and long-term performance is expected. 
IPO Risk (-): Following Ritter [1984] and Carter and Manaster [1990], the after-market 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily return during the first 30-days post-listing,          
is used to proxy for the riskiness of each IPO firm. If the coefficient estimate is negative 
[positive] and significant, it would then connote that IPOs with greater risk profiles 
perform worse [better] in the long-run than those with lower risk profiles. A higher early-
market return volatility could proxy for the riskiness of the offering in the immediate 
after-market. Obviously, higher risk would imply a higher probability of under-
performance in the long-term. Hence, a negative relationship between IPO risk and 
long-run performance is expected.  
After controlling for these firm level risk factors, the study next considers whether the 
characteristics of an issuing firm’s industry prior to or at the IPO can also determine 
and/or explain the performance of these firms107.To explore these possibilities, industry 
conditions relating to an adjusted IPO firm valuation [IPO surplus value], leverage, 
equity volatility, profitability, concentration and market-to-book ratio are considered as 
                                                          
106 Investors place too much emphasis on the short-term prospects of new equity issuances by over-
projecting future earnings leading to high market prices and high initial returns; however, if these 
expectations are not met, the prices are downwardly adjusted leading to lower long-run returns.    
107 See Section 3.3.4, pp.128. 
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the author seeks to ascertain their predictive and explanatory powers in univariate and 
multivariate regressions. Equally-weighted industry-specific averages are constructed 
over all existing public firms within each IPO industry108. For an IPO issued in year t, 
these averages are based on data observed in each firm’s fiscal year that ends in the 
twelve month period from year t-1 to t. The variables, their proxies and envisaged 
relationship to long-run performance [shown in brackets] are provided below:  
IPO Surplus Value (-): A surplus value measure         which relates the natural 
logarithms of the firm’s actual market value       to its industry and turnover-adjusted 
market value [    
 
]  proxies for an adjusted valuation for each IPO firm to be 
computed as follows: 
                   [    
 
]…….. [4.2] 
    
                      …….. [4.3] 
where        denotes the turnover of firm   at the IPO date and            refers to the 
average market-to-turnover ratio of all    firms which belong to the same industry   as 
                                                          
108 Equal-weighting is used to compute the industry averages as this provides a simple and indicative 
measure of the value of that characteristic in that industry. A firm’s industry is determined by standard 
industry classification [SIC] codes, as in the first empirical study, and is defined as that industry with at 
least four mature [age 7 years or more] firms. 
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firm  109. A negative [positive] value of the          measure implies that the firm trades 
at a discount [premium].  
Valuation levels and growth expectations may vary significantly between different 
industries, which are exacerbated during major IPO clusters [Hawawini, 2003]. During 
these tense market conditions, investors’ expectations of the future performance of 
these firms are high and as of a consequence, these firms are over-valued in the 
market place at the IPO date. If the coefficient estimate of the         variable is 
negative and significant as expected, it would then show that IPOs for which superb 
growth prospects are projected frequently may not manage to meet these lofty heights 
and may as a result perform worse than those for which growth expectations are more 
modest. Against this backdrop, the coefficient estimate of the surplus value variable is 
expected to be negative. 
Industry Leverage (+): The market leverage ratio serves as a proxy for the industry 
leverage, where            refers to the industry leverage for firm   as at the IPO date. To 
compute leverage, debt is identified as the sum of the book value of short-term debt 
and long-term debt. A firm’s equity is identified as its market capitalization at the IPO 
date. The leverage ratio is then the equally-weighted average of each firm’s debt 
                                                          
109 The market value of a firm is computed as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt. The market-to-turnover ratio is then calculated as the market value of equity divided by the turnover 
of the firm.  
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divided by debt plus equity, over all existing public firms in a given industry for firm   in 
year t. If the coefficient estimate of this variable is positive [negative] and significant, it 
would then mean that IPO firms from industries with higher leverage perform better 
[worse] in the long-run than those from industries with low or modest leverage. Based 
on the findings of Akhigbe, at al [2006] that IPO firms, following the raising of additional 
capital, could potentially pose an increasing threat to rivals, which is accentuated in 
industries that are already less concentrated and highly leveraged, a positive 
relationship between the firm’s industry leverage and its long-run performance is 
predicted and as such, a positive coefficient estimate is expected. 
Industry Equity Volatility (-): This is the standard deviation of an industry’s twelve 
monthly stock returns prior to the IPO date, computed as the equally-weighted average 
over all existing public firms from year t-1 to year t. Hence,         refers to the industry 
equity volatility for firm   as at the IPO date. If the volatility of an IPO firm’s industry is a 
proxy for the riskiness of the industry, then IPO firms from industries with high 
volatilities should earn higher returns if this risk is priced sufficiently. On the flip side, 
the higher risk could also imply a higher likelihood of poor market performance in the 
long-term. This second study leans towards the latter argument and predicts a negative 
relationship between an IPO firm’s industry equity volatility and its long-run 
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performance and as such, expects the coefficient estimate of the equity volatility 
variable to be negative. 
Industry Profitability (+): Profitability is the ratio of net operating income [defined by 
profit before tax] divided by turnover for each firm in year t-1. An industry’s profitability 
ratio is the equally-weighted average over all existing public firms in a given industry in 
year t-1. Hence,         refers to the industry profitability for firm   as at the IPO date. It 
is a generally accepted fact that investors’ perceptions of the future prospects of IPO 
firms are positively/[negatively] influenced by robust/[weak] industry profit conditions. 
Against this backdrop, the study predicts a positive relation between industry 
profitability and IPO long-run performance and as such, expects the coefficient 
estimate of the industry profitability variable to be positive. 
Industry Concentration (+): Industry concentration is computed as the Herfindahl Index 
[sum of squared market shares of existing firms], where each firm’s market share is its 
market capitalization divided by the total market capitalization of all existing public firms 
in the given IPO firm’s industry in year t. Hence,           refers to the size-weighted 
industry concentration for firm   as at the IPO date. If the coefficient estimate of this 
variable is negative [positive] and significant, it would invariably signify that IPO firms 
from industries with a higher level of concentration perform worse [better] in the long-
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run than those from industries with a low or modest level of concentration. The 
relationship between industry concentration and post-IPO performance is ambiguous. 
However, this second work leans towards the argument that concentrated industries 
can provide IPO firms with a more favourable environment to operate and as a result, 
expects the coefficient estimate of the Herfindahl index variable to be positive. 
Industry Market-to-book (-): The industry market-to-book is calculated as the equally-
weighted average of the market capitalisation divided by the book value of equity over 
all existing public firms in a given firm’s industry in year t-1. Hence,          refers to 
the industry market-to-book ratio for firm   as at the IPO date. If the coefficient estimate 
of this variable is positive [negative] and significant, it would lead us to infer that IPO 
firms from industries with higher market-to-book ratios perform better [worse] in the 
long-run than those from industries with low or modest market-to-book ratios. This 
study leans towards the view that suggests that firms are motivated to go public to take 
advantage of investor over-valuations in the market place, in line with the ‘window of 
opportunity’ hypothesis, which is subsequently corrected in the long-term as 
information on their true values begin to filter into the market. Following from this, the 
coefficient estimate of the industry market-to-book variable is expected to be negative. 
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TABLE 4.1:  DESCRIPTION & MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
Variable  Description   Measure 
         Offer Price   Natural Log of the Offer Price, in year t 
      Offer Proceeds   Natural Log of Offered Shares × share price, in year t 
            Age110    Natural Log of [1 + Age], where age is the year [t] of going public less year of incorporation 
      Market Capitalization  Natural Log of Outstanding shares111 × share price, in year t 
      Total Assets   Natural Log of Total Assets, in year t  
       Market-to-Book   Market Equity [ME] divided by Book Equity [BE], in year t 
       Pre-IPO Profit Margin  Operating profit before tax divided by total sales, in year t-1 
       Pre-IPO Return on Assets Operating profit before tax divided by total assets, in year t-1 
      Earnings Yield   Earnings per share [Operating profit before tax/Outstanding shares]/share price, in year t 
       Market Leverage   Book Debt [BD] divided by Sum of {Book Debt [BD] + Market Equity [ME]}, in year t 
              Market Heat   Dummy taking the value 1 for firms going public in hot and cold markets and 0 otherwise 
                                                          
110 Given that some of the firms may be less than a year old at the IPO date, taking the logarithms would produce negative values. In order to avert this, the study adds 1 to the age. 
111 This is the number of shares issued by each firm comprising the amount on offer and amount retained by the old shareholders.  
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 Table 4.1 - CONT’D 
      Underwriter Reputation  Gross proceeds for each underwriter divided by total proceeds for the sample period 
      Market Value   Natural Log of Market Equity [ME] + Book Debt [BD], in year t 
      Initial Returns   Sum of the daily returns for the first 30 days post-listing  
        IPO Firm Risk   Standard deviation of an IPO firm’s daily returns during the 1st 30 days post-listing.  
            Market-to-turnover   Market Equity [ME] divided by the turnover averaged over all firms in a given industry, in year t 
    
 
   Assigned Market Value  Firm turnover × Average market-to-turnover ratio          
          Surplus Value   Natural Log of Actual Firm Market value [MV] less the Natural log of Assigned Market Value [AMV] 
         Industry Leverage112  Book Debt [BD] divided by Sum of {Book Debt [BD] + Market Equity [ME]}, in year t 
          Industry Concentration  Herfindahl Index [HHI], computed as the sum of firms’ squared market shares in year t113  
        Industry Equity Volatility  Standard deviation of an industry’s twelve monthly stock returns, from year t-1 to t 
          Industry Profitability   Profit before tax/turnover, in year t-1 averaged over all firms in a given industry 
         Industry Market-to-Book  Market Equity/Book Equity, in year t-1 averaged over all firms in a given industry 
                                                          
112 The leverage as well as the other industry ratios are equally-weighted averages, over all existing public firms in a given industry for firm  , from year t-1 to year t. 
113
 A firm’s market share is its market capitalization divided by the total market capitalization of all existing public firms in the given IPO firm’s industry.  
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[4.4] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
[4.4.1] Correlation Analysis   
Table 4.2 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between the firm and industry 
level variables for the sample of IPO firms. Panel A [B] reports the pairwise correlations 
between the firm [industry] level variables only, while Panel C presents the same 
across both sets of variables. For the firm risk factors, apart from the size measure 
variables, underwriter reputation, initial returns, market leverage and IPO risk, all the 
other variables are not highly correlated. Clearly from the table, all the size measures 
[i.e. offer price, offer proceeds, market equity, total assets and market value] are shown 
to be highly and positively correlated, which is not surprising giving the established fact 
in the literature that large firms tend to be associated with higher offer prices and offer 
proceeds. The high negative correlation between underwriter reputation and the size 
measures is an indication that more prestigious underwriters tend to be associated with 
large and more seasoned firms 114 . This is also due to the fact that prestigious 
investment bankers tend to certify less risky firms, which are generally large and 
seasoned firms, in order not to lose their hard-earned reputational capital. The high 
positive correlation between initial returns and IPO risk is also noted. This suggests 
                                                          
114 In this study, the most prestigious underwriter is assigned Rank 1, the next Rank 2 and so on until Rank 
109 which denotes the least prestigious underwriter, hence the negative correlation between the 
underwriter prestige and size variables.  
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TABLE 4.2: PAIRWISE CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIRM & INDUSTRY RISK FACTORS FOR THE SAMPLE OF IPO FIRMS 
The sample is 746 IPO firms that went public over the period January 1999 and December 2006 and 485 firms that went public over the period excluding the 
‘dotcom’ years. The table reports the correlation coefficients between the firm and industry characteristics. The firm characteristics are the natural logarithms 
of the offer price [LP], age [LA], market value [LMV], underwriter reputation [LU], offer proceeds [LOP], market equity [LME] and total assets [LTA]. The 
others are market-to-book [MTB], profit margin [PM], return on assets [ROA], market leverage [Lev], earnings yield [EY], initial returns [IR] and IPO risk [Risk]. 
The industry characteristics are IPO surplus value [SV], profit margin [I_PM], leverage [I_Lev], market-to-book [I_MTB], concentration [I_Conc] and equity 
volatility [I_EV]. For the firm risk factors, the size measures [i.e. offer price, offer proceeds, market equity, total assets and market value] are shown to be 
highly correlated. The high positive correlation between the size measures and market leverage on the one hand and initial returns and IPO risk on the other 
hand is also noted. For the industry risk factors, the high correlation between leverage, concentration, market-to-book and equity volatility is equally noted.  
FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD 
PANEL A – FIRM RISK FACTORS ONLY 
               LTA         LME           LP          LOP         ROA          PM          LMV         LEV      MTB       EY        LU         LA     IR         Risk                                                                                                                                                              
Log TA [LTA]   1.00 
Log ME [LME]   0.77           1.00 
Log Price [LP]   0.63           0.69  1.00 
Log Proceeds [LOP]  0.80           0.82  0.74      1.00 
ROA    0.19           0.12  0.12      0.10           1.00   
Profit Margin [PM]  0.04           0.03  0.01      0.01           0.05  1.00 
Log MV [LMV]   0.81           0.99  0.69      0.83           0.13  0.03     1.00 
Mkt. Lev. [LEV]   0.45           0.10  0.11      0.22           0.08  0.07     0.20        1.00 
MTB   -0.04           0.20  0.12      0.11           0.04  0.01     0.19       -0.08         1.00    
Earnings Yield [EY]  0.18           0.23  0.13      0.10           0.38  0.11     0.23        0.07          0.03      1.00 
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PANEL A CONT’D – FIRM RISK FACTORS ONLY 
               LTA         LME           LP          LOP         ROA          PM          LMV       LEV         MTB        EY        LU         LA     IR       Risk                                                                                                                                                              
Log Reputation [LU] -0.54         -0.57 -0.50     -0.64         -0.06  0.01    -0.58      -0.14          -0.07      -0.05 1.00 
Log [1+Age] [LA]  0.07          0.15  0.17      0.15          0.02  0.04     0.15       0.01           0.07        0.12 -0.13 1.00 
Initial Ret [IR]   0.00          0.16 -0.01     -0.03         -0.08  0.03     0.15      -0.10           0.07        0.11  0.04 -0.02   1.00 
IPO Risk [Risk]  -0.16         -0.06 -0.14     -0.14         -0.17  0.01    -0.07      -0.17           0.03      -0.10  0.13 -0.07   0.60     1.00 
PANEL B - INDUSTRY RISK FACTORS ONLY 
        SV               I_Lev              I_MTB              I_PM             I_Conc   I_EV  
Surplus Val [SV]     1.00 
I_Leverage [I_Lev]    -0.09    1.00 
I_MTB      -0.18   -0.35    1.00 
I_Profitability [I_PM]     0.09   -0.07    0.17    1.00 
I_Concentration [I_Conc]    0.05    0.41   -0.15   -0.34    1.00 
I_Equity Vol. [I_EV]     0.01   -0.39    0.48    0.04   -0.10   1.00 
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    PANEL C – FIRM AND INDUSTRY RISK FACTORS 
            LTA    LME    LP     LOP   ROA      PM    LMV    LEV    MTB    EY      LU     LA      IR    Risk    SV     I_Lev    I_MTB   I_PM   I_Conc   I_EV 
LTA   1.00 
LME   0.77    1.00 
LP  0.63    0.70    1.00 
LOP  0.81    0.82    0.74    1.00 
ROA  0.18    0.09    0.11    0.08    1.00       
PM  0.05    0.02   -0.03    0.04    0.11        1.00              
LMV  0.81    0.99    0.70    0.83    0.09        0.02    1.00  
LEV  0.44    0.09    0.07    0.21    0.08        0.09    0.19    1.00 
MTB             -0.08    0.23    0.09    0.11    0.05        0.01    0.21    -0.11    1.00           
EY  0.18    0.21    0.12    0.09    0.39        0.13    0.22     0.07    0.03    1.00          
LU             -0.54   -0.57  -0.48   -0.64   -0.03        0.00   -0.57   -0.14    -0.07   -0.05    1.00 
LA  0.06    0.13    0.13    0.12   -0.03        0.07    0.13    0.00     0.04    0.11    -0.09    1.00 
IR             -0.01   0.18    0.00    -0.02   -0.03       0.04    0.16   -0.10     0.12    0.14     0.05    -0.01   1.00     
Risk             -0.16   -0.04   -0.10   -0.11  -0.10        0.00   -0.05   -0.17     0.06    -0.10    0.11    -0.03   0.58    1.00   
SV             -0.16   0.14     0.02   -0.01  -0.16       -0.37   0.10    -0.33     0.15    -0.14    0.01    -0.09   0.11    0.21     1.00     
I_Lev  0.08    0.01   -0.07   -0.02   0.04        0.04   0.03     0.14     -0.07    0.05    0.05    -0.03   -0.09   -0.10   -0.06   1.00 
I_MTB  0.03    0.05    0.13    0.08  -0.02        0.05   0.05    -0.03     0.08     0.01    -0.07    0.08    0.09    0.08   -0.19   -0.35    1.00 
I_PM             -0.08    0.00    0.04   -0.01  -0.02       -0.04   0.00    -0.07     0.11    -0.04    0.01     0.02    0.07    0.12    0.09   -0.06    0.15    1.00 
I_Conc  0.10    0.07   -0.02    0.02   0.03        0.03   0.08     0.10     0.00     0.05     0.05    -0.05    0.00   0.05    0.06    0.42    -0.14 -0.34 1.00 
I_EV             -0.02    0.07    0.18    0.14  -0.03        0.00   0.06    -0.17   0.12    -0.08    -0.08    0.02     0.10   0.23    0.01   -0.39     0.47  0.04     -0.09  1.00 
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that IPO firms with the most initial returns in the immediate after-market generally tend 
to exhibit greater after-market return volatility. The table also reveals the relatively high 
positive correlation between the size measures and market leverage, which suggests 
that larger and more seasoned IPO firms tend to be associated with higher levels of 
market leverage. This is against the backdrop of the fact that given the size of these 
firms, they are better positioned to undertake higher levels of leverage. 
For the industry risk factors, leverage, concentration, market-to-book and equity 
volatility are shown to be relatively highly correlated. The negative correlation between 
these factors indicates that industries with higher leverage tend to have lower market-
to-book and equity volatilities. The positive correlation between market-to-book and 
equity volatility, on the one hand and the negative correlation between profitability and 
concentration, on the other hand are also observed. These coefficients signify that 
industries with higher market-to-book multiples tend to have higher equity volatilities, 
while industries with lower profitability tend to be less concentrated. 
The empirical results from the range of approaches employed in assessing the 
survivorship of the IPO sample in this third and final study arew next presented. 
However, before this, the distribution of the initial and holding period returns for the 
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sample by year, industry and IPO market condition is first analysed in the section that 
follows. 
[4.4.2] Distribution of IPO Firms’ Returns  
Table 4.3 presents the distribution of the initial returns and long-term BHARs for the 
sample period going from 1999 to 2006 and the sub-period that excludes the 
technology bubble years [2002-2006] alongside some key offering characteristics. 
Panels A, B and D present the distribution for both periods by year, industry and IPO 
market condition respectively, while Panel C presents the distribution by industry 
exclusively for the sub-period going from 2002 to 2006. This section commences with 
an analysis for the whole period before proceeding to see how this changes when the 
‘dotcom’ years arte excluded. 
Inspection of Panel A reveals that the sample shows clear evidence of clustering. For 
example, 545 of the 746 sample offers [73.06%] occurred in 2000 and the period going 
from 2004 to 2006. These years account for 61.53% [£16,619.16m of the £27,011.58m 
total] of the aggregate gross proceeds which seems to be consistent with the notion of 
‘hot’ markets [Ritter, 1984]. On the basis of the number of the offerings, 2000, 2004 
and 2005 seem to be clear contenders for a ‘hot market’ tag, while 2000, 2002 and 
2006 are the candidates if the amount of gross proceeds is used, instead, as the ‘hot 
market’ indicator. Clearly, on the basis of the number of offerings and gross proceeds,  
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TABLE 4.3: DISTRIBUTION OF IPO FIRMS’ INITIAL & HOLDING PERIOD ABNORMAL 
RETURNS ALONGSIDE KEY OFFERING CHARACTERISTICS 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006 and 485 
IPOs for the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years [1999 – 2001], going from January 2002 to 
December 2006. In Panel A, IPO firms’ initial and 5-year value-weighted long-run BHARs are 
categorized by year, while in Panels B and C, they are categorized by industry. Panel D 
presents the distribution by the IPO market condition. The average 30-day returns and the 
value-weighted long-run BHARs, calculated using the 5th matching algorithm [M5] as the 
benchmark, represent the initial and holding period returns of the IPO firms. The initial returns 
are calculated for the immediate after-market, going from the first listing day of the IPOs to the 
30th day, while the long-run returns have been computed from the second month of trading 
following the listing day till the fifth anniversary of each of the IPOs. The penultimate and last 
rows in Panels A, B and C report the averages for the age, initial returns and BHARs for the 
overall sample period and the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. These rows also report 
the totals for the number of IPOs and the gross offer proceeds for both periods.  
Panel A: By year 
Year  No of IPOs Av Age [Yrs.] Gross Proc. [£]      Initial returns [%]   BHAR [%]     
1999                   48  2.44  2,838.06   38.69            -30.55 
2000    150  2.58  6,685.24       5.87            -13.44  
2001      63  3.38  1,487.08     0.48                47.51  
2002      50  4.99  3,932.43      1.92          -136.75  
2003      40  3.84  2,134.85        8.88              43.27  
2004    138  3.11  2,679.68      13.05            -57.65  
2005    152  2.44  3,355.98      10.73            -43.28  
2006    105  2.74  3,898.26        18.46              -7.74  
1999-2006  746            2.96         27,011.58              14.89         -11.30  
2002-2006   485            3.06         16,001.20                           9.81          -6.92 
 Panel B: By industry – For the entire period 
Industry             No of IPOs           Initial returns [%]        BHAR [%]     
Aerospace & Automobiles           6        36.11                -89.21      
IT & Computer Services       154        29.20                -49.18      
Health & Pharmaceuticals         79        12.38                -13.71      
Food Producers & Processors        14          9.27                -29.23      
Personal Care & Household Goods        18          9.17                -67.70      
Leisure, Hotels & Restaurants        64        16.98                 52.09      
Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas      130        12.68                 28.56      
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Panel B: By industry [Cont’d] 
Industry             No of IPOs           Initial returns [%]         BHAR [%]    
Construction, Engineering & Electrical    58        13.89                 -30.23      
Wholesalers & Retailers         27          3.06                   -7.26      
Media & Entertainment         79        12.10                 -41.09      
Telecommunications         23        21.65                 -43.91      
Transport          10        18.95                 -93.09      
Support Services          84        11.37                  27.82  
Overall [1999-2006]     746      14.89             -11.30     
Panel C: By industry: 2002 – 2006 [Ex. the ‘dotcom’ years] 
Industry             No of IPOs           Initial returns [%]         BHAR [%]     
Aerospace & Automobiles           5          5.72                -34.40      
IT & Computer Services         69        16.09                -19.98      
Health & Pharmaceuticals         57        13.51                  -8.85      
Food Producers & Processors        12          2.96              -167.94      
Personal Care & Household Goods        13          1.58                -48.70      
Leisure, Hotels & Restaurants        32          6.10                 74.48 
Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas      118         12.48                 31.56 
Construction, Engineering & Electrical    46        13.92                -33.73      
Wholesalers & Retailers         14         -1.57                 39.12      
Media & Entertainment         46        10.37                -80.96      
Telecommunications         15        10.58                 14.50      
Transport            5        35.37                -32.29      
Support Services          53          8.49                 22.94  
Overall [2002-2006]      485        9.81              -6.92     
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Panel D: By IPO market condition 
                       OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
      _______________________________          __________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                             Initial Ret [%]  BHAR [%]         Initial Ret [%]   BHAR [%]                         
Hot Market IPOs        19.44       -28.46  12.30       -28.33 
Neutral Market IPOs          8.83       -28.64    7.61       -57.65 
Cold Market IPOs          6.35        88.90   -4.18        98.07 
Difference [Hot – Cold]   13.09 [3.77***]     -117.36 [-7.75***]    16.48 [5.45***]    -126.39 [-7.37***] 
 
only 2000 is a hot market, while the choice of 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006 as ‘hot 
markets’ is not so clear-cut. In the same vein, 1999, 2002 and 2003 seem to be clear 
favourites for a ‘cold market’ tag on the basis of the number of the offerings, while 2001, 
2003 and 2004 are the front-runners if the amount of gross proceeds is used as the 
‘cold market’ indicator. Clearly, on the basis of the number of offerings and gross 
proceeds, only 2003 is a cold market, while the choice of 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004 
as ‘cold markets’ is not so unambiguous. In order to overcome the challenge of 
categorising the years, the age of the firms as of the IPO dates is next examined to see 
if it can be adopted as the ‘hot market’ indicator115. Clearly, from the same Panel A, the 
average age of the IPO firms is lowest in 1999, 2000 and 2005 and highest in 2001, 
                                                          
115 In a booming IPO market, there is a temptation for firms to float their IPOs to take advantage of high 
market prices occasioned by this market wave. This eventually leads to a situation where a great majority 
of weak and marginal firms float their offerings within a few years of their start-up. Peristiani and Hong 
[2004] show that with the ‘dotcom’ explosion of the late 1990s, the average age of an IPO firm dropped 
significantly from around seven years to about four years. Against this backdrop, the average age of the 
IPOs [measured from incorporation date to IPO date] will serve as the most direct measure of market heat.  
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2002 and 2003. Against this backdrop, 1999, 2000 and 2005 are considered as ‘hot 
market’ years, 2001, 2002 and 2003 as ‘cold market’ years, while 2004 and 2006 are 
dubbed ‘neutral market’ years. Following from this, IPOs in the ‘hot market’ years are 
tagged ‘hot’ IPOs, those in the ‘cold market’ years ‘cold’ IPOs, while those in the 
‘neutral market’ years are dubbed ‘neutral’ IPOs. 
Over the entire period, a wide variation in the initial and holding period returns is 
observed. The initial [holding period] returns by year range from 0.48% to 38.69%           
[-136.75% to 47.51%] respectively. The market for new issues has been known to go 
through ‘cycles’. It is a generally accepted fact that buoyant economic conditions and 
rising investors’ over-optimism in the market place raise the equilibrium prices at which 
a fixed cohort of firms can float their offerings to the public. These high market prices 
may become irresistible to many firms [both good and ‘poor quality’] as they may 
decide to go public. If indeed this is the case, it is likely that IPOs issued during ‘hot’ 
market periods will perform worse than those issued in ‘cold’ market periods.  
The results from the first two columns in Panel D for the whole period seem to support 
the conjecture that ‘cold’ IPOs should record less under-performance relative to the ‘hot’ 
IPOs. After 60 months, the long-run BHAR is -28.46% for ‘hot’ issues and 88.90% for 
‘cold’ issues, suggesting that the ‘cold’ IPOs actually out-perform the benchmarks for 
 240 
 
the period in review. The difference in the holding period returns between the ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ IPOs is significant at the 1% level, which seems to be consistent with the 
evidence that firms time their IPOs either after aggressive accounting accruals that 
creates a divergence between the reported earnings in the IPO year and the cashflows 
[Teoh, et al, 1998(a and b)] or when its own earnings and indeed valuation has peaked 
[Ritter, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1994]. In some other cases, they could time the IPOs when 
the valuations of comparable firms within the industry are its peak thus making equity 
issuance very attractive [Kim and Ritter, 1999; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2004; Pagano, et al, 1998; Rajan and Servaes, 2003]. The results are not 
different when the sub-period that excludes the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded116. From 
the 3rd and 4th columns in Panel D, the 5-year long-run BHAR is -28.33% and 98.07% 
for ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ issues respectively. The difference in the holding period returns 
between the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ IPOs remains significant at the 1% level. The ‘hot’ IPOs 
also tend to exhibit significantly greater initial returns than the IPOs in the other market 
periods, which is in line with the majority of the evidence in the literature. Expectedly, 
the ‘hot’ IPOs have the greatest initial returns and most severe long-run under-
performance, which is consistent with the ‘fads’ hypothesis of Aggarwal and Rivoli 
                                                          
116 Excluding the ‘dotcom’ period [1999 – 2001] from the sample leads to a re-classification of the ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ periods. Under this re-classification, 2005 and 2006 represent the ‘hot’ period, 2002 and 2003, ‘cold’ 
period and 2004 ‘neutral’ period.  
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[1990] and the ‘overreaction’ hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler [1985 and 1989] that 
suggests the more extreme the initial price movement, the greater is the subsequent 
price adjustment in the long-term. It is also observed that for both periods, the BHAR 
results for the ‘neutral’ market IPOs are more negative than those for the ‘hot’ market 
IPOs which is strange and difficult to explain. This abnormality may partly reflect the 
difficulty in the initial categorisation of the markets as ‘hot’ or ‘cold’.      
When the sample is segmented by industry as shown in Panel B, a wide variation in 
the long-run performance between the industries for the entire period is equally 
noticeable. For example, Leisure, Hotels & Restaurants; Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas 
and Support Services stand out as they out-perform the benchmark. The worst 
performing sectors are Transport, Aerospace & Automobiles and Personal Care & 
Household Goods, recording under-performances of 93.09%, 89.21% and 67.70% in 
that order. The IT & Computer Services sector, which was at the heart of the ‘dotcom’ 
bubble, is the fourth worst performer with an under-performance of 49.18%. The under-
performance of IPOs is present in all but three of the thirteen industrial groupings.  
There is a marked difference when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded from the sample as 
shown in Panel C. An upturn in the performances of the Wholesalers & Retailers and 
Telecommunications sectors is observed as they join the group of out-performing 
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sectors with 5-year long-run BHARs of 39.12% and 14.50% respectively. The worst 
performing sectors are now Food Producers & Processors [-167.94%], Media & 
Entertainment [-80.96%] and Personal Care & Household Goods [-48.70%] in that 
order. For this sub-period, the under-performance is present in all but five of the 
thirteen industrial groupings. Over both periods, it is observed that the sample sizes for 
some of the industries are small. From Panels B and C, the industries with low volume 
of IPOs [i.e. less than 30 IPOs] are Aerospace & Automobiles, Food Producers & 
Processors, Personal Care & Household Goods, Wholesalers & Retailers, 
Telecommunications and Transport. Hence, for these industries, the results must be 
interpreted with caution.  
Overall, a widespread variation in the performances of the firms across the years, IPO 
market condition and industry is noticeable. The IPO performances across the different 
market conditions have already been analysed and the worse performance of the ‘hot’ 
IPOs was adduced to the fact that many ‘poor quality’ IPOs take advantage of the 
opportunity created by this tense market condition to float their offerings. When the true 
value of these firms is revealed to investors with the passage of time, their values are 
subsequently adjusted downwards. The disparity in the performance of these firms 
across industry classifications is of keen interest as this suggests that there may be 
some industry structure risk factors at play in the market place that determines the 
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initial entry of these firms and their subsequent post-IPO performance. The task in the 
sections that follow is to explore these ex-ante industry risk factors in order to provide 
potential IPO investors with additional useful information, beyond that contained in the 
offer document, which they can use to distinguish firms that are likely to perform from 
those that are likely to under-perform at the offering stage of these firms.  
[4.4.3] Firm and Industry Risk factors and IPO Performance  
[4.4.3.1] Analysis of Mean Differences  
Prior to conducting detailed regression tests to explore any significant relations 
between the risk factors and IPO long-run performance, the sample data is first 
partitioned to check for any general patterns. Table 4.4 presents the average 5-year 
post-IPO BHARs for the IPO sample grouped into terciles based on a battery of 
offering, firm and industry characteristics for the entire sample period [1999 – 2006] 
and the period excluding the technology bubble years [2002 – 2006]. The BHAR 
returns are equal to an IPO’s actual 5-year raw return less the 5-year benchmark return 
of an appropriate matching firm, where matching has been based on the M5 algorithm 
as earlier defined in the first empirical study. This section commences with a 
preliminary analysis for the whole period before proceeding to see how this changes 
when the ‘dotcom years are excluded from the sample. 
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TABLE 4.4: LONG-TERM ABNORMAL IPO RETURNS BY TERCILES  
The sample is 746 IPO firms that went public over the period 1999 to 2006 and 485 firms for the 
sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years [2002-2006]. The first 2 columns of the table reports 
mean values for the characteristics [the age, offering, size and underwriter reputation measures 
are in logarithms, while the profitability, leverage, market-to-book & industry risk factors are in 
ratios] and 5-year value-weighted long-run abnormal returns for each IPO tercile over the entire 
period, while the last 2 columns report the same for the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. 
In Panels A and B, the firms are grouped into terciles based on a battery of firm and industry 
characteristics respectively. The reported characteristics are equally-weighted averages over all 
observations within each tercile. Long-run abnormal returns are computed using the BHAR 
metric, where an IPO firm’s long-term returns are measured for 5 years starting in the 2nd month 
following listing. The BHAR returns are equal to an IPO’s actual 5-year raw return less the 5-
year benchmark return of an appropriate matching firm, where matching has been based on the 
M5 algorithm as earlier defined in the first empirical study. At the bottom of each panel, 
significance levels [t-stats] for the difference between an item’s average in the first and third 
terciles are reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
PANEL A - FIRM & OFFERING CHARACTERISTICS 
PANEL A1 – OFFER PRICE 
                      OVERALL [1999 – 2006]       2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                
                                 ________________________________    ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
          Mean      BHAR [%]                   Mean      BHAR [%]                                                                                                                                                          
Least Offer Price [T1]         0.17             -20.57          0.14        -33.73     
Tercile 2          0.76             -23.90             0.68        -26.08 
Most Offer Price [T3]         2.02                 -9.15                   1.73          -3.29 
Difference [T1 – T3]        -1.85             -11.42 [-1.69*]                  -1.59        -30.44 [-2.45**] 
 
PANEL A2 – OFFER PROCEEDS 
                   OVERALL [1999 – 2006]   2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
  ________________________________        __________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                         Mean         BHAR [%]         Mean BHAR [%]                          
Least Offer Proceeds [T1]      1.55                -18.92          1.34        -11.10 
Tercile 2          6.39                -27.46          5.88        -31.26 
Most Offer Proceeds [T3]   100.56                    -9.99                    91.59          -5.16 
Difference [T1 – T3]      -99.01                    -8.93 [-0.69]                 -90.25  -5.94 [-0.36] 
 
PANEL A3 – MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
                             OVERALL [1999 – 2006]   2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
    ________________________________        __________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                      Mean         BHAR [%]                       Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Sized [T1]         5.60                   -55.39                      5.52        -41.30 
Tercile 2        23.00                 -29.00        21.71        -18.58 
Most Sized [T3]          400.36                 -9.67      346.22          -5.64 
Difference [T1 – T3]     -394.76                 -45.72 [-4.27***]    -340.70       -35.66 [-2.23**] 
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PANEL A4 – TOTAL ASSETS 
             OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
        _________________________________         ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                      Mean         BHAR [%]                  Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Sized [T1]        2.06                -79.18           2.36              -91.48 
Tercile 2         9.40                -69.04   10.30         -113.52 
Most Sized [T3]         217.14                  12.36  220.33                31.99 
Difference [T1 – T3]  -215.08               -91.54 [-7.27***]       -217.97        -123.47 [-7.81***]  
PANEL A5 – MARKET VALUE 
                        OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        _________________________________        ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                       Mean         BHAR [%]                  Mean      BHAR [%]                          
Least Sized [T1]        6.18        -53.86                 6.23                   -42.46 
Tercile 2       24.95        -23.23                 23.67                   -11.41 
Most Sized [T3]        466.41        -10.00                441.21        -6.05 
Difference [T1 – T3]   -460.23        -43.86 [-3.35***]        -434.98         -36.41 [-2.34**] 
 
PANEL A6 – PROFIT MARGIN [PM] 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        _________________________________          _______________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                        
Least Profitable [T1]      -16.64        -58.99       -15.96        -67.51 
Tercile 2         -3.70        -42.40         -2.55        -48.01 
Most Profitable [T3]         0.34         29.89          0.17         56.16 
Difference [T1 – T3]      -16.98        -88.88 [-7.56***]      -16.13     -123.67 [-9.58***] 
 
PANEL A7 – RETURN ON ASSET [ROA] 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        ________________________________          _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Profitable [T1]       -2.85         -93.97         -3.95      -118.52 
Tercile 2        -0.03         -19.55         -0.02          -3.99 
Most Profitable [T3]        0.11          29.84          0.09         56.21 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -2.96       -123.81 [-9.23***]         -4.04  -174.73 [-10.73***] 
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PANEL A8 – EARNINGS YIELD 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]              2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        _________________________________       _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                     Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Profitable [T1]      -0.20         -50.28          -0.18        -36.69 
Tercile 2        -0.01         -53.24          -0.01        -52.22 
Most Profitable [T3]        0.06          42.57           0.07         59.81 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -0.26         -92.85 [-6.87***]         -0.25      -96.50 [-5.98***] 
 
PANEL A9 – AGE 
             OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
        _________________________________       _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                    Mean         BHAR [%]         Mean      BHAR [%]                          
Youngest [T1]         0.22                -26.97          0.21        -36.32 
Tercile 2         1.01                -32.11          0.94        -26.52 
Oldest [T3]         7.76                  18.75          8.01         30.54 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -7.54                -45.72 [-3.49***]        -7.80      -66.86 [-4.33***] 
 
PANEL A10 – MARKET-TO-BOOK [MTB] 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        _________________________________       _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                     Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Market-to-Book [T1]     -3.56           -8.64        -1.64         -14.67 
Tercile 2          3.28           12.44         3.01          18.80 
Most Market-to-Book [T3]     28.48          -25.96        19.78          -16.39 
Difference [T1 – T3]      -32.04           17.32 [1.69*]      -21.42     1.72 [0.12] 
 
PANEL A11 – LEVERAGE 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        _________________________________        ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                     Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Levered [T1]        0.00        -54.40           0.00         -74.30 
Tercile 2         0.02         29.65           0.03          34.35 
Most Levered [T3]        0.22         17.08           0.27          29.91 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -0.22        -71.48 [-6.54***]         -0.27   -104.21 [-8.28***]  
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PANEL A12 – UNDERWRITER REPUTATION 
                        OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________              _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                     Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                          
Most Prestigious [T1]     10.75            -9.17          11.02          -4.40 
Tercile 2     27.08          -12.26             30.34        -15.16 
Least Prestigious [T3]      65.74          -37.67          68.79        -30.44 
Difference [T1 – T3]   -54.99           28.50 [2.42**]        -57.77 26.04 [2.11**] 
 
PANEL A13 – INITIAL RETURNS 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________             _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Initial Returns [T1]      -0.18         -11.36         -0.13         12.71 
Tercile 2         0.08         -17.76          0.07           0.17 
Most Initial Returns [T3]        0.42           -4.66          0.32        -33.46 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -0.60           -6.70 [-0.51]             -0.45        46.17 [2.99***] 
 
PANEL A14 – IPO FIRM RISK 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]              2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________              _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                          
Least Risky [T1]         0.01           -9.64          0.01           -9.64 
Tercile 2          0.03           -7.24          0.03         -10.21 
Most Risky [T3]          0.08         -20.94          0.06          10.42 
Difference [T1 – T3]        -0.07          11.30 [1.86*]        -0.05         -20.06 [-1.92*] 
 
PANEL B - INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
PANEL B1 – PROFITABILITY 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]              2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________                _______________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]          Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Profitable [T1]       -2.10        -24.45        -2.88          46.61 
Tercile 2         0.00         18.69        -0.18         -72.69 
Most Profitable [T3]        0.52        -21.28         0.27          26.37 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -2.62         -3.17 [-0.25]       -3.15  20.24 [1.90*] 
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PANEL B2 – LEVERAGE 
                         OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________             _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Levered [T1]        0.09         -38.76          0.10           -3.49 
Tercile 2         0.17           -5.66          0.18         -18.25 
Most Levered [T3]        0.25          16.19          0.27          13.64 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -0.16         -54.95 [-4.77***]        -0.17         -17.13 [-1.77*] 
 
PANEL B3 – MARKET-TO-BOOK 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]              2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________              _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                         Mean          BHAR [%]            Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Market-to-Book [T1]       0.82          -4.40           0.71         46.17 
Tercile 2           3.00        -22.34           2.48        -67.41 
Most Market-to-Book [T3]       6.13          -6.95           5.95         22.69 
Difference [T1 – T3]         -5.31           2.55 [0.21]         -5.24  23.48 [1.83*] 
 
PANEL B4 – CONCENTRATION 
                        OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       ________________________________                 ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                      Mean         BHAR [%]            Mean       BHAR [%]                         
Least Concentrated [T1]       0.16        -12.86           0.15        -27.58 
Tercile 2         0.22        -29.18           0.23         17.84 
Most Concentrated [T3]        0.59         12.12           0.68           7.15 
Difference [T1 – T3]       -0.43        -24.98 [-2.04**]         -0.53       -34.73 [-2.29**] 
 
PANEL B5 – EQUITY VOLATILITY 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       _________________________________               _________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                       Mean          BHAR [%]           Mean      BHAR [%]                         
Least Volatile [T1]         0.08         -37.74          0.07        -78.84 
Tercile 2          0.12          26.28          0.11         61.77 
Most Volatile [T3]         0.19         -17.60          0.15           1.84 
Difference [T1 – T3]        -0.11         -20.14 [-1.79*]        -0.08       -80.68 [-5.64***] 
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PANEL B6 – IPO SURPLUS VALUE 
                          OVERALL [1999 – 2006]               2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
     _________________________________                  ________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                       Mean         BHAR [%]            Mean       BHAR [%]                         
Least Surplus Value [T1]       -1.51          29.79          -1.51          44.19 
Tercile 2          0.08          29.18           0.08           -0.34 
Most Surplus Value [T3]         2.99         -55.13           2.99         -28.33 
Difference [T1 – T3]        -4.50          84.92 [5.58***]         -4.50        72.52 [4.04***] 
    
 
Panels A1–A5 categorise the IPO firms by offer price, offer proceeds, market 
capitalization, total assets and market value respectively. The size measures are 
expected to impinge positively on the IPO after-market performance given the fact that 
larger firms signal greater market confidence and stricter monitoring [Lamberto and 
Rath, 2008]. Also, larger firms with sizeable offerings tend to be linked with lower levels 
of uncertainty and are also generally less risky117. In the same vein, larger firms have 
better access to public equity markets, have a wider range of product lines and are also 
more likely to be backed by prestigious underwriters and venture capitalists. The 
results in Panels A1–A5 for the entire sample period tend to support this conjecture. 
Panel A1 shows that, after 60 months, the long-run BHAR is -20.57% for IPOs in the 
lowest offer price tercile and -9.15% for IPOs in the highest offer price tercile, implying 
that the latter out-performs the former by a significant 11.42% [t-stats: 1.69]. Similarly, 
                                                          
117 A number of researchers have used offer size as a proxy for asymmetric information [Jegadeesh, et al 
1993; Michaely and Shaw, 1994]. 
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from Panel A2, IPOs in the highest offer proceeds tercile are found to out-perform their 
counterparts in the lowest proceeds tercile by 8.93% [t-stats: 0.69]; however, the 
difference is statistically insignificant. When the sample is segmented by market 
capitalization in Panel A3, it is observed that the average BHAR for IPOs in the lowest 
market capitalization tercile is -55.39% and -9.67% for IPOs in the highest market 
capitalization tercile, with the difference in the holding period return between the two 
groups significant at the 1% level. The results are similar when the sample is 
categorised by total assets and market value in Panels A4 and A5 respectively. IPOs in 
the highest total assets and market value terciles are found to out-perform their 
counterparts in the lowest terciles by a highly significant 91.54% [t-stats: 7.27] and 
43.86% [t-stats: 3.35] respectively. All the size measure results seem to be consistent 
with the majority of the evidence in the literature that large firms with sizeable offerings 
perform better in the long-run. The sub-period results excluding the ‘dotcom’ years are 
similar.  
Panels A6–A8 group the IPO firms by a range of performance measures spanning 
profit margin, return on assets [ROA] and earnings yield. These measures are 
expected to impinge positively on the post-listing market performance of the firms. 
Going by the findings of Singh and Whittington [1968], Geroski and Jacquemin [1988] 
and Machin and Van Reenen [1993], IPO firms, which are profitable prior to flotation, 
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are expected to continue to exhibit superior operational and market performance post-
listing. The results for the entire sample period tend to support this surmise. Panel A6 
shows that, after 60 months, the long-run BHAR is -58.99% for IPOs in the least profit 
margin tercile and 29.89% for IPOs in the highest profit margin tercile, implying that the 
latter out-performs the former by a highly significant 88.88% [t-stats: 7.56]. Similarly, 
from Panel A7, IPOs in the highest ROA tercile are found to out-perform their 
counterparts in the lowest ROA tercile by a significant 123.81% [t-stats: 9.23]. When 
the sample is segmented by the earnings yield in Panel A8, it is observed that the 
average BHAR for IPOs in the lowest earnings yield tercile is -50.28% and 42.57% for 
IPOs in the highest earnings yield tercile. The high earnings yield IPOs out-perform 
their low earnings yield counterparts by a huge 92.85% [t-stats: 6.87], which is 
significant at the 1% level. All the profitability measure results seem to be consistent 
with the view that firms with the most profitable history prior to listing perform better in 
the long-term. The results are similar when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded from the 
sample period.  
Panel A9 categorises the IPO firms by age. A fledgling firm can launch its IPO without 
any track record of sustained profitability, which consequently increases the adverse 
selection costs for investors given the high information asymmetry that surrounds the 
IPO on the offering day. Conversely, older firms with several years of performance data 
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are expected to be better placed to reduce the uncertainty around their IPOs118. Also, 
since older firms tend to be more established and less speculative with a more stable 
source of business, they are also expected to perform better in the long-term. The 
results from Panel A9 seem to support this supposition. After 60 months, the long-run 
BHAR is -26.97% for the youngest firms [tercile 1] and 18.75% for the oldest firms 
[tercile 3], with the latter out-performing the former by a highly significant 45.72% [t-
stats: 3.49]. The results are consistent with those obtained from excluding the ‘dotcom’ 
years. An examination of Panel A10 shows that after 60 months, the holding period 
return for the IPO firms in the lowest and highest market-to-book terciles is -8.64% and 
-25.96% respectively, with the firms in the lowest market-to-book tercile out-performing 
their counterparts by 17.32% [t-stats: 1.69], which is significant at the 10% level. The 
results indeed show that investors may be overly optimistic about the future 
performance of IPO firms at the time of issuance and as such, willing to pay higher for 
the shares of these firms at the offering date; however, more often than not, these 
expectations are not met as these firms do not operate as well as they are expected to. 
Thus, investors are forced to revise their initial valuation downwards causing long-run 
returns to plummet. The result for the sub-period that excludes the technology bubble 
                                                          
118 Ritter [1991], Jegadeesh, et al [1993], Hoe, et al [2001] and Hensler, et al [1997] use firm age at the 
IPO date as a proxy for the riskiness of the firm.  
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years is different, given that the difference in the returns between lowest and highest 
market-to-book terciles is insignificant [1.72%, t-stats: 0.12].  
Panel A11 classifies the IPO firms by leverage. There are two competing views on the 
relation between leverage and firm performance. One view has it that the presence of 
leverage could potentially reduce the level of information asymmetry and ex-ante 
uncertainty around the firm as well as moral hazard costs to investors due to the 
supervision provided by debt holders. These positive indices are expected to improve 
the performance of the firm in the long-run. The other view contends that firms with a 
high level of leverage portend a higher risk since they have to pay a higher portion of 
their asset earnings to debt holders and as a result are expected to perform poorly in 
the long-term. The results from Panel A11 seem to be consistent with the former 
presumption. After 60 months, the holding period return for the least levered firms 
[tercile 1] is -54.40%, while that for the most levered firms [tercile 3] is 17.08%, with the 
difference in returns [71.48%, t-stats: 6.54] highly significant. Once again, the results 
for the sub-period that exclude the technology bubble years are similar.  
The IPOs are next categorised by underwriter reputation in Panel A12. Carter and 
Manaster [1990] document an inverse association between the risk of the IPO firm and 
the reputation of the investment banker. Chemmanur and Fulghieri [1994] argue that 
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prestigious investment banks gain reputation when they certify IPOs that perform better 
over the long-term and in order not to jeopardize their prized reputation capital, they 
tend to avoid smaller and riskier issues [Wolfe, et al, 1994]. After 60 months, the 
holding period returns for the IPO firms in the least and most prestigious underwriter 
reputation terciles are -37.67% and -9.17% respectively, with the latter out-performing 
the former by a significant 28.50% [t-stats: 2.42]. The results indeed show that the 
certification provided by top notch investment banks is germane to the market 
performance of new issues of common stock. The result for the sub-period that 
excludes the technology bubble years is also in line with this proposition.  
From Panel A13, it is noticeable that the 5-year BHAR for IPO firms in the least initial 
returns group is -11.36% and -4.66% for those in the most initial returns category, 
which tends to imply an insignificant under-performance of the former by 6.70% [t-stats: 
0.51]. However, the result for the sub-period that excludes the ‘dotcom’ years is in line 
with the ‘window of opportunity’ and De Bondt and Thaler’s [1985] ‘overreaction’ 
hypotheses that suggest that investors exaggerate the future prospects of new issues 
and are willing to pay higher for the firms’ stock in the immediate after-market; however, 
if these expectations are not met, they revise their initial valuation downwards, causing 
long-term returns to fall. Panel A14 partitions the IPO firms by risk, with the 30-day 
post-listing market return volatility serving as the proxy. At 60 months, the BHAR is       
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-9.64% for IPOs in the least risky group, and -20.94% for those in the most risky group. 
The difference in the holding period return between both groups is significant at the 10% 
level [11.30%; t-stats: 1.86]. There is an upturn in results when the ‘dotcom’ years are 
excluded. The long-term BHAR is -9.64% for IPOs in the least risky group, and 10.42% 
for those in the most risky group. The difference in the return between both groups is 
still significant at the 10% level [20.06%; t-stats: 1.92].  
The industry structure variables are next examined. From Panel B1, after 60 months, it 
is observed that the long-run BHAR for IPOs in the least profitable industries [tercile 1] 
is -24.45% and -21.28% for those in the most profitabile industries [tercile 3]. The 
difference in the holding period return between both groups is not statistically 
significant [-3.17%; t-stats: -0.25]. However, when the ‘dotcom’ years arte excluded, a 
different picture emerges with the firms in the least profitable industries out-performing 
those in the most profitable industries by 20.24% [t-stats: 1.90], which is significant at 
the 10% level. Panel B2 groups the IPO firms by industry leverage. The 5-year BHAR 
is -38.76% for IPOs in the least levered group and 16.19% for those in the most 
levered group. The difference in the holding period return between both groups is 
highly significant [-54.95%; t-stats: -4.77]. This pattern is also evident in the sub-period 
excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, albeit at a lower level of significance [10%] as the 
difference in the long-term BHAR returns between both groups reduces to -17.13% [t-
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stats: 1.77]. Panel B3 categorises the IPO firms by industry market-to-book. At 60 
months, the BHAR is -4.40% for IPOs in the lowest market-to-book group, and -6.95% 
for those in the highest market-to-book group. The difference in the holding period 
return between both groups is not significant even at the 10% level [2.55%; t-stats: 
0.21]. However, when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded, it is observed that firms from 
industries with the lowest market-to-book out-perform those in the highest market-to-
book industries by a significant 23.48% [t-stats: 1.83], which is significant at the 10% 
level.  
The industry concentration effect is next examined in Panel B4. The 5-year BHAR is     
-12.86% for IPOs in the least concentrated group and 12.12% for those in the most 
concentrated group. The difference in the holding period return between both groups is 
significant at the 5% level [-24.98%; t-stats: -2.04]. The results are similar when the 
‘dotcom’ years are excluded. The findings seem to be in tandem with the view that 
concentrated industries tend to be characterised by less price and market-share wars, 
which provide a good platform for IPO firms, which are typically smaller, high growth 
firms, to spot lucrative niches overlooked by the dominant players. The IPO firms are 
next grouped by industry equity volatility as shown in Panel B5. After 60 months, the 
BHAR is -37.74% for IPOs in the least equity volatility group and -17.60% for those in 
the most equity volatility group. The difference in the holding period return between 
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both groups is significant at the 10% level [-20.14%; t-stats: -1.79]. This pattern is also 
evident in the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, albeit at a higher level of 
significance [1%] as the difference in the long-term returns between both groups 
increases to -80.68% [t-stats: -5.64].  
Finally, the IPO firms are categorised by an industry-adjusted valuation measure in 
Panel B6, with the IPO firm surplus value serving as the maesure. Firms with the least 
surplus value, comprising mainly firms trading at a discount relative to industry peers, 
are grouped in the first tercile, while firms with the most surplus value, composed of 
firms trading above their industry-adjusted valuations [i.e. trading at a premium relative 
to industry peers] are grouped in the third tercile. At 60 months, the BHAR is 29.79% 
for IPOs in the least surplus value group and -55.13% for those in the most surplus 
value group. The difference in the holding period return between both groups is highly 
significant [84.92%; t-stats: 5.58] indicating that IPO firms that trade above their 
industry-adjusted valuations under-perform those with relatively modest valuations. The 
results are similar when the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded from the analysis, as the 
difference in the long-term returns between both groups remains significant at the 1% 
level [72.52%; t-stats: 4.04]. Overall, some of the results change when the ‘dotcom’ 
period is excluded. More specifically, an upturn in the results for the firm level variables 
of market-to-book value and initial returns and the industry structure variables of 
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profitability and market-to-book is observed which tends to suggest that the ‘dotcom’ 
period is driving some of the results.  
Thus far, these segmentations have been conducted in order to profile the 
characteristics of the IPO firms to enable the author to determine firstly, the 
characteristics of the best and worst performing firms and secondly, if these differences 
are significant. However, it does not tell us the nature of the relationship of these 
variables to long-term performance. In the sections that follow, the exact nature of 
these relationships are explored in univariate and multivariate regression frameworks. 
[4.4.3.2] Univariate Regression Analysis  
Having garnered an insight into the plausible nature of the relationship of the selected 
variables to IPO long-term performance, this section performs OLS regression analysis 
to provide a clearer picture of the nature of these relationships. Table 4.5 reports the 
univariate regression results of OLS regressions of IPO long-run performance using the 
5-year value-weighted M5-matched BHAR as the dependent variable for the sample 
and a host of firm and industry risk factors as separate explanatory variables. Panel A 
reports the results for the firm risk factors, while Panel B presents the same for the 
industry risk factors. The regressions are for a sample of IPOs that went public 
between 1999 and 2006 and also for the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. This 
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TABLE 4.5: RESULTS OF UNIVARIATE OLS REGRESSIONS OF IPO LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE  
This table reports the coefficient estimates & t-values [in parentheses] of OLS regressions of IPO long-run performance using the 5-year value-weighted M5-
matched BHAR as the dependent variable for the sample and a host of firm risk factors as the explanatory variables. The regressions are for a sample of IPOs that 
went public between 1999 and 2006 and also for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble period [2002 – 2006]. M5-matched BHAR returns are equal to an 
IPO’s actual 5-year raw return less the 5-year benchmark return of an appropriate matching firm, where matching has been based on size, market-to-book ratio, pre-
IPO performance, turnover growth & earnings yield. The explanatory variables are the natural logarithms of the offer price, market equity, market value, offer 
proceeds, [1+Age], underwriter reputation [UW] and total assets [TA]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], profit margin, return on asset [ROA], market leverage 
[Lev], earnings yield, hot and cold dummy variables, 30-day initial returns and IPO firm risk. Panel A reports univariate regression results for the firm risk factors, 
while Panel B presents the same for the industry risk factors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively. The t-stats have been calculated 
using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
                                     OVERALL [1999-2006]                                                    2002-2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                _____________________________________________________________        ________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                    Intercept     t-stats       Slope       t-stats        R2           No of  Obs.       Intercept     t-stats       Slope        t-stats       R2           No of Obs.                                                                                                                         
Log offer price       -0.5383 [-6.25***]   0.3462    [3.22***]    0.0102                746          -0.4845   [-5.04***]   0.4640      [3.40***]    0.0177               485 
Log Proceeds       -0.6442 [-5.91***]   0.1393   [3.85***]    0.0188             746          -0.6137 [-4.52***]   0.1799     [3.82***]     0.0341             485 
Log ME        -0.8012 [-6.09***]   0.1411   [4.31***]    0.0244             746           -0.6816 [-4.21***]   0.1388   [3.23***]       0.0249             485 
Log TA        -0.7846 [-7.58***]   0.1800   [5.66***]    0.0375             746           -0.6860 [-5.19***]    0.1745      [4.42***]   0.0406             485 
Log Mkt. Val       -0.8403 [-6.24***]   0.1487   [4.54***]     0.0277             746          -0.7257   [-4.39***]    0.1469      [3.47***]   0.0292               485  
Profit Margin       -0.3431 [-6.48***]  -0.0005     [-1.20]     0.0002             740           -0.2379 [-3.88***]  -0.0003     [-0.83]        0.0001             482  
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PANEL A CONT’D – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
ROA     -0.3226 [-6.09***]   0.0044       [0.25]     0.0000             732           -0.2243 [-3.60***]   0.0026      [0.11]        0.0000              477  
Earnings Yield   -0.3157 [-5.89***]   0.6123   [2.49**]      0.0079             736           -0.2269 [-3.55***]   0.5567    [1.99**]        0.0067             475 
Log [1+Age]     -0.3757 [-4.64***]   0.0408      [0.73]      0.0006             746           -0.2607   [-2.83***]    0.0268      [0.43]       0.0003              485 
Log UW     0.1411  [0.90]    -0.1497   [-3.24***]    0.0101             746           0.3482    [1.99**]     -0.1796     [-3.57***]   0.0175               485 
MTB     -0.2965 [-5.49***]  -0.0021  [-3.44***]    0.0055             716          -0.2222 [-3.51***]  -0.0019     [-1.67*]      0.0028              471 
Lev     -0.3865 [-6.54***]   0.6244   [2.02**]     0.0041             746           -0.3031 [-4.28***]   0.5840      [1.86*]       0.0053             481 
Hot     -0.1724 [-2.30**]   -0.3517 [-3.44***]   0.0154             746           -0.1773 [-2.16**]   -0.1870    [-1.74*]         0.0042            485 
Cold     -0.3637 [-7.37***]   0.1278     [0.74]    0.0013             746           -0.2217 [-4.61***]   -0.0768     [-0.30]         0.0005           485 
Initial Ret   -0.3441 [-5.99***]   0.0337     [0.16]    0.0001             744           -0.2563 [-3.54***]    0.2070      [0.70]         0.0013            484 
IPO Firm Risk   -0.1967 [-2.30**]   -3.4379 [-2.04**]    0.0100             744           -0.1812    [-1.87*]   -1.7070     [-0.88]         0.0013           484 
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
                                     OVERALL [1999-2006]                                                                2002-2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                _____________________________________________________________      __________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                     Intercept      t-stats        Slope      t-stats      R2        No of Obs.      Intercept     t-stats       Slope        t-stats        R2          No of Obs.                                                                                                                               
Surplus Value           -0.3167  [-5.12***]   -0.0013    [-0.05]      0.0000      746         -0.2250     [-3.16***]    -0.0110     [-0.41]     0.0003         485 
I_Profit Margin           -0.3907  [-6.82***]   -0.1001    [-3.35***]  0.0127      746         -0.3048      [-4.01***]   -0.0740     [-2.13**]   0.0084         485 
I_Leverage           -0.5220  [-4.40***]   1.0851     [1.75*]     0.0033      746         -0.2824      [-2.18**]     0.2573       [0.42]     0.0002         485 
I_MTB            -0.3537  [-4.27***]   0.0049     [0.23]      0.0001      746         -0.2963      [-3.19***]    0.0206      [0.85]     0.0013         485 
I_Concentration           -0.4072  [-5.36***]   0.2172     [1.24]      0.0014      746         -0.2918      [-3.59***]    0.1586      [0.96]     0.0011         485 
I_Equity Volatility        -0.0658  [-0.47]     -2.1138    [-2.08**]   0.0060      746         -0.3249      [-2.05**]     0.8154      [0.66]     0.0007         485 
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section commences with an analysis for the whole period before proceeding to see 
how this changes when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded119. 
In general, preliminary evidence from Panel A is in tandem with the sample 
segmentations and patterns conducted in the last section. The size measures [i.e. offer 
price, offer proceeds, market equity, total assets and market value] are all shown to be 
significantly positively related to IPO long-run performance. For the profitability 
measures [i.e. profit margin, return on assets, earnings yield], only earnings yield is 
shown to be significantly positively related to IPO long-run performance. The negative 
coefficient of the underwriter reputation variable, which indicates a positive relationship 
to IPO long-run performance120, suggests that IPOs managed by more prestigious 
investment bankers tend to have better long-run performance than those underwritten 
by their less prestigious counterparts. In line with the sample segmentation results, the 
market-to-book factor is also shown to be significantly negatively associated with 
subsequent returns of new stock issues, which is generally in line with the majority of 
the evidence in the literature. In the same vein, the significant positive coefficient of the 
                                                          
119 Expecting the presence of outliers and its potential impact on the results, the data is closely examined 
for any extremely large and small values [‘outliers’]. The examination indeed, reveals the presence of 
outliers, albeit, few and far between. In particular, these outliers are observed in the firm performance 
measures of profit margin, return on asset and earnings yield, which are all in ratios. They are also found 
in the market-to-book, initial returns and IPO firm risk variables. Hence, in the univariate tests that pertain 
to these variables in this section as well as in the multivariate frameworks, adjustments are made 
accordingly by excluding them from the regressions. 
120 See Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221 and Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99. 
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market leverage variable tends to suggest that firms with higher market leverage tend 
to have better after-market performances which is in tandem with the view in the 
literature that a higher volume of debt in the capital structure could potentially reduce 
moral hazard costs to prospective investors and provide a good platform for the firm to 
improve its market performance.  
The negative coefficient of the ‘hot’ market dummy indicates that IPOs issued in ‘hot’ 
market cycles perform significantly worse than those issued in ‘cold’ and ‘neutral’ 
markets. Moreover, the ‘cold’ market dummy is shown not to be significantly related to 
the subsequent stock performance of new stock issues. The 30-day post-listing market 
return volatility, a proxy for IPO firm risk, is also shown to be negatively associated with 
IPO long-run performance, suggesting that IPOs with a higher post-listing return 
volatility exhibit the worse long-run performance.  The univariate tests also suggest that 
the age and initial return variables are not valuable in distinguishing between the best 
and worst performing IPO firms, given that the coefficients are not significant. By and 
large, the results are similar when the regressions are performed excluding the ‘dotcom’ 
years. The only exception is IPO firm risk which is now no longer significantly related to 
long-run performance.  
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Performing regressions using the whole sample period, the results from Panel B show 
that industry risk factors of profitability, leverage and equity volatility are valuable in 
distinguishing between the best and worst IPO performers, while IPO surplus value, 
market-to-book and concentration are shown to be insignificant. The negative value for 
the industry profitability variable lays credence to the fact that IPO firms from industries 
with higher profitability or better profit conditions perform worse in the long-run than 
those from industries with low or modest profitability, contrary to the author’s 
expectations. It was expected that the robust profit conditions of an IPO firm’s industry 
should help reduce the adverse selection costs facing investors as they build their 
investment opportunity sets, against the backdrop of the fact that not much is known 
about the IPO firms at their offering stages. However, the results may indicate that 
despite the fanciful industry conditions that may prevail at the IPO date, investors may 
have some reservations about the IPO firms which may make them not value these 
firms properly in the market place.  
The positive sign of the industry leverage variable indicates generally that IPO firms 
from industries with a higher leverage perform better in the long-run than those from 
industries with a low or modest leverage, in line with the author’s expectations. The 
results suggest that following the raising of additional capital which reduces an IPO 
firm’s leverage ratio and in some cases actual debt burden when the offer proceeds are 
 265 
 
used to partially offset or fully repay any lingering debt burden, the IPO firm could then 
be a real competitive threat to rivals in an industry that is highly leveraged.  
The negative sign of the industry equity volatility measure generally implies that IPO 
firms from industries with higher equity volatilities perform worse in the long-run than 
those from industries with low volatilities, in line with the author’s expectations. The 
high equity volatility of an IPO firm’s industry should increase the riskiness of the 
offering and the consequent likelihood of poor performance in the long-term. When the 
regressions are re-estimated excluding the ‘dotcom’ period, only the industry 
profitability measure is found to be significant amongst the raft of industry conditioning 
risk factors in predicting long-run IPO performance. Thus far, these variables have 
been studied in isolation in univariate frameworks to enable us to determine the nature 
of their relationships to IPO long-term performance. However, this process does not 
control for other germane variables that may be associated with this long-term 
performance. Hence, in the section that follows, the impact of these variables are 
examined in multivariate frameworks that control for these other variables. 
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[4.4.3.3] Multivariate Regression Analysis  
Once again, using the 5-year BHARs as the dependent variable and the firm and 
industry risk factors as the independent variables, OLS regressions are conducted to 
determine their explanatory powers in a multivariate framework. In order to minimise 
the impact of cross-correlations and multicollinearity, the number of variables are 
limited in the regressions. This section of the study includes all relevant variables in the 
regressions and estimate several models that systematically exclude variables that are 
highly correlated as revealed by the correlation analysis performed in Section 4.4.1121. 
Table 4.6 reports the OLS regressions of IPO long-run performance using the 5-year 
value-weighted M5-matched BHAR as the dependent variable for the sample and a 
host of firm and industry risk factors as the explanatory variables. The regressions are 
for a sample of IPOs that went public between 1999 and 2006 and also for the sub-
period excluding the ‘dotcom’ period [2002-2006]. The regressions are first estimated  
                                                          
121 This study adopts this approach, in line with the majority of the literature and amid a range of other 
procedures in the econometrics literature [e.g. variable transformation, which could make the error terms 
serially correlated and heteroscedastic and the use of orthogonal variables], since it is relatively easier and 
more straightforward. Moreover, this procedure is not harmful to the unbiasedness and efficiency of the 
parameter estimates [Gujarati, 2003]. The study’s cut-off point for collinearity is 0.24. On a related note, 
the low explanatory power of the models, as captured by the coefficient of determination [i.e. R^2], is noted 
across the models. However, the author is not really concerned about this given that the intent of this study, 
and indeed other studies in the literature in this regard, is to determine the direction and significance of the 
relationship between the variables included in the models and long-term performance, as captured by the 
parameter estimates. The reported values for the R^2 are generally in line with the literature [Bhabra and 
Pettway, 2003; Gao, et al, 2006; Goergen, et al, 2007; Chan, et al, 2008; Thomadakis, 2010; Levis, 2011]. 
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TABLE 4.6: RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE OLS REGRESSIONS OF IPO LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE  
This table reports the coefficient estimates & t-values [in parentheses] of OLS regressions of IPO long-run performance using the 5-year value-weighted M5-
matched BHAR as the dependent variable for the sample and a host of firm risk factors as the explanatory variables. The regressions are for a sample of IPOs that 
went public between 1999 and 2006 and also for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble period [2002 – 2006]. M5-matched BHAR returns are equal to an 
IPO’s actual 5-year raw return less the 5-year benchmark return of an appropriate matching firm, where matching has been based on size, market-to-book ratio, pre-
IPO performance, turnover growth & earnings yield. The explanatory variables are the natural logarithms of the offer price, market equity, market value, offer 
proceeds, [1+Age], underwriter reputation [UW] and total assets [TA]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], profit margin, return on asset [ROA], market leverage 
[Lev], earnings yield, hot and cold dummy variables, 30-day initial returns and IPO firm risk. Panel A reports multivariate regression results for the firm risk factors, 
while Panel B presents the same for the industry risk factors. Panel C reports multivariate regression results for both the firm and industry risk factors.***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively. The t-stats have been calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
              OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                            2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                  ____________________________________________              _______________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                Model 1            Model 2                    Model 1                    Model 2           
Intercept    0.3731             -0.7202              0.5107         -0.8977 
     [1.81*]              [-4.13***]              [1.69*]          [-3.00***]             
Log Mkt. Val       0.1817                0.2299 
        [5.25***]               [4.27***] 
Earnings Yield    0.5224   0.3055              0.4531         0.1860 
     [2.26**]              [1.23]               [1.66*]          [0.66]             
Log [1+Age]    0.0288   0.0109            -0.0340        -0.0529 
      [0.50]    [0.20]             [-0.41]        [-0.68] 
Log UW    -0.1458               -0.1969 
      [-3.19***]              [-3.15***] 
MTB     -0.0023              -0.0032             -0.0052        -0.0085 
      [-3.86***]  [-5.20***]            [-1.17]         [-1.75*] 
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PANEL A CONT’D – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Lev     0.0970                 0.1617   
      [0.24]                 [0.32] 
Hot     -0.2990   -0.3714             -0.1531     -0.1452 
      [-2.81***]   [-3.68***]            [-1.06]      [-1.01] 
Initial Ret       -0.0671             0.3463 
         [-0.32]              [0.73] 
IPO Firm Risk    -1.7306                0.0543 
      [-1.02]                [0.02] 
R^2     0.0437   0.0649           0.0332    0.0730 
No of Obs.        701       701                440         440 
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
                 OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                                 2002 – 2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                  ____________________________________________               __________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                Model 1           Model 2          Model 3                                 Model 1         Model 2         Model 3     
Intercept    -0.1299             -0.1529          -0.4550             -0.3511    -0.4342 -0.4838 
      [-0.82]  [-0.95]           [-1.96**]              [-2.20**]     [-2.62**]  [-2.11**]          
Surplus Value    0.0249  0.0110           0.0285              0.0073    -0.0026  0.0092 
       [0.97]   [0.44]            [1.10]               [0.28]     [-0.10]   [0.34] 
I_Profit Margin    -0.1679            -0.1590             -0.1695   -0.1643 
      [-3.66***]            [-3.98***]              [-2.76***]    [-3.20***] 
I_Leverage                 1.1712         0.5769 
                   [1.45]          [0.75] 
I_MTB     0.0775  0.0611           0.0865              0.0490     0.0375 0.0529 
       [2.85***]  [2.20**]           [3.02***]               [1.61]      [1.19]  [1.66*] 
I_Concentration    -0.1773  0.1989               -0.0629     0.3344  
      [-0.55]   [0.64]                [-0.19]      [1.12] 
I_Equity Volatility   -3.6892             -3.3717          -3.2424             -1.0758    -0.0148          -1.0024 
      [-3.04***] [-2.72**]          [-2.64**]              [-0.80]     [-0.01] [-0.74] 
R^2     0.0337             0.0142         0.0358             0.0271    0.0066           0.0277 
No of Obs.         746      746  746      485         485     485 
 270 
 
 
PANEL C – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
                                     OVERALL [1999-2006]                                                            2002-2006 [EX. ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                __________________________________________________________        __________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                     Model 1       Model 2      Model 3     Model 4      Model 5      Model 6             Model 1      Model 2      Model 3       Model 4      Model 5      Model 6                                                                                                      
Intercept         0.4657 0.5090       0.2158      -0.6113   -0.6096      -0.8150       0.3572       0.3180  0.2727        -0.7269      -0.8714      -0.7719 
           [1.80*]   [1.98**]       [0.66]      [-2.58**]    [-2.55**]    [-2.60**]         [1.07]         [0.95]   [0.69]        [-2.14**] [-2.39**]    [-1.87*] 
Log Mkt. Val               0.1978    0.2009       0.1929                    0.1835       0.1945     0.1820 
               [5.06***]   [5.07***]     [4.97***]                    [3.68***]    [3.76***]    [3.68***] 
Earnings Yield        0.4999 0.5003      0.4858      0.2322   0.2370        0.2212       0.5201       0.4937 0.5090        0.3442       0.3129     0.3279 
         [2.18**] [2.18**]      [2.17**]      [0.98]    [1.00]          [0.93]      [1.75*]        [1.69*]  [1.74*]         [1.20] [1.10]      [1.13] 
Log [1+Age]       0.0366 0.0340      0.0392     0.0104   0.0079       0.0152     -0.0152      -0.0129     -0.0130      -0.0369      -0.0347    -0.0329 
         [0.60]  [0.55]       [0.64]       [0.18]    [0.14]         [0.26]     [-0.20]        [-0.17] [-0.17]        [-0.51] [-0.47]     [-0.44] 
Log UW       -0.1613       -0.1683     -0.1644              -0.1662       -0.1885    -0.1680 
         [-3.43***] [-3.56***]  [-3.49***]       [-2.98***]   [-3.34***] [-2.98***] 
MTB        -0.0028        -0.0032     -0.0029     -0.0040  -0.0043      -0.0040       0.0001       0.0003 0.0001       -0.0002       0.0001    -0.0002 
         [-2.18**]  [-2.70***]   [-2.21**]   [-3.11***]   [-3.63***]   [-3.11***]        [0.09]         [0.41]  [0.06]        [-0.17] [0.06]     [-0.19] 
Lev          0.1433 0.0848       0.0903           0.3423       0.2493 0.3123 
           [0.30]  [0.18]        [0.19]            [0.66]         [0.49]  [0.63] 
Hot        -0.3297        -0.3941     -0.3119    -0.3880 -0.4570        -0.3755      -0.2278       -0.1944     -0.2151    -0.2554      -0.2208    -0.2462 
         [-2.59**]      [-3.23***]  [-2.38**]  [-3.21***]  [-3.95***]   [-3.01***]      [-1.41]         [-1.17] [-1.27]        [-1.57]        [-1.31]     [-1.44] 
Initial Ret             0.0069  -0.0128       0.0087            0.0474       0.0538     0.0306 
               [0.04]   [-0.07]         [0.05]             [0.11]  [0.13]      [0.07] 
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PANEL C CONT’D – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
IPO Firm Risk   -1.2147        -1.5534     -1.3547      -1.4535       -1.2253     -1.5837 
     [-0.77]          [-0.99]      [-0.88]       [-0.49]         [-0.41] [-0.57] 
Surplus Val   0.0701          0.0624    0.0713     0.0493 0.0415       0.0483 0.0311       0.0188         0.0306     0.0174         0.0078   0.0134 
    [2.38**]        [2.10**]   [2.40**]     [1.89*]  [1.57]       [1.84*]  [0.98]        [0.59]  [0.94]       [0.61]          [0.27]    [0.45] 
I_Profit Margin  -0.1334   -0.1260     -0.1362       -0.1196        -0.1613              -0.1550    -0.1506   -0.1340 
   [-2.80***]    [-3.10***]  [-2.97***]      [-3.01***] [-2.70***]           [-3.08***]     [-2.63**]                  [-2.80***] 
I_Leverage       0.8973         0.4445    0.3118         -0.1267 
        [1.08]           [0.53]     [0.40]      [-0.16] 
I_MTB   0.0787          0.0682   0.0854      0.0768 0.0662       0.0812 0.0502       0.0404 0.0518     0.0533         0.0437   0.0510 
    [2.96***]      [2.52**]  [3.08***]    [2.86***] [2.42**]      [2.84***]  [1.61]        [1.26]  [1.61]      [1.74*]           [1.40]    [1.59] 
I_Conc.              -0.1749          0.1146       -0.3594 0.0771              -0.0882       0.2984     -0.2482         0.0981 
   [-0.53]           [0.38]        [-1.14] [-0.26]   [-0.25]        [0.95]      [-0.77]           [0.34] 
I_Equity Vol.      -2.8679         -2.5687 -2.5238      -3.2107        -2.9286     -2.9805         -1.7221      -0.5899        -1.6035    -1.9583        -0.8665  -1.8383 
  [-2.37**]       [-2.08**]  [-2.02**]   [-2.78***] [-2.48**]     [-2.48**] [-1.03]       [-0.33]  [-0.93]     [-1.14]          [-0.48]   [-1.04] 
R^2  0.0748        0.0635 0.0758     0.1008         0.0889    0.0992          0.0575     0.0396          0.0576    0.0774        0.0618  0.0762 
No of Obs.      701             701      701          701        701         701    440          440     440         440   440       440 
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with the firm risk factors only [Panel A], then the industry risk factors only [Panel B] and 
finally both factors combined [Panel C]. 
Market value is selected as the only measure of size, while the the other size measures 
[i.e. market equity and total assets] as well as the offering characteristics related to size 
[i.e. offer price and offer proceeds] are excluded entirely from the regressions due to 
the high correlation between them. In the same vein, earnings yield is also selected as 
the sole performance measure, while return on assets and profit margin are excluded 
entirely122. Hence, only the following firm risk factors are included in the multivariate 
framework: ‘hot’ market dummy, market leverage, market value, market-to-book, 
earnings yield, underwriter reputation, age, initial returns and IPO risk. Controlling for 
the relatively observed high correlation between market value and underwriter 
reputation, market value and market leverage and finally, initial returns and IPO risk, 
the firm regressions are estimated firstly, with the selected firm risk factors excluding 
market value and initial returns and secondly, with all the firm risk factors excluding 
market leverage, underwriter reputation and IPO risk. For the industry regressions, 
three different models are estimated to account and control for the observed high 
correlation between industry factors of leverage, market-to-book, equity volatility and 
                                                          
122 In unreported regressions that adopt the excluded size [i.e. market equity and total assets] and 
performance measures [i.e. return on assets and profit margin] as the alternatives, the results are similar.  
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concentration on the one hand as well as profitability and concentration on the other 
hand. Combining both firm and industry risk factors in the same regression and 
accounting for the inter-dependencies and cross-correlations inevitably leads to 
estimating six different models in a multivariate framework that includes both set of 
factors. 
Just like in the last section, this section starts with an analysis for the whole period 
before proceeding to see how this changes when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded. For 
the firm risk factors, the results from Panel A for the whole period show that only 
market value, market-to-book, earnings yield, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ 
market dummy are significantly related with 5-year post–IPO returns. The results seem 
to be consistent with the univariate results reported earlier and in line with the author’s 
expectations. The results are also generally in tandem with the results from the sample 
segmentations previously reported and also consistent with the majority of the 
evidence in the literature. More specifically, the significant positive sign on market 
value is consistent with the argument that larger firms are generally less risky and 
better placed than small firms to perform better in the long-run. Market-to-book is 
significantly negatively related to long-run performance with the result consistent with 
the ‘market overreaction’ and ‘window of opportunity’ hypotheses. The positive sign on 
the performance factor is also consistent with the expectation that IPO firms with a 
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track record of strong positive earnings are less risky and as such better placed to 
perform better in the future. By choosing to go public when their operating performance 
is good, investors are forced to raise their expectations of superior future performance, 
more especially when this performance is sustained in the post-IPO years.  
Underwriter reputation is also shown to be significantly positively related to IPO long-
run returns, given the negative sign of the coefficient estimate123. This is not a surprise 
given the established fact that successful firms tend to be underwritten by more 
prestigious investment bankers. Finally, the ‘hot’ dummy is shown to be another 
valuable distinguishing factor between the best and worst performing IPO firms. The 
significant negative coefficient indicates that IPOs issued in periods of intense and 
profound market activity [‘hot’ markets], perform worse that those issued in other 
periods. When the regressions are re-estimated for the sub-period that excludes the 
‘dotcom’ years in order to isolate the impact of the ‘technology bubble’, the results are 
broadly similar. The only difference now is the ‘hot’ market dummy, which is no longer 
significant as an explanatory factor in post-IPO stock returns.  
For the industry risk factors, the results from Panel B for the whole period show that 
profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility are significantly related with 5-year 
                                                          
123
 See Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221 and Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99. 
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post–IPO returns across the three models. The results seem to be consistent with the 
univariate results and sample segmentations reported earlier. However, when the 
regressions are re-estimated for the period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, equity 
volatility ceases to be significant as a valuable explanatory factor of post-IPO stock 
returns. The market-to-book factor is observed to go from being highly significant [at 
the 1% level] across the three models for the whole period to just being mildly 
significant [at the 10% level] in only one of the three models in the sub-period that 
excludes the ‘dotcom’ years. In fact, on the basis of these industry regressions, the 
profitability factor [consistent at the 1% level] and the market-to-book to a limited extent, 
stands out as the only significant industry factors across the three models that are 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ years.   
Controlling for the firm and industry risk factors simultaneously, the results from Panel 
C for the whole period show that market value, market-to-book, earnings yield, 
underwriter reputation, the ‘hot’ market dummy as well as industry risk factors of IPO 
surplus value, profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility are significantly related 
with 5-year post–IPO returns across the six models. More specifically, on the one hand, 
market-to-book, the ‘hot’ market dummy and industry risk factors of profitability and 
equity volatility are shown to be negatively related with subsequent IPO returns across 
the six models. On the other hand, size [market value], performance [earnings yield], 
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underwriter reputation124 and industry risk factors of surplus value and market-to-book 
are shown to be positively related with long-term returns125.   
The results are generally consistent with the sample segmentations and univariate 
regression results performed in earlier sections and also in line with the majority of the 
evidence in the literature. More specifically, the size result, which is in line with the 
author’s expectations, suggests that large firms with sizeable offerings perform better in 
the long-run. The performance result is consistent with the view that firms with a 
profitable history prior to listing perform better in the long-term, which also meets with 
the author’s expectations. The market-to-book result, consistent with the author’s 
expectations, show that investors may be overly optimistic about the future 
performance of high market-to-book firms at the time of issuance; however, more often 
than not, these expectations are not met as these firms do not operate as well as they 
are expected to. The negative coefficient of the underwriter reputation variable, which 
indicates a positive relationship to long-term performance and in tandem with the 
author’s expectations, suggests that IPOs managed by more prestigious investment 
bankers tend to have better long-run performance than those underwritten by their less 
prestigious counterparts. Expectedly, the ‘hot’ IPOs have the most severe long-run 
                                                          
124
 See Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221 and Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99. 
125 Earnings yield is significant in three of the six regressions while IPO firm surplus value is significant in 
four of the six regressions. 
 277 
 
under-performance, which tends to suggest that many of these IPOs issued in these 
tense market conditions are of ‘poor quality’.  
For the industry risk factors, the negative sign of the profitability variable suggests that 
IPO firms from industries with higher profitability or better profit conditions perform 
worse in the long-run than those from industries with low or modest profitability, which 
is quite surprising and contrary to the author’s expectations126. The market-to-book 
result, which is also against the author’s expectations, suggests that investors have 
high expectations of the future value of the firms based on the growth opportunities that 
abound in the industry which cause them to value the stocks highly. Consequently, 
these firms take advantage of these opportunities by going public to raise the capital 
needed to finance the huge investment outlay, which eventually shows up in the future 
operating and stock performance of these firms. Expectedly, the negative value for the 
equity volatility factor generally implies that IPO firms from industries with higher equity 
volatilities perform worse in the long-run than those from industries with low volatilities.  
The positive sign in the IPO surplus value factor indicates that firms trading above their 
industry-adjusted valuations [i.e. those firms trading at a premium relative to industry 
peers] perform better than their counterparts, which seems to be contrary to the 
author’s expectations and also at variance with the sample segmentation results. In 
                                                          
126 See Section 4.4.3.2, pp. 264. 
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univariate regressions, this variable is not a valuable factor in predicting or explaining 
IPO long-run performance. However, when the study controls for other firm and 
industry risk factors that are germane to post-IPO outcomes in multivariate frameworks, 
the ensuing result indicates that firms that trade at a premium relative to industry peers 
perform better in the long-term. The results imply that investors are confident that the 
present performance and the growth opportunities available to the IPO firm in the 
industry and reflected in the current stock prices will be sustained in the future, which in 
turn cause them to revise upwards their expectations of future superior performance.  
When the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded and the regressions are re-estimated, size 
[market value], performance [earnings yield], underwriter reputation and the industry 
risk factors of profitability and market-to-book to a limited extent127, are found to be the 
significant variables. The strong, overwhelming and pervading relationship between 
firm size, underwriter reputation, industry profitability and IPO long-run performance is 
observed as the results are significant at the 1% level across the models and robust to 
the inclusion or exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ years. The firm level variables of market-to-
book and ‘hot’ market as well as industry structure variables of IPO surplus value and 
equity volatility cease to be significant. More specifically, the aforementioned variables 
                                                          
127 The industry market-to-book goes from being highly significant across the six models for the whole 
period to just being mildly significant [at the 10% level] in only one of the six models when the ‘dotcom’ 
years are excluded. 
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go from being highly significant [all at the 1% level] for the entire period to being 
insignificant when the ‘dotcom’ years are excluded. The lack of robustness of these 
evidences clearly shows that the ‘dotcome’ period is massively influencing the results. 
The explanation for this is not difficult to gauge as this historic period was characterised 
by a massive demand for capital, high equity volatilities and ‘hot’ markets as both good 
and poor quality firms rushed to the market to raise capital on the back of brimming 
investors’ optimism and misevaluations in the market place that drove industry and 
market values to all-time highs.   
On the evidence of these results, the central hypothesis of this second study that 
industry–structure variables cannot foreshadow the long-term performance of IPOs is 
rejected. The results show that, after controlling for specific firm and industry risk 
factors that have been shown to be germane to the after-market performance of new 
stock issues, size [market value], performance [earnings yield], market-to-book, 
underwriter reputation, the ‘hot’ IPO market dummy as well as industry risk factors of 
IPO surplus value, profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility can be important 
predictors of post-IPO stock performance. However, when the study further controls for 
the effect of the ‘dotcom’ bubble, only size, performance, underwriter reputation, 
industry profitability and industry market-to-book to a limited extent, remain as the 
significantly distinguishing factors between the best and worst performing IPO firms.  
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Clearly, not all IPOs are bad investments as there are significant variations in the 
cross-sectional performance of these firms. In fact, the results from this second 
empirical study confirm the results from the first empirical study that suggests that size, 
amongst others, could be a key risk factor in the post-IPO performance of issuing firms 
given that value-weighted performance did not produce a strong and consistent under-
performance finding. The study also finds that the profile of under-performing IPO firms 
can be determined based on a set of observable firm and industry characteristics at the 
time of the IPO. Under-performance tends to restricted to small, high market-to-book 
firms with an unprofitable trading history, issued in hot IPO markets, underwritten by 
less prestigious investment bankers and trading below their industry-adjusted 
valuations [i.e. trading at a discount relative to industry peers]. These under-performing 
firms also tend to be located in more profitable and low market-to-book industries with 
high equity volatilities. On the evidence of these results, IPO managers, their 
investment bankers and potential IPO investors can foreshadow the long-run 
performance of these firms based on a battery of firm and industry – conditioning 
factors at the time of the IPO.    
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[4.5] SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
[4.5.1] Summary 
Several studies in the literature have analysed the relationship between certain firm 
characteristics and the long-run performance of new issues of common stock; however, 
little has been done to consider whether the characteristics of an issuing firm’s industry 
are also germane, which is startling given the extant literature’s widespread handling of 
other corporate finance issues. The second study seeks to firstly, confirm the results of 
previous studies on the relationship between these firm characteristics and long-run 
IPO performance and secondly, explore salient industry–specific conditioning factors 
prior to or at the time of the offering that could also prove valuable in predicting or 
explaining the cross-sectional performance of new issuances. 
Using the same sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 as 
in the first empirical study, the economic importance of selected industry-specific risk 
factors prior to or at the issue date to IPO firms, their investment bankers and potential 
IPO investors is tested. When doing this, the study controls for and confirms the results 
of previous studies on the impact of firm-specific risk factors. Size, market-to-book, 
past performance, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market are found to be 
important predictors of IPO performance in a cross-section. The study documents that 
industry risk factors relating to an adjusted IPO valuation [i.e. IPO surplus value], 
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profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility can potentially 
predict or explain the cross-sectional differences in IPO long-term performance. 
However, after controlling for other factors that are germane to IPO long-run 
performance in a cross-section, the findings reveal that only IPO surplus value, industry 
profitability, industry market-to-book and industry equity volatility can be significant 
predictors of an IPO’s long-term performance.  
More specifically, significant negative relationships between industry conditioning risk 
factors of profitability, equity volatility and IPO long-run performance on the one hand 
and significant positive relationships between industry structure variables of IPO 
surplus value, market-to-book and IPO long-term performance on the other hand are 
found. These results are robust to including controls for other variables known to 
predict IPO long-term performance. However, apart from firm size, past performance, 
underwriter reputation, industry profitability and industry market-to-book to a limited 
extent, the other variables are not robust to the exclusion of the late 1990s technology 
bubble, which suggests that the ‘dotcom’ years are driving some of the results. In 
general, the results suggest that IPOs issued in low market-to-book and profitable 
industries with high equity volatilities and that also tend to trade below their industry-
adjusted valuations [i.e. trading at a discount relative to industry peers] perform worse 
than other IPOs in the counterpart industries. 
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[4.5.2] Conclusions 
Given that the literature is still shallow on the impact of industry characteristics on the 
subsequent long-term performance of new issues of common stock, the goal of this 
study is to identify salient industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the IPO that 
could explain and/or predict the long-run performance of IPOs. Put differently, this 
second empirical study seeks to identify relevant ex-ante firm and industry 
characteristics prior to or at the IPO that could firstly, help potential investors build their 
investment opportunity sets and secondly, provide IPO firms and their investment 
bankers with additional information they could use to time their offerings.  
Consistent with existing literature, several firm characteristics that have been shown to 
be germane to the subsequent performance of new issues arte included in the analysis. 
To fully understand the role of industry conditioning risk factors, industry-specific 
averages of some selected industry risk factors are constructed over all existing firms 
in a given IPO’s industry prior to or at the IPO. In this regard, industry risk factors 
relating to IPO surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and 
equity volatility are considered. The impact of industry conditioning risk factors prior to 
or at the IPO on the post-issue market performance of these firms are also evaluated 
both in isolation and after controlling for variables that are known to be crucial 
determinants of the long-term performance of IPO firms.   
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The study finds that the evidence on size, past performance, underwriter prestige and 
industry profitability is strong, overwhelming and compelling. The size result shows that 
firms desirous of transiting to public life should first attain a critical size level in order to 
withstand the vagaries of the market place. The performance result suggests that firms 
desirous of going public should first build a track record of profitable performance to 
enhance their long-run performance prospects, while the underwriter reputation 
evidence lays credence to the fact that firms underwritten by the most prestigious 
investment bankers are less likely to under-perform due to their ability to self-select or 
hand-pick better and quality firms from the pool of firms going public. The industry 
profitability evidence suggests that, despite fanciful industry conditions that may prevail 
at the time of the IPO, firms should ensure that they are top quality before they go 
public. Overall, the results suggest that not all IPOs are bad investments as potential 
IPO investors can substantially improve their long-run returns if these IPOs are 
painstakingly selected. A meticulous selection would entail going beyond the offer 
document prepared by the investment bankers that lists the offering and firm specific 
risk factors to considering salient characteristics of the IPO firm’s industry. The results 
also suggest that IPO firms and their investment bankers should consider industry– 
conditioning factors prevailing at the IPO to provide them with additional information on 
whether to go ahead with the IPO, or alternatively, withdraw and re-launch at a more 
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auspicious date. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is [1] the first study in the 
literature that documents the unique relationships between industry risk factors of IPO 
surplus value, profitability, market-to-book, equity volatility and IPO performance [2] the 
first study in the UK market that investigates the impact of this raft of industry risk 
factors on IPO performance. 
Conclusively, this work attempts to fill an important void in the literature by identifying 
relevant industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the issue date that could be 
germane to the long-run performance of IPOs, more particularly for the benefit of 
potential IPO investors. This study’s analysis of the impact of key industry risk factors 
on the long-run performance of IPO firms adds another dimension to the decision-
making process of not only potential IPO investors, but also IPO firms and their 
investment bankers in the timing of the offering. Despite assessing the relation 
between the industry structure risk factors used in this study and the long-run 
performance of IPOs, future research is encouraged into identifying other salient 
industry risk factors that could prove useful to potential IPO investors in distinguishing 
between firms that are likely to perform from those that are likely to under-perform in 
the long-run. 
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CHAPTER 5 - SURVIVORSHIP OF IPOS 
[5.1] Introduction  
Thus far, this study has followed the sample of IPOs right from their migration from 
private to public life by assessing their post-listing market performance relative to that 
of an appropriately matched set of non-issuing control firms. At this juncture, this final 
part of the study evaluates them on a ‘stand-alone’ basis to enable the author to 
delineate the class of firms within the general IPO group that eventually survive and in 
the process bring to the fore the plethora of risk factors prior to or at the IPO that 
shapes this critical stage in the life of these firms. For owners and managers of these 
firms, ensuring survival is crucial in shielding and improving their financial interests in 
the firm as the failure rate among new issues of common stock is still relatively high128. 
Survival is the definitive performance assessment of a firm since it offers a distinctive 
test of whether the firm has performed sufficiently to survive the torrid and competitive 
market place. Due to the tendency of IPO failure to occur within a few years of going 
public, the reasons for this and the factors that accentuate this tendency is examined in 
this third and final empirical study.  
                                                          
128 Average failure rates of up to 40% have been reported for IPOs 3 - 7 years after listing by several 
authors in the literature [see section 5.5.2.2, pp. 353-354]. 
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The assessment of the likelihood of failure of IPO firms is important to the various 
stakeholders in the firm that include the firm’s investors [i.e. owners], regulators, 
auditors, investment bankers, board members and executives. The investors are 
interested in the risk of failure of the firm because it provides them with an additional 
dimension on stock valuation. The regulators are concerned about the survival of the 
firm because it provides them with additional information on on how to revise the pre-
listing or post-listing requirements for firms that may wish to go to public. The 
professional and business interests of the other stakeholders are also linked to the 
survival of the firm in the market place. Given that IPO firms are fundamentally different 
from public firms that already have a visible track record of performance in the market 
place, there is a greater uncertainty associated with their valuation and risk of failure 
[Weber and Willenborg, 2003]. If this risk is not properly identified and measured at the 
IPO stage, efficient pricing and risk measurement then requires that issuers and their 
investment bankers should offer commensurate discounts to compensate unsuspecting 
investors for losses on new issues that subsequently fail in the post-IPO years [Lewis, 
et al, 2000].   
Subsequent to the offering, the success or failure of an IPO should be of grave concern 
to reputable investment bankers who may not want to be associated with failed 
offerings in order to maintain their hard-earned reputational capital; alike, for IPO 
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investors who may not also want to lose their prized investments. Hence, any 
information prior to or at the IPO that could be germane to the likelihood of survival of 
IPOs would prove invaluable to these stakeholders. Several studies in the literature 
have analysed the relationship between certain firm characteristics and the survival of 
new issues; however, only a few others have studied the impact of industry 
conditioning risk factors on IPO survival. By and large, the amount of published 
research on this area is still limited. This provides the springboard for this study as it 
seeks to identify salient industry conditioning risk factors prior to or at the IPO that can 
foreshadow the likelihood of survival of IPO firms. Realistically, a firm’s ultimate 
survival in the market place is not only a function of the firm, industry and market 
conditions around its IPO date, but also on the market and industry conditions 
subsequent to the issue129. However, the author’s goal in this third empirical study is to 
determine if one can predict the survival of new issues by using only that information 
that would be available to the issuer, its investment banker or the IPO investor prior to 
or on the date of the offering130. Hence, similar to the second empirical study, the aim 
of this third empirical study is to firstly, determine the class and profile of IPO firms that 
                                                          
129 For example, years after the IPO, dominant players could emerge in an industry that was initially 
fragmented and competitive, which could lead to less competition, limit growth opportunities and induce 
severe negative survival effects for the other firms. Similarly, the subsequent entry of new firms into an 
initially close-knit and highly profitable industry could lead to over-investment and a reduction in the excess 
rents in that industry with attendant negative competitive and survival effects for the current firms [Akhigbe, 
et al, 2003; Jain and Kini, 2006]. 
130 See footnote 72. 
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survive by using only that information that would be available to the issuer, its 
investment banker or the IPO investor prior to or at the IPO; secondly, ascertain if a set 
of observable firm and industry characteristics prior to or at the IPO can presage the 
survival likelihood of the issuing firms and; thirdly, provide IPO firms, their investment 
bankers and potential IPO investors with an initial estimate of the survivability of new 
stock issues based on ex-ante firm and industry conditions prevailing at the offering 
date in order to guide them in their decision making process.  
This third empirical work attempts to fill an important void in the literature by identifying 
salient industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO that could be influential to the survival 
prospects of IPO firms for the benefit of the IPO firms, their investment bankers and 
potential IPO investors. The empirical analysis in this third part of the study is 
conducted using a range of approaches. The first stage of the analysis here involves 
data stripping and univariate analysis to enable us to profile surviving and failing firms 
and thereafter determine if there are any significant differences in the characteristics of 
the two groups. In the second stage, the study attempts a non-parametric estimation of 
the hazard rate [i.e. rate of failure] by tracking the firms in duration time. In the third 
stage, the cohort of firms are trailed in event time by ascertaining crucial firm and 
industry risk factors that may impinge on the survival likelihood of these firms, 
employing binary logit models. In the fourth and final stage and also as a robustness 
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check, this same legion of firms are tracked in calendar time, employing survival 
models [also known as Cox hazard methodology, failure time methodology, duration 
time models or event-history analysis] that include the parametric accelerated failure 
time [AFT] and semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard [CPH] models.  
Subsequent to the 5-year performance analysis that was performed in the first 
empirical study, the post-event window is extended by another year in logistic 
regressions, as each of the sample firms is tracked for six years after the listing date or 
until the firm is delisted. In duration models, all firms are tracked from listing date to the 
earlier of failure date or the last observation date [i.e. 31 December 2012]131, while 
controlling for those firms that are alive and continue to trade beyond this date, using a 
censoring indicator. Survivors are defined as firms that continue to operate 
independently as public limited corporations, with acquired/merged firms included in 
this category132. Consistent with this definition, firms that are delisted for a variety of 
negative reasons such as bankruptcy/insolvency or liquidation are classified as failures 
                                                          
131 Failing or uncensored firms are tracked to the date of failure, while surviving or censored firms [i.e. firms 
that have not yet failed] are trailed to the end of the study period [i.e. 31 December 2012].  
132 This is line with the approach of Bhabra and Pettway [2003]. However, Jain and Kini [1999] treat 
acquired firms as distinct from firms that continue to operate independenly [survivors] or fail outrightly due 
to financial distress [non-survivors].  In contrast, Jain and Kini [2000] classify acquired firms as failures 
based on the findings of some studies that those firms are typically distressed prior to their acquisition 
[Welbourne and Andrews, 1996].    
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or non-survivors133. The decision to include firms that are acquired/merged in the group 
of survivors is partly based on the accepted view that shareholders of such firms gain 
from such arrangements and also partly on the fact that the focus of this study is on 
IPO firms that continue to operate either as single independent entities and/or whose 
shareholders do not experience any substantial loss in the value of their investments 
after the listing date.  
Using the same sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 as 
in the first and second empirical studies, this section of the study tests for the economic 
importance of selected firm and industry risk factors [already identified and used in the 
second empirical study], prior to or at the IPO to the issuers, their investment bankers 
and potential IPO investors. The results show that size, past performance, initial market 
return volatility [IPO risk], underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market are important 
predictors of the probability of IPO survival in cross-sectional regressions. The findings 
also reveal that industry conditioning risk factors relating to profitability and the 
valuation of the firms relative to industry peers [i.e. IPO surplus value] can be valuable 
determinants of an IPO’s survival prospects. More specifically, this third study finds 
significant negative relationships between the aforementioned industry risk factors and 
IPO survival likelihood.  
                                                          
133 This information was obtained from www.opencorporates.com. 
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The sensitivity of the findings to several methodologies and the inclusion and exclusion 
of the late 1990s technology bubble offer mixed findings. There is a strong and 
compelling evidence that past performance and underwriter prestige are strong survival 
signals [i.e. positively related to survival] with their relationship to IPO survival robust 
firstly, to event time regressions that either consider the survival or failure of IPO firms 
in a fixed time period using a binary operator or duration models that track all sample 
firms to the last observation date, while controlling for those that have not yet failed 
using a censoring indicator; secondly, to including controls for other variables known to 
predict IPO survival probability and; thirdly, to the inclusion or exclusion of the late 
1990s technology bubble. Size is found to be statistically significant in all the models 
employed; albeit, not robust to the exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ period and the inclusion of 
the industry risk factors in the empirical design. There is also evidence in the CPH 
model that suggests that IPO surplus value is a bad survival signal [i.e. negatively 
related to survival], albeit this evidence, once again, disappears in regressions that 
exclude the ‘dotcom’ period. IPO firm risk, ‘hot’ market and industry profitability are also 
found to be significantly distinguishing factors in event-time logistic regressions, even 
though these evidences are not robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the late 1990s 
technology bubble. The lack of robustness of some of the evidences indicates that the 
technology bubble period is driving some of the results. The results generally indicate 
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that subsequent to the IPO event, large firms with a profitable trading history, highly 
volatile initial market returns [IPO risk], issued in less tense market conditions [i.e. 
periods of low or modest IPO activity], underwritten by more prestigious investment 
bankers, trading at a discount relative to industry peers [i.e. trading below their 
industry–adjusted valuations] and from less profitable industries have a higher survival 
likelihood than their counterparts.  
This third empirical study contributes to the literature in four ways; firstly, the unique 
relationships between industry profitability and the valuation of the IPO firms relative to 
industry peers [i.e. IPO surplus value] and IPO survival likelihood are first documented 
in this study; secondly, it is the first to study the impact of industry-specific risk factors 
on the survival of IPOs in the UK market; thirdly, since the study investigates the 
survival of newly-listed firms using a set of observable ex-ante firm and industry 
characteristics prior to or at the IPO date, it provides an initial estimate of the 
survivability of new stock issues to enable the stakeholders [i.e. IPO firms, their 
investment bankers and potential IPO investors] to make better and informed decisions 
at the offering date and; fourthly, given the rate of failure of new listings in the market 
place, the study helps us to better understand the milieu of factors that tend to prevent 
the capital market from growing in terms of the number of listed firms. Conclusively, 
despite using a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach that utilises salient firm and 
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industry information prior to or at the IPO to predict the probability of survival of IPO 
firms, future research is encouraged into identifying other salient industry risk factors 
that could prove useful to the various stakeholders in distinguishing between firms that 
are likely to survive from those that are likely to fail. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the literature on the 
relevant issues in firm and industry characteristics and the survivorship of IPOs, while 
Section 5.3 presents the research questions and testable hypothesis. Section 5.4 
describes the methodologies used in assessing IPO survivorship. The empirical 
analysis and ensuing findings are reported in Section 5.5, while Section 5.6 
summarises and concludes the study.         
[5.2] Literature Review  
The performance of IPOs following listing follows two research streams in the literature. 
The first focuses on the stock and operating performance of these firms following their 
IPOs relative to a comparable benchmark, regardless of survival, while the second 
focuses on the ultimate survival of these firms in a fixed time period post-listing. It is 
pertinent to point out that the amount of published research on the survivorship of new 
issues of common stock is limited as the majority of the papers in this area treat 
survival as a marginal issue rather than the focal point. In addition, the majority of the 
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studies, which have been few and far between, have mainly focussed on the US 
market. 
The positive relationship between firm size and IPO survival likelihood is well 
documented [Schultz, 1993; Hensler, et al, 1997; Jain and Kini, 1999]. Jain and Martin 
[2005] also find that small US IPOs exhibit shorter times to failure when compared to 
large firms, which is consistent with the findings of Bhabra and Pettway [2003] and 
Dimson and Stolin [2002] in their studies of the survival likelihood of US and UK IPOs 
respectively. More recent studies by Kooli and Meknassi [2007], Yung, et al [2008], 
Hamza and Kooli [2010], Raju and Prabhudesai [2012] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] 
also show that smaller firms have lower survival likelihoods. However, the evidence 
from Australia seems to be contrary to the majority of the findings in the literature as 
Rath [2008] and Chancharat, et al [2012] find that the size of the firm [measured by 
total assets] is negatively related to survival, albeit the former’s results suggest that 
investors should invest in firms that have a large offer size at the offering date134. The 
difference in results between the firm and offer size measures from Rath’s [2008] study 
is hard to explain given the established fact that larger firms, which tend to be 
                                                          
134 The difference in the Australian results from the other studies, which have been majorly on the US 
market, could be due to the small size of the samples, which may be connected with the relatively small 
size of the Australian capital market. The sample sizes for the Rath [2008] and Chancharat, et al [2012] 
studies are 154 and 125 respectively. 
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associated with larger offerings, are better placed to withstand tough economic and 
industry conditions, which in the process ensures longer times to failure.       
On a related note, prior research has also shown that low-priced [‘penny’] stocks, which 
tend to be associated with small firms, are more likely to fail and delist. Seguin and 
Smoller [1997] examine the likelihood of failure of ‘penny’ and ‘non-penny’ stocks in the 
US over the period 1974-1988, employing logistic regressions and a 5-year tracking 
window. They find that ‘penny’ IPO stocks, when compared to ‘non-penny’ stocks, are 
more likely to end up in financial distress. The results are also in line with those 
obtained in a similar study in the same market by Bradley, et al [2008]. Fernando, et al 
[2004] also observe that lower [higher] priced stocks are more [less] likely to fail in the 
5 years following the initial listing. In the same vein, Bhabra and Pettway [2003] and 
Demers and Joss [2007], in studies of US IPOs, find that firms with relatively higher 
offer prices at the issue date exhibit higher survival likelihoods.  
Classifying a firm as a non-survivor if it fails or delists within five years in a study of US 
IPOs using the logistic regression model, Bhabra and Pettway [2003] find that past 
profitability is significantly positively associated with the probability of survival. Earlier 
studies by Jain and Kini [1999], Lewis, et al [2000], Dimson and Stolin [2002] and 
Peristiani and Hong [2004] also find the same evidence. More recent studies by 
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Demers and Joss [2007], Chi, et al [2010] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] also document 
longer times to failure for IPOs with strong pre-listing operating performances. The 
results suggest that pre-listing profitability levels tend to uphold post-listing operating 
and market performance levels as firms are motivated to go public at the peak of their 
performance.    
The majority of the studies in the literature document a shorter time to failure for IPO 
firms with a high level of risk. Several variables have been used in the literature to 
proxy for the risk and uncertainty that may surround new issues135. Using the number 
of risk factors in the offer document as the proxy, Hensler, et al [1997], Bhabra and 
Pettway [2003] and Rath [2008] find that IPO risk is an increasing function of the 
hazard rate of new issues. In the same vein, Jain and Kini [1999], Dimson and Stolin 
[2002], Chi, et al [2010] document a similar relationship, employing the IPO after-
market return volatility as the proxy for the riskiness of the IPO firm. The finding by Van 
der Goot, et al [2009], using IPO valuation uncertainty as the measure of IPO risk, is 
also in tandem with the majority of the evidence in the literature.  
                                                          
135 Some of these proxies are the early market return volatility [computed as the standard deviation of the 
IPO daily return in the immediate after-market], the number of risk factors in the prospectus and the 
valuation uncertainty relating to the performance of the firm after the offering {computed as the spread in 
the valuation of the initial price range [as revealed by potential IPO investors under a process of 
bookbuilding] divided by the average value of the initial price range}. 
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Employing logit and survival-duration models on a sample of US IPOs over the period 
1975-2005, Chang, et al [2013] investigate firstly, whether ‘hot’ market IPOs are 
fundamentally different from ‘cold’ market IPOs and secondly, whether there are 
significant differences in the survival probability and time to failure between firms that 
go public in the first half of a ‘hot’ market [‘pioneers’] and those that go public in the 
second half [‘followers’]136. They document a higher hazard probability for firms that go 
public in ‘hot’ market conditions. They also find that ‘pioneers’ have a longer time to 
failure than followers with the negative ‘hot’ market effect disappearing once they 
control for the ‘followers’.  In a study of the delisting experience of a sample of US IPOs 
that were listed over the period 1973-2004, Yung, et al [2008] find that the volatility in 
long-run abnormal returns and attrition of new listings increases considerably during 
‘hot’ markets relative to ‘cold’ markets. More specifically, they find that ‘hot market’ 
IPOs are three and half times more likely to delist relative to ‘cold market’ IPOs when 
they are tracked within three and five years from their issue date. The findings of 
Hensler, et al [1997], Hamza and Kooli [2010], Chang, et al [2013] and Espenlaub, et al 
[2012] are in line with the aforementioned studies as they show that going public in ‘hot’ 
market periods accelerates or shortens the time to failure. However, Lewis, et al [2000] 
find that the hazard rate is higher for older firms and IPOs issued in cold markets in 
                                                          
136 This is the degradation of issuers’ quality in ‘hot’ markets predicted by Alti’s [2005] information-spillover 
and Khanna, et al’s [2008] inelastic investment banking theories.   
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logistic regressions in a study of US IPOs, contrary to the majority of the evidence in 
the literature. They rationalize this result on the fact that it is not ‘hot’ market conditions 
per se that increases the hazard rate of IPOs, but rather that more new issues are 
underwritten by low-quality investment banks as a result of the opportunity created by a 
buoyant economy and an excessive demand for new issues by investors.     
On a related note, firms that take advantage of the transitory opportunities created by 
‘hot’ market periods often do not manage to do well in the future. This market period 
usually results in high equity market levels and in the process leads to a flurry of both 
‘good’ and ‘poor’ quality issues in the market. Firms issuing their IPOs in these periods 
typically have high market-to-book values as they cash in on investors’ over-optimism 
in the market. Demers and Joss [2007], using the 90-day pre-IPO market return as the 
market gauge, finds a significant negative relationship between the market level at the 
time of the listing and the time to failure of IPOs. Van der Goot, et al [2009], employing 
the average value of the NASDAQ index during the month of offering as the market 
indicator, also show that the market level at the time of the listing is a bad survival 
signal [i.e. negatively related to survival].  
The positive relationship between the age at the IPO and the survival likelihood of new 
stock issues is also well documented [Schultz, 1993; Hensler, et al 1997; Jain and 
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Martin, 2005; Peristiani and Hong, 2004]. These studies rationalize this on the fact that 
older firms tend to be mature and established with a track record of strong performance 
in their industries and hence, are less likely to fail after their IPOs. More recent studies 
by Yung, et al [2008], Demers and Joss [2007] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] document 
shorter times to failure for young firms with little or no pedigree. However, Lewis, et al 
[2000] find a contrary result and hinge this on the fact that IPOs issued in ‘cold’ market 
conditions, which experience higher failure rates, also tend to be the older IPOs. 
The presence of expert informational intermediaries have been shown to have a 
positive impact on the time to failure of new issues due to the certification services they 
provide before, during and after the offering. These intermediaries include the 
underwriter, venture capitalist [VC] and auditor. Jain and Kini [2000], Yung, et al [2008] 
and Hamza and Kooli [2010] document a higher likelihood of survival for IPO firms with 
VC-backing and underwritten by prestigious investment bankers. Schultz [1993], Jain 
and Kini [1999], Kooli and Meknassi [2007] and Lewis, et al [2000] also show that 
prestigious investment bankers tend to be associated with more successful IPO firms. 
Developing proxies for the presence of the underwriter, the venture capitalist and the 
‘big auditor’, Demers and Joss [2007] find that these variables are a negative function 
of the likelihood of failure for these firms. Chou, et al [2007] investigate the impact of 
expert intermediaries on the post-issue survival of IPOs using a sample of US firms 
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that went public during the period 1991-2001, employing logistic regressions and the 
CPH model. They document a longer time to failure for IPOs associated with industry 
specialist auditors as well as those backed by reputable venture capitalists, with their 
results suggesting that the involvement of these parties help the IPO firms to withstand 
the vagaries and uncertainties of the market place and thus reduce the likelihood of 
failure. Howton [2006] finds that firms that are VC-backed and also use more 
prestigious underwriters are less likely to fail five years after the IPO. Jain and Martin 
[2005] study the relationship between audit quality, the reputation of the underwriter 
and the time to failure of new stock listings in the US, using the CPH model. They 
document a positive relationship between the quality of the auditor, the reputation of 
the underwriter and IPO survival time. Espenlaub, et al [2012], in a study of UK new 
stock issues, find that the reputation of the nominated advisor to the IPO firm has a 
significant impact on the survival of IPOs. More specifically, they find that IPOs backed 
by more reputable advisors survive longer than those backed by less reputable 
advisors, employing the AFT model. However, the findings of Rath [2008] and 
Chancharat, et al [2012] with respect to the investment banker reputation and VC-
backing variables are contrary to the majority of the evidence in the literature137.   
                                                          
137 See footnote 134. 
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IPO firms with the greatest level of under-pricing and the most initial returns in the early 
after-market have also been shown to have shorter times to failure. Demers and Joss 
[2007] show that high initial returns in the immediate after-market is a bad survival 
signal [i.e. negatively related to survival]. In the same vein, Raju and Prabhudesai 
[2012] show that there is a tendency for IPOs which have the greatest under-pricing, 
generally attributed to information asymmetry and investors’ misevaluations in the 
marketplace, to have lower survival likelihoods. Kooli and Meknassi [2007] and Hamza 
and Kooli [2010] reach similar conclusions in their studies of the survival profile of US 
IPOs. However, the findings by Hensler, et al [1997] is at variance with the majority of 
the evidence in the literature as they show that the most under-priced new stock issues 
exhibit longer survival times. Schultz [1993] also finds that firms with the most initial 
returns in the first year post-listing have longer survival times, albeit this relationship 
disappears in the second and third years. The difference in results could be explained 
by the signalling model of Deeds, et al [1997] where more informed issuers deliberately 
under-price new issues in order to send strong signals about the quality and 
capabilities of the firm in the future.  
There have also been some studies on the role of corporate governance characteristics 
on the survival likelihood of new issues. Howton [2006] examines whether observable 
ex-ante governance-related firm characteristics available to investors at a firm’s IPO 
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date can predict the firm’s survival or failure. Using a sample of US firms that went 
public in 1997 employing logistic regressions, they find that firms that have a CEO-
founder, a large stockholder and a more stable board of directors are less likely to fail 
five years after the IPO. In the same vein, Chandy [2006] studies the impact of post-
IPO strategic choices on the survival profile of internet-related firms listed on the US 
market between 1995 and 1999, using the CPH model. They find that strategic 
decisions relating to market expansion, entry into alliances and the enlargement and 
reconstruction of the management team and/or board of directors significantly reduce 
the hazard rate. Chi, et al [2010] find that failing firms tend to be those with a high 
likelihood of changing management within the first three years of the IPO. Yang and 
Ding [2012], using logistic regressions and CPH models on a sample of Chinese IPOs 
listed over the period 1990-2005, document a negative relationship between the extent 
of government equity stake in these firms and the hazard rate. They also find that the 
hazard rate is a positive function of the number of directors in the board. Chancharat, 
et al [2012] find that the likelihood of survival is a non-monotonic positive function of 
board independence which suggests there is an optimal level of board independence. 
They also find that the hazard rate for firms with small or large board sizes is lower 
than those with moderate sized boards.  
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Jain and Kini [2000] show that road show success and analyst following significantly 
improve the survival time of new issues of common stock. Carpentier and Suret [2011] 
study the impact of pre-listing requirements on the survival of a sample of new issues 
that came into the Canadian market over the period 1982-2000, using the CPH model. 
They find that survival probability is significantly lower when the pre-listing 
requirements are low. Mauer, et al [2013] explore the impact of international trade on 
the performance and survival of IPO firms using a sample of US IPO firms listed over 
the period 1986-2010, employing probabilistic and hazard models. They find that IPO 
firms with export activities around their IPO years have significantly lower valuation 
uncertainty, stronger long-run performance and higher survival likelihood than those 
firms with no export activities. Besides the firm characteristics at the time of the IPO, 
the form and nature of the offering has also been found to be significantly related to 
survival. Schultz [1993] examines 797 unit and share US IPOs issued over the 1986-
1988 period and finds that firms which issue ‘bundled’ or ‘packaged’ offerings, 
comprising a share and an option, are more likely to fail than firms that conduct straight 
offerings.  
There is also some evidence that has shown that firms with low leverage [Bhabra and 
Pettway, 2003; Demers and Joss, 2007; Chancharat, et al, 2012], least earnings 
 305 
 
management [Li, et al, 2006], high investor demand prior to the issue138 [Hamza and 
Kooli, 2010; Van der Goot, et al, 2009], strong secondary market [Lewis, et al, 2000], 
high owner stock retention at the IPO [Yang, 2006; Hensler, et al, 1997; Peristiani and 
Hong, 2004; Espenlaub, et al, 2012], high free cashflows [Van der Goot, et al, 2009] 
and high R-and-D intensity [Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Demers and Joss, 2007] tend 
to have longer times to failure.  
The issue of the survival of UK IPOs remains a largely unexplored area. Dimson and 
Stolin [2002], in an unpublished study, investigate the determinants of common stock 
delisting on the LSE over the period 1975 - 1998, employing CPH models. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, the only published UK IPO survival study is that of 
Espenlaub, et al [2012], who examine the determinants of the survival of IPO firms over 
a window of five years post-listing of firms listed on the Alternative Investment Segment 
[AIM] of the LSE over the period 2000-2004139. More specifically, they investigate the 
impact of a battery of firm, offering and market-wide factors on the survivability of new 
                                                          
138 This is also captured by the over-subscription ratio, which is the ratio of the aggregate demand for the 
issue to the total shares on offer. Potential investors provide the underwriter with crucial information on 
their valuations, via the process of book-building, on how they [i.e. underwriters] can adjust the final offer 
price to reduce the potential level of under-pricing.      
139 The AIM is the lower tier segment of the LSE that provides a market for small and growing firms that 
are unable to meet the stringent listing rules of the upper tier Main Market, to list their shares. AIM 
regulation requires every listed firm to have an approved financial firm that could act as advisors, 
‘gatekeepers’, ‘decentralized regulators’ and sometimes underwriters.   
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issues. However, just like the majority of the previous studies, they do not consider 
whether the characteristics of an IPO firm’s industry are also germane to survival.  
In summary, it is clear that almost all of the previous studies have either employed 
event time logistic models or duration-based AFT and CPH survival models in 
assessing the survival likelihood of new listings. They do not find that one approach is 
always preferred to the other as they provide in each case the relative merits and 
demerits of each approach; however, there seems to be a general consensus that the 
duration models provide better estimates of the survival likelihood function given that 
they account for the individual differences in the time to failure of the sample firms, in 
addition to controlling for those firms that are still alive at the end of the last observation 
date. It is also vital to note that the majority of these studies have mainly focussed on 
the impact of firm, offering and general market characteristics on this stage of the life of 
these firms. In this regard, the most researched variables in the literature have been 
size, underwriter reputation, IPO risk, past performance, IPO market condition, age, 
venture capital, corporate governance, initial returns/under-pricing, market-to-
book/general market level, owner stock retention, auditor quality and leverage in that 
order. In general, these variables have been found to be significantly related to the 
survival likelihood of new issues of common stock.  
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From the foregoing, it does appear that the relationship between industry structure 
conditions at the IPO and the survival likelihood of new issues has been greatly under-
examined in the literature. In fact, the only published studies have been Jain and Kini 
[1999 and 2008] and Howton [2006]. The earlier of the Jain and Kini studies finds that 
industry R-and-D intensity is positively related to survival. However, they find no 
significant evidence to suggest that other industry risk factors of market-to-book and 
concentration can be used to distinguish surviving firms from failing firms. In the later 
study, they find that more diversified IPO firms whose pre-IPO industry-adjusted 
investment in R-and-D intensity is larger exhibit higher survival probabilities and longer 
times to failure than their counterparts [i.e. less diversified firms with lower pre-IPO 
industry-adjusted investments in R-and-D intensity]. Howton [2006] also finds no 
evidence to suggest that industry concentration and industry R-and-D expenditure is 
significantly related to IPO survival. 
Since the focus of this final empirical study is on the impact of industry structure 
variables on the survivability of new issues, a limited range of the firm and offering 
characteristics is pre-selected as control variables in the empirical design, just like in 
the second empirical study. In this regard, size related variables of offer price, offer 
proceeds, market capitalization, total assets and market value as well as performance 
related variables of profit margin, return on assets and earnings yield are considered. 
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The IPO market condition, firm leverage, firm age, market-to-book ratio, underwriter 
prestige, initial returns and IPO firm risk are also included. These are the variables 
which the majority of the previous studies have shown to be the most important in the 
assessment of the survivability of IPOs. VC-backing and auditor quality are not 
included because the author believes that the underwriter prestige variable provides an 
adequate proxy and effectively captures the role and impact of expert informational 
intermediaries on the survivorship of new stock issues. This study also excludes 
earnings management, analyst recommendations, percentage of ownership retention 
at the IPO and corporate governance characteristics, as they are outside the scope of 
this work. The discussion of the choice variables to be used in this third empirical study 
will be conducted in Section 5.4.2. 
[5.3] Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Given the findings from the second empirical study which showed that some industry 
conditioning risk factors prior to or at the IPO can be germane to the long-run 
performance of new stock issues, this final empirical study now seeks to ascertain 
whether these same battery of industry risk factors can foreshadow the survivability of 
these new listings, using the works of Jain and Kini [1999 and 2008] and Howton [2006] 
as a springboard. Hence, similar to the research questions posed in the second 
empirical study regarding long-run performance, the author now asks if an IPO firm’s 
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industry structure relating to an adjusted firm valuation, concentration, market-to-book, 
profitability, leverage and equity volatility can foreshadow its survival likelihood140. 
Following from the above, the study will provide answers to the following knotty 
questions: 
 What are the industry characteristics of IPOs that survive or fail? 
 Are industry risk factors related to an adjusted firm valuation, market-to-book, 
leverage, concentration, equity volatility and profitability also associated with the 
survival of these equity issuances? 
Following from the research questions above, the central hypothesis under 
investigation in this third empirical study is presented below: 
Hypothesis – [H0]: Industry - structure risk factors related to an adjusted IPO firm 
valuation [i.e. IPO surplus value], market-to-book, profitability, leverage, concentration 
and equity volatility cannot foreshadow IPO survival likelihood.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 See Section 4.2.3, pp. 204-211. 
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[5.4] Methodology 
[5.4.1] Applied Empirical Design 
The first stage of the empirical analysis in this final study involves data stripping to 
enable us to profile surviving and failing firms and thereafter determine if there are any 
significant differences in the characteristics of both groups. These factors are then 
compared across the two post-IPO states – survival or non-survival – in calendar time. 
The mean [median] values are determined for both groups and the pairwise differences 
are then subjected to significance tests, employing both parametric           and 
non-parametric              test statistics.   
In the second stage and as a preliminary analysis, the shape of the hazard function is 
estimated without employing any of the explanatory variables141. Let     be a random 
variable measuring the duration of an offering on the LSE with duration distribution 
function:              and density function                . Now, the duration 
data can be described in terms of the likelihood of failing during an infinitesimal time 
interval     , given that it has survived up to time   : 
     
    
    
 
                
       
 ……. [5.1] 
                                                          
141 This is also known as non-parametric estimation of the hazard function. 
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In the third stage, the IPO firms are tracked in event time using binary logit models and 
a string of explanatory variables. Following Jain and Kini [2000], a logistic regression 
analysis that utilizes the coefficients of the independent variables is employed to 
investigate the probability of occurrence of a dichotomous dependent variable and also 
permits us to examine the overall effect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. The technique weights the independent variables and creates a score for 
each firm in order to classify it as a survivor or a failure with the ‘survivor category’ 
chosen as the reference class against which the ‘non-survivors’ are contrasted. More 
specifically, functions of the form below are estimated: 
           ⁄ |        ∑           
 
     ……. [5.2] 
The subscript   indexes the IPO firms,    is the probability of the ‘survivor’ state and 
    is the probability of the ‘non-survivor’ state.      symbolizes a set of observable ex-
ante firm and industry characteristics of the listed firm   prior to or at the IPO date that 
will be deemed germane to its survival prospects, while    are the coefficient 
estimates. The interpretation of the logistic regression model results in a value that can 
be interpreted as the conditional probability of failure relative to survival. Apart from the 
signs, the coefficients from this model are not easy to interpret directly. In order to 
examine the individual impact of the explanatory variables,     on the probability of 
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failure, this third study computes ‘marginal effects’, defined as the partial derivative of 
the probability of failure relative to survival for each of the explanatory variables, while 
holding the other predictor variables constant at their means.  
Given a standard logistic distribution function: 
             {    }……. [5.3]  
where,           
The partial derivatives or marginal effects can be derived as: 
      
     
 
   
        
   ……. [5.4] 
However, due to the non-linearity of the logit model, the marginal effect is the effect of 
an infinitesimal [i.e. less than one-unit] change in the predictor variables on the 
probability of failure. To assess the impact of a one-unit change in the predictor 
variables, the study turns to the log-odds given by: 
           
   
  
         ……. [5.5] 
The effect of one-unit changes in the predictor variables on the log-odds is then given 
by: 
     
     
    ……. [5.6] 
However, in terms of the odds rather than the log-odds, equation [5.6] can be written as: 
 313 
 
          
        
         ……. [5.7] 
From equation [5.7], the right-hand side can be interpreted as the change in the odds 
of failure relative to survival associated with one-unit increases in the explanatory 
variables. If          , then the odds of failure relative to survival are greater by 
       . On the other hand, if          , then the odds are smaller by        . The 
quantified percentage change in the odds [i.e. odds effect] is given by 
{               . The odd ratios are much more comparable to the time and 
hazard ratios from the AFT and CPH models respectively. 
To perform the logistic regressions, the binary dependent variable is set equal to one if 
the firm fails within six years of the IPO and zero otherwise. Under this model, positive 
[negative] parameter estimates indicate factors that increase [decrease] the conditional 
likelihood of failure relative to survival. However, this technique has some noticeable 
drawbacks; firstly, it only answers the question of whether the event will occur, but not 
when it eventually occurs and as such is unable to distinguish between firms that fail 
within six months of their listing date from those that fail within two years [Lowers, et al, 
1999]; secondly, it does not control for those firms that are still trading and have not yet 
failed by the end of the last observation date and; thirdly, it assumes a steady state for 
the failure process that is, in most cases, violated [Jain and Kini, 2000]. Despite these 
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drawbacks, it is important to point out that the majority of the studies in the literature 
have employed this technique [Jain and Kini, 1999; Chou, et al, 2007; Yang, et al, 2008; 
Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Kooli and Meknassi, 2007; Demers and Joss, 2007; Chi, et 
al, 2010; Bhattacharya, et al, 2010; Lewis, et al, 2010; Hamza and Kooli, 2010; Chang, 
et al, 2012; Yang and Ding, 2012; Raju and Prabhudesai, 2012]. 
To overcome these problems, survival analysis or hazard models that has its origins in 
the bio-medical sciences and has been employed in a variety of business applications 
[Freeman, et al, 1983; Carroll, 1984; Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; Lane, et al, 1986; 
Keasey, et al, 1990; Chen and Lee, 1993; Bandopadhyaya, 1994; Somers, 1996] is 
adopted in the fourth and final stage to track IPO survival in duration time. Specifically, 
this technique provides the following benefits; firstly, it permits an assessment of the 
conditional probability of failure of an IPO firm given that the firm has survived till the 
present time; secondly, it allows for a better handling of ‘censored data’142 and time-
varying covariates [LeClere, 2000; Shumway, 2001] and; thirdly, it employs estimation 
techniques that incorporate information from both censored and uncensored data to 
provide efficient and consistent parameter estimates [Allison, 2000]. In the real world, 
the IPO market is characterized by situations where firstly, a large number of firms that 
                                                          
142 Censoring refers to a situation where the event has not yet occurred at the end of the tracking period or 
the firm has left the sample for reasons other than failure. Therefore, the time to the event is only known 
for a portion of the sample [LeClere, 2000]. 
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went public are still operational even after the end of the observation period and 
secondly, different time windows for each of the firms depending on when the firm went 
public. For instance, in the sample, the firms are tracked until 31 December 2012. 
Therefore, a firm that went public in 1999 is tracked for 13 years, while a firm that had 
its IPO in 2006 is tracked for 6 years. Against this backdrop, the most appropriate 
methodology for the analysis of a duration-dependent behaviour such as IPO survival 
is the survival or hazard model, also known as the Cox [1972] hazard methodology. 
The hazard model is used to perform tests of the theorized variables that may impinge 
on the survival or time to failure of the IPO firms. The hazard probability is the 
conditional probability that the IPO, offered for sale at    , fails at time   given that it 
has not failed before time  . Using  , a proxy for IPO survival time, defined as the 
number of months an IPO remains operational before failure or the end of the 
observation or tracking period, the hazard probability is given by: 
              {        } ……. [5.8] 
where         is the probability that an IPO with characteristics   has failed before time 
  and        is the probability density function on  . The general form of the hazard 
model is given by: 
             
   ……. [5.9] 
where: 
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  = length of trading period in months 
      = baseline hazard function describing the expected pattern of the trading period 
duration for a pool of IPOs that went public in different periods 
  = a vector of independent variables hypothesized to impinge on IPO survival time 
  = a vector of model parameters 
The baseline hazard function describes the probability distribution for IPOs that fail 
under standardized conditions. Variation from these conditions affects the baseline 
function and changes the expected probability distribution for the operational period of 
a non-surviving IPO. A plethora of hazard models exists, differing from each other in 
terms of the shape of the hazard function [Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980]. In this third 
empirical study, the choice model is the parametric AFT model. The attraction of this 
model is that the effect of changes to the independent variables on the hazard 
probability at any time   can differ according to the length of the post-IPO period 
[Hensler, et al, 1997]. For example, the impact of underwriter reputation on survival 
may be less for IPOs that went public in earlier periods compared to those that listed in 
recent times. The AFT model is given by: 
            
     …………. [5.10] 
 
Or alternatively, 
                     ……. [5.11] 
With 
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    ………….. [5.12] 
 
where  ,   and   are as defined previously.        
  is the baseline hazard function 
with a specified continuous density, while   is an ancillary scale parameter that shapes 
the function. Several functional forms exist for modelling the time to failure of IPOs. The 
log-logistic model is the model of choice143 given that the frequency distribution of IPO 
failure by year for the sample is non-monotonic144. The log-logistic baseline hazard 
function is: 
             
               ……. [5.13] 
where   and   are density parameters and   is the individual IPO failure time. If    , 
the log-logistic function is monotonically decreasing145. On the other hand, if    , the 
function becomes non-monotonic implying that the conditional probability that an IPO 
will fail rises in the early post-IPO period to its utmost after which it diminishes, with the 
most plausible failure period occurring at: 
             ……. [5.14] 
Equation [5.13] is then estimated with the maximum likelihood method to obtain the 
parameter estimates, with         and      . The statistical significance of these 
                                                          
143 It is also possible to use the log-normal distribution. However, results from such a model are most times, 
not robust to a sample comprising IPO firms with very short survival times. Also, the model does not 
effectively deal with censored observations, unlike its log-logistic counterpart.  
144 See Figure 5.1, pp. 352. 
145 The density function for the time to failure for the IPOs is non-monotonic           ] rising in the early 
post-IPO years, reaching its peak in year six and reducing thereafter [See Figure 5.1, pp. 352]. 
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estimates is then determined using a z-statistic computed as the ratio of the parameter 
estimate to its standard error {         
 
     
        
 
     
}.      is the value of the 
maximum log likelihood of the estimated model. 
A substantial number of the sample firms were still operational at the end of the 
observation period146. In order to control for this, an additional binary variable that 
denotes whether an observation is right-censored or not is introduced 147 . If the 
censoring marker is denoted as   , taking the value of 1 for failed firms and 0 for 
censored observations, the general form of the maximum likelihood function becomes: 
   ∏         
  {           }
     
    ……. [5.15] 
 
where            and            are as defined previously in equation 5.8 and   is a 
constant term.  
Just like in the logit model, the parameter estimates resulting from this model do not 
lend themselves to easy interpretation. One way to assess the effect of the individual 
variables on the trading or survival time is to conduct a ‘sensitivity analysis’, defined as 
the process whereby the individual explanatory variables are ‘shocked’ from their 
                                                          
146 At the end of the tracking period [31 December 2012], 568 firms did not experience the event [i.e. these 
firms continued to trade after 2012] and as such the end-point of these firms is not observed in the event 
window [See Table 5.4, pp. 350]. 
147 A right-censored observation is an IPO firm that continues to trade after the end of the observation 
period. Left-censoring occurs when some firms have started trading before the commencement of the 
study period, which is not applicable in the data. 
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means, while holding the other predictor variables constant in order to determine the 
extent to which survival time is affected by that variable. Typically, the shocks are 
multiples of the variables’ standard deviations from their means [Hensler, et al, 1997; 
Van der Goot, et al, 2009]. Another way of assessing the impact of the individual 
variables on survival time is to consider the extent to which changes in the 
hypothesized predictor variables accelerate or decelerate the time to failure, given by 
the time ratios. Similar to the hazard ratio in the CPH model, the time ratio is calculated 
as       , while the quantified percentage change on survival time or time to failure is 
computed as {              }. A positive [negative] value of  , which corresponds 
to time ratios          greater [less] than one, indicates that increasing values of the 
explanatory variable increases [decreases] the survival time or time to failure [Bradburn, 
et al, 2003].    
Overall, under this model, positive [negative] parameter estimates indicate factors that 
increase [decrease] the trading period or time to failure, which in turn increase 
[decrease] the probability of survival and decrease [increase] the failure rate. A number 
of studies in the literature have employed this technique [Hensler, et al, 1997; Kooli and 
Meknassi, 2007; Van der Goot, et al, 2009; Yang, 2006; Raju and Prabhudesai, 2012; 
Espenlaub, et al, 2012]. 
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Under the AFT model, the study has assumed a functional form for the underlying 
survival distribution148. However, the model parameters can be estimated by relaxing 
this assumption. In this regard and also to ensure robustness, the semi-parametric 
CPH model is employed to assess the conditional probability of failure [i.e. the hazard 
rate], given that the IPO firm has survived up to the present time. Specifically, the CPH 
technique provides the following benefits; firstly, the baseline hazard function can 
assume any functional form which broadens its applicability [Jain and Kini, 2008] and 
secondly, it allows for both discrete and continuous measurement of event times 
making it relatively easier to integrate time dependent variables [Jain and Kini, 1998; 
Allison, 2000]. 
Under the CPH model, the survival likelihood from one period to another is taken as a 
function of the hazard rate. For the sample, the hazard rate can be defined as the rate 
at which an IPO firm, alive at time  , has failed at time    , where   is an infinitesimal 
time interval. Hence, the hazard rate can be viewed as the spot change from a survivor 
state to a non-survivor state. Therefore, the lower the mortal force, the less likely the 
IPO firm will fail. In terms of the probability density and cumulative density function, the 
hazard function,      is given as: 
                                                          
148 The evidence from Figure 5.1 [see pp. 352] indeed suggests that the survival distribution for the sample 
data approximates the log-logistic form. 
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   ……. [5.16] 
where         is the probability that an IPO firm, listed at time,    , with 
characteristics   has failed before time   and        is the probability density function. 
The general form of the hazard model is given by: 
                              ∑      
 
    ……. [5.17] 
where       is the baseline hazard rate,   represents a         vector of explanatory 
variables and   is a       vector of parameters to be estimated with the method of 
partial likelihood. If the baseline hazard function is eliminated from equation [5.17], the 
likelihood function has the following form: 
       ∏
        
∑             
 
    ……. [5.18] 
where   is the number of time periods,    is the vector of covariates associated with 
the IPO firms observed at time   and    is the risk set at time  , representing the time-
varying cohort of firms at risk for the event occurring at any point after time  . Firms that 
have experienced the event will be included in the numerator of equation [5.18], while 
the entire cohort of firms at the risk of experiencing the event just before the last time 
period   will be included in the denominator.  
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The coefficient estimate,   under this variant of the survival model represents the 
hazard rate and is interpreted as the increase in the log hazard ratio for a one-unit 
increase in the explanatory variable, while holding the other predictor variables 
constant. The relative hazard rate or the hazard ratio is computed as       , while the 
quantified percentage change on the hazard rate is calculated as {              }. 
A negative [positive] value of  , which corresponds to a hazard ratio          less than 
one [greater than one], indicates that increasing values of the explanatory variable 
lowers [increases] the risk of failure and increases [reduces] the survival time 
[Vittinghoff, et al, 2005].    
Under this model, positive [negative] parameter estimates indicate factors that increase 
[decrease] the force of mortality which consequently reduce [increase] the trading 
period or time to failure and in turn, increase [decrease] the hazard rate and decrease 
[increase] the probability of survival. The concept underlying the CPH model is similar 
to that of the logistic model and as such, the signs of the parameter estimates from 
both models are expected to be the same. A substantial number of studies have 
employed the CPH technique [Jain and Kini, 2000; Chou, et al, 2007; Jain and Martin, 
2005; Demers and Joss, 2007; Carpentier and Suret, 2011; Peristiani and Hong, 2004; 
Hamza and Kooli, 2010; Yang and Ding, 2012; Chancharat, et al, 2012; Van der Goot, 
et al, 2009; Chandy, 2006; Rath, 2008; Dimson and Stolin, 2002].  
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It is pertinent to note that the AFT and CPH models share some similarities. They can 
be employed to model hazard rates and can both be estimated by the method of 
maximum likelihood. However, they also differ in some respects; firstly, the CPH model 
is defined in the proportional hazard metric, while the AFT technique is set out in the 
accelerated time metric; secondly, the CPH model has no intercept since it is 
undetectable from the data, while the AFT model has an intercept and; thirdly, there is 
a flipping of the signs of the coefficients when there is a switch from the AFT to the 
CPH model due to the fact that the time acceleration parameter under the former 
corresponds to         , while the hazard rate under the latter is scaled by        .  
In summary, the logistic and CPH models track factors that impinge on the probability 
of failure or hazard rate of firms, while AFT models focus on those that increase the 
trading period or time to failure. Following from this, the signs of the coefficient 
estimates from the AFT model are expected to be opposite to those of the logistic and 
CPH models. Given that the majority of the studies in the literature have employed the 
event-time logistic model, this third study uses this technique as the baseline model. 
However, in order to reduce model bias which becomes more likely when one 
technique is favoured over the others and to also give the greatest possible level of 
depth and robustness to the results, the duration-based AFT and CPH models are also 
employed to assess the survivability of IPOs. 
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[5.4.2] Variable Selection and Expectations  
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the variables that are under consideration in this third 
empirical study and their expected relationship to survival probability 149 . A brief 
explanation of the justification for each variable and its expected relationship with 
survival [shown in brackets] follows.  
Hot Market Condition (-): Specifically, this study wants to investigate whether the issue 
period has an effect on the survival prospects of issuing firms. During periods of high 
IPO issuing activity [‘hot markets], there is the temptation for fledgling, marginal and 
poor quality firms to go public to take advantage of the opportunity created by intense 
investor optimism and a booming demand for capital in the market place. Following the 
findings of Yung, et al [2008], Fama and French [2004], Chi, et al [2010], Hamza and 
Kooli [2010], Chang, et al [2013] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] that IPOs issued in ‘hot’ 
market conditions are more likely to fail than those issued in other market conditions, a 
negative relationship between the ‘hot’ market dummy and survival is expected. The 
‘hot’ market indicator for firm   is denoted as       .  
                                                          
149 See Table 4.1, pp. 228 for the definitions and measurements of the variables. The author points out 
that the categorisation of some of the variables could differ from industry to industry. For example, the 
definition of a large [size] or an old [age] firm could differ, where firms in different industries have different 
sizes and lifespans. The author has not controlled for these effects since they are not expected to affect 
the results. 
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Age (+): Young firms tend to have very little trading history and also not yet strong 
enough to withstand the vicissitudes of the industry and indeed the market place. Also, 
they tend to be uncertain about their future prospects and are also less likely to have 
the requisite managerial expertise to withstand the vagaries of the market place. On 
the other hand, older firms tend to be mature and established with a track record of 
sales and positive earnings in their industries because they have been operating for 
several years. Hence, these firms are less likely to fail after their IPOs. Hensler, et al 
[1997], Yung, et al [2008], Demers and Joss [2007], Jain and Martin [2005], Peristiani 
and Hong [2004] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] document a positive relationship between 
the age of the firm at the IPO and the likelihood of survival. Therefore, firm age at the 
offering date is expected to be positively related with survival. The age variable is 
denoted as            . 
Size (+): The size of a firm is a crucial factor in its competitiveness and likelihood of 
survival in the market place150. Larger firms tend to be associated with larger offerings 
which, more often than not, are indicators of market confidence. They are also subject 
to greater market scrutiny, command a great analyst following and also tend to be 
favoured by informed investors. Hensler, et al [1997], Jain and Kini [1999], Bhabra and 
Pettway [2003], Kooli and Meknassi [2007], Jain and Martin [2005], Hamza and Kooli 
                                                          
150 See Section 3.3.4, pp. 124-125. 
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[2010], Raju and Prabhudesai [2012] and Espenlaub, et al [2012] find that large firms 
have better survival prospects than smaller firms. Against this backdrop, a positive 
relationship is expected between the size of the firm and the likelihood of survival. The 
offer price         , offer proceeds      , market capitalization      , market value 
      and total assets       serve as proxies for the size of the firm.  
Leverage (+): The exact relationship between leverage and firm performance and by 
extension, survival is still hazy as there are two contending views in the literature151. 
Hence, the precise nature of the relationship between leverage, performance and firm 
survival is inconclusive and can only best be determined by specific empirical tests. 
However, this study leans towards the view that the judicious use of debt can boost the 
performance and survival likelihood of the firm and hence, a positive relationship is 
predicted between leverage and survival, which is contrary to the findings of Bhabra 
and Pettway [2003], Demers and Joss [2007] and Chancharat, et al [2012]. The firm 
leverage is denoted as       .  
Pre-IPO Performance (+): IPOs with a stronger record of profitability at the time of the 
IPO are expected to exhibit superior performance in the long-term which should in turn 
massively influence the transition to any of the post-IPO states. Jain and Kini [1999], 
Bhabra and Pettway [2003], Chi, et al [2010], Peristiani and Hong [2004] and Lewis, et 
                                                          
151 See Section 4.3.2, pp. 218 and Section 4.4.3.1, pp. 253. 
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al [2000] document a positive association between past profitability and the probability 
of survival for new issues of common stock. In the light of the above, a positive 
relationship between pre-IPO performance and the IPO firm’s chances of survival is 
expected. The pre-IPO performance is measured by return on assets       , profit 
margin        and the earnings yield          
Market-to-book (-): The study next examines if the expectations of strong future 
earnings built into the prices of these firms and reflected in their market-to-book values 
at the time of their going public has any impact on the post-IPO outcomes. On the one 
hand, if investors perceive these firms to be of good quality with a great future, they 
would value the firms highly and pay the going price to acquire the stock. If this view 
holds sway, high market-to-book firms are less likely to fail. On the other hand, if poor 
quality IPOs are issued during periods of high market misevaluations, unsuspecting 
investors buy into these IPOs and become overly optimistic about their future prospects. 
However, with the passage of time, the true quality of these firms is revealed via their 
operating performances and investors are then forced to revise their expectations as 
the share prices are downwardly adjusted in equilibrium. Extending the link between 
market-to-book and IPO long-run performance to include post-IPO outcomes, IPO firms 
with high market-to-book ratios are more likely to fail. This study goes along with this 
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latter view and predicts a negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio and 
survival likelihood. The firm’s market-to-book ratio is denoted as       .   
Underwriter Reputation (+): Driven by the need to maintain and enhance their 
reputational capital towards boosting their business volumes, highly prestigious 
investment bankers provide post-issue monitoring, stabilization and price support 
services to the IPO firms. They are also able to select quality IPOs from the myriad of 
new issues that may be in the market at any time due to the experience garnered over 
the years from handling top-quality issues. Against this backdrop, firms underwritten by 
them are expected, on average, to have a higher likelihood of survival. The findings of 
Schultz [1993], Jain and Kini [1999 and 2000], Yung, et al [2008], Kooli and Meknassi 
[2007], Lewis, et al [2000] and Hamza and Kooli [2010] are in line with this surmise. 
Hence, a positive relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO survivability is 
predicted. However, given the study’s categorisation of the underwriter reputation 
variable152, a negative sign for the coefficient estimate is expected, which indicates a 
positive relationship to IPO survival. Underwriter market share serves as this study’s 
direct measure of underwriter reputation [    . 
Under-pricing/Initial returns (-): The firm’s initial return is the level of returns available in 
the immediate after-market to investors who subscribe to the offer at the IPO date. A 
                                                          
152 See Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99 and Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221. 
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greater level of under-pricing should logically result in a higher level of initial returns to 
IPO subscribers in the early after-market. There are two competing views on the role of 
under-pricing as a signal of firm quality. On the one hand, Rock’s [1986] adverse 
selection theory associates poor quality IPOs with a greater level of under-pricing in 
order to induce uninformed investors to buy the stock. On the other hand, the signalling 
theory contends that high quality IPOs under-price their shares in order to send signals 
to potential investors about the capabilities and future values of the firms. However, the 
majority of the empiricism on under-pricing tends to align more with the adverse 
selection arguments. Moreover, Kooli and Meknassi [2007], Demers and Joss [2007] 
and Hamza and Kooli [2010] show that under-pricing is a bad survival signal [i.e. 
negatively related to survival]. Therefore, this study goes along with the adverse 
selection arguments and predicts a negative relationship between under-pricing/initial 
returns and the probability of survival. Initial returns is denoted as      . 
IPO Risk (-): Several researchers have used different proxies of risk in an attempt to 
capture the uncertainty that surround new stock issues. Rath [2008], Bhabra and 
Pettway [2003] and Hensler, et al [1997], using the number of risk factors in the 
prospectus, find that risk is negatively related to the IPO firm’s survival likelihood. 
Following Ritter [1984], Carter and Manaster [1990] and Jain and Kini [1999] who also 
find that higher risk significantly reduces the survival probability of new issues of 
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common stock, the after-market standard deviation of the firm’s daily return during the 
first 30-days post-listing,          is employed to proxy for the riskiness of each IPO firm. 
In line with the majority of extant literature, a negative relationship is predicted between 
IPO risk and the probability of survival.  
IPO Surplus Value (-): Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004], Chang, et al [2010], 
Corhay, et al [2002] and Xia and Wang [2003] show that IPO valuation at the listing 
date could presage the long-term performance of new issues. More specifically, they 
find that over-valued IPOs [i.e. trading at high market-to-book multiples] tend to under-
perform in the long-term. This argument between IPO valuation and long-term 
performance is extended to include an assessment of the chances of survival of an IPO 
firm based on an industry-adjusted valuation. If the link between the industry-adjusted 
valuation of an IPO firm and its long-run performance is also extended to include post-
IPO outcomes, it is expected that IPO firms trading above their industry-adjusted 
valuations [i.e. trading at a premium relative to industry peers] will be more likely to fail. 
Hence, IPO surplus value is expected to be negatively related to survival. The industry-
adjusted valuation or IPO surplus value for firm   is denoted as        . 
Industry leverage (+):  The precise nature of the relationship between firm leverage and 
IPO firm performance is still hazy and as such, best addressed empirically. However, 
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the relationship between industry leverage and IPO performance should be less 
ambiguous. IPO firms in industries that are already less concentrated and highly 
leveraged are expected to perform better due to the competitive advantage they enjoy 
from a relatively healthier capital structure following the injection of new equity capital. 
Once again, if this argument between industry leverage and long-term performance is 
extended to include post-IPO outcomes, highly leveraged industries are expected to 
portend positive signals for the survival prospects of IPO firms. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is predicted between industry leverage and the probability of survival of 
new issues of common stock. The market leverage ratio serves as a proxy for the 
industry leverage. The industry leverage for firm   as at the IPO date is denoted as 
        . 
Industry Equity Volatility (-): If the volatility of an IPO firm’s industry is a proxy for the 
riskiness of the industry, the risk profile of each of the constituent firms in that industry 
is expected to increase. On the one hand, if this risk is priced sufficiently, then IPO 
firms from industries with high volatilities should earn higher returns. On the other hand, 
higher risk could also imply a higher likelihood of poor performance and failure in the 
long-term. Therefore, if a firm or its industry is seen by its investors to be too risky, then 
its likelihood of failure will increase. This study leans towards the latter argument and 
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predicts a negative relationship between the equity volatility of an industry and IPO 
survival. The industry equity volatility for firm   as at the IPO date is denoted as        .  
Industry Profitability (+):  High growth and profitable industries, a measure of industry 
attractiveness, may provide a good platform for IPO firms to survive and grow. They 
can do this by identifying and utilising profitable niche opportunities, more especially in 
industries that are less concentrated. Therefore, the likelihood of survival is likely to be 
positively related to the profitability of an industry. Moreover, prospective investors can 
use an IPO firm’s industry profit conditions to value firms going public and in the 
process reduce the information asymmetry and uncertainty surrounding the firm’s long-
term performance and survival prospects. This measure of industry attractiveness is 
captured by the profitability of the firms currently in the industry. Based on the 
foregoing, a positive relationship is predicted between industry profitability and IPO 
survival. The industry profitability for firm   as at the IPO date is denoted as        .   
Industry Concentration (+):  This is another measure of industry attractiveness. There 
are two competing views on the relationship between this risk factor and the 
performance and survival prospects of IPO firms. In less concentrated [i.e. more 
competetitive] industries, it is unlikely that a dominant player has emerged which 
provides a good avenue for new entrants into the industry to deploy their equity capital 
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more productively. In highly concentrated industries which tend to be less competitive 
because they are dominated by established players, there are fewer opportunities to 
deploy the IPO firm’s equity capital to maximum effect. However, on the balance, it 
may still provide IPO firms with a more favourable environment to ply their trade due to 
the fact that firms in this industry tend to avoid aggressive price and market share wars. 
Clearly, the relation between survival and industry concentration is still unclear and 
best addressed empirically. Jain and Kini [1999] do not find strong evidence to support 
the fact that surviving firms are in more concentrated industries than the failing firms. 
However, this study leans towards their findings and predicts a positive relationship 
between the probability of survival and industry concentration. The size-weighted 
industry concentration for firm   as at the IPO date is denoted as          .   
Industry Market-to-book (-):  This is a measure of the growth prospects of an industry. 
There are two competing explanations for the relation between industry market-to-book 
and the likelihood of going public [Pagano, et al, 1998]. The first explanation suggests 
that marginal firms are motivated to go public to take advantage of industry and market 
over-valuations, while the second explanation suggests that investors have high 
expectations of the future prospects of the firms based on the growth opportunities that 
abound in the industry which cause them to value the stocks highly. Extending the link 
between industry market-to-book and the probability of going public to include the  
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TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES & THEIR EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP TO 
SURVIVAL  
Variable  Description               Exp. relationship to survival 
         Offer Price               +  
      Offer Proceeds                         + 
            Age                           + 
      Market Capitalization                + 
      Total Assets                +  
       Market-to-Book               - 
      Profit Margin               + 
       Return on Assets              + 
      Earnings Yield                          + 
        Market Leverage              + 
       Market Heat               - 
      Underwriter Reputation             +  
      Market Value               + 
      Initial Returns               - 
        IPO Firm Risk                - 
          Surplus Value               - 
         Industry Leverage               + 
          Industry Concentration              + 
        Industry Equity Volatility             -  
          Industry Profitability              + 
         Industry Market-to-Book              - 
 
 335 
 
likelihood of survival of the IPO firms, the first explanation should result in a higher 
failure rate, while the second explanation should culminate in a lower hazard rate. This 
study aligns with the second argument and predicts a negative relationship between 
the industry market-to-book and the probability of survival. The industry market-to-book 
ratio for firm   as at the IPO date is denoted as [       . 
In summary, survival time or time to failure is expected to increase with increasing age, 
size, leverage, pre-IPO operating performance, underwriter reputation and industry risk 
factors of leverage, profitability and concentration, and decrease with increasing hot 
markets, market-to-book, initial returns, risk and industry risk factors of IPO surplus 
value, equity volatility and market-to-book. 
[5.5] EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
[5.5.1] Distribution of Post-IPO States  
Table 5.2 provides a distribution of the surviving and non-surviving firms as at the last 
observation date [i.e. 31 December 2012] by the year of the IPO [Panel A] and industry 
[Panel B] for the sample of firms that went public over the period 1999 to 2006 and the 
sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, going from 2002 to 2006. The fact that the 
new issues market goes through cycles is well documented. In tense market conditions 
characterised by high demand for capital and profound investor optimism, firms and  
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TABLE 5.2: DISTRIBUTION OF POST-IPO STATES FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 firms that went public over the period January 1999 and December 2006 and 
a sub-sample of 485 firms that went public over the period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years [i.e. 
2002 and 2006]. The table reports the distribution of the surviving and non-surviving firms as at 
the last observation date [i.e. 31 December 2012] by the year of the IPO [Panel A] and industry 
[Panel B]. The definition of industry is based on the standard industry classification [SIC] codes. 
Survivors are defined as firms that continue to operate independently as public limited 
corporations, with acquired/merged firms included in this category. Firms that discontinue 
operations and cease to trade during the observation period are classified as non-survivors.   
Panel A 
Year   Survivors %     Non-Survivors %  Total                  %    
1999    29 60           19 40        48                   100 
2000   105 70           45 30      150                   100 
2001     46 73           17 27        63                   100 
2002     38 76           12 24        50                   100 
2003     29 73           11 28        40                   100 
2004    110 80           28 20      138                   100 
2005    121 80           31 20       152                  100 
2006     90 86           15 14       105                  100 
 
Overall [1999 - 2006] 568 76              178           24        746                    100 
2002 – 2006   388 80   97           20        485                     100          
Panel B: By industry 
Industry                  Survivors        %           Non-Survivors     %           Total           % 
Aerospace & Automobiles                           6         100                      0  0          6         100 
IT & Computer Services                       112           73             42 27      154         100 
Health & Pharmaceuticals            61           77            18 23        79         100 
Food Producers & Processors            9           64                  5 36        14         100 
Personal Care & Household Goods            9           50                     9 50        18         100 
Leisure, Hotel & Restaurants           44          69                   20 31        64         100 
Chemicals, Mining, Oil & Gas                   115          88                 15 12      130         100 
Construction & Engineering           42          72              16 28        58         100 
Wholesalers & Retailers            21          78                     6 22        27         100 
Media & Entertainment            58          73                21 27        79         100 
Telecommunications            17          74                    6 26        23         100 
Transport               6          60                     4 40        10         100 
Support Services             68          81                 16 19        84         100 
OVERALL [1999 – 2006]                       568         76     178 24       746        100 
2002 – 2006 [ex. ‘dotcom’ years]            388         80       97 20                 485       100 
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their investment bankers take advantage of the transitory opportunity provided by this 
market condition to float their offerings. Given that this market situation provides a good 
platform for weaker firms to also go public due to the reduced market scrutiny, it is very 
possible that firms issuing their shares in this market condition are likely to have lower 
survival rates compared to other market conditions. However, the results from Panel A 
do not support this argument. The survival rates of 60%, 70% and 80% for the three 
‘hot’ market periods of 1999, 2000 and 2005 respectively compares favourably with the 
overall average survival rate of 76%. An improvement in the survival rate after 2003 is 
also observed, which suggests enhanced quality of the issuers in this later period. 
When the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded from the sample, the survival rate improves 
further, going from 76% to 80%. Given that a lot of firms failed during this period, 
excluding this momentous period from the sample is bound to increase the survival rate. 
This evidence provides some support for the ‘hot market’ argument that firms floating 
their offerings in periods of high IPO activity [1999 and 2000 of the ‘dotcom’ period are 
classified as ‘hot’ market years] are likely to under-perform and consequently fail when 
compared to those firms that go public in ‘cold’ or ‘neutral’ market conditions.  
Panel B provides a distribution of the post-IPO states by industry. It is observed that 
the percentage of the survivors varies from a low of 50% for Personal Care & 
Household Goods to a high of 100% for Aerospace & Automobiles. Conversely, the 
 338 
 
percentage of non-survivors varies from a low of 0% for Aerospace & Automobiles to a 
high of 50% for Personal Care & Household Goods. A closer look at the table also 
generally reveals that over the entire period, industries with a high volume of IPOs [i.e. 
sixty or more IPOs] display survival rates fairly comparable with the overall average of 
76%. On the flip side, industries with a low volume of IPOs [i.e. less than sixty issues] 
tend to exhibit failure rates that are generally above the overall average of 24%. These 
results generally suggest that there may be some industry – specific risk factors at play 
in the market place that determines the entry and survival of this class of firms.  
[5.5.2] Firm and Industry Risk Factors and IPO Survival  
[5.5.2.1] Univariate Analysis  
Prior to conducting more specific and detailed tests on the possible impact of the 
selected variables on IPO survival likelihood, preliminary tests are first undertaken to 
enable the author to gain an insight into the characteristics of the IPO firms and how 
they could help distinguish firms that are likely to fail from those that are likely to 
survive. To accomplish this, simple differences in means and medians are employed to 
ascertain if the characteristics of the surviving and failing group of firms are significantly 
different.  
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TABLE 5.3: COMPARISON BETWEEN FIRM & INDUSTRY RISK FACTORS OF THE POST-IPO STATES FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006 and 485 IPOs for the period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years [2002 - 2006]. 
Panel A presents the differences in mean and median firm and industry risk factors between the survivor and non-survivor IPO firms for the entire sample 
period [1999 – 2006], while Panel B reports these differences for the period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years [2002 – 2006]. The first four columns present the 
means, while the last four columns report the medians. The significance tests for differences in means [medians] are conducted using a two-sample t-
statistic [Wilcoxon z-statistics]. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively.  
Panel A: ENTIRE PERIOD [1999 – 2006] 
                                  MEAN                                   MEDIAN                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                  ___________________________________________________      __________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                              Non-Survivors      Survivors        Mean Diff    t-stat   Non-Survivors       Survivors       Median Diff     Z-stat                                                                                                                                                            
Offering Size [£, Log]       1.919 2.290         -0.371    (-3.12***)      1.792 2.038           -0.246     (-2.82***) 
Offer Price [£, Log]       0.512 0.602         -0.090    (-2.54**)      0.470 0.588           -0.118       (-2.28**) 
Total assets [£, Log]       2.050 2.620         -0.570    (-4.42***)      1.883 2.433           -0.550      (-3.52***) 
Market Cap [£, Log]       3.086 3.402         -0.316    (-2.39**)      2.923 3.212           -0.289       (-2.43**) 
Market Val [£, Log]       3.131 3.485         -0.354    (-2.64**)      2.956 3.283           -0.327       (-2.60**) 
5-YR VW BHAR [%]    -53.826          -27.455        -26.371    (-2.18**)   -19.643          -15.022           -4.621     (-2.72***) 
Pre-IPO Profit Margin [%]             -949.697         -469.498      -480.199    (-1.82*)          0.000  0.000            0.000         (-2.32**) 
Pre-IPO ROA [%]    -52.966          -12.173       -40.793    (-3.52***)     -4.867             -1.472          -3.395       (-2.96***) 
Pre-IPO EPS [£]      -0.031            -0.011         -0.020    (-1.43)         -0.005 -0.002          -0.003        (-2.35**) 
Earnings Yield [%]      -8.843            -4.047         -4.796    (-2.70***)     -2.001 -0.622          -1.379        (-2.21**) 
Market Leverage       0.076 0.079         -0.003    (-0.31)           0.005  0.011           -0.006         (-1.80*) 
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Panel A CONT’D – ENTIRE PERIOD [1999-2006] 
Market-to-Book [MTB]     10.109  8.298           1.811      (0.54)          3.432  2.947            0.485            (1.08) 
Age @ offering [years]       2.463 3.153         -0.690    (-1.34)           0.971 0.836            0.135            (0.16) 
Underwriter Reputation [Log]      3.322  3.157           0.165      (2.02**)          3.296   3.296            0.000             (1.20) 
Initial Returns [%]     11.186            10.165           1.651      0.59           8.269   7.374            0.895             (0.66) 
IPO Firm Risk [%]       4.518  4.081           0.437      (1.24)          3.288   2.906            0.382             (0.88) 
Surplus Val [Log]       0.775 0.451          0.324      (1.51)          0.412              -0.072            0.484            (1.50) 
Industry Leverage       0.160  0.173         -0.013    (-2.15**)      0.175   0.179          -0.004          (-1.94*) 
Industry MTB        3.399  3.290          0.109      (0.52)          3.051   2.945            0.106             (0.97) 
Industry Profitability [%]    -24.214           -61.883         37.669      (2.02**)          5.158   1.029            4.129        (3.16***) 
Industry Conc. [HHI] [%^2]            2,706.377       3,368.302     -661.925    (-3.17***)            2,072.857        2,206.143      -133.286       (-2.69***) 
Industry Equity Volatility [%]     13.234 12.731          0.503      (2.02**)       12.227  12.065            0.162             (0.63) 
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Panel B: PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
                               MEAN                                  MEDIAN                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                  ___________________________________________________       __________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                              Non-Survivors      Survivors        Mean Diff    t-stat    Non-Survivors       Survivors      Median Diff   Z-stat                                                                                                                                                            
Offering Size [£, Log]         1.671 2.207         -0.536    (-3.49***)      1.609 1.949          -0.340       (-3.21***) 
Offer Price [£, Log]         0.452 0.557         -0.105    (-2.41**)      0.405 0.539          -0.134        (-2.31**) 
Total assets [£, Log]         2.064 2.709         -0.645    (-3.74***)      1.884 2.489          -0.605       (-3.25***) 
Market Cap [£, Log]         2.959 3.349         -0.390    (-2.34**)      2.857 3.177          -0.320        (-2.30**) 
Market Val [£, Log]         3.002 3.452         -0.450    (-2.61**)      2.883 3.255          -0.372        (-2.57**) 
5-YR VW BHAR [%]      -51.763        -16.554        -35.209    (-2.34**)   -35.546          -13.143        -22.403        (-0.27) 
Pre-IPO Profit Margin [%]            -1,246.147      -441.273     -804.874    (-2.06**)     -0.004 0.000          -0.004       (-2.72***) 
Pre-IPO EPS [£]       -0.021 0.005         -0.026    (-1.80*)        -0.005            -0.002          -0.003        (-2.21**) 
Earnings Yield [%]       -9.054           -2.789         -6.265    (-2.80***)     -2.865            -0.511          -2.354        (-2.47**) 
Pre-IPO ROA [%]     -55.639         -12.453       -43.186    (-3.17***)     -5.413            -1.130          -4.283       (-2.91***) 
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Panel B CONT’D – PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002-2006] 
Market Leverage          0.098 0.098          0.000     (-0.01)          0.007 0.021          -0.014        (-1.34) 
Market-to-Book [MTB]                     7.811 6.592          1.219      (0.42)          3.426 2.755           0.671          (1.13) 
Age @ offering [years]         2.236 3.268         -1.032    (-1.37)           0.923 0.773           0.150         (0.14) 
Underwriter Reputation [Log]        3.486 3.194           0.292      (2.64**)      3.526           3.434           0.092          (2.23**) 
Initial Returns [%]       10.229 8.191           2.038      (0.76)           7.785           6.859           0.926          (0.92) 
IPO Firm Risk [%]         3.381 3.351           0.029      (0.09)           2.547           2.653          -0.106        (-0.77) 
Surplus Mkt. Val [Log]         0.545 0.274          0.271      (0.95)        -0.105          -0.216           0.111           (0.93) 
Industry Leverage         0.173 0.182          -0.009    (-1.17)            0.180           0.180           0.000         (-0.89) 
Industry MTB         3.095 2.892           0.202      (0.76)           2.945           2.461           0.484          (1.09) 
Industry Profitability [%]     -62.521         -100.634         38.113      (2.64**)     -1.593        -16.718         15.125          (2.18**) 
Industry Conc. [HHI] [%^2]            2,924.956       3,671.565      -746.609    (-2.36**)           1,887.318    2,206.143      -318.825        (-2.64**) 
Industry Equity Volatility [%]     10.531            10.998          -0.467      (2.64**)      9.984         11.025          -1.041        (-1.43) 
(a) Outliers [i.e. extremely large and small values] in the data have been excluded from the computation of the measures of central tendency; hence, the reported means and medians 
for both periods are based on adjusted data (b) The profit margins look odd and at a great variance from the other performance measures. Over the period, quite a number of the firms 
posted very small turnovers, while recording substantial operating losses. The adjusted sample mean turnover and profit margin for the full period are about £55m and -750% 
respectively, which belies the true sample distribution. More specifically, nearly half of the firms [357 out of the 746 total] posted turnovers of less than £1m, while 258 firms out of the 
357 sub-total [about 72%] posted turnovers of less than £0.1m. The 357 firms recorded operating pre-tax (losses)/profits of between -£36m and £65m. For these firms, the adjusted 
mean profit margin ranges from -41,650% to 4,643%. A similar analogy also applies to the industry profitability measure. 
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Table 5.3 reports the mean and median values of these characteristics as well as the 
differences between these values for the two post-IPO states. Panel A presents these 
values for the entire sample period, while Panel B reports same for the period 
excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. Significance tests for differences between the mean and 
median values for both groups are performed, using parametric           and non-
parametric              test statistics respectively. This section commences with an 
analysis for the whole period before proceeding to see how this changes when the 
‘dotcom’ years are excluded.  
Clearly, the results from Panel A show that there are quite a number of significant 
differences between the surviving and failing firms in the sample. Firstly, failing firms 
are shown to be significantly smaller than surviving firms as all the pairwise differences 
in the mean and median values across all the size measures [i.e. market capitalization, 
total assets and market value] and the offering measures associated with size [i.e. offer 
price and offer proceeds] are significant, at least at the 5% level. The results also 
generally indicate that firms need to achieve a critical mass at the time of their going 
public to substantially improve their chances of surviving the torrid market place. These 
results are consistent with the majority of the evidence in the literature [Hensler, et al, 
1997; Jain and Kini, 1999; Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Kooli and Meknassi, 2007; Jain 
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and Martin, 2005; Hamza and Kooli, 2010; Raju and Prabhudesai, 2012; Espenlaub, et 
al, 2012] and also in line with the author’s predictions. 
It is also observed that the market performance of surviving firms, measured by the       
5-year BHAR, is also significantly better than that of the failing firms with the mean and 
median values significant, at least at the 5% level. The results generally suggest that 
firms with stronger pre-IPO operating and market performances have a greater 
likelihood of survival in the market place in the post-IPO years. These results are also 
in tandem with the majority of the evidence in the literature [Jain and Kini, 1999; 
Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Chi, et al, 2010; Peristiani and Hong, 2004] and also in line 
with the author’s surmise. Preliminary evidence from the univariate tests also suggests 
that there are significant differences in the pre-IPO performance measures between the 
surviving and failing firms. For example, the differences in the mean and median pre-
IPO profit margins between the surviving and failing firms are significant, at least at the 
10% level. The mean [median] return on assets for the surviving group is -12.17%       
[-1.47%] compared to -52.97% [-4.87%] for the failing group, with the differences 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the mean [median] earnings yield of surviving 
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firms is -4.05% [-0.62%] compared to -8.84% [-2.00%] for the failing group, with the 
differences again significant at least at the 5% level153.  
The study finds that, though the mean difference in the market leverage between the 
surviving and non-surviving firms is not significant, the median market leverage of the 
former is significantly higher than that of the latter at the 10% level. This result is in 
tandem with the view that leverage, in addition to the benefits of increased monitoring 
provided by debt-holders, could be a potential ‘booster’ to the performance and survival 
of the firm in the market place, if used judiciously. The leverage result is in line with the 
expectations. Surviving firms are also found to have significantly higher levels of 
investment banker prestige compared to the failing firms, with the mean difference 
significant at the 5% level. The results generally suggest that surviving firms tend to be 
underwritten by more prestigious investment bankers, which is consistent with the 
majority of the evidence in the literature [Schultz, 1993; Jain and Kini, 1999 and 2000; 
Yung, et al, 2008; Kooli and Meknassi, 2007; Lewis, et al, 2000; Hamza and Kooli, 
2010] and also meets with the author’s conjecture. Evidence from this preliminary 
analysis suggest that information on age, market-to-book, initial returns and IPO risk 
are not likely to be valuable in distinguishing between the surviving and failing firms.  
                                                          
153 However, the result for the earnings per share is mixed. The evidence on the mean difference between 
both groups is weak [t-stats: -1.43], albeit the median difference is shown to be significant at the 5% level. 
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The results for the industry structure variables are mixed. The industry leverage of the 
survivor firms is significantly higher than that of the failing firms, with the mean and 
median differences significant at least, at the 10% level. An explanation for this result 
could be that industries with higher leverage provide a good platform for an IPO issuer 
whose competitive position is enhanced following the raising of additional capital which 
reduces its leverage ratio and in some cases, the actual debt burden. This competitive 
threat is exacerbated in industries which are already less concentrated and highly 
leveraged. Therefore, IPO issuers from industries with a higher leverage are more 
likely to survive than those from industries with a lower leverage. These results are also 
in line with the author’s expectations.  
There is also strong evidence to indicate that survivor firms are in less profitable 
industries than the failing firms, contrary to the author’s predictions. The difference in 
the mean and median measures of the industry profitability factor across both groups is 
significant, at least at the 5% level. The author’s initial conjecture was that the robust 
profit conditions of an IPO firm’s industry should help reduce the adverse selection 
costs facing investors as they build their investment opportunity sets, against the 
backdrop of the fact that not much is known about the IPO firms at their initial offering 
stages. However, the results may indicate that despite fanciful industry profit conditions 
that may prevail at the IPO date, there may be some firm-specific or idiosyncratic 
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factors that may hamper the operating and market performance of these firms and their 
ultimate survival in the market place.  
There is compelling evidence of a strong association between industry concentration 
and the survival likelihood of IPO firms, as the mean and median Herfindahl Index [HHI] 
measures of industry concentration for the surviving firms is significantly higher at the 1% 
level. The result, which is in line with the author’s surmise, indicates that survivor firms 
are in more concentrated industries, which seems to be in consonance with the view 
that concentrated industries provide a more conducive environment for IPO firms to ply 
their trade. The mean industry equity volatility of surviving firms is shown to be 
significantly lower than that of failing firms, at the 5% level. The results indicate 
generally that IPO firms from industries with high equity volatilities have a lower 
likelihood of survival than those from industries with low volatilities, in line with the 
author’s expectations. This result is not surprising as the high volatility of an IPO firm’s 
industry is expected to rub off on the constituent firms and to consequently increase the 
riskiness of the offering and the likelihood of failure in the long-term. On the evidence of 
the tests conducted in this section, no significant differences are found in the other 
industry risk factors of market-to-book and an adjusted IPO firm valuation [i.e. IPO 
surplus value] between the surviving and failing firms. 
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To test for the effect of the ‘dotcom’ period and to also ensure robustness of the results, 
similar tests are undertaken by excluding this period from the analysis. The results in 
Panel B show that apart from industry leverage, all the other results are robust to 
including or excluding this historic period. So far, these univariate tests suggest that 
size, past operating performance, market performance, investment banker prestige and 
industry conditioning risk factors of profitability, concentration, equity volatility and 
leverage to a limited extent, appear to show more potential in distinguishing between 
firms that are likely to survive from those that are likely to fail. Hence, on the strength of 
this preliminary evidence, failing firms are smaller, offer less equity at the IPO at a 
lower offer price, are less profitable, less leveraged and tend to be underwritten by less 
prestigious investment bankers. They also tend to be located in less concentrated, less 
leveraged and more profitable industries with higher equity volatilities.  
In this section, the characteristics of surviving and failing firms have been profiled to 
enable the author to determine if the differences in the characteristics between this set 
of firms are statistically significant. However, it does not say anything about the nature 
of the association of these variables with IPO survival likelihood. In the sections that 
follow, the exact nature of these relationships are explored in event and duration 
models. But first, an estimate of the shape of the hazard function is attempted in 
calendar time without employing the explanatory variables.  
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[5.5.2.2] Non-parametric estimation  
Having examined the differences in the characteristics of surviving and failing firms, 
this study next estimates the hazard rate by tracking the cohort of firms in calendar 
time. Table 5.4 shows the life table of the 746 firms in the sample at the end of the last 
observation date [i.e. 31 December 2012], from the end of the first anniversary [year 1] 
to the end of the sixth anniversary [year 6]. It also shows extended anniversaries for 
the full period [up to the 13th anniversary] and sub-period IPOs [up to the 11th 
anniversary] because this study is also interested in tracking sample firms that have 
survived their sixth anniversaries. Panel A reports the life table for the sample of IPO 
firms for the entire period [1999-2006], while Panel B presents the same for the sample 
of IPO firms for the sub-period excluding the technology bubble years [2002-2006].  
Over the entire period from Panel A, the life table shows that of the 746 firms in the 
sample, 79 and 178 fail by year 6 and year 13 respectively, corresponding to 
probabilities of 11% and 24% that a firm will fail within 6 and 13 years of its listing date. 
For the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, the life table in Panel B shows that of 
the 485 firms in the sample, 65 and 97 fail by year 6 and year 11, corresponding to 
respective probabilities of 13% and 20% that a firm will fail within 6 and 11 years of its 
listing date. Hence, the study finds that the probability of failure [survival] for the full and 
sub-periods are 11% [89%] and 13% [87%] respectively, using a 6-year tracking 
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TABLE 5.4: LIFE TABLE FOR THE SAMPLE OF IPO FIRMS 
The sample is 746 [485] firms that went public over the period 1999 to 2006 [2002 to 2006]. Panels A and B report the life table for the full sample and sub-
samples respectively. The table shows the number and proportion of surviving and non-surviving firms as at 31 December 2012, from the 1st anniversary 
date or interval up to the 13th [in the case of the full period IPOs] and 11th [in the case of the sub period IPOs] intervals. The proportion of terminating or non-
surviving firms by the end of each interval is the absolute number terminating in that interval divided by the total number of sample firms [i.e. 746 and 485 for 
the entire and sub-periods respectively]. The proportion of surviving firms by the end of each interval is simply calculated as 1 minus the proportion 
terminating in that interval. Cumulative proportion terminating in any particular interval is simply the sum of the proportions terminating in the preceding and 
current intervals, while cumulative proportion surviving in any particular interval is calculated as 1 minus the cumulative proportion terminating in that interval.   
Panel A: ENTIRE PERIOD [1999 – 2006] 
Anniv. Year No entering  No terminating       Prop terminating     Cum Prop terminating           Prop surviving         Cum Prop surviving       
1    746              2               0.003        0.003      0.997          0.997                                 
2    744              3   0.004        0.007      0.996          0.993                                 
3    741              6   0.008        0.015      0.992          0.985                                 
4    735            10   0.013        0.028      0.986          0.972                                 
5    725            21   0.028        0.056      0.971          0.944                                 
6    704            37   0.050        0.106      0.947          0.894                                 
7    667            25   0.034        0.139      0.963          0.861                                 
8    642            20   0.027        0.166      0.969          0.834                                 
9    622            15   0.020        0.186      0.976          0.814                                 
10    607            18   0.024        0.210      0.970          0.790                              
11    589            12   0.016        0.227      0.980          0.773                                 
12    577              7   0.009        0.236      0.988          0.764   
13    570              2   0.003        0.239      0.996          0.761        
Overall [1999-2006]              746         178                    0.239               0.761 
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Panel B: PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
Anniv. Year No entering  No terminating         Prop terminating     Cum Prop terminating            Prop surviving          Cum Prop surviving       
1    485              2                 0.004        0.004      0.996          0.996                                 
2    483              2     0.004        0.008      0.996          0.992                                 
3    481              4     0.008        0.016      0.992          0.984                                 
4    477              5     0.010        0.027      0.990          0.973                                 
5    472            17     0.035        0.062      0.964          0.938                                 
6    455            35     0.072        0.134      0.923          0.866                                 
7    420            14     0.029        0.163      0.967          0.837                                 
8    406            12     0.025        0.188      0.970          0.812                                 
9    394              3     0.006        0.194      0.992          0.806                                 
10    391              2     0.004        0.198      0.995          0.802                                 
11    389              1     0.002        0.200      0.997          0.800                                  
Overall [2002-2006]              485           97                        0.200               0.800 
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FIGURE 5.1: IPO FAILURE FREQUENCY SHOWING THE TIME FROM LISTING TO 
FAILURE BY CALENDAR YEAR FOR THE FULL IPO SAMPLE 
 
FIGURE 5.2: IPO HAZARD CURVES FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD [1999 – 2006] & THE 
PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002 – 2006]  
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FIGURE 5.3: IPO SURVIVALCURVES FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD [1999 – 2006] & THE 
PERIOD EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS [2002 – 2006]  
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the period 1950-60, is around 20% after ten years of listing. Carpentier and Suret [2011] 
document a 5-year failure rate of 20% for Canadian IPOs, while Rath [2008] 
documents failure rates of 20% and 29% respectively within 5 and 7 years of listing for 
Australian new stock issues.  
In order to show the the time from listing to failure by calendar year for the full IPO 
sample, Figure 5.1 is constructed using the first and third columns from Panel A. 
Clearly from this diagram, the rate of failure rises in the early post-IPO years reaching a 
peak in the sixth year after which it diminishes. This diagram is in tandem with the 
fourth column of Panel A which shows the proportion of firms terminating or failing at 
the end of each anniversary. From this column, the hazard rate rises from 0.003 [0.3%] 
in the first year and peaks at 0.050 [5%] in the sixth year, after which it decreases. 
These patterns are not unconnected with the fact that at the early stages of the life of 
these firms, they struggle to find their footing in their respective industries, hence the 
high failure or hazard rates. However, a point in time arrives when these firms are able 
to ride the vagaries of the market place which enable them to establish some kind of 
foothold. When this threshold is eventually reached [i.e. year 6], the failure rate begins 
to taper.  
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Employing the first, fifth and seventh columns from Table 5.4 again, hazard and 
survival functions are constructed for the entire sample period as well as the sub-period 
excluding the ‘dotcom’ years over the 6-year and extended windows. Figure 5.2 [5.3] 
shows the hazard [survival] curve for the entire period and the sub-period that excludes 
the ‘dotcom’ years. These functions respectively show the hazard and survival 
probabilities from the date of the offering up to around 13 years post-listing. From both 
figures, there is no clear-cut difference in these functions for both samples. The hazard 
function for the full period is for the most part below that of the sub-period excluding the 
‘dotcom’ years. This pattern only reverses around month 118 from the time of the listing 
of the IPOs. Expectedly, the survival function for the full period is for the most part 
higher than that for the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years, until month 118, when 
this pattern reverses as well. In the section that follows, the explanatory variables are 
introduced into the analysis in order to assess their impact on the probability of failure 
in an event time framework.   
[5.5.2.3] Logit Model  
Table 5.5 reports logistic regression results for the IPO sample that controls for various 
variables known to presage post-IPO outcomes. In this table, results from regressions 
including the firm level variables only [Panel A] and those including both the firm and 
industry level variables [Panel B] are reported. In all models, the dependent variable is  
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TABLE 5.5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. The 
table reports logistic regression results for the IPO sample. In this table, results from firm 
[firm and industry] logistic regression results for two [six] separate models are reported. In 
all models, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm fails within 6 years of the 
IPO date and 0 otherwise. The firm level independent variables are the natural logarithms 
of the market value, [1+Age] and underwriter reputation [UW]. The others are market-to-
book [MTB], market leverage [Lev], earnings yield, 30-day initial returns, IPO risk and the 
hot dummy variable. The industry level independent variables are IPO surplus value, 
profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility. Panel A reports 
results including the firm level variables only, while Panel B presents the same including 
both firm and industry level variables. The z-stats, shown in parentheses, are calculated 
using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively. 
Dependent variable,     if firm fails within 6 years of IPO and     otherwise 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Intercept    -3.2627                 -1.4421 
      [-5.66***]                [-5.01***]            
Lev     0.5026      
      [0.58]       
Log Mkt. Val         -0.1420  
          [-1.79*]  
MTB     -0.0005                 -0.0003
      [-0.26]     [-0.18]  
Earnings Yield    -1.2620     -1.0114 
      [-2.91***]       [-2.21**] 
Log UW    0.4220                  
          [3.02***]          
Log [1+Age]    -0.1515                 -0.1518 
      [-1.10]     [-1.12]  
Initial Ret                     0.1476  
           [0.55]  
IPO Risk    -2.7063       
      [-0.97]       
Hot      0.2061      0.1524 
       [0.90]      [0.66] 
  
Log Likelihood     -266.29     -269.86  
Pseudo - R2         0.04               0.02  
N                  701               701 
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
                   Model 1          Model 2        Model 3          Model 4         Model 5        Model 6                                                                                                                  
Intercept      -3.1931   -3.1929        -3.2163            -1.0439     -1.0439        -0.1575    
      [-4.02***]   [-4.02***]       [-3.85***]          [-2.11**]     [-2.11**]       [-2.15**]    
Lev        1.1982    1.1973         1.0805         
        [1.18]     [1.19]            [1.08]         
Log Mkt. Val                       -0.0937     -0.0937        -0.0966 
                         [-1.07]       [-1.07]          [-1.10] 
MTB       -0.0007           -0.0007        -0.0009            -0.0007     -0.0007        -0.0008 
        [-0.26]     [-0.27]          [-0.32]              [-0.24]     [-0.24]            [-0.26] 
Earnings Yield     -1.4238   -1.4237        -1.4541            -1.1927    -1.1925         -1.2111 
     [-3.17***]   [-3.17***]       [-3.22***]          [-2.39**]    [-2.38**]        [-2.42**] 
Log UW      0.5104             0.5103          0.5005          
      [3.15***]    [3.16***]       [3.14***]      
Log [1+Age]     -0.1808   -0.1808         -0.1795            -0.1835    -0.1836         -0.1806 
       [-1.22]    [-1.22]            [-1.20]             [-1.25]      [-1.25]           [-1.22] 
Initial Ret                    -0.0784    -0.0785         -0.0761 
                        [-0.23]         [-0.23]  [-0.23] 
IPO Risk     -6.2055            -6.2086         -6.5460      
       [-1.63]     [-1.65]          [-1.73*]      
Hot       0.2783             0.2778          0.2782             0.1575     0.1567          0.1631 
       [1.07]                 [1.08]           [1.07]               [0.59]      [0.60]              [0.61] 
Surplus Val      0.0667             0.0667          0.0581             0.0383     0.0382          0.0340 
                   [0.98]                 [0.98]           [0.88]               [0.59]      [0.59]            [0.53] 
I_Profitability     -0.0016                    0.0344            -0.0023              0.0251 
        [-0.01]                    [0.36]               [-0.02]               [0.28] 
I_Leverage              -0.4930                    -0.1534 
                [-0.27]                        [-0.09] 
I_MTB       0.0252            0.0251          0.0220             0.0185      0.0184         0.0209 
       [0.36]                [0.35]            [0.34]               [0.24]      [0.23]             [0.30] 
I_Conc      -0.6971           -0.6936          -0.5546     -0.5495 
       [-0.76]              [-0.85]           [-0.54]      [-0.60] 
I_Equity Vol     -2.3353  -2.3329          -2.3659         -3.9080          -3.9056       -3.9419 
       [-0.77]             [-0.76]            [-0.79]             [-1.23]      [-1.22]          [-1.28] 
Log Likelihood   -213.54 -213.54           -213.96         -219.63          -219.63       -219.90 
Pseudo - R2        0.06         0.06     0.06               0.03          0.03             0.03 
N                 701                   701                 701               701           701     701 
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TABLE 5.6: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RISK AND ODDS OF FAILURE 
FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE   
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. The 
table reports the coefficients    , marginal effects and odds ratios of the predictor variables 
based on the regression specifications that include both the firm and industry level 
variables reported in Panel B of Table 5.5. These coefficients and the corresponding 
marginal effects and odds ratios are reported in ranges given that some of the predictor 
variables have been estimated and found significant in more than one model. The ‘marginal 
effect’, is defined as the rate of change of the probability of failure for less than one-unit 
increases in the predictor variables, while holding the other predictor variables constant. 
The odds ratio, computed as         , is defined as the odds of failure relative to survival 
for one-unit increases in the predictor variables. The percentage change in the odds [odds 
effect] is given by {              . A negative [positive] coefficient, which corresponds 
to an odds ratio of less than one [greater than one], indicates that the odds of failure 
relative to survival is smaller [larger] by         . The odds effects have only been reported 
for the significant variables. * indicates the significant variables, while ** indicates 
significance in specifications that include only the firm level variables. 
Variables  Coefficient     Marginal Effect        Odds Ratio                Odds effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Lev   1.081 – 1.198       1.081 – 1.198           0.106 – 0.117   
  
Log Mkt. Val**                         -0.142*                  -0.016          0.868                 -13.2%
   
MTB                            -0.001                -0.0000          0.999  
       
Earnings Yield*             -1.193 – -1.454*    -0.125 – -0.143           0.234 – 0.303   -69.7% – -76.6%
   
Log UW*  0.501 – 0.510*      0.049 – 0.050           1.650 – 1.666               65.0% – 66.6%
                
Log [1+Age]             -0.180 – -0.184    -0.018 – -0.019          0.832 – 0.836   
 
Initial Ret             -0.076 – -0.079                  -0.008          0.925 – 0.927 
 
IPO Risk *              -6.546*                  -0.644         0.001                 -99.9%
      
Hot   0.157 – 0.278       0.016 – 0.027          1.170 – 1.321    
 
Surplus Val  0.034 – 0.067       0.004 – 0.007          1.035 – 1.069                            
   
I_Profitability              -0.002 – 0.034     -0.000 – 0.003          0.998 – 1.035 
 
I_Leverage             -0.153 – -0.493    -0.016 – -0.049          0.611 – 0.858  
 
I_MTB   0.018 – 0.025      0.002 – 0.003          1.019 – 1.026                             
 
I_Conc   0.115 – -0.697    -0.058 – -0.068           0.498 – 1.121 
 
I_Equity Vol               -2.333 – -3.942    -0.229 – -0.414            0.019 – 0.097                        
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a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the firm fails within six years of the IPO 
date and zero otherwise. The firm level independent variables are the natural 
logarithms of size [measured by the market value], Age {measured as [1+Age]} and 
underwriter reputation [UW]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], market leverage 
[Lev], past performance [measured by earnings yield], 30-day initial returns, IPO firm 
risk and the ‘hot’ dummy variable. The industry level independent variables are IPO 
surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility.  
In order to minimise the impact of cross-correlations and multicollinearity, the study 
limits the number of variables in the regressions154. The author includes all relevant 
variables in the regressions and estimates several models that systematically exclude 
variables that are highly correlated as revealed by the correlation analysis performed in 
Section 4.4.1. Market value is selected as the only measure of size, while the other 
size measures [i.e. market equity and total assets] and the offering characteristics 
related to size [i.e. offer price and offer proceeds] are excluded entirely from the 
regressions. In the same vein, earnings yield is selected as the sole profitability 
measure, while return on assets and profit margin are excluded155. Hence, only the 
following firm risk factors are included in the regressions including the firm level 
                                                          
154 The author is using the same data from the second empirical study that has already been adjusted for 
the presence of extremely large and small values [‘outliers’]. 
155
 In unreported regressions that adopt the excluded size [i.e. market equity and total assets] and 
performance measures [i.e. return on assets and profit margin] as the alternatives, the results are similar. 
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variables only: ‘hot’ market dummy, market leverage, market value, market-to-book, 
earnings yield, underwriter reputation, age, initial returns and IPO risk. Controlling for 
the relatively observed high correlation between market value and underwriter 
reputation, market value and market leverage and then initial returns and IPO risk, the 
study estimates the regressions including only the firm level variables firstly, with the 
selected firm level risk factors, excluding market value and initial returns and then 
secondly, with all the firm level risk factors excluding market leverage, underwriter 
reputation and IPO risk. Combining both firm and industry risk factors and also 
accounting for the inter-dependencies and cross-correlations in a multivariate 
framework inevitably leads the author to estimate six different regression models. 
It was earlier highlighted in the empirical design in Section 5.4.1 that under the logit 
model, positive [negative] parameter estimates indicate factors that increase [decrease] 
the likelihood of failure relative to survival. From Table 5.5, size is found to be 
significant in regressions that control only for the firm level variables [Panel A] as this 
evidence disappears completely in regression specifications that control additionally for 
the industry risk factors [Panel B]. The performance [earnings yield] evidence is 
present across all specifications regardless of whether industry level variables are 
included or not in the empirical design. However, it is observed that in specifications 
that control additionally for the industry level variables excluding leverage, underwriter 
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reputation and IPO risk [model 2 of Panel A and models 4 - 6 of Panel B], the 
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller. A similar pattern is observed in the underwriter 
prestige evidence as the size of the coefficient is higher when the study controls 
additionally for the industry risk factors. IPO risk is found to be only significant in a 
regression that controls for both the firm and industry level variables excluding size, 
initial returns and industry concentration [model 3 of Panel B].  
Overall, the study finds unassailable evidence that shows that firm level factors of size 
[market value], past performance [earnings yield] and underwriter prestige continue to 
be significant in distinguishing between the surviving and failing firms. However, 
contrary to the author’s expectations and the univariate results, IPO risk is found to be 
significantly negatively related to the probability of failure. The evidence on IPO risk 
implies that the volatility of an issuing firm’s immediate after-market return could proxy 
for the riskiness of the firm in that industry. If this risk is priced sufficiently, the market 
performance and ensuing expected returns to investors is expected to increase in the 
market place. All things being equal, this should rub off positively on the survival of the 
firm and should consequently reduce the probability of failure.  
To assess the effect of the individual variables on the probability of failure or the odds 
of failure, the study turns to the ‘marginal effects’ and ‘odds ratios’ presented in Table 
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5.6 alongside the coefficients derived from the regression specifications that include 
the firm and industry level variables from Panel B of Table 5.5. These coefficients and 
the corresponding marginal effects and odds ratios are reported in ranges given that 
some of the predictor variables have been estimated and found significant in more than 
one model. The largest positive effects on IPO survival are provided by IPO risk, past 
performance, underwriter reputation and size in that order. For infinitesimal [i.e. less 
than one-unit] increases in IPO risk, past performance and size, the probability of 
failure reduces by 64.4%, 12.5%-14.3% and 1.6% in that order156. This pattern is also 
observable in the ‘odds’ figures as the study finds that a one-unit increase in each of 
these variables reduces the odds of failure by 99.9%, 69.7%-76.6% and 13.2% 
respectively. For underwriter prestige, an infinitesimal increase in this variable, which 
would represent a deterioration in underwriter quality going by the author’s 
construction157, increases the probability of failure by 4.9%-5%. Similarly, a one-unit 
increase [decrease] in this variable increases [reduces] the odds of failure by 65%-
66.6%. This derivative analysis, which is in tandem with the results from Table 5.5, 
provides further evidence that size, past performance, underwriter reputation and IPO 
risk are crucial survival signals that potential IPO investors, issuers and investment 
bankers should take into consideration in their decision making process at the IPO date.  
                                                          
156 The marginal effects have been converted to percentages to make for better comparisons. 
157 See Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99 and Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221. 
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Hence, under this model, the probability of failure significantly decreases with 
increasing firm size [10% level], past performance [at least at the 5% level], underwriter 
prestige [1% level] and IPO risk [10% level]. More importantly, industry risk factors of 
IPO surplus value, profitability, leverage, concentration, market-to-book and equity 
volatility are not found to be valuable predictors of the likelihood of survival or failure of 
IPO firms, contrary to the preliminary univariate results. In general, these multivariate 
results suggest that after controlling for other factors that can foreshadow the survival 
likelihood of IPO firms, firm size, past performance, investment banker prestige and 
IPO risk appear to show more potential in distinguishing between firms that are likely to 
survive from those that are likely to fail based on information available at the offering 
date. On the strength of this enhanced evidence, failing firms are smaller, less 
profitable, more risky and tend to be underwritten by less prestigious underwriters.  
Given the problems already highlighted with this event model technique and to also 
ensure robustness, this study next undertakes a parametric duration model analysis 
that replaces the dependent binary variable in the logistic regressions with a duration- 
specific variable that tracks all sample firms from IPO date to date of failure or last 
observation date [i.e. 31 December 2012], while simultaneously controlling for those 
firms that are still surviving by the end of this date, using a censoring indicator.  
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[5.5.3] Robustness Checks  
[5.5.3.1] Parametric Accelerated Failure Time Model  
Table 5.7 reports maximum likelihood results of the log-logistic AFT model for the IPO 
sample. In this table, results from regressions including the firm level variables only 
[Panel A] and those including both the firm and industry level variables [Panel B] are 
reported. In all models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of 
months an IPO survives from the listing date to failure date or last observed date [i.e. 
31 December 2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that takes the value of 
one for those firms that fail within the observation period [‘uncensored firms’] and zero 
for those firms that are still alive as at the last observed date [‘censored firms’]. 
The study earlier highlighted in Section 5.4.1 that under the AFT model, positive 
[negative] parameter estimates indicate factors that increase [decrease] the trading 
period or time to failure. From Table 5.7, the size evidence is found across all 
specifications; albeit, the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly lower when the industry 
level variables are included in the empirical design. The performance evidence is also 
largely present across all specifications regardless of whether industry level variables 
are included or not in the regressions. However, similar to the pattern observed in the 
logit model, the study finds that in specifications that exclude firm leverage, underwriter 
reputation and IPO risk [model 2 of Panel A and models 4–6 of Panel B], the magnitude  
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TABLE 5.7: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS OF THE LOG-LOGISTIC AFT 
MODEL OF THE DURATION OF IPOS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE 
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between 1999 and 2006. The table reports maximum 
likelihood results for the log-logistic AFT model. In all models, the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the number of months from the listing date to the date of failure or the end 
of the study period [i.e. 31 December 2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that 
takes the value of 1 for firms that go bankrupt and fail within the tracking period and zero for 
censored observations, representing firms that are still alive at the end of the study period. In 
this table, results from firm [firm and industry] regression results for two [six] separate models 
are reported. The firm independent variables are the natural logarithms of the market value, 
[1+Age] and underwriter reputation [UW]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], market 
leverage [Lev], earnings yield, 30-day initial returns, IPO risk and the hot dummy variable. The 
industry independent variables are IPO surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, 
concentration and equity volatility. Panel A reports results including the firm level variables only, 
while Panel B presents the same for the firm and industry level variables. The z-stats, not 
shown, have been calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. The 
numbers in parentheses are the   values. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels 
respectively.  
Dependent variable,    natural log of no of months from listing date to failure date or Dec 2012 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Intercept     1.7938                 1.6338  
      [0.000***]                [0.000***]            
Lev     -0.0630      
      [0.391]       
Log Mkt. Val          0.0169  
          [0.007***] 
MTB      0.0001                  0.0001  
      [0.582]     [0.734]  
Earnings Yield    0.0990     0.0692  
      [0.010***]      [0.087*]  
Log UW    -0.0336                  
           [0.001***]          
Log [1+Age]    0.0005     0.0006  
      [0.961]     [0.953]  
Initial Ret                    -0.0077  
          [0.724]  
IPO Risk    0.1881       
     [0.373]       
Hot     -0.0103     -0.0086 
      [0.578]                   [0.649] 
  
Log Likelihood     -166.47     -168.81  
N                 701               701  
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variables              Model 1  Model 2        Model 3             Model 4        Model 5        Model 6                                                                                                                  
Intercept    1.8254   1.8255           1.8066              1.6252       1.6255        1.6138    
     [0.000***]  [0.000***]       [0.000***]        [0.000***]     [0.000***]   [0.000***]   
Lev    -0.1204  -0.1183           -0.1144         
                [0.174]   [0.182]           [0.198]         
Log Mkt. Val                                        0.0162       0.0163        0.0162 
                                       [0.026**]      [0.027**]   [0.025***] 
MTB     0.0004              0.0004 0.0004            0.0004       0.0004        0.0004 
     [0.161]   [0.143]             [0.149]            [0.213]      [0.198]          [0.206] 
Earnings Yield    0.1081   0.1084 0.1100            0.0790       0.0790        0.0800 
    [0.009***] [0.009***]          [0.008***]        [0.077*]     [0.077*]       [0.074*] 
Log UW   -0.0423             -0.0423 -0.0421          
    [0.001***]  [0.001***]          [0.001***]     
Log [1+Age]   -0.0002  -0.0001             -0.0002          -0.0001       0.0001       -0.0001 
                 [0.987]   [0.996]  [0.985]           [0.995]       [0.992]         [0.994] 
Initial Ret                     -0.0013       -0.0008      -0.0013 
                        [0.961]       [0.976]         [0.962] 
IPO Risk    0.3483              0.3616   0.3638     
     [0.240]   [0.221]   [0.211]     
Hot    -0.0171             -0.0148  -0.0157         -0.0135       -0.0110      -0.0126 
    [0.440]               [0.498]  [0.479]           [0.549]       [0.622]        [0.578] 
Surplus Val         -0.0088              -0.0086  -0.0080         -0.0064       -0.0062      -0.0059 
    [0.145]               [0.154]   [0.186]          [0.251]       [0.269]        [0.292] 
I_Profitability   0.0044                 0.0016          0.0047                          0.0029 
     [0.63]                  [0.844]          [0.617]               [0.728] 
I_Leverage                   0.1370               0.0905 
        [0.378]                [0.563] 
I_MTB   -0.0046  -0.0044   -0.0043        -0.0041       -0.0038      -0.0039 
    [0.427]               [0.455]    [0.454]         [0.510]       [0.540]         [0.506] 
I_Conc    0.0559   0.0458            0.0366        0.0259  
    [0.476]   [0.527]            [0.668]        [0.742] 
I_Equity Vol   0.1077   0.0983    0.1609         0.2308            0.2234       0.2692 
    [0.660]               [0.692]    [0.522]         [0.365]        [0.388]        [0.297] 
Log Likelihood  -143.87 -143.99               -143.94         -148.69          -148.82      -148.71 
N               701                     701         701   701             701     701 
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TABLE 5.8: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS FROM THE LOG-LOGISTIC AFT 
REGRESSIONS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. The 
table reports the coefficients, time ratios and survival time effects of all the explanatory 
variables used in the model. The coefficients are the results from the regression 
specifications that include both the firm and industry level variables as reported in Panel B 
of Table 5.7. These coefficients and the corresponding time ratios and survival time effects 
have been reported in ranges given that the predictor variables have been estimated and 
found significant in more than one model. The time ratio is computed as       , while the 
quantified percentage effect on survival time is calculated as {              }. A 
positive [negative] value of the coefficient, which corresponds to time ratios          
greater [less] than one, indicates that increasing values of the explanatory variable 
increases [decreases] the survival time or time to failure. The survival time effects have 
only been reported for the significant variables. * indicates the significant variables. 
Variables     Coefficient            Time Ratio           Survival Time Effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Lev   -0.114 – -0.120       0.887 – 0.892    
  
Log Mkt. Val*                0.016*                    1.016                                   1.6%  
 
MTB                  0.000           1.000  
       
Earnings Yield*    0.079 – 0.110*       1.082 – 1.116       8.2% – 11.6% 
      
Log UW*                -0.042*           0.959                       -4.1%
                     
Log [1+Age]     0.000           1.000    
 
Initial Ret    -0.001           0.999    
 
IPO Risk     0.348 – 0.364       1.417 – 1.439     
      
Hot   -0.011 – -0.017       0.983 – 0.989    
 
Surplus Val  -0.006 – -0.009       0.991 – 0.994                          
 
I_Profitability    0.002 – 0.005       1.002 – 1.005 
 
I_Leverage    0.091 – 0.137       1.095 – 1.147 
 
I_MTB   -0.004 – -0.005       0.995 – 0.996 
 
I_Conc     0.026 – 0.056       1.026 – 1.057 
 
I_Equity Vol    0.098 – 0.269       1.103 – 1.260   
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of the coefficient is much smaller. There is no marked difference in the size of the 
underwriter prestige coefficient when the study controls additionally for the industry risk 
factors. Juxtaposing the results from Table 5.7 with the logit results in Table 5.5 from 
the previous section, firm size, past performance and underwriter prestige continue to 
be good and strong survival signals [i.e. positively related to survival] as they are 
significantly positively related to IPO survival across all specifications. These results 
are in tandem with the logit results and also in line with the author’s expectations. 
However, contrary to the logit results, there is no evidence to support the fact that IPO 
risk can significantly distinguish between the surviving and failing firms.  
To assess the effect of the individual variables on survival time, the study undertakes a 
transformation of the coefficients of the predictor variables reported in Table 5.7. Hence, 
Table 5.8 reports the coefficients, time ratios and survival time effects of all the 
explanatory variables used in the model. The coefficients are the results from the 
regression specifications that include both the firm and industry level variables as 
earlier reported in Panel B of Table 5.7. These coefficients and the corresponding time 
ratios and survival time effects have been reported in ranges given that some of the 
predictor variables have been estimated and found significant in more than one model. 
The survival time effects have only been reported for the significant variables. Clearly 
and expectedly, the largest positive effects on survival time are provided by past 
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performance [earnings yield] and underwriter reputation. A one-unit increase in past 
performance affects the time ratio with a factor of 1.082-1.116, which is equivalent to 
an increase of 8.2%-11.6% in survival time. In the same vein, a one-unit increase in the 
underwriter reputation variable, which would represent a deterioration in underwriter 
quality going by the author’s construction158, impacts on the time ratio with a factor of 
0.959, which corresponds to a decrease of 4.1% in survival time159. The only other 
positive effect is provided by size. A one-unit increase in the size of the firm affects the 
time ratio with a factor of 1.016, which is equivalent to an increase of 1.6% in the time 
to failure. This derivative analysis, which is in consonance with the results from Table 
5.7, provides further evidence that size, past performance and underwriter reputation 
are crucial survival signals that potential IPO investors, issuers and investment bankers 
should take into consideration in their decision making process at the offering date. 
More particularly, past performance and the reputation of the underwriter are found to 
be the most important as they provide the largest positive effects on survival time.  
Hence, under the AFT model, the time to failure or survival time significantly increases 
with increasing firm size [at least at the 5% level], past performance [at least at the 10% 
level] and underwriter prestige [1% level]. More importantly, once again, the study does 
                                                          
158 See Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99 and Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221. 
159 Put differently, a one-unit decrease in the underwriter reputation rank, which would represent an 
improvement in underwriter quality, impacts on the time ratio with a factor of 0.959, which is equivalent to 
an increase of 4.1% in survival time. 
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not find that industry risk factors of IPO surplus value, market-to-book, profitability, 
leverage, concentration and equity volatility can be valuable predictors of the survival 
time of IPO firms, just like in the logit model. In the next section, the study undertakes 
another variant of the duration model analysis by replacing the dependent variable in 
the AFT model with the natural logarithm of the hazard rate.  
[5.5.3.2] Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Table 5.9 reports partial likelihood results of the semi-parametric CPH model for the 
IPO sample. In this table, results from regressions including the firm level variables 
only [Panel A] and those including both the firm and industry level variables [Panel B] 
are reported. The time to failure is measured as the number of months that elapses 
between the IPO month and the date of failure or the end of the study period [i.e. 31 
December 2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that takes the value of one 
for firms that go bankrupt and fail within the tracking period [‘uncensored firms’] and 
zero for ‘censored’ observations, representing firms that are still alive at the end of the 
study period. In all models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
hazard rate, where hazard rate is defined as the probability that the firm will fail at time 
 , given continual listing.  
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TABLE 5.9: PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD RESULTS OF THE COX PROPORTIONAL 
HAZARD MODEL OF THE DURATION OF IPOS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. The 
table reports partial likelihood results of the Cox proportional hazard [CPH] model for the 
duration of the IPOs. The time to failure is measured as the number of months elapsed 
between the IPO month and the date of failure or the end of the study period [i.e. 31 
December 2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that takes the value of one for 
firms that go bankrupt and fail within the tracking period and zero for censored observations, 
representing firms that are still alive at the end of the study period. In all models, the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate, where hazard rate is defined 
as the probability that the firm will fail at time   given continual listing. In this table, results 
from firm [firm and industry] regression results for two [six] separate models are reported. 
The firm independent variables are the natural logarithms of the market value, [1+Age] and 
underwriter reputation [UW]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], market leverage [Lev], 
earnings yield, 30-day initial returns, IPO risk and the hot dummy variable. The industry 
independent variables are IPO surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, 
concentration and equity volatility. Panel A reports results including the firm level variables 
only, while Panel B presents the same including both firm and industry level variables. The 
z-stats, not shown, have been calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust 
standard errors. The numbers in parentheses are the   values. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively.  
Dependent variable,    natural logarithm of the hazard rate 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lev      0.6417      
      [0.339]       
Log Mkt. Val          -0.1483 
          [0.012**] 
MTB      -0.0006                -0.0002  
      [0.767]     [0.897]  
Earnings Yield    -0.7563                 -0.4926  
     [0.010***]      [0.109]  
Log UW    0.2877                  
          [0.003***]          
Log [1+Age]    0.0122     0.0185  
      [0.903]     [0.853]  
Initial Ret                    0.1123  
          [0.597]  
IPO Risk    -1.2696       
     [0.496]       
Hot      0.1182      0.1195 
      [0.486]      [0.475]  
Log Likelihood     -965.66     -967.36  
N                   701                701  
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variables              Model 1            Model 2          Model 3           Model 4       Model 5       Model 6                                                                                                                  
Lev     1.1166   1.1046            1.0791         
     [0.145]              [0.149]            [0.159]         
Log Mkt. Val                            -0.1412       -0.1416      -0.1418 
                             [0.034**]      [0.034**]    [0.033**] 
MTB    -0.0033             -0.0034           -0.0035            -0.0030       -0.0031      -0.0031 
     [0.327]   [0.311]             [0.308]             [0.381]       [0.369]        [0.373] 
Earnings Yield   -0.8394             -0.8394           -0.8426            -0.5554       -0.5530      -0.5579 
               [0.007***] [0.007***]          [0.006***]         [0.090*]       [0.091*]      [0.089*] 
Log UW    0.3521              0.3515 0.3496          
   [0.001***] [0.001***]           [0.001***]     
Log [1+Age]    0.0237   0.0225             0.0219              0.0269        0.0252       0.0264 
                [0.824]   [0.834]             [0.838]              [0.799]        [0.812]        [0.804] 
Initial Ret                        0.0637        0.0618       0.0663 
                         [0.798]        [0.804]        [0.790] 
IPO Risk             -2.6698             -2.7463            -2.7521      
    [0.244]  [0.231]              [0.232]      
Hot                0.1750              0.1587              0.1676              0.1688         0.1510      0.1641 
                [0.367]              [0.403]              [0.388]              [0.380]         [0.422]       [0.395] 
Surplus Val   0.0769              0.0756              0.0700              0.0570         0.0550      0.0528 
   [0.082*]             [0.087*]            [0.112]               [0.180]        [0.193]        [0.215] 
I_Profitability  -0.0347              -0.0092             -0.0361             -0.0208 
               [0.678]               [0.906]               [0.663]               [0.789] 
I_Leverage                -1.2019                    -0.7952 
                  [0.417]                 [0.589] 
I_MTB               0.0414           0.0394              0.0382               0.0347         0.0326      0.0342 
   [0.362]               [0.381]              [0.398]               [0.510]        [0.476]      [0.459] 
I_Conc  -0.5172              -0.4415                    -0.3232        -0.2464  
   [0.373]               [0.418]                     [0.587]        [0.662] 
I_Equity Vol -1.1368              -1.0690             -1.6244             -2.0081         -1.9384    -2.3688 
               [0.583]               [0.605]              [0.453]               [0.325]        [0.342]       [0.270] 
Log Likelihood -771.40              -771.48             -771.49             -775.57        -775.67     -775.58 
N               701                    701                    701                   701            701     701 
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TABLE 5.10: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS FROM THE COX PROPORTIONAL 
HAZARD REGRESSIONS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE  
The sample is 746 IPOs that went public between 1999 and 2006. The table reports the 
coefficients, hazard ratios and hazard rate effects of all the explanatory variables used in 
the model. The coefficients are the results from the regression specifications that include 
both the firm and industry level variables as reported in Panel B of Table 5.9. These 
coefficients and the corresponding hazard ratios and hazard rate effects have been 
reported in ranges given that the predictor variables have been estimated and found 
significant in more than one model. The coefficient estimates represent the hazard rates, 
interpreted as the increase in the log hazard ratio [i.e. the risk of failure] for a one-unit 
increase in the explanatory variables, while holding the other predictor variables constant. 
The relative hazard rate or the hazard ratio is computed as       , while the quantified 
percentage effect on the hazard rate is calculated as {              }. A negative 
[positive] coefficient, which corresponds to hazard ratios less [greater] than one, indicates 
that increasing values of the predictor variable lowers [increases] the risk of failure and 
increases [reduces] the survival time. The hazard rate effects have only been reported for 
the significant variables. * indicates the significant variables. 
Variables    Coefficient           Hazard Ratio       Hazard Rate Effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Lev    1.079 – 1.117       2.942 – 3.054    
  
Log Mkt. Val*  -0.141 – -0.142*       0.868 – 0.868                               -13.2%  
 
MTB   -0.003 – -0.004       0.997 – 0.997  
       
Earnings Yield*  -0.553 – -0.843*       0.431 – 0.575     -42.5% – -56.9% 
      
Log UW*   0.350 – 0.352*       1.419 – 1.421                  41.9% – 42.1%
                     
Log [1+Age]   0.022 – 0.027       1.022 – 1.027    
 
Initial Ret   0.062 – 0.066       1.064 – 1.069    
 
IPO Risk  -2.670 – -2.752       0.064 – 0.069     
      
Hot    0.151 – 0.175       1.163 – 1.191    
 
Surplus Val*   0.076 – 0.077       1.079 – 1.080                         7.9% – 8.0% 
 
I_Profitability  -0.009 – -0.036       0.965 – 0.991 
 
I_Leverage  -0.795 – -1.202       0.301 – 0.451 
 
I_MTB    0.033 – 0.041       1.033 – 1.042 
 
I_Conc   -0.246 – -0.517       0.596 – 0.782 
 
I_Equity Vol  -1.069 – -2.369       0.134 – 0.343   
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It was already highlighted in Section 5.4.1 that under this model, positive [negative] 
parameter estimates indicate factors that increase [decrease] the force of mortality 
which consequently increase [decrease] the hazard rate or the probability of failure. 
From Table 5.9, no noticeable difference is observed in the magnitude of the coefficient 
of the size variable in Panels A and B. The performance evidence is largely present 
across all specifications regardless of whether or not industry level variables are 
included in the regressions. However, just like in the previous models, the study finds 
that in specifications that exclude firm leverage, underwriter reputation and IPO risk 
[model 2 of Panel A and models 4 – 6 of Panel B], the magnitude of the coefficient is 
much smaller. The size of the underwriter prestige coefficient is also noticeably higher 
when the study controls additionally for the industry risk factors, just like in the logit 
model. The results are generally in tandem with the AFT and logit results reported 
earlier. Expectedly, the signs of the coefficient estimates for the significant parameters 
are the same as those obtained from the logit model. This is not surprising given the 
fact that both models track the likelihood of failure; one [logit], from an event time 
perspective and the other [CPH], from a duration time standpoint. More particularly, the 
study finds that firm size, past performance and underwriter prestige continue to be 
good and strong survival signals [i.e. positively related to survival], just like in the other 
models, as they are significantly negatively related to the hazard or mortality rate. In 
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addition and unlike in the previous models, firms trading above their industry – adjusted 
valuations [i.e. those firms with positive IPO surplus values or trading at a premium 
relative to industry peers] are found to have higher hazard rates, which is in line with 
the author’s expectations.  
To assess the effect of the individual variables on the hazard rate or risk of failure and 
by extension, on survival time, the study undertakes a transformation of the coefficients 
of the predictor variables reported in Table 5.9. Table 5.10 reports the coefficients, 
hazard ratios and hazard rate effects of all the explanatory variables used in the model. 
The coefficients are the results from the regression specifications that include both the 
firm and industry level variables as earlier reported in Panel B of Table 5.9. These 
coefficients and the corresponding hazard ratio and hazard rate effects have been 
reported in ranges given that the some of the predictor variables have been estimated 
and found significant in more than one model. The hazard rate effects have only been 
reported for the significant variables as earlier revealed from Table 5.9. 
Clearly and expectedly, the largest positive effects on survival time are provided by 
past performance [earnings yield] and underwriter reputation. A one-unit increase in 
past performance affects the hazard rate with a factor [i.e. hazard ratio] of 0.431-0.575, 
which is equivalent to a decrease of 42.5%-56.9% in the risk of failure. In the same 
vein, a one-unit increase in the underwriter reputation variable, which would represent 
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a deterioration in underwriter quality going by the author’s construction160, impacts on 
the risk of failure with a factor of 1.419-1.421, which corresponds to an increase of 
41.9%-42.1% on the hazard rate161. The only other positive effect on survival is 
provided by size. A one-unit increase in the size of the firm affects the hazard rate with 
a factor of 0.868, which is equivalent to a decrease of 13.2% in the risk of failure. IPO 
surplus value provides the only negative effect on survival time as a one-unit increase 
in this variable impinges on the hazard rate with a factor of 1.079-1.080, which is 
equivalent to an increase of 7.9%-8% in the risk of failure. This derivative analysis, 
which is in consonance with the results from Table 5.9, provides further incontrovertible 
evidence that size, past performance and underwriter reputation are crucial survival 
signals that potential IPO investors, issuers and investment bankers should take into 
consideration in their decision making process at the offering date. The study also finds 
that under this model, the valuation of IPO firms relative to industry peers captured by 
the IPO surplus value emerges as another vital survival signal which the stakeholders 
should also pay attention to.  
Hence, under the CPH model, the hazard rate or the probability of failure significantly 
decreases with increasing firm size [at least at the 5% level], past performance [at least 
                                                          
160 See Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99 and Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221. 
161 Put differently, a one-unit decrease in the underwriter reputation variable, which would represent an 
improvement in underwriter quality, impacts on the risk of failure with a factor of between 1.419 and 1.421, 
which is equivalent to a decrease of between 41.9% and 42.1% in the hazard rate. 
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at the 10% level] and underwriter prestige [1% level] and increases with increasing 
industry–related measure of IPO surplus value [10% level]. More particularly, past 
performance and the underwriter prestige are found to be the most important as they 
provide the largest positive effects on survival time. More importantly and just like in the 
previous models, industry risk factors of market-to-book, profitability, leverage, 
concentration and equity volatility are found not to be significant. 
[5.5.3.3] Exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble   
The study next undertakes a further robustness check by excluding the ‘dotcom’ period 
[1999 – 2001] from the sample period. Tables 5.11 – 5.16 report the respective 
regression and derivative analysis results for the logit, AFT and CPH models that 
exclude this historic period. For Tables 5.11, 5.13 and 5.15, Panel A reports the firm 
level regression results, while Panel B presents the same for regressions that include 
the firm and industry level variables. From the logit results in Table 5.11, the 
performance evidence is also found to be largely present across all the specifications 
regardless of whether or not the industry factors are included in the regressions; albeit, 
the coefficients are much higher when the study controls additionally for the industry 
factors. A similar pattern is observed in the underwriter prestige evidence as the size of  
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TABLE 5.11: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE 
EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS  
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 2002 and December 2006. The 
table reports logistic regression results for the IPO sample that excludes the ‘dotcom’ years. 
In this table, results from firm [firm and industry] logistic regression results for two [six] 
separate models are reported. In all models, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if 
the firm fails within 6 years of the IPO date and 0 otherwise. The firm independent variables 
are the natural logarithms of the market value, [1+Age] and underwriter reputation [UW]. 
The others are market-to-book [MTB], market leverage [Lev], earnings yield, 30-day initial 
returns, IPO risk and the hot dummy variable. The industry independent variables are IPO 
surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility. 
Panel A [B] reports results including the firm level variables only [firm and industry level 
variables]. The z-stats, shown in parentheses, are calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon 
[1993] robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels 
respectively. 
Dependent variable,     if firm fails within 6 years of IPO and     otherwise 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Intercept    -3.3112            -1.5058 
      [-4.77***]            [-4.16***]            
Lev      0.3653      
      [0.37]       
Log Mkt. Val         -0.1364  
           [-1.43]  
MTB      0.0010              0.0012  
      [0.47]                 [0.56]  
Earnings Yield    -1.9182            -1.8446 
      [-2.80***]           [-2.49**] 
Log UW     0.4336                  
           [2.58***]         
Log [1+Age]    -0.0497            -0.0385  
      [-0.31]              [-0.25]  
Initial Ret                     0.5190  
           [1.17]  
IPO Risk    -2.2749       
      [-0.43]       
Hot      0.3130          0.3501 
       [1.12]            [1.27] 
  
Log Likelihood     -189.37        -191.75  
Pseudo - R2         0.05                  0.04  
N                  440               440 
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variables             Model 1           Model 2          Model 3           Model 4         Model 5       Model 6                                                                                                                  
Intercept   -3.8158           -3.7513           -4.1140        -2.0478           -1.9177       -2.4642    
              [-4.23***]          [-4.05***]        [-4.31***]          [-3.20***]          [-2.99***]   [-3.48***]   
Lev     0.9293            1.0319            0.7944         
      [0.79]              [0.90]  [0.68]         
Log Mkt. Val                     -0.0877           -0.0924      -0.0942 
                   [-0.83]             [-0.91]  [-0.88] 
MTB                 0.0046             0.0042            0.0044          0.0036            0.0035        0.0033 
                  [0.69]               [0.62]             [0.67]           [0.55]       [0.53]            [0.50] 
Earnings Yield   -2.3630            -2.3331            -2.4665         -2.4473           -2.3927      -2.5417 
               [-3.43***]          [-3.37***]          [-3.50***]         [-3.31***]        [-3.22***]   [-3.40***] 
Log UW    0.5007             0.5127             0.4869          
   [2.66***]            [2.74***]           [2.62***]      
Log [1+Age]   -0.1294           -0.1382             -0.1191          -0.1106           -0.1184     -0.0976 
                 [-0.74]  [-0.79]              [-0.67]            [-0.63]       [-0.68] [-0.55] 
Initial Ret                      0.1105           0.0756        0.1130 
                         [0.22]        [0.15]   [0.23] 
IPO Risk   -8.5738           -9.0011             -8.8647      
     [-1.27]  [-1.32]              [-1.38]      
Hot                 0.7872            0.7504               0.8290           0.7402           0.6977        0.7920 
                        [2.29**]            [2.13**]              [2.48**]          [2.14**]          [1.96*]         [2.32**] 
Surplus Val           0.0388 0.0492                0.0371          0.0186            0.0326        0.0243
      [0.46]  [0.59]                [0.47]             [0.23]            [0.41]           [0.31] 
I_Profitability     0.1737                0.1985          0.2076                          0.2234 
      [1.26]                             [1.63]            [1.50]                                [1.84*] 
I_Leverage                  1.2664                    1.8105 
                     [0.56]                   [0.82] 
I_MTB     0.0232 0.0336                0.0266          0.0305            0.0433       0.0399 
                     [0.30]              [0.41]                 [0.36]            [0.37]              [0.49]   [0.51] 
I_Conc                -0.3138           -0.6820                -0.1464           -0.6016 
     [-0.34]              [-0.75]                  [-0.15]             [-0.60] 
I_Equity Vol          3.6479 2.7157                 4.0488           3.5061            2.4672      3.8409 
       [0.97]              [0.70]                  [1.11]            [0.92]              [0.61]  [1.02] 
Log Likelihood   -150.57           -151.28                -150.52         -154.76           -155.79    -154.50 
Pseudo - R2         0.09                0.09                    0.09   0.07             0.06          0.07 
N                 440                 440                     440    440              440           440 
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TABLE 5.12: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
FOR THE IPO SAMPLE EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS  
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 2002 and December 2006. The 
table reports the coefficients    , marginal effects and odds ratios of the predictor variables 
based on the regression specifications that include both the firm and industry level 
variables reported in Panel B of Table 5.11. These coefficients and the corresponding 
marginal effects and odds ratios are reported in ranges given that some of the predictor 
variables have been estimated and found significant in more than one model. The odds 
ratio, computed as         , is defined as the odds of failure relative to survival for one-unit 
increases in the predictor variables. The ‘marginal effect’, is defined as the effect on the 
probability of failure for less than one-unit increases in the predictor variables, while holding 
the other predictor variables constant. The percentage change in the odds [odds effect] is 
given by {              . A negative [positive] coefficient, which corresponds to an 
odds ratio of less than one [greater than one], indicates that the odds of failure relative to 
survival is smaller [larger] by         . The odds effects have only been reported for the 
significant variables. * indicates the significant variables. 
Variables  Coefficient     Marginal Effect        Odd Ratio                  Odds effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Lev   0.794 – 1.032    0.090 – 0.119           2.213 – 2.806  
             
Log Mkt. Val              -0.088 – -0.094  -0.011 – -0.011           0.910 – 0.916                         
   
MTB                0.003 – 0.005    0.000 – 0.001           1.003 – 1.005  
       
Earnings Yield*             -2.333 – -2.542*  -0.268 – -0.304           0.085 – 0.097   -90.3% – -92.1%
   
Log UW*                0.487 – 0.513*    0.055 – 0.059           1.627 – 1.670             62.7% – 67.0% 
               
Log [1+Age]             -0.098 – -0.138  -0.012 – -0.016           0.871 – 0.907   
 
Initial Ret  0.076 – 0.113    0.009 – 0.014           1.079 – 1.120 
 
IPO Risk              -8.574 – -9.001  -0.975 – -1.035           0.000 – 0.000                
     
Hot*                0.698 – 0.829*    0.085 – 0.095           2.009 – 2.291  100.9% – 129.1% 
 
Surplus Val  0.019 – 0.049    0.002 – 0.006           1.019 – 1.050                
   
I_Profitability*                             0.223*                 0.027                        1.250                 25.0% 
 
I_Leverage                1.266 – 1.811   0.144 – 0.217           3.548 – 6.114  
 
I_MTB    0.023 – 0.043    0.003 – 0.005           1.023 – 1.044                                       
 
I_Conc                -0.146 – -0.682  -0.018 – -0.078           0.506 – 0.864 
 
I_Equity Vol   2.467 – 4.049    0.300 – 0.461       11.789 – 57.329                        
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TABLE 5.13: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS OF THE LOG-LOGISTIC 
AFT MODEL FOR THE IPO SAMPLE EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS   
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 1999 and December 2006. The table 
reports maximum likelihood results for the log-logistic AFT model for the IPO sample that 
excludes the ‘dotcom’ years. In all models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
number of months from the IPO listing date to the date of failure or the end of the study period 
[31 December 2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that takes the value of one for 
firms that go bankrupt and fail within the tracking period and zero for censored observations, 
representing firms that are still alive at the end of the study period. In this table, results from firm 
[firm and industry] regression results for two [six] separate models are reported. The firm 
independent variables are the natural logarithms of the market value, [1+Age] and underwriter 
reputation [UW]. The others are market-to-book [MTB], market leverage [Lev], earnings yield, 
30-day initial returns, IPO risk and the hot dummy variable. The industry independent variables 
are IPO surplus value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility. 
Panel A reports results including the firm level variables only, while Panel B presents the same 
including both firm and industry level variables. The z-stats, not shown, have been calculated 
using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. The numbers in parentheses are 
the   values. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels respectively.  
Dependent variable,    natural log of no of months from listing date to failure date or Dec 2012 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Intercept     1.8112             1.6291  
      [0.000***]                [0.000***]            
Lev     -0.0173      
      [0.852]       
Log Mkt. Val          0.0156  
          [0.056*]  
MTB      -0.0000          -0.0001  
      [0.900]            [0.679]  
Earnings Yield    0.1378            0.1230  
      [0.004***]          [0.020**] 
Log UW    -0.0433                  
           [0.005***]          
Log [1+Age]    -0.0011        -0.0014  
      [0.934]         [0.915]  
Initial Ret                    -0.0396  
          [0.333]  
IPO Risk    0.2416       
     [0.622]       
Hot     -0.0172        -0.0222 
      [0.486]         [0.366]  
Log Likelihood     -105.90        -109.09  
N                  440               440  
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variables            Model 1         Model 2           Model 3             Model 4         Model 5       Model 6                                                                                                                  
Intercept     1.8721           1.8709           1.9216            1.6742         1.6655         1.7374    
               [0.000***] [0.000***]       [0.000***]          [0.000***]     [0.000***]   [0.000***]   
Lev        -0.0815          -0.0872          -0.0626         
      [0.460]            [0.424]           [0.565]         
Log Mkt. Val                                          0.0131         0.0137       0.0139 
                                           [0.169]        [0.143]        [0.142] 
MTB     -0.0001           -0.0001           -0.0001             -0.0002       -0.0002      -0.0001 
                  [0.856]            [0.869]            [0.886]             [0.744]         [0.739]        [0.804] 
Earnings Yield     0.1502            0.1505            0.1564              0.1484        0.1479        0.1520 
      [0.001***]       [0.001***]        [0.001***]           [0.007***]     [0.008***]   [0.011**] 
Log UW    -0.0554           -0.0554           -0.0524          
     [0.002***]         [0.002***]       [0.003***]     
Log [1+Age]           0.0066            0.0066            0.0050              0.0059         0.0058       0.0040 
                  [0.652]            [0.649]            [0.730]              [0.700]         [0.703]        [0.795] 
Initial Ret                          0.0004        0.0008      -0.0003 
                            [0.993]       [0.987]        [0.995] 
IPO Risk      0.7355            0.7426             0.7661      
       [0.216]   [0.215] [0.174]      
Hot      -0.0416           -0.0401            -0.0481              -0.0430        -0.0411    -0.0502 
      [0.196]              [0.217]   [0.122]              [0.190]         [0.218]       [0.117] 
Surplus Val            -0.0091           -0.0095            -0.0094              -0.0069        -0.0075    -0.0083 
                   [0.255]    [0.231]             [0.219]              [0.355]         [0.313]       [0.259] 
I_Profitability     -0.0069                           -0.0092               -0.0102            -0.0110 
       [0.570]                [0.376]              [0.413]                           [0.297] 
I_Leverage                              -0.2394                  -0.3026 
                    [0.225]                [0.123] 
I_MTB       -0.0071    -0.0074            -0.0077 -0.0079         -0.0084   -0.0091 
       [0.285]     [0.269]   [0.228]              [0.257]          [0.241]     [0.175] 
I_Conc        0.0219     0.0394      -0.0012          0.0246 
        [0.799]     [0.608]         [0.989]          [0.762] 
I_Equity Vol      -0.1394    -0.0948            -0.2176             -0.1337         -0.0718   -0.2065 
        [0.699]     [0.790]             [0.537]  [0.723]          [0.852]      [0.577] 
Log Likelihood       -85.86               -86.03    -85.24   -91.55          -91.93 -90.51 
N                   440           440        440       440              440           440 
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TABLE 5.14: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS FROM THE LOG-LOGISTIC AFT 
REGRESSIONS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ 
YEARS  
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 2002 and December 2006, 
excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. The table reports the coefficients, time ratios and survival 
time effects of all the explanatory variables used in the model. The coefficients are the 
results from the regression specifications that include both the firm and industry level 
variables as reported in Panel B of Table 5.13. These coefficients and the corresponding 
time ratios and survival time effects have been reported in ranges given that the predictor 
variables have been estimated and found significant in more than one model. The time ratio 
is computed as       , while the quantified percentage effect on survival time is calculated 
as {              }. A positive [negative] value of the coefficient, which corresponds to 
time ratios          greater [less] than one, indicates that increasing values of the 
explanatory variable increases [decreases] the survival time or time to failure. The survival 
time effects have only been reported for the significant variables. * indicates the significant 
variables. 
Variables     Coefficient            Time Ratio           Survival Time Effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Lev   -0.063 – -0.087       0.916 – 0.939    
  
Log Mkt. Val*                0.016*                    1.016                                   1.6%  
 
MTB                  0.000           1.000  
       
Earnings Yield*    0.148 – 0.156*       1.159 – 1.169       15.9% – 16.9% 
      
Log UW*  -0.052 – -0.055*       0.946 – 0.949                 -5.1% – -5.4%
                     
Log [1+Age]    0.004 – 0.007       1.004 – 1.007    
 
Initial Ret    0.000 – 0.001       1.000 – 1.001    
 
IPO Risk    0.736 – 0.766       2.087 – 2.151     
      
Hot   -0.040 – -0.050       0.953 – 0.961    
 
Surplus Val  -0.007 – -0.010       0.991 – 0.993                          
 
I_Profitability  -0.007 – -0.011       0.989 – 0.993 
 
I_Leverage  -0.239 – -0.303       0.739 – 0.787 
 
I_MTB   -0.007 – -0.009       0.991 – 0.993 
 
I_Conc    -0.001 – 0.039       0.999 – 1.040 
 
I_Equity Vol  -0.072 – -0.218       0.804 – 0.931   
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TABLE 5.15: PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD RESULTS OF THE COX 
PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL FOR THE IPO SAMPLE EXCLUDING 
THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS  
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 2002 and December 2006. The table 
reports partial likelihood results of the Cox proportional hazard model for the IPO sample that 
excludes the ‘dotcom’ years. The time to failure is measured as the number of months elapsed 
between the IPO month and the date of failure or the end of the study period [31 December 
2012], with an additional right-censoring indicator that takes the value of one for firms that go 
bankrupt and fail within the tracking period and zero for censored observations, representing 
firms that are still alive at the end of the study period. In all models, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the hazard rate, where hazard rate is defined as the probability that the 
firm will fail at time   given continual listing. In this table, results from firm [firm and industry] 
regression results for two [six] separate models are reported. The firm independent variables 
are the natural logarithms of the market value, [1+Age] and underwriter reputation [UW]. The 
others are market-to-book [MTB], market leverage [Lev], earnings yield, 30-day initial returns, 
IPO risk and the hot dummy variable. The industry independent variables are IPO surplus value, 
profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility. Panel A [B] reports 
results including the firm level variables only [firm and industry level variables]. The z-stats, not 
shown, have been calculated using Davidson & Mackinnon [1993] robust standard errors. The 
numbers in parentheses are the   values. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 & 10% levels 
respectively.  
Dependent variable,    natural logarithm of the hazard rate 
PANEL A – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES ONLY 
Independent Variables                             Model 1                            Model 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lev      0.2548      
      [0.760]       
Log Mkt. Val          -0.1494 
          [0.079*]  
MTB     0.0002            0.0007  
     [0.953]            [0.808]  
Earnings Yield    -1.2495           -1.0534  
     [0.003***]      [0.018**] 
Log UW    0.3919                  
         [0.005***]          
Log [1+Age]    0.0193         0.0202  
      [0.886]         [0.880]  
Initial Ret                    0.3777  
          [0.402]  
IPO Risk    -1.8059       
     [0.673]       
Hot      0.0374         0.0931 
      [0.875]         [0.691]  
Log Likelihood     -506.35        -508.98  
N                   440                440  
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PANEL B – REGRESSIONS INCLUDING THE FIRM & INDUSTRY LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variables           Model 1            Model 2            Model 3            Model 4       Model 5       Model 6                                                                                                                  
Lev   0.8126                0.8542             0.6333         
   [0.388]               [0.362]              [0.503]         
Log Mkt. Val                                          -0.1135        -0.1173     -0.1238 
                                            [0.221]         [0.201]        [0.181] 
MTB               0.0018                0.0017  0.0015              0.0021         0.0021       0.0018 
              [0.792]                [0.804]               [0.826]             [0.755]        [0.750]         [0.799] 
Earnings Yield   -1.5013              -1.4984             -1.5285             -1.4106       -1.4033      -1.3942 
            [0.001***]            [0.002***]          [0.001***]           [0.005***]   [0.005***]  [0.004***] 
Log UW               0.4770               0.4841              0.4588          
  [0.002***]           [0.001***] [0.002***]     
Log [1+Age] -0.0480               -0.0513             -0.0337            -0.0469        -0.0490     -0.0263 
               [0.742]                [0.724]   [0.818] [0.747]         [0.736]        [0.858] 
Initial Ret                        -0.0278        -0.0252     -0.0424 
                           [0.958]        [0.962]       [0.935] 
IPO Risk -6.4677               -6.4053             -7.1218     
   [0.231]                 [0.234]              [0.173]     
Hot               0.2580                 0.2381              0.3220             0.2670         0.2492       0.3264 
               [0.376]                 [0.413]              [0.263]  [0.350]        [0.384]        [0.117] 
Surplus Val  0.0834                 0.0872              0.0865  0.0619        0.0682       0.0743 
               [0.159]                  [0.138]   [0.136] [0.265]         [0.214        [0.180] 
I_Profitability  0.0681                               0.0985  0.0891              0.1048 
   [0.534]                          [0.320] [0.419]                  [0.298] 
I_Leverage                                2.2278                   2.6526 
                     [0.232]                [0.150] 
I_MTB   0.0633              0.0673              0.0659 0.0739         0.0792       0.0824 
   [0.251]                  [0.225]    [0.199] [0.185]         [0.159]        [0.116] 
I_Conc  -0.2701                 -0.4462              -0.0873        -0.3132  
   [0.677]                  [0.461]               [0.893]         [0.611] 
I_Equity Vol 1.0944              0.6371              1.9077 1.1001         0.5653       1.7423 
               [0.722]                 [0.835]    [0.527]            [0.719]         [0.854] [0.565] 
Log Likelihood  -405.76                -405.96              -405.15          -410.86         -411.19     -409.85 
N               440                      440         440      440             440    440 
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TABLE 5.16: DERIVATIVE ANALYSIS FROM THE COX HAZARD 
REGRESSIONS FOR THE IPO SAMPLE EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ 
YEARS  
The sample is 485 IPOs that went public between January 2002 and December 2006, excluding 
the ‘dotcom’ years. The table reports the coefficients, hazard ratios and hazard rate effects of all 
the explanatory variables used in the model. The coefficients are the results from regressions 
that include both the firm and industry level variables as reported in Panel B of Table 5.15. 
These coefficients and the corresponding hazard ratios and hazard rate effects have been 
reported in ranges given that the predictor variables have been estimated and found significant 
in more than one model. The coefficients represent the hazard rates, interpreted as the increase 
in the log hazard ratio [i.e. the risk of failure] for a one-unit increase in the explanatory variables, 
while holding the other predictor variables constant. The relative hazard rate or the hazard ratio 
is computed as       , while the quantified marginal effect on the hazard rate is calculated as 
{              }. A negative [positive] coefficient, which corresponds to hazard ratios 
         less than one [greater than one], indicates that increasing values of the predictor 
variable lowers [increases] the risk of failure and increases [reduces] the survival time. The 
hazard rate effects have only been reported for the significant variables. * indicates the 
significant variables, while ** indicates significance in specifications that include only the firm 
level factors. 
Independent Variables    Coefficient                      Hazard Ratio       Hazard Rate Effect                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Lev      0.633 – 0.854       1.884 – 2.349   
    
Log Mkt. Val**               -0.149*                    0.861                                  -13.9% 
 
MTB      0.002 – 0.002       1.002 – 1.002  
       
Earnings Yield*   -1.394 – -1.529*       0.217 – 0.248      -75.2% – -78.3% 
      
Log UW*      0.459 – 0.484*       1.582 – 1.623                  58.2% – 62.3%
                     
Log [1+Age]    -0.026 – -0.051       0.950 – 0.974    
 
Initial Ret    -0.025 – -0.042       0.958 – 0.975    
 
IPO Risk     -6.405 – -7.122       0.001 – 0.002   
   
Hot      0.238 – 0.326       1.269 – 1.386    
 
Surplus Val     0.062 – 0.087       1.064 – 1.091 
 
I_Profitability    0.068 – 0.105       1.070 – 1.110 
 
I_Leverage    2.228 – 2.653       9.279 – 14.191 
 
I_MTB     0.067 – 0.082       1.065 – 1.086 
 
I_Conc    -0.087 – -0.446       0.640 – 0.916 
 
I_Equity Vol    0.565 – 1.908       1.760 – 6.738   
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the coefficient is higher when the study controls additionally for the industry risk factors. 
The ‘hot’ IPO market evidence emerges in specifications that control additionally for a 
raft of industry factors; however, the coefficient and by extension, the evidence is the 
least when firm leverage, underwriter reputation, IPO risk, industry profitability and 
industry leverage are excluded from the specifications [model 5 of Panel B]. The 
industry profitability variable is only marginally significant in a regression framework 
that excludes firm leverage, IPO risk, underwriter reputation and industry concentration 
[model 6 of Panel B]. When juxtaposed with the results for the entire period reported in 
Table 5.5, the results from Table 5.11 present mixed findings. Past performance and 
underwriter prestige continue to be negatively related to the probability of failure as 
they are statistically significant across all specifications. The ‘hot’ IPO market dummy 
and industry profitability variables turn the corner as they also become significantly 
distinguishing factors, while the IPO risk evidence disappears.  
For an assessment of the dynamics in the marginal and odds effect under the logit 
model for both periods, the results from Table 5.12 are juxtaposed with those from 
Table 5.6. The study observes a reduction in the risk and odds of failure for the past 
performance [earnings yield] variable when the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded from the 
sample. For instance, the marginal effect rises from 12.5%-14.3% in the full period to 
26.8%-30.4% in the sub-period. Similarly, the odds effect for a one-unit increase in the 
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performance variable surges from 69.7%-76.6% in the full period to 90.3%-92.1% in 
the sub-period excluding the ‘dotcom’ years. However, there is no marked difference in 
the change in the risk and odds of failure for the underwriter prestige variable between 
the two periods. The ‘hot’ market indicator and the industry profitability factor emerge 
as bad survival signals [i.e. negatively related to survival] when the ‘dotcom’ period is 
excluded. A one-unit increase in the former increases the failure odds by 100.9%-
129.1%, while an equivalent increase in the latter raises the odds of failure by 25%.  
From the AFT results in Table 5.13, the size evidence is found to be only present in a 
firm specification that does not include the industry level variables in the empirical 
design [model 2 of Panel A]. The performance evidence is also largely present across 
all specifications regardless of whether industry level variables are included or not in 
the empirical design; albeit, the coefficients are much higher when the study controls 
additionally for the industry level variables. In addition, similar to the pattern observed 
in the full period, the study finds that in specifications that exclude firm leverage, 
underwriter reputation and IPO risk [model 2 of Panel A and models 4 – 6 of Panel B], 
the magnitude of the coefficient is also smaller. There is no marked difference in the 
size of the underwriter prestige coefficient when the study controls additionally for the 
industry risk factors. Comparing the results in Table 5.13 with the results for the entire 
period earlier reported in Table 5.7, past performance and underwriter prestige 
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continue to remain good and strong survival signals [i.e. positively related to survival], 
as these variables are significantly positively related to IPO survival time across all the 
regressions. However, the size evidence disappears and is only marginally significant 
at the 10% level in a multivariate framework that does not include the industry risk 
factors.  
For an assessment of the dynamics in the survival time effect for both periods under 
the AFT model, the results from Table 5.8 are juxtaposed with those from Table 5.14. 
Generally, the study finds that the effects of the significant predictor variables on 
survival time are more when the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded from the sample. For 
instance, the survival time effect for a one-unit increase in past performance [earnings 
yield] jumps from 8.2%-11.6% in the full period to 15.9%-16.9% in the sub-period. In 
the same vein, the effect on survival time for a one-unit improvement in the quality of 
the underwriter increases from 4.1% in the full period to 5.1%-5.4% in the sub-period. 
There is no change in the survival time effect for the size variable for both periods.  
The pattern observed in the AFT results in Table 5.13 is also evident in the CPH model 
results presented in Table 5.15. The size evidence is only present in a firm 
specification that does not include the industry level variables in the empirical design 
[model 2 of Panel A]. The performance evidence is also largely present across all 
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specifications regardless of whether industry level variables are included or not in the 
empirical design; albeit, the coefficients are much higher when the study controls 
additionally for the industry risk factors. In addition, similar to the pattern observed in 
the full period, the study finds that in specifications that exclude firm leverage, 
underwriter reputation and IPO risk [model 2 of Panel A and models 4 – 6 of Panel B], 
the magnitude of the coefficient is also smaller. The size of the underwriter prestige 
coefficient is also found to be higher when the study controls additionally for the 
industry risk factors, just like in the full period. Comparing the results in Table 5.15 with 
the results for the entire period earlier reported in Table 5.9, the evidence on past 
performance and underwriter prestige continue to be irresistible with the variables, 
once again, significant across both set of regressions in Panels A and B, while the 
evidence on IPO surplus value disappears. The size evidence disappers and is now 
only observed marginally at the 10% level in a multivariate framework that does not 
include the industry risk factors. 
For an assessment of the dynamics in the hazard effect for both periods under the 
CPH model, the results from Table 5.10 arte compared with those from Table 5.16. 
Generally, the effect of the significant predictor variables on the risk of failure is found 
to be more when the ‘dotcom’ period is excluded from the sample. For instance, the 
percentage reduction in the risk of failure for a one-unit increase in past performance 
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[earnings yield] jumps from 42.5%-56.9% in the full period to 75.2%-78.3% in the sub-
period. Similarly, the effect on the hazard rate for a one-unit improvement in the quality 
of the underwriter increases from 41.9%-42.1% in the full period to 58.2%-62.3% in the 
sub-period. The study also observes that the hazard rate effect for the size variable 
increases from 13.2% in the full period to 13.9% in the sub period. In general, the study 
finds from all the models employed that excluding IPOs issued in the ‘dotcom’ period 
from the sample reduces the probability and risk of failure and consequently increases 
survival time for the cohort of firms, which is in tandem with the earlier findings from 
Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.2. 
Table 5.17 presents a summary of the significance of the findings from the various 
models used to test the null hypothesis of zero relationship between the selected 
industry risk factors and IPO survival162 . Overrall, firm level factors of size, past 
performance, underwriter prestige, IPO risk and ‘hot’ market and industry conditioning 
risk factors relating to IPO surplus value and profitability are found to be significant 
across the three models and both periods. The study does not find the other firm level 
factors as well as the industry risk factors relating to leverage, concentration, market- 
to-book and equity volatility to be significant in any of the models employed. Clearly,  
                                                          
162 It is important to note that a factor that reduces the hazard rate or probability of failure of a firm under 
the CPH and logit models respectively will invariably increase the same firm’s trading period, survival time 
or time to failure under the AFT model. 
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TABLE 5.17: SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE VARIOUS 
MODELS USED TO TEST THE NULL HYPOTHESIS OF ZERO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE SELECTED INDUSTRY RISK FACTORS & IPO SURVIVAL  
 FULL PERIOD [1999 – 2006] 
MODEL VARIABLE SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL MARGINAL IMPACT 
LOGIT (+) SIZE*  
(+) PAST PERFORMANCE  
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE  
(+) IPO RISK  
  
10% 
AT LEAST 5% 
1%  
10% 
 
-13.2% 
-69.7% to -76.6% 
 65.0% to 66.6% 
-99.9% 
  
AFT (+) SIZE 
(+) PAST PERFORMANCE  
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE  
  
AT LEAST 5% 
AT LEAST 10%  
1%  
 
1.6% 
8.2% to 11.6% 
4.1%  
 
CPH (+) SIZE* 
(+) PAST PERFORMANCE  
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE 
(-)  IPO SURPLUS VALUE  
  
5%  
AT LEAST 10%  
1%  
10% 
 
-13.2% 
-42.5% to -56.9% 
 41.9% to 42.1% 
 7.9% to 8.0%  
 
 PERIOD EXCLUDING THE DOTCOM YEARS [2002 – 2006] 
LOGIT (+) PAST PERFORMANCE 
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE  
(-)  HOT MARKET 
(-)  INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY  
AT LEAST 5% 
1%  
AT LEAST 10%  
10%  
 
-90.3% to -92.1% 
 62.7% to 67.0% 
100.9% to 129.1% 
 25.0% 
  
AFT (+) SIZE*  
(+) PAST PERFORMANCE  
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE  
10%  
AT LEAST 10%  
1%  
 
1.6% 
15.9% to 16.9% 
-5.1% to -5.4%  
 
CPH (+) SIZE* 
(+) PAST PERFORMANCE  
(+) UNDERWRITER PRESTIGE  
  
  
10% 
AT LEAST 5%  
1%  
 
 
-13.9% 
-75.2% to -78.3% 
 58.2% to 62.3% 
 
(a) The signs behind the variables indicate the relationship to survival (b) The figures in the third column 
specify the significance level in ascending order, with 10% and 1% being the lowest and highest levels 
respectively (c) The figures in the fourth column in the logit, AFT and CPH models indicate the quantified 
percentage impact on the odds, survival time and risk of failure respectively for one-unit increases in the 
predictor variables found to be significant in the models (d) * indicates significance in regression 
frameworks that controls only for the firm level factors without the industry level factors (e) The logit [AFT] 
model results indicate relationship to probability of failure [time to failure] in event [duration] time, while the 
CPH results depicts relationship to the hazard rate in duration time.  
 393 
 
past performance and underwriter prestige, in line with the author’s surmise, are found 
to be strong and overwhelming survival signals with the evidences robust firstly, to all 
the variants of the survival models employed and secondly, to the inclusion or 
exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. Expectedly, the size evidence also 
appears to be relatively strong as it is largely present in the three models. However, in 
regressions that exclude the ‘dotcom’ period and control additionally for the industry 
risk factors, this evidence disappears. The evidences on IPO risk and IPO surplus 
value are only present in the logit and CPH models respectively for the whole period as 
they disappear in regression frameworks that exclude the ‘dotcom’ period. The risk 
evidence is against the author’s supposition, while the IPO surplus value evidence 
meets the author’s conjecture. The ‘hot’ market and the industry profitability evidences 
are only present in logit models that also exclude this momentous period. The former is 
in tandem with the author’s presumption, while the latter is contrary to the author’s 
prediction. The lack of robustness of the evidences on IPO risk and ‘hot’ market as well 
as industry structure variables of IPO surplus value and profitability suggest that the 
‘dotcom’ period is driving some of the results.  
It is also observed that the largest positive effect on survival time is provided by IPO 
risk, past performance, underwriter prestige and size in that order. For example, under 
the logit model for the entire period, a one-unit increase in IPO risk, past performance 
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and size reduces the odds of failure by 99.9%, 69.7%-76.6% and 13.2% respectively. 
For the underwriter prestige variable, a one-unit increase [decrease], which represents 
a deterioration [improvement] in underwriter quality going by the author’s 
construction163, increases [reduces] the odds of failure by 65%-66.6%. These patterns 
are also generally observable under the logit model for the period excluding the 
‘dotcom’ years as well as the AFT and CPH models for both periods as the study finds 
that the largest positive effects are provided by past performance, underwriter prestige 
and size in that order. The largest negative effect on survival time is provided by the 
‘hot’ market, industry profitability and IPO surplus value variables in that order. For 
example, a one-unit increase in the ‘hot’ market and industry profitability risk factors 
under the logit model for the period excluding the technology bubble years increases 
the odds of failure by 100.9%-129.1% and 25% respectively. A similar increase in the 
IPO surplus value variable under the CPH model for the entire period increases the risk 
of failure by 7.9%-8.0%.     
Against this backdrop, the central hypothesis of this third empirical study that industry–
structure variables cannot foreshadow the survival likelihood of IPOs is rejected as the 
study finds industry profitability and IPO surplus value to be significant factors that can 
distinguish between surviving and failing firms. On the evidence of these results, IPO 
                                                          
163
 See Panel F of Table 3.5, pp. 99 and Section 4.3.2, pp. 220-221. 
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managers, their investment bankers and potential IPO investors can foreshadow the 
survival likelihood of these firms based on a battery of firm and industry conditioning 
risk factors prior to or at the IPO. The study finds that failing firms are restricted to small 
firms with an unprofitable trading history, less volatile initial market returns, issued in 
hot IPO markets, underwritten by less prestigious investment bankers, trading above 
their industry–adjusted valuations [i.e. trading at a premium relative to industry peers] 
and also tend to be located in more profitable industries.    
[5.6] SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
[5.6.1] Summary 
Several studies in the literature have analysed the relationship between certain firm 
characteristics and the survival of new issues of common stock; however, little has 
been done to consider whether the characteristics of an issuing firm’s industry are also 
germane, which is startling given the extant literature’s widespread handling of other 
corporate finance issues. The study seeks to confirm the results of previous studies on 
the relationship between these firm characteristics and the survival of IPOs and also to 
explore salient industry conditioning risk factors at the time of the offering that could 
also prove valuable in predicting the probability of survival of new issuances. 
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Using the same sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 as 
in the previous two studies, this final study tests for the economic importance of 
selected firm and industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO to the issuing firms, their 
investment bankers and potential IPO investors. In the process, the study confirms the 
results of previous studies on the impact of firm-specific risk factors. The results show 
that size, past performance, underwriter reputation, highly volatile initial market returns 
[IPO risk] and the ‘hot’ IPO market are important predictors of the probability of IPO 
survival in cross-sectional regressions. This study identifies industry risk factors relating 
to industry-adjusted IPO valuations, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, 
concentration and equity volatility as potential determinants of the likelihood of survival 
of IPO firms. However, after controlling for all possible factors that may predict IPO 
survival in a cross-section, the findings reveal that industry conditioning risk factors of 
IPO surplus value and profitability can be valuable predictors of an IPO’s survival 
prospects. More specifically, the study finds significant negative relationships between 
IPO surplus value, industry profitability and IPO survival likelihood. However, it does 
not find that the other industry risk factors of leverage, concentration, market-to-book 
and equity volatility can foreshadow the likelihood of IPO survival.  
The sensitivity of the findings to several methodologies and the inclusion and exclusion 
of the late 1990s technology bubble offer mixed findings. There is a strong and 
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compelling evidence that past performance and underwriter prestige are strong survival 
signals [i.e. positively related to survival] with their relationship to IPO survival 
probability robust firstly, to event time regressions that either considers the survival or 
failure of IPO firms in a fixed time period using a binary operator or duration models 
that track all sample firms to the last observation date, while controlling for those that 
have not yet failed using a censoring indicator; secondly, to including controls for other 
variables known to predict IPO survival probability and; thirdly, to the inclusion or 
exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. The size evidenceis found in all the 
models employed; albeit, not robust to the exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ years and the 
inclusion of the industry risk factors in the empirical design. There is also evidence in 
the CPH model that suggests that IPO surplus value is a bad survival signal [i.e. 
negatively related to survival], albeit, this evidence, once again, disappears in 
regressions that exclude the ‘dotcom’ period. IPO firm risk, ‘hot’ market and industry 
profitability are also found to be significantly distinguishing factors in event-time logistic 
regressions, even though these evidences are not robust to the inclusion or exclusion 
of the late 1990s technology bubble. The lack of robustness of some of the evidences 
indicates that the technology bubble period is driving some of the results. The results 
generally indicate that subsequent to the IPO event, large firms with a profitable trading 
history, highly volatile initial market returns, issued in less tense market conditions [i.e. 
 398 
 
periods of low or modest IPO activity], underwritten by more prestigious investment 
bankers, trading below their industry–adjusted valuations [i.e. trading at a discount 
relative to industry peers] and from less profitable industries have a higher survival 
likelihood than their counterparts. 
[5.6.2] Conclusions 
Given that the literature is still shallow on the impact of industry characteristics on the 
likelihood of survival of new stock issues, the goal of this study is to identify salient 
industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO that can be germane to the survivorship of 
IPO firms. Put differently, this study seeks to identify relevant industry characteristics at 
the time of the IPO that could be useful to the managers of these firms and their 
investment bankers on the likely future implications of going ahead with the IPO. 
Consistent with existing literature, the study includes in the analysis several firm risk 
factors that have been shown to be germane to the survival or failure of new issues. To 
fully understand the role of industry risk factors, industry-specific averages of some 
selected industry risk factors are constructed over all existing firms in a given IPO’s 
industry prior to or at the IPO. In this regard, industry conditions relating to IPO surplus 
value, profitability, leverage, market-to-book, concentration and equity volatility are 
considered.  
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The study evaluates the impact of these industry conditioning risk factors on the post-
issue survival likelihood of IPO firms both in isolation and after controlling for variables 
that are germane to their survival prospects. More particularly, the evidence here on 
past performance and underwriter prestige is strong, overwhelming and compelling. 
The former suggests that firms desirous of going public should first build a track record 
of profitable performance to enhance their long-run survival prospects, while the latter 
lays credence to the fact that firms underwritten by prestigious investment bankers are 
less likely to fail due to their ability to hand-pick better and quality firms from the pool of 
firms going public. Overall, this work attempts to fill an important void in the literature by 
identifying salient industry risk factors prior to or at the IPO that could be influential to 
the survival prospects of IPO firms for the benefit of the managers of the IPO firms, 
their investment bankers and potential IPO investors. The results also suggests that 
IPO firms and their investment bankers should consider industry conditioning risk 
factors prevailing at the time of the IPO, particularly those relating to profitability and 
the valuation of the IPO firm relative to industry peers, to provide them with additional 
information on whether to go ahead with the IPO, or alternatively, withdraw and re-
launch at a more auspicious date. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is [1] the 
first study that documents the unique relationships between industry risk factors of IPO 
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surplus value, profitability and IPO survival and [2] the first in the UK market that 
investigates the impact of a raft of industry risk factors on the survival of IPOs.   
Conclusively, despite using a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach that utilises 
salient firm and industry information prior to or at the IPO to predict the probability of 
survival or failure of IPO firms, future research is encouraged into identifying other 
salient industry risk factors that could prove useful to the various stakeholders in 
distinguishing between firms that are likely to survive from those that are likely to fail.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 401 
 
CHAPTER 6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
[6.1] Introduction  
The majority of the findings in the literature reveal the prevalence of long-run under-
performance of new issues of common stock. However, these findings have come 
under increasing attack in the finance literature by notable authors who contend that 
these findings are to a lesser extent, a function of the market investigated, the period 
and sample size and to a large extent, the methodology, benchmark and weighting 
schemes employed. This informs the motivation in the first part of this study as it seeks 
to critique the validity, reliability and robustness of the documented long-run under-
performance of new issues of common stock using a fresh sample of 746 IPOs in the 
UK market over the period 1999 – 2006 and stepwise matching algorithms that selects 
the matching firms from the general population on the basis of key firm risk factors that 
includes three new factors – pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield 
– employing a refined matching technique and a battery of methods. The IPO 
performance results are compared across five different horizons with the results of a 
set of matching firms selected according to the six stepwise matching algorithms as 
earlier defined. More importantly, the use of stepwise matching algorithms that selects 
the matching firms from the general population on the basis of key firm risk factors that 
includes three new risk factors – pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings 
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yield – employing a distance metric matching technique is first documented in this 
study.  
In the course of analysing the performance of these new issues, the study finds that the 
under-performance is more prevalent in some groups of IPOs than others. Hence, in 
the second part of the work, the study tests for the economic importance and 
significance of key firm and industry risk factors that may predict or explain this cross-
sectional variation. When doing this, the study controls for and confirms the results of 
previous studies on the impact of firm-specific risk factors. In the final part, these firms 
are tracked for an extended period in event and calendar time in order to explore the 
significance of this same battery of firm and industry risk factors on the survival 
likelihood of these firms. 
[6.2] Main Findings  
The findings from the first empirical study reveal that, indeed, in line with the majority of 
extant research, IPOs are poor investments either in event time methodologies or 
calendar time techniques that rebalance the IPO stocks in monthly portfolios, using the 
equally-weighted technique. However, the evidence is mixed when a value-weighted 
performance measure is adopted. Under this scenario in event-time methodologies, the 
under-performance is also largely evident; however, when the risk-adjusted 
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performance of the IPO stocks is tracked in calendar time, under-performance is found 
to be non-existent in some cases, and at best, weak in others. This pattern of results is 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. The results 
also show that the scale of the under-performance, which varies substantially and in 
some cases disappears altogether across the matching board, is sensitive to firstly, the 
choice of empirical method; secondly, the choice of matching firms in the benchmark 
portfolio; thirdly, the method of cumulating abnormal returns; fourthly, the weighting 
scheme employed; fifthly, the horizon over which it is measured and; sixthly, the 
inclusion or exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. The study also documents a 
novel finding. It is found that in almost all the cases, the observed under-performance 
is least, and in some cases evaporates, when the matching algorithm includes industry 
as an additional risk factor, which tends to suggest that a matching criterion that 
includes the industry of the firms is vital in the matching process as it ensures that 
issuing and non-issuing firms are fairly similar, thus making for better comparisons. In 
general, the findings show that firstly, after adjusting for market, size, book-to-market, 
pre-IPO performance, turnover growth, earnings yield and industry effects, the 
evidence for under-performance and by extension, against market efficiency is strong 
under the equally-weighted approach; secondly, the under-performance and the 
evidence against market efficiency is not as strong, may not even exist and in some 
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cases, weak under a value-weighted performance approach and; thirdly, no unique 
‘IPO effect’ is established in the market place under the value-weighted performance 
approach.  
Employing only that information that is available prior to or at the IPO date, the results 
from the second empirical study indicate that firm size, market-to-book, past 
performance, underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market are important predictors 
of IPO performance in a cross-section, in line with the majority of extant literature. The 
study also documents that industry risk factors relating to IPO surplus value, 
profitability, market-to-book and equity volatility can help distinguish the best 
performing from the worst performing firms. These results are robust to including 
controls for variables known to predict IPO long-term performance. However, apart 
from firm size, past performance, underwriter reputation, industry profitability and 
industry market-to-book to a limited extent, they are not robust to the exclusion of the 
late 1990s technology bubble, which suggests that those years are driving some of the 
results. The findings suggest that investing in IPOs may not be poor investments after 
all and that investors should be able to improve their long-run returns by strategically 
investing in well-selected IPOs after due consideration of relevant firm and industry 
information prior to or at the IPO date.  
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In the final part of the study and equally using only information that is available prior to 
or at the IPO date, the study confirms that firm risk factors of size, past performance, 
initial market return volatility [IPO risk], underwriter reputation and the ‘hot’ IPO market 
are important predictors of the probability of IPO survival in cross-sectional regressions, 
in line with the majority of extant literature. The findings also reveal that industry risk 
factors of IPO surplus value and profitability can be valuable determinants of an IPO’s 
survival prospects. More specifically, the study finds significant negative relationships 
between IPO surplus value, industry profitability and IPO survival likelihood. More 
importantly, these industry effects are first documented in this study, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge.   
The sensitivity of the findings to several methodologies and the inclusion and exclusion 
of the late 1990s technology bubble presents mixed findings. There is a strong and 
compelling evidence that past performance and underwriter prestige are strong survival 
signals [i.e. positively related to survival] with their relationship to IPO survival 
probability robust firstly to, event time regressions that either considers the survival or 
failure of IPO firms in a fixed time period using a binary operator or duration models 
that track all sample firms to the last observation date, while controlling for those that 
have not yet failed using a censoring indicator; secondly, to including controls for other 
variables known to predict IPO survival probability and; thirdly, to the inclusion or 
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exclusion of the late 1990s technology bubble. Size is found to be statistically 
significant in all the models employed; albeit, not robust to the exclusion of the ‘dotcom’ 
years and the inclusion of the industry risk factors in the empirical design. Ther is also 
have evidence in the CPH model that suggests that IPO surplus value is a bad survival 
signal [i.e. negatively related to survival], albeit this evidence, once again, disappears 
in regressions that exclude the ‘dotcom’ period. IPO firm risk, ‘hot’ market and industry 
profitability are also found to be significantly distinguishing factors in event-time logistic 
regressions, even though these evidences are not robust to the inclusion or exclusion 
of the late 1990s technology bubble. The lack of robustness of some of these 
evidences, once again, indicates that the technology bubble period is driving some of 
the results.   
[6.3] Policy Implications  
Overall, this work attempts to fill an important void in the literature by firstly, re-
assessing the robustness of the under-performance finding of IPO stocks with respect 
to a variation of the empirical method and choice of matching criteria towards 
determining if it is really an anomaly that challenges the efficient market hypothesis and 
secondly, identifying salient industry risk factors that could be influential to the long-run 
performance and survival prospects of these firms for the benefit of the managers of 
the IPO firms, their investment bankers and potential IPO investors.  
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The intent of this study at the onset was to determine if a ‘unique’ IPO effect indeed 
exists in the market place. The results from the first empirical suggest that when the 
stocks are stacked in equal proportions in the investor’s portfolio, a strong and unique 
‘IPO effect’ exists, which disappears and is at best, weak under a value-weighted 
measure of performance. The equally-weighted results also generally imply, on the one 
hand, that investors who are unable to subscribe to the offer in the primary market due 
to over-subscription and therefore hoping to find some succour in the secondary 
market might be disappointed as a long-term investment in this set of IPOs from the 
second month of trading following the listing of these stocks relative to a similar 
investment in a set of comparable firms selected according to the six matching 
algorithms consistently produces an inferior performance across the horizon and 
matching board. On the other hand, a similar investment in a basket of IPO stocks 
stacked in proportion to their market values does not produce a strong and consistent 
under-performance finding. 
Using only that information that is available prior to or at the IPO date, the results from 
the second part of the study suggest that large firms with a profitable trading history, 
low market-to-book, issued in less tense market conditions [i.e. periods of low or 
modest IPO activity], underwritten by more prestigious investment bankers, trading at a 
premium relative to industry peers [i.e. trading above their industry-adjusted valuations] 
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and from less profitable and high market-to-book industries with low equity volatilities 
perform better than their counterparts in the long-term. Consequently, these results 
generally indicate that not all IPOs are bad investments as potential IPO investors can 
substantially improve their long-term returns if these IPOs are painstakingly selected. A 
meticulous selection would entail going beyond the offer document prepared by the 
investment bankers that lists the offering and firm specific risk factors to considering 
salient characteristics of the IPO firm’s industry. The search for value by investors 
drives them to considering only stocks that would substantially improve their wealth 
position in the short and long-term. However, this value can only be delivered by firms 
with a track record of consistent positive financial performance in the market place 
which should reflect in the share price and translate to consistent dividend payments 
and capital appreciation. However, at the time of the IPOs of these firms, information 
on them is not available which makes the investment decision more complex for 
investors as they are forced to rely solely on the offer document. More times than often, 
these firms ‘window-dress’ as they paint glowing financial projections in the prospectus 
that never materialise. Unsuspecting investors, in their search for value, are fooled to 
believing these projections as they part with their hard-earned money. The author 
avers that investors can substantially reduce the uncertainty that surrounds new issues 
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and in the process improve their long-run returns if they also consider relevant industry 
information at the time of the IPO.  
On the evidence of the results from the third part of the study, the profile of non-
surviving IPO firms can be determined based on a set of observable firm and industry 
characteristics prior to or at the IPO. The study finds that failing firms are restricted to 
small firms with an unprofitable trading history, less volatile initial market returns, 
issued in ‘hot’ IPO markets, underwritten by less prestigious investment bankers, 
trading at a premium relative to industry peers [i.e. trading above their industry–
adjusted valuations] and also tend to be located in more profitable industries. On the 
evidence of these results, IPO managers, their investment bankers and potential IPO 
investors can foreshadow the survival likelihood of these firms based on a battery of 
firm and industry risk factors at the time of the IPO. The results from the third part of 
the study also suggest that IPO firms and their investment bankers should consider 
industry conditioning risk factors prevailing at the time of the IPO, particularly those 
relating to profitability and the valuation of the IPO firm relative to industry peers, to 
provide them with additional information on whether to go ahead with the IPO, or 
alternatively, withdraw and re-launch at a more auspicious date. If the conditions of the 
IPO firm’s industry are not conducive, the firm can actually withdraw its offering during 
the period between the intention to float being publicised and the commencement of 
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the offer period. Alternatively, the firm could consider other equity capital options like a 
private placement exercise or better still, douse the unfavourable industry conditions 
that may prevail at the originally intended flotation date by listing by introduction with a 
view to a flotation at a later date.  
[6.4] Limitations and Future Research  
Despite the fact that the greatest possible level of depth and robustness has been 
given to these results, the author warns that the results only hold for the sample size 
and period used here as this may change if a different and/or a larger sample were to 
be employed. Also, given the scope of this study, the impact of the delisting and failure 
of IPO firms on industry rivals’ after-market performance as well as investors’ 
sentiments towards that industry regarding subsequent IPOs has not been investigated. 
Hence, an examination of the impact of the delisting and failure of IPO firms on [1] 
industry rivals after-market performance and [2] investors’ sentiments towards that 
industry regarding subsequent IPOs could be a lush area for future research.  
Since the focus of the second and third parts of the study is on the impact of industry 
structure variables prior to or at the IPO on the long-run performance and survival 
likelihood of issues of ordinary equity, a limited range of the variables that have been 
shown to be germane to the performance and survivability of new listings are pre-
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selected as the control variables in the empirical design. Earnings management, 
analyst recommendations, percentage of ownership retention at the IPO and corporate 
governance characteristics have been excluded as they are outside the scope of this 
work. Hence, future research is encouraged into controlling for these variables to 
enable a more robust assessment of the performance and survival likelihood of IPO 
firms.  
In the real world, a firm’s ultimate survival in the market place is not only a function of 
the prevailing conditions around its IPO date but also on conditions subsequent to the 
issue. However, given that the author’s goal in the final part of this study is to provide 
an initial estimate of the survivability of these new listings by using only that information 
that would be available to the issuer or the IPO investor prior to or at the offering date, 
conditions subsequent to the IPO date have not been considered. It is important to note 
that industry conditions are in a state of flux with its attendant impact on the 
performance and eventual survival of firms. Against this backdrop, a consideration of 
time-varying industry conditions subsequent to the IPO date on the performance and 
survivability of new stock issues would be another productive area for future research. 
Prior research has mainly focussed on the impact of [1] firm and offering characteristics 
usually contained in the offer document on the decision of investors on whether or not 
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to invest in IPOs at the offering date and [2] market timing and the cost of going public 
on the decision by IPO firms and their investment bankers to float, delay or withdraw an 
equity offering. This study’s analysis of the impact of key industry risk factors on the 
performance and survival likelihood of IPO firms adds another dimension to the 
decision-making process of potential IPO investors, IPO firms and their investment 
bankers prior to or at the issue date. On the part of the IPO firms and their investment 
bankers, the timing of the going public decision and the possibility and consequences 
of an early or late entry is a fruitful area for future research.  
Conclusively, despite using a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach that utilises 
salient firm and industry information prior to or at the IPO to re-assess the performance 
and survival likelihood of IPO firms, future research is encouraged into identifying other 
salient firm and industry risk factors that could be used in selecting the control firms 
from the general population in re-assessing IPO long-run performance and also help in 
distinguishing between firms that are likely to survive from those that are likely to fail.         
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APPENDIX 1: CAPM & FAMA-FRENCH-CAHART 4-FACTOR REGRESSIONS ON THE 
IPO & CONTROL FIRM PORTFOLIO MATCHED ON VARIOUS ALGORITHMS OVER 
THE PERIOD JANUARY 1999 & DECEMBER 2006 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-values [in parentheses] of equally and 
value-weighted ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions. In all regressions, the 
discrepancy between the IPO firms’ portfolio monthly return [IPO] and the monthly return of 
the designated control portfolio benchmark [Match] is the dependent variable. The sample 
comprises 746 firms going public between 1999 and 2006 and 485 firms going public for 
the sub-period 2002 and 2006 [excluding the ‘dotcom’ period] and their matching mature 
control firms [firm age since IPO is at least 7 years]. The explanatory variables are the 
monthly excess return of the value-weighted FTSE All-Share index over 3-month Treasury 
Bills rate [RMRF], the return of a zero-investment size portfolio [SMB], the return of a zero-
investment book-to-market portfolio [HML] and the return of a zero-investment momentum 
portfolio [MOM]. Panels A1 – A6 and B1 – B6 report the respective coefficient estimates 
and t-values [in parentheses] of equally and value-weighted OLS regressions for the entire 
period [1999 – 2006] and the period excluding the dotcom years [2002 – 2006] respectively. 
The first two columns presents the results for the CAPM regressions, while the last two 
columns present Fama-French 3-factor [FF3F] regressions with Cahart’s [1997] momentum 
factor.***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
    ENTIRE PERIOD [1999 – 2006] 
PANEL A1 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
        CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL          FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
       Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted        Eq. Weighted         Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]    -0.0146 [-3.01***]    -0.0106 [-1.37]     -0.0161 [-4.01***] -0.0117 [-1.86*] 
RMRF                    0.2586 [2.35**]       0.6004 [3.43***]    0.2996 [3.22***]   0.5804 [3.99***] 
SMB            0.4481 [4.86***]    0.8635 [5.99***] 
HML           -0.4648 [-5.19***] -0.8191 [-5.84***] 
MOM            0.1638 [1.99**]    0.0666 [0.5178] 
R^2         0.0316                    0.0787                  0.3743                   0.4213                                        
 
PANEL A2 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
          
      CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL           FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
     Eq. Weighted       Val. Weighted             Eq. Weighted         Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]  -0.0150 [-3.39***]    -0.0119 [-1.33]      -0.0159 [-4.31***]   -0.0148 [-2.07**] 
RMRF      0.2982 [2.99***]      0.7179 [3.55***]      0.3141 [3.67***]     0.6846 [4.15***] 
SMB           0.4279 [5.05***]     1.1624 [7.11***] 
HML          -0.4342 [-5.27***]  -0.8283 [-5.22***] 
MOM           0.0958 [1.27]  0.1400 [0.96] 
R^2               0.0539         0.0773                     0.3746                       0.4458 
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PANEL A3 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL              FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
      Eq. Weighted       Val. Weighted            Eq. Weighted         Val. Weighted                                                                                                                              
Intercept [alpha]  -0.0157 [-3.40***]   -0.0110 [-1.21]        -0.0167 [-4.20***]   -0.0138 [-1.86*]                                  
RMRF        0.2186 [2.09**]        0.6586 [3.18***]      0.2426 [2.63***]    0.6267 [3.64***]    
SMB              0.4070 [4.45***]    1.1489 [6.73***]      
HML         -0.4251 [-4.79***]   -0.8324 [-5.02***]                              
MOM           0.1121 [1.37] 0.1380 [0.91] 
R^2                 0.0237        0.0617                  0.3156               0.4144 
 
   PANEL A4 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL              FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
     Eq. Weighted      Val. Weighted             Eq. Weighted          Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha] -0.0159 [-3.67***]    -0.0120 [-1.41]     -0.0175 [-4.78***]  -0.0149 [-2.15**]                                  
RMRF      0.2111 [2.16**]        0.6573 [3.42***]    0.2291 [2.71***]     0.6246 [3.90***]  
SMB           0.4578 [5.45***]     1.0941 [6.88***]      
HML          -0.3601 [-4.41***] -0.7411 [-4.80***]                        
MOM          0.1307 [1.74*]   0.1377 [0.97] 
R^2                0.0256      0.0714                 0.3429           0.4185 
 
   PANEL A5 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL             FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
     Eq. Weighted      Val. Weighted             Eq. Weighted          Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha] -0.0155 [-3.66***]    -0.0101 [-1.12]      -0.0166 [-4.38***]  -0.0134 [-1.82*]                                
RMRF     0.2144 [2.24**]       0.6736 [3.30***]       0.2322 [2.65***]   0.6430 [3.80***]  
SMB            0.3625 [4.17***]    1.1663 [6.94***]      
HML         -0.3336 [-3.95***]   -0.7779 [-4.77***]                        
MOM           0.1012 [1.30]             0.1612 [1.07] 
R^2               0.0282        0.0666              0.2646            0.4190 
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   PANEL A6 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL             FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
     Eq. Weighted      Val. Weighted             Eq. Weighted        Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha] -0.0127 [-3.08***]     0.0011 [0.09]    -0.0150 [-3.83***]     -0.0055 [-0.47]                                
RMRF      0.1500 [1.60]          0.3957 [1.46]      0.2095 [2.31**]        0.5218 [1.93*]  
SMB           0.2616 [2.91***]     0.7593 [2.84***]      
HML         -0.1619 [-1.86*]          -0.2824 [-1.09]                      
MOM          0.2185 [2.73***]        0.5545 [2.32**] 
R^2                0.0111      0.0081    0.1692             0.1144 
 
2002 – 2006 PERIOD [EXCLUDING THE ‘DOTCOM’ YEARS] 
   PANEL B1 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL             FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
      Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted         Eq. Weighted     Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha] -0.0195 [-4.01***]       -0.0069 [-1.14]      -0.0214 [-4.29***]    -0.0059 [-0.94]                                
RMRF        0.0108 [0.10]         0.3066 [2.31**]      -0.0054 [-0.05]        0.3048 [2.09**]  
SMB              0.0918 [0.61]           0.0726 [0.38]      
HML             0.2201 [1.48]         -0.1512 [-0.81]                      
MOM            0.1203 [1.00]          -0.0700 [-0.46] 
R^2      0.0001             0.0403    0.0010            0.0196 
 
   PANEL B2 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL               FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
       Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted        Eq. Weighted         Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]   -0.0203 [-4.25***]    -0.0102 [-1.27]     -0.0208 [-4.23***]     -0.0100 [-1.23]                                
RMRF        0.1302 [1.24]        0.5396 [3.07***]      0.0805 [0.70]         0.5634 [2.99***]  
SMB            0.0077 [0.05]          0.5932 [2.43**]      
HML            0.1852 [1.26]          -0.3885 [-1.61]                      
MOM          -0.0144 [-0.12]            0.0307 [0.16] 
R^2                0.0052            0.0747   0.0002            0.1059 
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PANEL B3 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL            FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
       Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted           Eq. Weighted      Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]  -0.0199 [-4.08***]    -0.0100 [-1.25]       -0.0196 [-3.87***]   -0.0096 [-1.18]                                
RMRF        0.1172 [1.10]       0.5314 [3.04***]        0.0703 [0.60]       0.5521 [2.94***]  
SMB            -0.0360 [-0.24]       0.5655 [2.33**]      
HML              0.1008 [0.67]        -0.3986 [-1.66]                      
MOM             -0.0722 [-0.59]         0.0072 [0.04] 
R^2    0.0019           0.0733        0.0224            0.1021 
 
   PANEL B4 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL             FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
       Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted         Eq. Weighted       Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]   -0.0192 [-3.68***]    -0.0106 [-1.32]      -0.0194 [-3.60***]    -0.0105 [-1.30]                                
RMRF        0.1409 [1.23]         0.5254 [2.98***]        0.0778 [0.62]      0.5353 [2.84***]  
SMB             -0.0245 [-0.15]      0.5985 [2.45**]      
HML               0.1938 [1.21]       -0.3466 [-1.43]                      
MOM             -0.0543 [-0.42]         0.0220 [0.11] 
R^2       0.0049            0.0707       0.0375            0.1023 
 
   PANEL B5 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL           FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
        Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted         Eq. Weighted       Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]   -0.0165 [-4.58***]    -0.0087 [-1.18]      -0.0171 [-4.55***]    -0.0086 [-1.19]                                
RMRF        0.0614 [0.77]         0.5454 [3.40***]       0.0470 [0.54]       0.5915 [3.52***]  
SMB              0.0180 [0.16]      0.7023 [3.23***]      
HML             0.0945 [0.85]       -0.4855 [-2.25**]                      
MOM            0.0255 [0.28]  0.0670 [0.38] 
R^2      0.0058              0.0920     0.0161           0.1618 
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   PANEL B6 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE –     
       
         
  CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL           FF-CAHART-4F MODEL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
        Eq. Weighted Val. Weighted        Eq. Weighted         Val. Weighted                                                                                                                           
Intercept [alpha]   -0.0159 [-5.00***]    -0.0160 [-1.93*]    -0.0176 [-5.55***]   -0.0141 [-1.67*]                                
RMRF         0.0058 [0.08]        0.4989 [2.74***]    -0.0034 [-0.04]       0.5584 [2.85***]  
SMB            0.2105 [2.21**]          0.3396 [1.34]      
HML           0.1151 [1.22]         -0.5531 [-2.20**]                      
MOM           0.1162 [1.52]           -0.0617 [-0.30] 
R^2         0.0001             0.0590                0.0591            0.0777 
   
